




JEJU FORUM JOURNAL

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**Han Intaek**

President, Jeju Peace Institute

The Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity, which the Jeju Peace Institute annually organizes, is an important opportunity for scholars, political leaders, diplomats, and activists from around the world to discuss current issues regarding peace, prosperity, and multilateralism; it gives our scholarly activities an important practical anchor as well as a point of reflection.

This journal intends to be a bridge from one forum to the next. Throughout the year, it wants to follow up on ideas brought forward within the Jeju Forum and establish new angles for the next. At the same time, it aims to provide an independent platform for our readers to better understand the environment and circumstances surrounding East Asia and the world. Specifically, the *Jeju Forum Journal* publishes manuscripts analyzing events that shaped the world we live in today; events that are expected to have severe repercussions on relations between states; foreign policies of certain states that can affect other states' actions; and other issues that are widely discussed among the public, scholars, and global leaders today.

The two articles in this issue are contributed by the participants of the 2021 Jeju Forum. The first article, "COVID-19 crisis and the global economy: Measuring and Ranking Resilience Index by country," is written and presented by the JPI researchers at the Jeju Forum – Dr. Alec Chung (Research Fellow), Dr. Haeyong Lim (Research Fellow), and Dr. Ki Eun Ryu (Postdoctoral Researcher). The JPI researchers created indices – Economic Performance Index (EPI) and Economic Resilience Index (ERI) – measuring which countries economically performed better and how resilient they were from the economic crisis caused by the spread of COVID-19. They also ranked 80 countries in the order of each country's economic resilience.

The second article is written by the participant of the session "ROK-U.S. Alliance under the

Biden Administration: Way Forward” – Professor John Delury. He points out the importance of principled negotiation without any pre-set assumptions about the other. Bringing the US-North Korea nuclear disarmament negotiations to the theater, he uses the same events with different assumptions to show us first a comedy and then a tragedy. With no way to tell which version is more accurate, he argues for indeterminacy and entanglement as principles of interpretation.

Finally, three JPI researchers have each contributed an essay for this volume of the *Jeju Forum Journal*. Dr. Alec Chung’s essay reviews the Biden Administration’s strategies toward non-democracies and suggests three possible scenarios on whether and how the US will cooperate with non-democracies. Dr. Haeyong Lim’s essay discusses how the new-normal driven by the US-China strategic competition and COVID-19 will transform the global political and economic order. Finally, Dr. Kieun Ryu’s essay examines how the international community viewed the Taliban and the US government after the Taliban’s occupation of Kabul, employing a big data analysis technique.

These contributions cannot represent all the topics and issues discussed among the speakers at the 2021 Jeju Forum nor all the academic activities of the JPI. Still, through these five contributions, JPI hopes the readers will be able to get a glimpse of some of the essential topics and issues discussed at this year’s Jeju Forum and throughout the year by the JPI.

The Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity has been a premier regional dialogue platform, shaping the discourse to promote peace and prosperity in the region. We hope that the *Jeju Forum Journal* will help expand the ideas that have been brought up at the annual forum and stimulate discussions for future forums.

COVID-19 crisis and the global economy: Measuring and Ranking Resilience Index by country

Abstract

Since COVID-19 started to spread worldwide, in the first half of 2020, many countries have taken a huge economic hit. Still, as vaccination began in late 2020 and early 2021, individuals, firms, and governments were able to resume their normal economic activities like the days before the spread of COVID-19. Thus, the Jeju Peace Institute created the Economic Performance Index (EPI) and Economic Resilience Index (ERI) to measure and rank which countries were able to rebound and recover swiftly or which countries are struggling to recover from the economic recession caused by COVID-19.

Today, resilience is a concept that is receiving worldwide attention from those who have suffered from the spread of COVID-19. However, to design and implement policies to enhance countries' resiliency, we need first to measure it objectively. In this sense, we hope our research will serve as a basis for attempts to measure economic resilience more objectively and precisely in the future.

1. Introduction

- Many economies around the world were hit hard by COVID-19, which began to sweep the world in the first half of 2020. Due to the spread of COVID-19, many countries had to implement measures such as social distancing campaigns, self-isolation, and lockdown to prevent the pandemic from spreading further, which led to a suspension of individuals' and firms' economic activities. As a result, most countries' productivity declined across all industries (manufacturing and services), leading to the collapse
- of global value chains, deteriorating the economic conditions of countries that depend on international trade.
- As such, many people have lost their jobs temporarily or for an extended period due to the global economic downturn. As a result, signs of various political and social conflicts appear worldwide, centering on people who are experiencing financial hardship, and there

1. (In alphabetical order of last names) Alec Chung, Haeyong Lim, and Kieun Ryu

are even signs that they will escalate into political and economic conflicts between countries.

- However, the distribution of COVID-19 vaccines began in 2021, and countries were able to return to pre-COVID-19 days, resuming their economic activities. Thus, various economic indicators that fell in 2020 are expected to rebound and recover in 2021.
- In particular, the economic resilience index measures how much capacity a country has to minimize economic damage from external shocks and initiate a rapid rebound simultaneously (at a macro level). This study's greatest significance is that it attempted to objectively quantify and measure a factor called 'resilience,' which has recently received wide attention worldwide.
- Many institutes and media are currently creating various indices using COVID-19-related data and releasing country ranks. *Foreign Policy* released the COVID-19 Global Response Index² generated by combining indicators measuring how each country responded to contain the spread of COVID-19 (testing policy and testing rates, death rates and case rates, travel restrictions, public-gathering restrictions, emergency healthcare spending per capita, income support, etc.) *Our World in Data*³ also created the COVID-19 Stringency Index measuring which country imposed the strictest policies to prevent the spread of COVID-19 (composed of indicators such as school closures, workplace closures, cancel public events, restrictions on gatherings, close public transport, restrictions on internal movement, etc.). Finally, Bloomberg released Covid Resilience Ranking⁴ measuring how much each country has returned to the pre-COVID-19 days in terms of social and economic dimensions (composed of indicators such as Total Deaths Per 1M, Positive Test Rate, Lockdown Severity, Community Mobility, 2021 GDP Growth Forecast, Universal Healthcare Coverage,

Human Development Index, etc.).

- As such, the COVID-19 indices created by other institutions or media are mainly based on statistics related to the number of cases and deaths by country and the strength of the policy taken by the government to prevent the spread of it. They also measure how much each country responded effectively to the COVID-19 crisis.
- On the other hand, the Jeju Peace Institute (JPI) aims to create the Economic Performance Index (EPI) and Economic Resilience Index (ERI) based on each country's economic indicators and annual change of them.
- JPI's index and ranking differ from those released by other institutes and media because JPI focuses on each country's economic performance and economic resiliency, specifically.
- Besides, the significance of JPI's index is that it forecasts each country's not just 2021 but also 2026 economic performance index by employing the most recent economic indicators released by the IMF (International Monetary Fund).
- Finally, this report will also examine whether there is a correlation between a country's political system (democracy or authoritarian) and economic performance/resiliency.

2. The COVID-19 Global Response Index, *Foreign Policy*, <https://globalresponseindex.foreignpolicy.com/>.

3. COVID-19: Stringency Index, *Our World in Data*, <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/covid-stringency-index>.

4. The Covid Resilience Ranking, *Bloomberg*, <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-resilience-ranking/>.

2. Creating the Economic Performance Index (EPI) and the Economic Resilience Index (ERI) comparing before and after the spread of COVID-19

- To create the Economic Performance Index (EPI) and the Economic Resilience Index (ERI) measuring how much the country's economy was resilient since the spread of COVID-19 began, we employed the following indicators (<Table 1>).

<Table 1> List of Indicators employed to create the Economic Performance Index (EPI) and the Economic Resilience Index (ERI)

	Indicator ⁵	Unit
1	Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (GDPPC)	US \$
2	Annual Change of GDP	Percentage (%)
3	Purchasing Power Parity in terms of GDP per capita	US\$ Billions
4	Total Investment inflow, % of GDP	Percentage (%)
5	Unemployment Rate	Percentage (%)
6	General Government Gross Debt, % of GDP	Percentage (%)
7	Current Account Balance, % of GDP	Percentage (%)
8	Inflation	Percentage (%)
9	Total Population (countries over one million)	Millions

- The World Economic Outlook data released by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 2021 contains each country's annual economic indicators from 2017 to 2026 (indicators from 2021 to 2026 are based on predictions). Among those indicators, we employed indicators introduced in <Table 1> and created 2017-2019 average, 2020, and 2021 EPI (see <Table 2>).⁶ Using the identical indicators, we also created the pre-COVID-19 three-year (2017-2019) average (base), 2020 compared to the base, and 2021 compared to the base ERI (See <Table 3>).⁷
- Introduction of the TOPSIS (Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution) method
 - When TOPSIS ranks among alternatives, it standardizes several

common items of each alternative and sums the distance between the best and worst values. In this way, the value that one alternative has among all alternatives is expressed as a number, and a ranking is given.

- TOPSIS is one of many solutions to Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM), which computes an index by sequencing similar preferences for ideal alternatives within the same variable.
- TOPSIS has the following characteristics:
 - TOPSIS is widely used as a method of performing a within-group comprehensive evaluation. It has the advantage of using the information from the original data sufficiently and the result accurately reflects the difference in evaluation methods.
 - TOPSIS has no strict restrictions on data distribution or data content, and calculating the index is simple.
 - The core mechanism of TOPSIS is removing individual characteristics of the raw data by standardizing those composed of different dimensions. It enables the users to compare variables by converting the raw data.

• TOPSIS method⁸

- Let's take a brief look at how to assign rankings through TOPSIS. The method of calculating the index through TOPSIS consists of five steps. First, given raw data is understood as a matrix, and in the matrix element composition, each alternative

5. World Economic Outlook Database (April 2021 Edition), IMF, <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2021/April>.

6. Each country's economic performance before the spread of COVID-19 was measured using the average of three-year EPI - 2017, 2018, and 2019. We would be able to measure each country's economic performance before COVID-19 more comprehensively by using the average of the previous three years rather than the economic performance of 2019 alone. The average of the pre-COVID-19 three-year EPI will serve as a reference point for estimating the level of economic performance by country after the spread of COVID-19.

7. Like the EPI, each country's economic resilience before the spread of COVID-19 is measured through the average of the three-year resiliency - 2017 compared to 2016, 2018 compared to 2017, and 2019 compared to 2018. The average of the three-year resiliency will be used as a reference point.

8. Hwang, C.L.; Yoon, K. (1981). *Multiple Attribute Decision Making: Methods and Applications*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

(*i*) is arranged in a row, and the evaluation item (*j*) for each alternative is arranged in a column.

1. The raw data (X_{ij}), which is an element in a matrix with *n* rows and *m* columns, is standardized between 0 and 1 in the following way, centering on the item (*j*).

$$r_{ij} = \frac{X_{ij}}{\sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^n X_{ij}^2}}$$

2. The standardized index (r_{ij}) is multiplied by the weight (W_j) corresponding to each item (*j*) to create a weighted standardized index (R_{ij}).

$$R_{ij} = r_{ij} \times W_j$$

3. Select the highest value (R^+) and lowest value (R^-) of each item. The highest and lowest values have different directions depending on economic preferences for each individual variable.

$$R^+ = (R_{11}^+, R_{21}^+, \dots, R_{m1}^+) = (\max\{R_{11}, R_{21}, \dots, R_{n1}\}, \max\{R_{12}, R_{22}, \dots, R_{n2}\}, \dots, \max\{R_{1m}, R_{2m}, \dots, R_{nm}\})$$

$$R^- = (R_{11}^-, R_{21}^-, \dots, R_{m1}^-) = (\min\{R_{11}, R_{21}, \dots, R_{n1}\}, \min\{R_{12}, R_{22}, \dots, R_{n2}\}, \dots, \min\{R_{1m}, R_{2m}, \dots, R_{nm}\})$$

4. Calculate the sum of the distances 1) from individual index R_{ij} and the highest value of the item (Ideal Value, R^+) to which the individual index belongs and 2) from individual index R_{ij} and the lowest value of the item (Worst value, R^-) to which the individual index belongs. Then, obtain the Euclidean distance of each alternative (*i*) from the highest and lowest values, respectively.

$$S_i^+ = \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^m (R_{ij} - R_j^+)^2} \quad S_i^- = \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^m (R_{ij} - R_j^-)^2}$$

5. Calculate the final exponent (P_i) of each alternative (*i*) using the Euclidean distance. The closer the distance from the highest value and the farther the distance from the lowest value, the higher the final index value. The higher the final index value (P_i) the higher the ranking calculated by TOPSIS.

$$P_i = \frac{S_i^-}{S_i^+ + S_i^-}$$

- Calculating the Economic Performance Index (EPI) and the Economic Resilience Index (ERI)

- Six items were used to calculate the Economic Performance Index (EPI) - Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (GDPPC), Total Investment inflow, % of GDP, Unemployment Rate, General Government Gross Debt, % of GDP, Current Account Balance, % of GDP, and inflation. These six items are selected because they are some of the basic variables representing a country's domestic and international aspects and the status of its macroeconomy. Each item's weight is set to be identical.

- Six items composing the Economic Resilience Index (ERI) are the annual change rate of Gross Domestic Product Per Capita (GDPPC), Total Investment inflow, % of GDP, Unemployment Rate, General Government Gross Debt, % of GDP, Current Account Balance, % of GDP, and inflation. General macroeconomic indicators will fluctuate around the indicator's default value that constitutes the potential growth rate. In the era of economic crisis, they are expected to move to a value associated with the potential growth rate as it emerges from a situation less favorable than the default. Such a shift can be understood as resilience in times of crisis, and the resilience index was obtained by calculating the change rate of economic variables. In other words, ERI attempts to measure resilience by putting together change rates of important economic variables used to obtain EPI.

- While EPI measures the overall health, stability, and productivity of a country in terms of its macroeconomy, ERI measures (based on a country's overall economic condition and level of development) how much a country's economic health, stability, and productivity have changed (improved or deteriorated) in a year using change rates. Therefore, in the case of a country whose EPI is already very high and it is difficult to increase further, that country's economic resilience index itself may turn out to be low. On the other hand, if the previous EPI was very low or the economic performance of the previous year temporarily decreased due to an external shock such as COVID-19, the level of country's resiliency could be high, due to the base effect, with only a slight recovery of economic health, safety, and productivity in the following year. Economic resilience can be measured by comprehensively examining the change rates of major economic indicators in a situation where the global economy has suffered and is suffering from the COVID-19 shock.

3. EPI and ERI ranking by country

<Table 2> EPI ranking by country

Ranking	Country	2017–2019 Average EPI	Country	2020 EPI	Country	2021 EPI
1	Singapore	0.8495	Singapore	0.8419	Switzerland	0.8528
2	Netherlands	0.8451	Netherlands	0.8249	Denmark	0.8458
3	Switzerland	0.8437	Taiwan	0.8247	Singapore	0.8420
4	Denmark	0.8376	Denmark	0.8150	Netherlands	0.8401
5	Taiwan	0.8228	Ireland	0.7927	Norway	0.8369
6	Norway	0.8227	Hong Kong	0.7890	Taiwan	0.8363
7	Germany	0.8104	Switzerland	0.7865	Ireland	0.8344
8	Hong Kong	0.7998	Germany	0.7845	Germany	0.8174
9	Sweden	0.7846	Sweden	0.7772	Hong Kong	0.8053
10	South Korea	0.7782	Norway	0.7662	Sweden	0.8037
11	Azerbaijan	0.7704	Israel	0.7614	South Korea	0.7834
12	Thailand	0.7678	Slovenia	0.7583	Slovenia	0.7804
13	Slovenia	0.7667	South Korea	0.7579	Israel	0.7799
14	Israel	0.7633	Lithuania	0.7525	Australia	0.7761
15	Austria	0.7559	Australia	0.7453	Austria	0.7693
16	Russia	0.7506	Austria	0.7382	Lithuania	0.7634
17	Estonia	0.7445	Czech Republic	0.7364	Finland	0.7598
18	Ireland	0.7407	Finland	0.7242	Russia	0.7513
19	Australia	0.7342	Poland	0.7201	Malaysia	0.7437
20	Czech Republic	0.7336	Malaysia	0.7200	Czech Republic	0.7416
21	Malaysia	0.7325	Latvia	0.7184	Estonia	0.7389
22	Bulgaria	0.7314	Thailand	0.7152	China	0.7364
23	Lithuania	0.7270	China	0.7114	Poland	0.7324
24	Iran	0.7269	Russia	0.7106	Vietnam	0.7315
25	Finland	0.7268	New Zealand	0.7093	New Zealand	0.7283
26	Belgium	0.7258	Italy	0.7048	Bulgaria	0.7270
27	China	0.7226	Mexico	0.7038	Latvia	0.7268
28	Croatia	0.7202	Vietnam	0.7033	Mexico	0.7262
29	Vietnam	0.7200	Nicaragua	0.7027	Italy	0.7259
30	Hungary	0.7179	Ukraine	0.6992	Belgium	0.7249
31	Latvia	0.7146	Philippines	0.6987	Iran	0.7232
32	Italy	0.7133	Belgium	0.6979	Canada	0.7224
33	Paraguay	0.7132	Estonia	0.6979	Ecuador	0.7217
34	United States	0.7127	Chile	0.6971	Thailand	0.7185
35	France	0.7110	Honduras	0.6971	Chile	0.7182
36	Spain	0.7098	Paraguay	0.6968	Hungary	0.7165
37	Poland	0.7096	Bulgaria	0.6911	Azerbaijan	0.7160
38	New Zealand	0.7083	Hungary	0.6898	Paraguay	0.7157
39	Uruguay	0.7073	Belarus	0.6890	Kazakhstan	0.7119
40	Canada	0.7054	Slovakia	0.6866	Belarus	0.7112
41	Ecuador	0.7033	Ecuador	0.6847	Slovakia	0.7074
42	Portugal	0.6996	Indonesia	0.6831	France	0.7069
43	Dominican Republic	0.6979	Iran	0.6821	Japan	0.7047
44	Belarus	0.6971	Japan	0.6808	Nicaragua	0.7047
45	Mexico	0.6967	Spain	0.6803	Spain	0.7038

46	Kazakhstan	0.6945	Canada	0.6796	Peru	0.7033
47	Slovakia	0.6944	United States	0.6790	Indonesia	0.7026
48	Nicaragua	0.6943	Peru	0.6784	United States	0.7009
49	Peru	0.6936	France	0.6775	Portugal	0.6996
50	Philippines	0.6934	Azerbaijan	0.6760	Philippines	0.6990
51	United Kingdom	0.6929	Portugal	0.6694	United Kingdom	0.6934
52	Japan	0.6928	Uruguay	0.6690	Dominican Republic	0.6926
53	Indonesia	0.6894	Dominican Republic	0.6681	Croatia	0.6900
54	Chile	0.6858	Panama	0.6676	Uruguay	0.6886
55	Turkey	0.6842	United Kingdom	0.6664	Honduras	0.6870
56	Romania	0.6801	Kazakhstan	0.6643	Bahrain	0.6825
57	Honduras	0.6797	Sri Lanka	0.6633	Panama	0.6816
58	Bahrain	0.6792	El Salvador	0.6576	Sri Lanka	0.6815
59	Sri Lanka	0.6764	Morocco	0.6556	Turkey	0.6811
60	Costa Rica	0.6726	Bolivia	0.6546	Ukraine	0.6780
61	El Salvador	0.6706	Croatia	0.6535	Romania	0.6778
62	Ukraine	0.6691	Romania	0.6501	Bolivia	0.6747
63	Bolivia	0.6669	South Africa	0.6487	Morocco	0.6700
64	Panama	0.6667	Egypt	0.6444	Costa Rica	0.6665
65	Colombia	0.6643	Turkey	0.6430	Colombia	0.6660
66	Mauritius	0.6620	Mongolia	0.6429	El Salvador	0.6622
67	Morocco	0.6610	Costa Rica	0.6429	Egypt	0.6605
68	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.6523	Serbia	0.6423	Moldova	0.6564
69	Egypt	0.6487	Colombia	0.6411	Serbia	0.6563
70	Serbia	0.6467	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.6409	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.6546
71	Moldova	0.6396	Moldova	0.6336	South Africa	0.6471
72	Armenia	0.6331	Armenia	0.6181	Algeria	0.6412
73	Albania	0.6303	Kyrgyzstan	0.6127	Kyrgyzstan	0.6391
74	South Africa	0.6292	Bahrain	0.6118	Albania	0.6281
75	Kyrgyzstan	0.6257	Algeria	0.6012	Armenia	0.6237
76	Greece	0.6236	Albania	0.6010	Mongolia	0.6164
77	Algeria	0.6174	Mauritius	0.5906	Greece	0.6147
78	Mongolia	0.5906	West Bank and Gaza Strip	0.5897	West Bank and Gaza Strip	0.6005
79	West Bank and Gaza Strip	0.5814	Greece	0.5881	Mauritius	0.5901
80	Brazil	0.2670	Brazil	0.2430	Brazil	0.2707

- Looking at the EPI ranking shown in <Table 2>, the three-year average economic performance (2017–2019) was best in the order of Singapore, Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Taiwan, Norway, Germany, Hong Kong, Sweden, and South Korea. They were all either Northwestern European or upper-middle-income Asian countries.

- In 2020, when COVID-19 hit the world, countries such as Singapore, Netherlands, Taiwan, Denmark, Ireland, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, and Norway showed top ten economic performance amid the pandemic. Although down three steps from its pre-COVID-19 ranking, South Korea also ranked 13th. Still, among all 80 countries, South Korea showed a fairly good level of economic performance during the COVID-19 crisis.
- In 2021, global vaccination has finally begun, although the COVID-19 crisis continued. In this year, Switzerland, Denmark, Singapore, Netherlands, Norway, Taiwan, Ireland, Germany, Hong Kong, and Sweden are expected to show top 10 economic performance, followed by South Korea, which is ranked 11th. Most of the countries expected to show top-level economic performance in 2021 are those that minimized the damage and maintained the top rankings in 2020, during the spread of COVID-19 in 2020.
 - South Korea's EPI and its ranking decreased slightly due to the damage caused by the spread of COVID-19 in 2020. Still, South Korea is expected to rebound rapidly and EPI and its ranking returned to the pre-COVID-19 level in 2021.
- Meanwhile, China's three-year average economic performance ranking was 27th. Then, its ranking increased 23rd in 2020 and 22nd in 2021. The result indicates that China has performed better than other countries amid the COVID-19 crisis.
- The United States ranked 34th in the three-year average economic performance, but its ranking fell to 47th in 2020. It means the United States economy has been hit hard by the COVID-19 crisis compared to other countries. In addition, the United States is expected to be ranked 48th in 2021, not showing the level of economic performance shown before the spread of COVID-19.
- Finally, Brazil recorded the lowest EPI and ranked last among 80 countries around the world before and after

the spread of COVID-19.

<Table 3> ERI ranking by country

Ranking	Country	Three-year ERI average before COVID-19	Country	2020 ERI	Country	2021 ERI
1	Hong Kong	0.5451	Taiwan	0.7955	Taiwan	0.8291
2	Nicaragua	0.5383	China	0.7771	Greece	0.8271
3	Ecuador	0.5219	Greece	0.7651	China	0.8250
4	Iran	0.4773	Switzerland	0.7644	Albania	0.8142
5	Turkey	0.4632	Israel	0.7598	Ukraine	0.8134
6	Algeria	0.4407	France	0.7598	France	0.8122
7	Sri Lanka	0.4395	Poland	0.7547	Denmark	0.8118
8	Finland	0.4289	Nicaragua	0.7543	Latvia	0.8077
9	Mexico	0.4277	South Korea	0.7537	Malaysia	0.8020
10	Costa Rica	0.4217	Albania	0.7519	South Korea	0.8017
11	South Africa	0.4168	Sweden	0.7507	Croatia	0.8013
12	Honduras	0.4126	Netherlands	0.7489	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.8010
13	Uruguay	0.4079	Japan	0.7461	Slovenia	0.7974
14	Panama	0.4070	Denmark	0.7423	Vietnam	0.7952
15	Ukraine	0.4027	Australia	0.7406	Norway	0.7942
16	Singapore	0.3987	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.7382	Australia	0.7936
17	Chile	0.3915	Vietnam	0.7370	Serbia	0.7934
18	Bahrain	0.3902	Slovenia	0.7355	Italy	0.7933
19	Bolivia	0.3834	Serbia	0.7335	Sweden	0.7883
20	Colombia	0.3784	Italy	0.7322	Portugal	0.7881
21	Paraguay	0.3779	Germany	0.7274	Romania	0.7860
22	South Korea	0.3778	Austria	0.7219	Switzerland	0.7858
23	Malaysia	0.3776	Bahrain	0.7209	Israel	0.7846
24	Brazil	0.3771	Egypt	0.7172	Japan	0.7845
25	Mauritius	0.3756	Moldova	0.7137	Netherlands	0.7845
26	Norway	0.3737	United Kingdom	0.7126	Austria	0.7825
27	West Bank and Gaza Strip	0.3696	Romania	0.7105	Germany	0.7805
28	New Zealand	0.3652	Norway	0.7103	Belgium	0.7794
29	Australia	0.3614	Croatia	0.7090	Egypt	0.7767
30	Sweden	0.3586	Bulgaria	0.7076	Hungary	0.7734
31	Peru	0.3547	Hungary	0.7041	Moldova	0.7734
32	Dominican Republic	0.3499	Spain	0.7034	Spain	0.7729
33	Kyrgyzstan	0.3481	Sri Lanka	0.7021	New Zealand	0.7721
34	Lithuania	0.3460	Hong Kong	0.7019	Bahrain	0.7701
35	Canada	0.3459	Costa Rica	0.7008	Russia	0.7686
36	China	0.3455	Malaysia	0.7004	Canada	0.7677
37	Italy	0.3448	Belgium	0.6991	Turkey	0.7632
38	Greece	0.3399	Morocco	0.6980	Singapore	0.7615
39	Indonesia	0.3395	Singapore	0.6974	Kazakhstan	0.7613
40	Morocco	0.3393	New Zealand	0.6974	Sri Lanka	0.7590

41	El Salvador	0.3384	Portugal	0.6929	United States	0.7558
42	France	0.3376	Indonesia	0.6918	Morocco	0.7546
43	Armenia	0.3353	Ireland	0.6847	Bolivia	0.7532
44	Russia	0.3349	Belarus	0.6822	Paraguay	0.7519
45	Kazakhstan	0.3344	Armenia	0.6807	Costa Rica	0.7515
46	United Kingdom	0.3322	Lithuania	0.6806	Indonesia	0.7487
47	Philippines	0.3313	Kazakhstan	0.6793	Nicaragua	0.7456
48	Moldova	0.3276	El Salvador	0.6756	Uruguay	0.7445
49	Azerbaijan	0.3271	United States	0.6741	United Kingdom	0.7421
50	Denmark	0.3269	Canada	0.6730	Bulgaria	0.7419
51	Japan	0.3262	Dominican Republic	0.6700	Thailand	0.7400
52	Switzerland	0.3262	Finland	0.6684	El Salvador	0.7378
53	United States	0.3238	Algeria	0.6678	Chile	0.7358
54	Israel	0.3235	Thailand	0.6672	Dominican Republic	0.7348
55	Germany	0.3231	Latvia	0.6661	West Bank and Gaza Strip	0.7340
56	Albania	0.3224	Paraguay	0.6606	Honduras	0.7322
57	Taiwan	0.3221	Russia	0.6596	Poland	0.7281
58	Spain	0.3193	Slovakia	0.6587	Finland	0.7266
59	Mongolia	0.3152	Mauritius	0.6518	Peru	0.7253
60	Vietnam	0.3125	West Bank and Gaza Strip	0.6485	Mongolia	0.7219
61	Belgium	0.3072	Uruguay	0.6469	Lithuania	0.7209
62	Portugal	0.3071	Azerbaijan	0.6463	Algeria	0.7203
63	Austria	0.3057	Bolivia	0.6445	Mexico	0.7202
64	Romania	0.3018	Chile	0.6444	Slovakia	0.7184
65	Thailand	0.2999	Mongolia	0.6381	Armenia	0.7135
66	Slovakia	0.2964	Brazil	0.6377	Belarus	0.7123
67	Croatia	0.2886	Colombia	0.6376	Czech Republic	0.7060
68	Latvia	0.2859	Turkey	0.6219	Colombia	0.7053
69	Estonia	0.2854	Estonia	0.6151	Azerbaijan	0.6991
70	Slovenia	0.2853	South Africa	0.6089	Mauritius	0.6978
71	Netherlands	0.2836	Peru	0.6076	Brazil	0.6939
72	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.2758	Honduras	0.6069	Kyrgyzstan	0.6936
73	Poland	0.2611	Kyrgyzstan	0.5996	South Africa	0.6867
74	Egypt	0.2517	Ukraine	0.5920	Estonia	0.6720
75	Bulgaria	0.2453	Mexico	0.5744	Panama	0.6683
76	Serbia	0.2441	Philippines	0.5566	Philippines	0.6552
77	Czech Republic	0.2417	Czech Republic	0.5479	Ireland	0.6174
78	Belarus	0.2416	Ecuador	0.5430	Hong Kong	0.6170
79	Hungary	0.2236	Panama	0.5389	Iran	0.5917
80	Ireland	0.1991	Iran	0.4954	Ecuador	0.4883

- As explained above, ERI measures how high the level of rebounding and recovering has been during a year, considering a country's overall economic performance in the previous year. Examining the pre-COVID-19 three-year average economic resiliency (2016-17, 2017-

2018, 2018-2019), Hong Kong, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Iran, Turkey, Algeria, Sri Lanka, Finland, and Mexico were the countries that ranked at the top 10.


- In 2020, when the spread of COVID-19 began, countries like Taiwan, China, Greece, Switzerland, Israel, France, Poland, Nicaragua, and South Korea turned out to have shown high economic resilience compared to the three years before COVID-19. Since they were able to minimize the economic damage caused by COVID-19, their economy appears to have recovered more quickly than other countries in 2020. In other words, this means that these countries were less vulnerable to external shocks.
- In 2021, when the global vaccination began, Taiwan, Greece, China, Albania, Ukraine, France, Denmark, Latvia, Malaysia, and South Korea were expected to be ranked top in ERI. In other words, the forecast expected these countries to show relatively high economic recovery and resilience in 2021 compared to 2020.
- South Korea's level of economic resilience was ranked 22 before the spread of COVID-19. However, its ranking increased to 9th in 2020 and 10th in 2021, showing a high level of economic resilience after the spread of COVID-19. The results indicate that South Korea's economy has minimized the damage caused by COVID-19 and quickly recovered to the pre-COVID-19 level.⁹
- Meanwhile, before the spread of COVID-19, China's ERI ranking was 36th. However, compared to the spread of COVID-19, China's ERI ranking increased to 2nd in 2020 and 3rd in 2021. On the other hand, the

9. South Korea's EPI and ERI were both ranked relatively high among 80 countries. The results indicate that South Korea's overall economic performance remained very good, both before and after the spread of COVID-19. Also, such a result was possible because South Korea's economic resilience was also very high before and after the spread of COVID-19.

United States was ranked 53rd before COVID-19, 49th in 2020, and 41st in 2021. The results show that the United States' economic vulnerability to the spread of COVID-19 was higher than that of China. China's ability to recover from the damage was also higher than that of the United States.

4. Comparison of EPI ranking by country

<Figure 1> The number of COVID-19 confirmed cases in each country¹⁰ and 2019*-2020 EPI ranking change¹¹



* average of 2017-2019 EPI

- <Figure 1> shows the relationship between the severity of COVID-19 and the change in economic performance index rankings by country. The ranking compares the 2017-2019 average EPI ranking and the 2020 EPI ranking shown in <Table 2>.
- For those countries where the number of confirmed cases per million people is lower than the global average (the lower part of the blue horizontal line), many of them had their EPI ranking increased in 2020 compared to 2019. China, New Zealand, Mongolia, Japan, Philippines, Indonesia, Honduras, Mexico, and Ireland were those countries.
- On the other hand, among the countries with above-average confirmed cases (the upper part of the blue

horizontal line), there were many countries whose EPI ranking decreased after the spread of COVID-19 in 2020. Those countries include Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Spain, Hungary, and Croatia.

- However, it is difficult to argue that there is a clear inverse relationship between the number of confirmed cases and a country's EPI. Countries like the Czech Republic, Israel, Italy, Poland, and Chile had their EPI ranking increased even though they had above-average confirmed cases. On the other hand, countries such as Russia, Canada, Norway, South Korea, and Thailand had their EPI ranking decreased despite having below-average confirmed cases.
- Meanwhile, regarding each country's response to COVID-19, is there a correlation between a country's political system and its EPI? In <Figure 1> above, those countries marked green represent democracies while those marked red represent authoritarian countries.¹²
- As can be seen in <Figure 1>, most authoritarian countries had relatively low number of confirmed cases. China, Thailand, Singapore, and Egypt recorded less than 10,000 confirmed cases per million during 2020. Other authoritarian countries such as Morocco, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Ecuador also controlled the spread of COVID-19 relatively well. The results seem to suggest that authoritarian countries were able to implement stronger and stricter control

10. Our World in Data (<https://ourworldindata.org/>)


11. The horizontal blue dotted line represents the average value of each country's number of COVID-19 confirmed cases (per million people), while the vertical blue dotted line shows the change in EPI ranking between 2019 and 2020.

12. To classify whether a country is a democracy or not, we referred to the classification made in Polity 2, created by the POLITY IV Project (<http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>). Countries with a Polity 2 score above seven were coded as democracies, while others were coded as authoritarian.

policies more easily than democracies.

- However, there were many cases where successful control of the spread of COVID-19 did not lead to clear economic results. For instance, Thailand, an authoritarian country in Southeast Asia, had a small number of confirmed cases, but its EPI ranking declined. On the other hand, countries evaluated as relatively democratic in Asia, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, had their EPI ranking increased in 2020 than in 2019, even though their number of confirmed cases is higher than that of Thailand.
- Many democracies failed to respond promptly to COVID-19 in 2020, and they suffered economically compared to 2019. Democracy countries such as the United Kingdom, United States, France, Switzerland, and Belgium have failed to control COVID-19, and their EPI ranks have also declined. In the case of Canada, Germany, and Norway, their economic performance was sluggish compared to before COVID-19, although the number of confirmed cases remained below the global average by responding relatively effectively to COVID-19.


<Figure 2> The number of COVID-19 confirmed cases in each country and 2019-2021 EPI ranking change



- <Figure 2> shows how each country's EPI ranking changed from 2019 (before the spread of COVID-19) to 2021 (when the recovery from it began).
- From <Figure 2>, we can see that countries that were hit hard by COVID-19 in 2020, such as Bulgaria, Colombia, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Canada, etc., gradually recovered their ranking in 2021. Countries such as China and Japan, where the number of confirmed cases was relatively small, had their EPI ranking increased in 2021 compared to 2019. However, countries like the United States, France, Spain, Croatia, and Hungary, which had above-average confirmed cases, showed a decline in their rankings. Still, there were countries such as Thailand, Singapore, Turkey, and Russia, whose EPI rankings declined despite the small number of confirmed cases. At the same time, there were countries like Chile, Poland, Ireland, and Italy, whose EPI rankings rose despite a large number of confirmed cases. In other words, we cannot say countries with a large number of confirmed cases will inevitably show poor economic performance.
- South Korea had its ranking decline in 2020, but it is recovering gradually in 2021.
- Meanwhile, many countries that recorded the above-average number of confirmed cases were democracies. Those countries included advanced democracies such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium.
- Compared to democracies in other regions, Asian democracies (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Mongolia, Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia) were successful in controlling COVID-19 up until 2021.
- There is no clear correlation between the number of confirmed cases and a country's economic performance. In other words, there are countries with a large number of confirmed cases that experienced economic sluggishness. Still, there are also countries

whose economic performance has risen despite a large number of confirmed cases. Conversely, even among countries that have succeeded in controlling COVID-19, there are countries with improved economic performance while those who struggled.


<Figure 3> The number of COVID-19 confirmed cases in each country and 2020 ERI¹³



- <Figure 3> shows the correlation between the number of confirmed cases in each country and its 2020 ERI (compared to the average of before COVID-19 three years). <Figure 3> also shows whether each country is a democracy (green) or an authoritarian country (red).
- Similar to the EPI, regarding ERI, most countries have either 1) shown a high level of economic resiliency while maintaining the number of confirmed cases low (Asian countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, China, Japan, and Singapore or other countries like Nicaragua, Greece, Australia, Norway, etc.), or 2) shown a high level of economic resiliency but recorded above-average confirmed cases (European countries such as Switzerland, Israel, Netherlands, France, Poland, Italy, and United Kingdom, etc.), or 3) shown a low level of economic resiliency but succeed in controlling confirmed cases to below-average (such as Thailand, Indonesia, New Zealand, Mongolia, Philippines, Mexico, Canada, and Finland, etc.).

- There were countries such as Turkey, Panama, Czech Republic, Brazil, Peru, and Colombia whose level of economic resiliency was low and recorded above-average confirmed cases but not many among 80 countries that are ranked.

<Figure 4> The number of COVID-19 confirmed cases in each country and 2021 ERI



- <Figure 4> shows the correlation between the number of confirmed cases in each country and its 2021 ERI (compared to the average of before COVID-19 three years). <Figure 4> also shows whether each country is a democracy (green) or an authoritarian country (red).
- (Compared to before the spread of COVID-19) Each country's 2021 ERI showed a similar pattern to that of most countries' 2020 ERI.
- Asian countries such as Taiwan, South Korea, China, Japan, and Singapore, etc., continued to record top-level ERI and low numbers of confirmed cases.
- Countries like Ukraine, Turkey, and Russia had little change in the number of confirmed cases, but their 2021 ERI ranking increased significantly. On the other hand, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, and Poland, etc., had their ERI rankings lowered in 2021.
- Meanwhile, Estonia's 2020 ERI ranking was low, but it recoded

13. The horizontal blue dotted line represents the average value of each country's number of COVID-19 confirmed cases (per million people) while the vertical blue dotted line shows the median of 80 countries' ERI (a line distinguishing the upper and lower 50%).

below-average confirmed cases. However, its ERI ranking was still low in 2021, but it failed to control COVID-19, recording above-average confirmed cases. In the case of the Czech Republic, its ERI was low in 2020 and 2021 while recording above-average confirmed cases, showing the most negative condition.

- Finally, there was no clear correlation between the number of confirmed cases and a country's economic resiliency according to its political system.
 - As explained above, most of the countries that recorded above-average confirmed cases were democracies. However, even among democracies, whether a country showed 1) a high level of economic resilience and above-average confirmed cases, 2) a low level of economic resilience and above-average confirmed cases, 3) a high level of economic resilience and below-average confirmed cases, or 4) a low level of economic resilience and below-average confirmed cases differed drastically.
 - While many authoritarian countries showed below-average confirmed cases, their level of economic resiliency differed among countries.

5. Conclusion

- In this report, JPI investigated how EPI and ERI and rankings of 80 countries changed before and after the spread of COVID-19.
- As mentioned earlier, EPI and ERI created in this study are different from other COVID-19-related indices and rankings released by other institutions in that they were constructed only with economic indicators.
- Economic Performance Index (EPI) measures the overall economic health, stability, and productivity of a country in terms of macroeconomics. EPI does not directly measure the impact the COVID-19 crisis has on the national economy. However, by examining how a country's EPI and its ranking change before and after the event, it shows us whether a country has successfully overcome the crisis. In this case, as shown in <Table 2>, developed countries generally ranked high. Such a result is shown because developed countries are mostly superior to developing countries or low-income countries in terms of health, stability, and productivity.
- On the other hand, the Economic Resilience Index (ERI) measures how much a country's overall economic health, stability, and productivity have improved during the year, based on the country's overall economic condition and level. In other words, ERI focuses solely on the change rate rather than the overall performance of a country's economy. In other words, ERI measures how much the soundness, stability, and productivity of a country's economy recovers and rises compared to the previous year. In this case, as shown in <Table 3>, developing or low-income economies generally ranked high (with some developed countries as exceptions).
- In particular, we need to pay attention to ERI in years which huge external shocks hit the world, such as 2020 and 2021. When all countries around the world were hit by an external threat, examining which country minimized the damage caused by the crisis and recovered quickly enables us to know whether a country was economically ready to respond to unexpected crises. However, in the case of a country whose EPI is already very high and it is challenging to increase further, its ERI itself may come out low. On the other hand, if a country's EPI was very low or its previous year EPI temporarily decreased due to an external shock such as the spread of COVID-19, the level of resilience could be high with only a slight economic health, stability, and productivity recovery in the following year (due to the base effect).
- Then, how can we utilize the index developed in this study?

- First of all, changes in the economic resilience of existing powerful countries can be a yardstick for predicting future world order. If a powerful country has low economic resilience, it will take a long time to recover from the severe economic damage caused by COVID-19. On the other hand, countries with higher economic resilience than those of great powers will be able to minimize the economic damage caused by COVID-19. At the same time, they will be able to recover their economy swiftly, narrowing down the power gap between them and other great powers. Therefore, through EPI and ERI, we will be able to predict changes in the balance of power between countries and the possibility of the world order being reorganized.
- Second, when developed countries support developing countries and low-income countries through Official Development Assistance (ODA), or when international organizations plan and implement various development projects, they must focus on strengthening resilience rather than merely improving a country's income level. Only by strengthening a country's resiliency will its economic health, stability, and productivity improve in the long run. In other words, rather than simply focusing on raising a country's income level, it is necessary to ensure that the country has sufficient capacity to respond and recovery by minimizing the damage when it gets hit by external shocks. However, to select a target country in need of foreign aid to improve its economic resilience and know exactly how much improvement is required for the country to get on a stable growth trajectory, there should be a reference material that measures a country's level of economic resilience. However, so far, there has been no index that can objectively measure this. Therefore, if a more precise economic resilience index is developed in the future, we will be able to understand why some countries have high economic resiliency and use such information as reference material for enhancing other countries' resiliency. Conversely, for a country with low economic resilience, by identifying the cause, the international community will be able to introduce customized policies to increase the country's economic resilience.
- Furthermore, while the international community has focused on the need for sustainable development, more and more people are paying attention to resilience in recent years. Thus, we propose to the United Nations to implement the Sustainable and Resilient Development Goal (SRDGs) that will follow the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), beginning in 2031. Through this goal, we expect more people will be able to survive and improve their quality of life by setting goals that encompass growth, sustainability, and resilience and implementing policies that fit them.
- Today, resilience is a concept that is receiving great attention from many people and countries around the world who have experienced the spread of COVID-19. However, in order to implement the concept that is receiving a lot of attention today in actual policy, we must be able to measure it objectively. In this sense, we hope our research results will serve as a basis for moving forward to measure economic resilience more objectively and accurately.

Escaping the Tragicomedy: Is Principled Negotiation between the United States and North Korea Possible?

Abstract

This article asks whether “principled negotiation” as explained by William Ury and Roger Fischer in their classic book *Getting to Yes* is possible in the context of negotiations between the United States and North Korea. Answering this question leads to a description of two competing schools of interpretation among American analysts trying to explain why negotiations since the end of the Cold War have failed genres. In the end, however, it seems impossible to judge which of these schools—the comedic and the tragic—is correct. Instead, the article concludes by proposing two principles of interpretation—indeterminacy and entanglement—in place of the two.

Escaping the Tragicomedy: Is Principled Negotiation between the United States and North Korea Possible?

Each year I ask my undergraduate students to engage in a simulated negotiation to try to resolve the security dilemma that keeps the Korean Peninsula stuck in a state of perpetual hostility and division. They do their own research to learn more about various aspects of the conundrum, including the specific national interests that each negotiating team brings into the room. But the one thing everyone has to read in common is the bestselling guidebook to negotiation, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving in*, by Roger Fisher and William Ury (New York: Penguin, 2014). The students’ task is to act out a principled negotiation together as

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a class, applying Fisher/Ury's four steps: separating problem from people; identifying mutual gain; inventing new options; sticking to objective criteria. My students have not yet come up with the perfect agreement to solve the riddle of peace in Korea. But every year, it seems to me when all is said and done my undergraduates do a better job than the adults in charge of diplomacy.

Listening for the Language of Getting to Yes

With its sunny title, *Getting to Yes* might seem an unlikely paradigm for approaching talks with Kim Jong Un's Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), widely considered a rogue actor and pariah state that operates outside of the international system and as a spoiler to any constructive framework for negotiation. If you listen carefully enough to North Korea's state media, however, you can hear the language of principled negotiation, or elements of it, at least. The DPRK foreign ministry regularly puts out statements that affirm the principle of mutual gain, for example.

Even the Supreme Leader himself, Kim Jong Un, has been known to employ a rhetoric compatible with principled negotiation. "Dialogue partners will reach the destinations that are beneficial to each other without fail if they put forward fair proposals on the principle of recognizing and respecting each other by abandoning their dogged insistence broadmindedly and conduct negotiations with a proper stand and the will to settle issues," Kim explained in his 2019 New Year's Day Address. In the flurry of diplomatic signaling after the failure of talks between Kim and then-US President Donald Trump in Hanoi (February 2019), we heard a lot about Fisher/Ury's third step—inventing new options—in what North Korea described as the need for a "new method of calculation." Addressing the impasse in

diplomacy with the U.S., Chairman Kim's remarks to the Supreme People's Assembly on April 12, 2019, can easily be read in terms of principled negotiation as separating people from problem (the United States vs. hostility in US-DPRK relations), affirming mutual benefit by "meeting each other's interests," and sticking to established criteria (the Kim-Trump Singapore Statement from June 2018). "Given the deep-rooted animosity between the DPRK and the United States, in order to implement the June 12 Joint Statement both sides should give up their unilateral terms and seek a constructive solution that meets each other's interests. To this end, it is needed above all for the United States to approach us with a new way of calculation after putting aside the current one," Kim explained to the First Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly. Chairman Kim took the idea of separating problem from people one step further by pointing out that the deep animosity in the relationship went beyond his "personal" relationship with a particular US president—even if his relationship with President Trump was good, that would not solve the bilateral dilemma.

Like their North Korean counterparts, American officials, for their part, routinely insist that they are acting on the premises of principled negotiation. Trump and Biden administration officials—most recently, special envoy Sung Kim—insist that the United States bears no hostile intentions towards North Korea and approaches negotiations in a spirit of mutual benefit. US diplomats promise they too are open to new ideas as ways to break the logjam, such as the South Korean government's proposal of making an end-of-war declaration. And it is fair to say that US diplomats are most eager to encourage reliance on objective, established criteria, such as the September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (1992), and, most importantly, Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). At least officially, Washington

also claims to separate the problem—defined as North Korea's possession and development of nuclear weapons—from the people (the Kim regime) and shows willingness to deal with Kim Jong Un in order to address the underlying problem.

Two Ways to Read Failure

By now, the mind of a skeptical reader will be seething with objections to either or *both* descriptions, thinking of manifold ways in which either North Korea or the United States violate the four key principles of principled negotiation. And even if a dubious reader could be persuaded there is at least a modicum of commitment to principled negotiation on both sides, the record would seem to speak for itself. Although every president since George H. W. Bush has authorized officials to engage in talks with North Koreans, no negotiation has seemed to work. It is a record of failure.

There have been three intensive periods of US-DPRK negotiation—during the Bill Clinton administration over the Agreed Framework, during the George W. Bush administration via the Six Party Talks, and during the Trump administration at Singapore and Hanoi. The most comprehensive process, during the Clinton years, failed to survive the transition to a new president. All three efforts failed to produce a lasting settlement, as did the brief burst of US-DPRK talks during the Barack Obama administration in the second half of 2011, which resulted in an agreed announcement (the Leap Day Deal) that both sides walked away from before the ink was dry. Neither side can claim victory in US-DPRK negotiations since the end of the Cold War, despite numerous efforts, in different modalities (bilateral, tripartite, four-party, six-party), at varying levels of government (from the New York channel up to presidential summits).

What explains the decades of failure in negotiations

between the US and North Korea? I am not the first person to pose the question, of course, and there is much to learn from the existing literature on patterns in US-DPRK negotiating behavior. Many of the best-known analyses focus on a distinctive feature of the experience—the maddening nature of North Korea's negotiating tactics—and drill down from there. Scott Snyder's *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior* (United States Institutes of Peace, 1999), for example, offers a cultural interpretation to explain why North Koreans used crisis diplomacy, brinkmanship, demands for unilateral concessions, bluffing and threats, and artificial deadlines during the Agreed Framework discussions of the 1990s. The description of North Korea's bag of tricks is a common feature in the literature. However, when it comes to explaining the significance of North Korean guerrilla negotiating style, as part of the general challenge of doing diplomacy with Pyongyang, two competing schools of interpretation emerge.

The best way to describe the difference between the two lines of analysis may be to draw upon literary theory, odd as that sounds. There are, broadly speaking, two genres of interpretation in reading North Korean negotiation—the comedic school and the tragic school. Reflecting on how these rival schools of interpretation frame the debate about whether and how to talk to North Korea might help future efforts at negotiation.

The Comedians

One of the earliest accounts of North Korean negotiation was Admiral C. Turner Joy's book about the Korean War Armistice talks, *How Communists Negotiate* (New York: Macmillan, 1955). From Joy's classic study all the way down to commentary on the unconventional summits between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump, the dominant genre of interpretation of North Korean

negotiating behavior among American observers and analysts belongs to what I call the comedic school.

The comic theory of the case was put well by the former Pentagon official Chuck Downs, who, as a fellow at the think tank American Enterprise Institute, wrote a study of Cold War-era US-DPRK negotiations, including thorny issues like the release of US sailors from the USS Pueblo incident of 1968. In Downs' view, North Korea "does not generally participate in negotiations because it seeks an agreement. Its objective is to gain concessions and benefits merely in the process of agreeing to talk, or as a consequence of participating in talks" (Chuck Downs, *Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy*, Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1998, 10). More recently, former CIA analyst Bruce Klingner—like Downs, a fellow at AEI—encapsulated the comedic school's view of North Korean intention even more succinctly in the title of his article on the Obama-era Leap Day negotiations. In Klingner's view, the Pyongyang playbook is to deny, deceive, delay (Bruce Klingner, "Deny, Deceive and Delay: North Korea's Nuclear Negotiating Strategy," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* (Fall/Winter 2012): 1-24).

According to the comedic school, virtually everything North Korean negotiators do is born from the bad faith of deny, deceive and delay. Underlying the comedic reading of negotiating behavior are a common set of premises about North Korea's true strategic objectives, which could be classified as minimal goal, corollary objective, and ultimate aim. Minimally, North Korean diplomats seek to force the United States (and by extension the international community) to relent and recognize the DPRK as nuclear state. As a corollary goal, North Korea seeks to split the US from its allies and stress the US-ROK alliance to the breaking point.

The maximal goal is achieving the "final victory" of coercive reunification of the Korean Peninsula—absorbing South Korea into the North and dissolving the ROK under Kim family/ Korean Workers' Party rule (Jung H.

Pak, *Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA Officer's Insights into North Korea's Enigmatic Young Dictator*, New York: Ballantine Books, 2020). As former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster put it, "Kim Jong-un may want to keep his nuclear weapons really for reasons of extortion... to rend the U.S.-South Korean Alliance as the first step in saying what the Kim regime has said it wants to do... which is to unify the peninsula under the quote 'red banner'... what the North I think envisions, has envisioned over the years, is dragging South Korea down as a way to equalize the playing field and to begin this unification" (H.R. McMaster, "Instruments of American Power: Implementing Foreign Policies and Protecting Against Global Threats," *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*, October 10, 2019, 18).

Given the comedians' assumptions about North Korea's strategic intentions, it is logical that, in their view, "peace and denuclearization" diplomacy, and negotiations designed to advance those goals, is a farce. North Korea's actual goals—coercing adversaries into recognition of its nuclear status and reunification of the Korean Peninsula—are the negation of the stated objective of the diplomacy. With the weary voice of the jaundiced comedic observer, McMaster explains what he saw unfold over the course of the Trump administration: "And then of course we know what happens next. Long, drawn-out negotiations during which the North Koreans try to extort more money and pay offs from us, and then ultimately what do you get? You get a weak agreement that locks in the status quo as the new normal, and then North Korea breaks that agreement right away" (McMaster, "Instruments of National Power," 18).

The stress on the absurdity of repetition is a hallmark of the comedic interpretation of North Korean negotiation. Repetition is a standard trope in the comedic genre in general. Just watch one of the funniest scenes from one of the most famous sit-coms in American television history, "I Love Lucy," in which Lucy and her friend Ethel work

the assembly line at a chocolate wrapping factory. The audience starts laughing as soon as the conveyor belt starts running, anticipating how accelerating repetition will lead to comic disaster. “I think we are fighting a losing game,” Lucy says before she starts popping chocolates in her mouth in order to keep up with the line. So it is with the comedic critics of North Korean diplomacy, who see something bitterly funny about DPRK officials using the same tricks again and again. Even funnier, in a sad way, is how American negotiators fall for them, naively stuffing bonbons in their mouths. As McMaster quipped about negotiating in good faith with Pyongyang, “that’s the definition of insanity, if we do that again.”

For members of the comedic school, negotiation is inevitably a painful and possibly humiliating ruse. There is no such thing as a successful negotiation with North Korea. Even if the talks appear to result in a written agreement or joint statement, Pyongyang will inevitably reinterpret the agreement after the fact, violate its terms, or walk away from the implementation process while blaming the other side. Based on their conviction that negotiating with Communists is a fool’s errand, hardened American observers in the comedic school were quick to pour cold water on the diplomatic breakthrough between the two Koreas in early 2018. Retired US military negotiator Steve Tharp wrote a column comparing the process to another funny Lucy, the character from the *Peanuts* comic strip who holds the football for Charlie Brown and grabs the ball right before he kicks it, so that Charlie falls on his fanny. The joke got funnier as Lucy did the same trick over and over again, each year for the annual kickoff episode of *Peanuts* (Steve Tharp, “Lucy and the Football,” *Korea Times*, April 23, 2018).

During the moment of hope-tinged relief in Seoul as the “fire and fury” of 2017 shifted toward dialogue and negotiation in the spring of 2018, Bruce Klingner alluded to another standby of the comedic school, the movie *Groundhog Day* in which Bill Murray’s character is cursed

to re-live the same day. “The more I read today’s inter-Korean statement and reread the 1972 Joint Communiqué, 1992 Basic Agreement, and 2000 and 2007 summit joint statements, the more I feel we are in *Groundhog Day* again,” Klingner tweeted. He continued, tongue in cheek, “North Korea agreed to non-aggression statement in 1992 and 2007, then abrogated them, along with armistice, in May 2009 and again in May 2013. Much of today’s language seems lifted from previous agreements. Can Moon and Kim be penalized for plagiarism?” (Bruce Klingner, Twitter, April 27, 2018, 11:03pm).

The comedians’ solution to the problem of negotiating with North Korea is simple: never take the talks seriously. There might be valid reasons to sit down for discussions with the DPRK—to placate pro-engagement allies in Seoul, for example, or to pre-empt Beijing’s argument that the fault lies in Washington’s refusal to engage. It is not inherently harmful to enter into negotiations... so long as the American team harbors no illusions about they are doing. Charlie Brown can walk onto the field and act like he’s ready to start the game with the kickoff—but he should not be suckered into actually kicking the ball, no matter what Lucy says or does. Meanwhile, the other tools in the box—deterrence signaling, economic sanctions, alliance coordination, and international opprobrium—do the real work of dealing with the DPRK.

The Tragedians

While the comedic paradigm would appear to be the dominant one in Washington DC, not every analyst or informed commentator on North Korean negotiation agrees with it. Indeed, there exists an antithetical genre of exegesis on the transcripts of US-DPRK talks offered by a group I call the tragedians, exponents of which might include commentators such as Leon Sigal, Joel Wit, and probably the present author.

Observing the same frustrating North Korean negotiating tactics, adherents of the tragic school view them through the lens of a fundamentally different assessment of North Korea's strategic goals, which are defensive in nature. The Kim's ultimate objective since the end of the Cold War, when the DPRK lost its dual patrons of the USSR and PRC, has been to increase security against political-military threats—acquiring a nuclear deterrent and improving relations with the US are the most powerful means to that end. The rising power and influence of China added impetus to that goal both for Kim Jong Il and even more for his son, Kim Jong Un, who took power in 2011. A corollary objective has been improving relations with US allies, starting with South Korea, and regional partners, like Singapore and Vietnam. Under Kim Jong Un, the primary strategic goal has been redefined as transforming North Korea into a prosperous East Asian country, integrated into regional dynamism and no longer the region's backwater—a “new strategic line” that Kim announced in April 2018 in the context of breakthroughs with Seoul and Washington. However, these objectives must be pursued with extreme caution, given the deep animosity in relations with both the US and the ROK and difficulty in achieving a genuine transformation of the relationships. For example, Kim Jong Un had to back away from the new line of “putting all efforts on economic development” after the failure of negotiations in early 2019 (and step back further with the onset of the pandemic in early 2020).

From this theory of North Korea's long game (to borrow a phrase from Rush Doshi), the diplomatic banner of “peace and denuclearization” lofted back in 2018 appears realistic and plausible, albeit difficult and time-consuming. Peace with the DPRK in the sense of normalizing relations with the US and ROK is achievable, since Pyongyang wants it, with plenty of fears, caveats, and ambivalence. Although North

Korea cannot be expected to *want* denuclearization, nonetheless the possibility of progress, starting with capping and rolling back nuclear weapons program (as laid out in the roadmap proposed by Siegfried Hecker and Robert Carlin), is real. In the long run, many years or maybe decades hence, it is not inconceivable that the DPRK would be in a position to eliminate their nuclear weapons capabilities, but only *after* a long, sustained process of normalization, peace-building, and economic development.

Working off this very different set of assumptions about North Korea's strategic interests, the erratic or intransigent behavior of its negotiators looks very different. Instead of obstructionism, North Korean tactics are generally interpreted as something like what James Scott, in a different context, called “weapons of the weak.” Stalling, swearing, and swerving are tricks used to navigate perilous engagement with a hostile, stronger adversary in search of a path to reconciliation and normalization, and doing so from a position of chronic weakness.

Complicating the matter even further, North Koreans ironically see *the Americans* as the party negotiating in bad faith, trying to get everything they want (captured in the acronym CVID, complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement) in return for nothing. North Koreans are fatalistic about the cynicism of the dominant comedic school in Washington, with its deep pessimism over the chances of achieving anything through direct negotiations. North Koreans have their equivalent of Lucy and the Football jokes about how Washington (and Seoul) grab the football just before kickoff, either because Congress objects to a deal made by the White House or because the opposition party wins a presidential election. North Korean negotiators have learned to be skeptical and cautious, although it may manifest as bluster and obstinacy.

According to the tragedians, the repeated failure of

US-DPRK negotiations is not funny but sad. Again and again, efforts at rapprochement have ended up being a missed opportunity. The Americans are not innocent buffoons, but rather, tragic heroes who fail to read their interlocutor correctly and squander the chance at progress, becoming victims of their misreading.

The tragedians' solution, in turn, is a more daunting one than the course advised by the comedians. It is up to American negotiators to find the path to mutual gain, holding their counterparts' hands as they walk toward "yes" and then stick with the commitments in the implementation phase. The only way to escape the ongoing tragedy is to make a leap of faith.

Stockholm Syndrome

Principled negotiation between the US and DPRK is possible in theory if the tragic school is right. But if the comedic school is right, pursuing principled negotiation is a waste of time, and the US national interest would be better served by working on what Fisher and Ury call the BATNA (best alternative to negotiated agreement) of economic sanctions and "strategic patience." Which reading is correct? On what basis can we make a judgment? Is an inductive approach to the interpretation of North Korean negotiation possible, or are we doomed to choosing between two teleological readings, each of which fits observed behavior into its own a priori sense of North Korea's strategic goal?

In an attempt to answer that question, let's look at the most recent round of negotiation, as a case study, held two years ago, in October 2019, at a location outside Stockholm. To problematize the case, let's also turn the question around in order to also ask how North Korean analysts might interpret US negotiating behavior. Would an America watcher in Pyongyang be able to correctly infer underlying strategic intention from observed

negotiation experience?

Steve Biegun, the top US negotiator at the time of the last bilateral interaction, has publicly shared his assessment that his DPRK counterparts came to Sweden in bad faith, and had no intention or authorization to engage in principled negotiation aimed at a constructive outcome or reaching an initial understanding ("An Interview with Stephen Biegun," *NKNews Podcast*, episode 191). But what would the DPRK lead diplomat, Kim Myong Gil, say if he could speak publicly with the same relative freedom as Biegun in his capacity as a former official?

Kim Myong Gil might tell us how his delegation, and the top decision-makers back in Pyongyang, had an ongoing debate over the true intentions of Donald Trump, the Trump administration, and the US government as a whole, in seeking to resume talks. The North Korean equivalent of tragedians—analysts who took Trump at his word in Singapore that this unconventional president wanted to "establish new relations" with the DPRK—would argue that Biegun was sincere in trying to set up a working-level negotiating process. They would note that Biegun was very disciplined in his messaging, consistently seeking a constructive approach, and that he had been promoted to the number two position in the State Department while retaining the North Korea portfolio, elevating the level of US-DPRK engagement. The diplomatic implication of a tragic reading might be that Biegun should be teased out further to see what Trump would be willing to offer, in substantive and symbolic terms, toward North Korea's goals. As Trump's envoy tasked with making progress in finding mutually-acceptable compromise, Biegun should be engaged and, as it were, empowered by robust talks.

But skeptical analysts would be able to counter with strong arguments that Biegun's overture for talks, wittingly or unwittingly, was a stalling device. Even if Trump

personally was open to establishing new relations, he was surrounded by advisors and officials who demonstrated implacable hostility to the DPRK, most notably his National Security Advisor John Bolton, who had stepped down only a month before the Stockholm meeting. And even if Trump personally did not bear animosity and wanted to improve relations, he had failed to convince the US foreign policy establishment let alone Congress to see North Korea in a different light or take his summitry seriously. Moreover, it had become apparent at the time of the Hanoi summit that Trump had lost much of his former enthusiasm for the North Korea issue, as media attention waned. By the time of the Stockholm talks, the White House was already focused one thing and one thing alone: re-election. From that skeptical perspective, the Biegun team would be seen as a stalling device, designed to generate some sympathetic media coverage on Trump's foreign policy chops.

For everything we know about the inner workings of the Trump administration from leaks at the time and the flood of media interviews and published memoirs since, who can say definitively which North Korean interpretation of US negotiating intentions is true? And if we cannot know for sure how to interpret the American side, about which so much more has entered into the public record... who among us can confidently assert whether the comic or tragic reading of the North Korean approach to the talks in Sweden is more compelling? Did Kim Myong Gil travel from Pyongyang to Stockholm as part of an elaborate “deny, delay, and deceive” strategy, buying another chunk of time as North Korea methodically and inexorably works to improve its nuclear/missile weapons capabilities? Or did he carry two sets of instructions—one if it looked like the American team arrived empty-handed, another if he detected something promising from the other side? Biegun described Kim's negotiating posture during the day of talks: “Generally, the [North Korean] view at

each section was, ‘What else do you have? What else you bringing?’” (Bryan Betts, “An Interview with Stephen Biegun, Former US Special Envoy to North Korea,” July 14, 2021). Was Kim listening for real or just as a ruse?

Beyond Comedy and Tragedy: Indeterminacy and Entanglement

Reflecting on the dominant frameworks used by American analysts to interpret North Korean negotiation seem to arrive at an unsatisfying, if not unsettling, conclusion: Whether principled negotiation between the US and DPRK is possible depends on who you ask, a comedian or a tragedian. It seems impossible to determine who is correct. Rather than arrive at a final judgment between comedy or tragedy, the reflection would seem to leave us with a pair of heuristic principles to keep in mind for the time when, almost inevitably, a future round of US-DPRK talks takes place (quite possibly in the next half year). The principles I would like to propose as part of a shared framework for analysis of negotiation are indeterminacy and entanglement.

Indeterminacy means the outcomes is not predetermined. Neither side knows if the play (or the current act of the play) will end in comedy or tragedy. Neither the participants (negotiators and heads of state) nor observers (analysts and commentators) can read the outcome. The notion of indeterminacy is ironic in the context of talking about North Korea, a topic that elicits stubborn certitudes from the mainstream foreign policy establishment as well as fairly predictable arguments from critics on the margins (note: I include my own voice in the latter group and am as guilty of predictability as anyone).

To accept indeterminacy would require an analytical framework according to which Kim Jong Un himself might not be sure of the desired end state, let alone his top diplomats and designated negotiators. Even more

unsettling is the proposition that the Americans do not necessarily know their desired endstate, either. Both sides are in flux, pulled internally in different directions, unsure externally which among the realistic options is optimal, or, among optimal options, what is realistic. Both sides are uncertain about the other because the political will behind each negotiator is, in reality, indeterminate. Embracing indeterminacy may even yield results. Former intelligence analyst and negotiation advisor, Bob Carlin, has written about how persevering through indeterminacy, without clinging to a false certainty, can yield breakthroughs, a moment “usually late in the talks, what was impossible suddenly becomes possible” (Robert Carlin, “Negotiating with North Korea,” *38 North*, February 19, 2019).

The second principle of entanglement is related to the notion of intersubjectivity. Both terms might call to mind (for students of international relations theory at least) the writings of Alexander Wendt. Constructivist theory seems well suited to US-DPRK relations, drawing attention to the fragility of American and North Korean perceptions of one another and the ways in which perceptual feedback loops drive negotiations (usually driving them off a cliff). North Korean negotiating behavior is entangled in their perception of our unspoken goals, just as American behavior is entangled in our perception of theirs. If Wendt offers a deep theoretical basis for entanglement, Carlin provides applied insights of how the phenomenon works in practice. Carlin is worth quoting in a passage that applies the principles of entanglement *and* indeterminacy:

“Depending on the context, if the North Koreans think we are serious about negotiating, there is a good chance they will be, too. If they don't think we are serious (as was the case with the missile negotiations from 1996-1999), they will simply dance around. Although it would obviously be good to know, and may be a somewhat

useful intellectual exercise for setting up mile markers, it's usually a waste of effort guessing at the outset what Pyongyang's final position will be. What is more important is to watch for subtle, early indicators of which way the wind is blowing.”

- Robert Carlin, “What Do We Really Know? How Sound Policy Relies on Contextual Intelligence,” *GlobalAsia* 16.3 (September 2021)

Every US administration since the end of the Cold War has engaged in negotiations with the DPRK, under the leadership of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un. Biden's turn is up next. Whether the two sides can escape the Tragicomedy might depend on their ability to accept indeterminacy and entanglement. Is principled negotiation possible? It's up to them to try, and up to us to accept. peace and prosperity.

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Biden's Administration and Democracy: U.S. Strategies and Prospects toward Non- Democratic Countries

Abstract

Joe Biden has been emphasizing the value of democracy and the need to defend and spread the political system since taking office as the President of the United States. In addition, Biden continues to emphasize the need for cooperation and ties between democratic countries to check and balance against non-democratic countries such as China. In particular, recently, to counter China's "One Belt, One Road" project, Biden proposed the establishment of a new version of the project led by democracies. In this regard, the author intends to examine what kind of cooperation and solidarity between democracies is Biden envisioning and what effect Biden's initiative will have on the international political order and South Korea's diplomatic strategy.

I. Introduction

On March 26, 2021, the US President Joe Biden, in a phone call with British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, proposed establishing a democracy-led infrastructure project against China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In other words, Biden proposed a plan to support the construction of infrastructure in countries and regions in need of economic help by gathering democracies.

U.S. President Joe Biden has been known to have emphasized the value of democracy for a long time from the past until recently. For example, Joe Biden, who became president-elect of the United States in November last year, announced plans to hold a Summit for Democracy in 2021. In addition, on November 15, 2020, when 15 countries in the Asia-Pacific region,

including China, signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Biden announced that the United States would respond by rewriting the international trade rules through cooperation among democracies. And in his inaugural address on January 20, 2021, Joe Biden mentioned the word "democracy" 11 times. This is said to be the case in which "democracy" is mentioned the most among the inaugural speeches of the past. Furthermore, at the Munich Security Conference on February 20, 2021, Biden emphasized the importance of safeguarding

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democracy and cooperation between democracies. And finally, on March 26, 2021, Biden proposed the 'One Belt, One Road' consisting of democratic countries.

As such, Joe Biden places great importance on the value of democracy and continues to express his will to strengthen ties in the fields of politics, economy, and security among democratic countries in the world. If so, what is China's Belt and Road Road that made Biden openly propose the unity of democracies?, Why is the United States trying to confront the Belt and Road project, and what kind of cooperation among democracies is Biden envisioning? In this manuscript, we will discuss the prospects of whether Biden's envision will be implemented and how Biden's proposal will affect Korea's diplomacy.

II. Why did Biden point to China's Belt and Road Initiative project?

Biden's remarks were made with the intention that democracies, including the United States, should respond to China's Belt and Road Initiative. So, what is China's Belt and Road Project? This is a large-scale project that China has been implementing since 2013, aiming to support the construction of infrastructure (roads, railways, ports, etc.) in more than 100 countries including Eurasia and Africa. The plan is currently being implemented one by one, reflecting China's ambition to unite China, Eurasia, and African countries into one economic sphere by improving their connectivity.

However, various opinions exist as to why China is pursuing the Belt and Road Policy. Some scholars and experts argue that China's BRI is a project with an economical purpose. However, there is also a negative view that BRI is rather a strategy aimed at expanding China's influence on the Eurasian continent and countering American hegemony. Besides, despite

the merits of improving infrastructure and achieving economic development through Chinese investment, the BRI is not receiving not just positive reviews from those who are accepting the investment. For instance, people in countries that are attracting Chinese investment do not really benefit from it because China brings in Chinese workers with the investment money instead of creating local jobs. Also, China's investment decisions are often made secretly between governments, excluding the voices of local people who are directly affected by the decision. Finally, the influx of Chinese capital increases the country's economic dependence on China leading to an increased negative sentiments toward Chinese capital and participating in the BRI.

Thus, it seems the Biden administration is aiming to delve into the fact that China's BRI contains the ambition to expand China's influence around the world, but that there is widespread negative perception among the participating countries about the process and results of its implementation. Therefore, recognizing that BRI is a strategy to expand China's influence in Eurasia and Africa, the Biden administration seems to be planning to balance against the BRI by suggesting, as a pretext, a 'American version' or 'Western-style' Belt and Road Initiative led by a democratic country.

III. Prospects for Biden's Policy of Solidarity among Democratic Nations

In an article written for *Foreign Affairs* in the first half of 2020, while he was still a presidential candidate, Biden emphasized that if he were to be elected as the president of the United States, the United States would continue to work to strengthen ties between democratic countries. Biden showed his will to strengthen multilateral cooperation among democratic countries,

including the United States, to safeguard and establish democracy around the world. Therefore, the remarks aimed at China's BRI can be seen as an example of Biden's will.

An infrastructure composed of democracies seems like a good excuse to bring together countries that want to balance against and check China's rise. However, contrary to the aspirations that Biden has announced, specific plans and strategies for implementing them have not been revealed. As mentioned earlier, since Biden became president-elect of the United States in November of last year, he continued to announce plans to strengthen political, economic and security ties among democracies by holding summit meetings, set new international trade rules through cooperation, and proposing an infrastructure plan centered on democracies this time. However, Biden has not clearly stated how the plans will be implemented or which countries would be categorized as democracies (base on which standards) also has not been announced or implemented. (For instance, if a certain country has a democratic political system but the government of that country is often in conflict with the United States, Biden would have to think about whether he and his administration will still recognize that country as a democracy. Also, Biden will have to think about whether to include and how to respond to non-democratic states that express favorable attitudes toward the United States.)

Above all, this "American version" or "Western-style" BRI project proposal also did not mention specific plans on how to secure the huge amount of budget needed for this project. The United States, which has been burdened with huge amounts of federal debt due to the global financial crisis in 2008 and the COVID-19 crisis that began in 2020, has recently passed the bill to spend approximately \$2 trillion on infrastructure reconstruction and improvement within the United States. Still, the Biden administration will have to

provide a clear answer to the question of whether there is any way to raise funds to support infrastructure construction in other countries.

The international situation is constantly changing rapidly. China overcame COVID-19 in a short time and continues to grow rapidly today. Furthermore, through mega projects such as the BRI, China is expanding its influence in its neighboring countries and the entire Eurasian continent. (Whether China's BRI has a purely economic purpose or a strategic objective for hegemony with the United States, it is undeniable that China's political and economic influence is gradually expanding across Eurasia.) If the Biden administration's strategy to counter China's rising influence is to emphasize democratic values and criticize China for its human rights issues and authoritarian political system, it is imperative to prepare specific strategies and policies for the next four (or eight) years to respond to China.

Meanwhile, Biden has so far emphasized cooperation between democratic countries, but no mention of cooperation with non-democratic countries. In this regard, countries around the world need to figure out more clearly whether the multilateral cooperation Biden is pursuing is targeted for democratic countries. For the rest of the world, except for the United States, it is important to know how Biden's United States plans to treat non-democratic countries. Following Biden's footsteps thus far, the United States has not specifically stated its intention to cooperate with non-democratic countries.

For instance, (as mentioned earlier) regarding RCEP signed on November 15, 2020, Biden expressed his intentions to rewrite the international trade rules by working with democracies rather than the United States joining in it. Biden did not indicate his intention not to cooperate with non-democracies such as China. But Biden does not specifically state how the United States will seek cooperation with non-democratic

countries. If Biden continues to only emphasize cooperation between democracies, non-democracies can take it as a signal that the United States intends to exclude them from the international multilateral cooperation system.

In the JPI PeaceNet I wrote in December 2020, the author presented three scenarios for the international multilateralism system in the Biden era.

The first scenario is that the Biden administration is actively cooperating with non-democracies, including China. In order to solve the current global problems such as pandemics, climate change, environmental destruction, etc., all countries in the world must cooperate regardless of their political system. And Biden, who's interested in issues like climate change, is probably aware of this. Therefore, Biden will not be able to continue his foreign policy while distinguishing democracies and non-democracies.

The second scenario is a negative one, in which Biden does not cooperate with non-democracies such as China and Russia. However, as mentioned in the first scenario, it is realistically difficult for the Biden government to continue to carry out such a policy. Cooperation with non-democratic countries is essential to tackle problems like COVID-19 and climate change. Also, if large and small conflicts such as trade disputes with non-democracies continue, it will lead to instability in the international order, which will have a negative impact on the US economy as well (which desperately needs a quick recovery after COVID-19).

The third scenario is that the US dualizes the international multilateral cooperation system. In other words, after dividing each pending issue, such as pandemic, climate change, human rights, the spread of democracy, and national security, the US could establish two separate international multilateral system – one consisted of issues that need cooperation with non-democracies and the other consisted of

issues that cooperation only among democracies are suffice. In this case, there may be a situation in which two international multilateral systems coexisting: a global-level multilateral system and a multilateral system unique to democracies. However, such a dual international multilateral cooperation system would also be difficult to operate in reality. Each issue cannot be accurately distinguished every time as an issue that requires cooperation of democracies or that requires the participation of non-democracies. Today's issues such as pandemics, climate change, human rights, recovery of the global economy, regional conflicts, and the spread of democracy, etc. are not independent issues but are intertwined one by one.

Therefore, realistically, the only scenario Biden could choose in the end would be the first scenario - the United States and democracies actively cooperating with non-democracies. If so, we should keep an eye on whether Biden will continue to emphasize cooperation among democracies and continue to criticize non-democracies and authoritarian regimes.

In addition, the key question is how democracies around the world will react to Biden's ideas and proposals that emphasize ties between democracies. As of now, it is unclear whether they will join Biden's proposal just to be seen as democracies by others, without any geopolitical or strategic considerations. For example, while China's neighbors feel threatened by security from China's rise, they also benefit economically by increasing exports to China. Under this circumstance, their participation in Biden's "group of democracies" could mean giving up some of the profits from economic exchanges with China (although it may be a bit of a dichotomous judgment). Therefore, it may be premature to predict that these countries will value democracy more than economic gain and participate in the United States' grand scheme.

IV. South Korea's Response to the Biden Administration's Diplomatic Strategy Emphasizing Democracy

So, how should South Korea respond to Biden's plan, which continues to emphasize cooperation and ties between democratic countries?

As mentioned earlier, Biden is yet to announce specific strategies and plans for the summit between democracies, international trade order, and infrastructure plan. In other words, it means that South Korean government still has time to prepare for what actions Biden will take in the future (although everything is unclear).

However, it is not a good sign for South Korea if the United States continues to confront and try to contain China. The United States is an important security and trading partner for South Korea. China is also South Korea's largest export market whose cooperation is essential for peaceful inter-Korean relations. In such a situation, if Biden continues to call for unity among democracies and pressures South Korea to choose between the United States and China, it is highly likely that South Korea will be in a diplomatically difficult situation.

However, being recognized as a democracy, internationally, and economic growth (and export increase) are the two goals South Korea must achieve at the same time. It is important for South Korea to maintain close relations with other democracies to continue and protect human rights of its citizens, while raising its reputation and status in the international community. Also, for the material well-being and welfare of the people, economic growth through export growth must continue.

The best scenario for South Korea in the current situation is for the United States and China to maintain friendly relations and pursue international cooperation in various fields. However, if Biden establishes foreign policy that seeks closer cooperation among democracies, South

Korea will, for the sake of its national interest, have to consider many things when implementing foreign policy. Therefore, South Korea should prepare a scenario in advance listing the choices it should make in each field, such as politics, military, diplomacy, and economy, and prepare countermeasures, in case the conflict between the United States and China continues. In the international community, being recognized as a democracy comes with an enormous premium. For this reason, South Korea needs to appeal to the international community that it is maintaining close relations with democracies. At the same time, however, it is necessary to find a way to pursue economic interests.

Due to complex crises such as pandemic crises, global economic recession, climate change, and conflicts between great powers, the international situation is getting unstable day by day, and South Korea is also in a difficult situation in many ways than ever. However, in times like these, South Korea desperately needs diplomatic measures to improve its international status as a democracy and to pursue practical benefits between the US and China.

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The Rise and Fall of Donald Trump, and COVID-19 Pandemic: What the New Normal Implies about International Political Economy

Abstract

How will the 'new normal', which was triggered by the US-China strategic competition and the COVID-19 pandemic change the existing international political and economic order? After experiencing the period of embedded liberalism after World War II and neoliberal globalization that emerged after the 1980s, and after the COVID-19 pandemic, the international political and economic order is requesting a new form of order. Thus, through a contribution by Dr. Haeyong Lim, research fellow at the JPI, we intend to investigate what Trump's electoral victory and defeat means, and how the new normal brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic will have on the changes in the existing international political order.

*Opinions included hereby do not necessarily align with JPI's perspectives.

The disastrous COVID marked the year 2020, and the war is still an ongoing phenomenon. Humankind is now at the transition phase in this pandemic situation. Changes in daily lives have brought some perspectives as to how our world would look different from before the pandemic to after: What would be the new normal? How would it influence relations? To tell the truth, the pandemic is expected to accelerate changes in the relationship between state and society. It is a quasi-state of war that vastly increased state's support as well as control over the society, thereby bringing about the state-society relationship. In broad terms, however, the pandemic is not the fundamental reason for the changes in state-society relationship. Resistance in

domestic politics against inequality that was created by the neoliberal globalization continued on even before the pandemic. The United States, or the hegemon, elected Donald Trump as its president who rose to power based on the triumphs over the rush belt, and

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the rise of Donald Trump has made the globalization to lose its place in the domestic politics. In large, the election of Donald Trump can be deemed as a request for protection upon the state from those marginalized by the globalization, the very concept that established order in the international political economy through the Washington consensus for more than a generation.

The same can be said for the fall of Donald Trump as the administration abandoned a state's responsibility to fend off the pandemic from society. This is doubly so since Trump's chances of re-election was higher before the outbreak. What the white voters of the rust belt wanted in fact was the social protection expected upon the state from economic and public health crises.

The implications of the rise and fall of Donald Trump in international political economy

To catch the meaning of Trump's defeat, it is necessary to look back at what his election in the first place. His footholds of victory were Michigan, Wisconsin, and Ohio, the industrial rust belt in the Midwest. Trump was supported by laborers of the rust belt for his political slogan of America First as they had fallen victims to the globalization. This collectively shows that the United States voters no longer tolerate the foreign policy of the government who assumes as hegemon under the banner of neoliberalism. However, what the former president did not see coming was that the moment had far more profound meaning than 'making America great again.' Rather, it was an inflection point in the state-society relationship, as the globalization was driven further. While citizens supported Trump in the hopes of state's protection upon society, Trump reduced their supports into something personal, even racial. This political reduction was a grave miscalculation against the

voters' support. Many U.S. citizens, who would usually have said against government regulations, expected the state to take actions against the pandemic. Trump's efforts did not meet their eyes. The administration failed to hold responsibilities for the protection of society in numerous aspects. The failure was one of the biggest factors that contributed to Trump's defeat.

What the white laborers of the rust belt who put Trump into power in 2016 truly wanted was not white supremacy but social responses from the state. Under the pandemic, the response would be the government's carrying out necessary measures and not shifting responsibility to individuals. Trump's victory four years before and defeat this time indicate the political spout of those rust belt laborers. While the former president succeeded in converting the voices of the marginalized into his own political assets, yet he failed to grasp the true meaning. Such nonfeasance has led to Trump's defeat in the next election.

Changes in the United States' domestic foothold for foreign policy

The election of Donald Trump as president meant changes in the state-society relationship within the United States. At the same time, it was a turning point for the international system to transform as well. A foreign policy of a state runs and maintains based around its domestic background. In a liberalistic point of view, a foreign policy is an outward projection of the identity and benefits of domestic social groups. On the other hand, in the perspective of international relations, a foreign policy depends on the status of the state within an international system. According to Peter Gourevitch, a foreign policy of a state is subject to the international environment,

which is named 'the second image reversed.'² As per his theory, changes in public opinion do not necessarily lead to transitions in the foreign policy but are, in many cases, rather subject to the international system. However, this is not the case for a hegemonic state, where its domestic changes can lead to shift in the foreign policy, thereby bringing about transition in the international system. What happened during the Trump administration is a disclosure that the domestic changes of a hegemonic state accelerate the systemic changes in foreign policy.

The domestic change of a hegemonic state is distinctive in that it becomes the initiating/turning point for the system's change. For a hegemonic state, 'the second image,' according to Kenneth Waltz, can function as a driving force for the international system to change.³ The second image reversed, suggested by Gourevitch, has comparatively less to do with a hegemonic state. As for a hegemonic state such as the United States, the changes within can be said as a reason that brings about changes in the international system. Yet, it is imperative that we consider the endogeneity that the domestic society of hegemonic state also came from the globalization. In this timeline, globalization influenced the domestic society, and the voices of those marginalized within a hegemonic state accumulates to give rise to changes in domestic politics. The changes in the domestic politics directly affect transitions in the international system by altering the foreign policy of the hegemonic state. The U.S.-China conflict, as estimated in the influence war theory, was already expected due to the rapid economic and military growth of China. However, its actual trigger is based on the state-societal change. Again, there is a distinctive characteristic about the changes in the domestic society of a hegemonic state in that they cause alterations to the international system. The second image reversed mostly applies to non-hegemonic states, and the magnitude of influence will likely differ depending on the status of individual state.

The COVID pandemic and acceleration of state-society relationship change

In the end, the changes in state-society relationship within hegemonic states, which triggered the U.S.-China strategic competition, are likely to amplify due to the pandemic. The era of a new normal, in the meantime, will reverse the world from the hands of neoliberal globalization and accelerate protectionism. This would have been even so had Trump been re-elected. On the contrary, President Biden, who turns to multilateral cooperation, also called for America First and is supported by the rust belt, which binds him to listen to the region's industry.

The most crucial and obvious issue for the past year has been the COVID-19. Numbers have been updated in real time while a majority of citizens stuck to government instruction in this war with the virus. The government came to the front to control the daily life of its people through disinfection and vaccination. Such mobilization of resources can only be done at the state level. The war with the coronavirus cannot be left to the hands of market nor enterprises since governmental actions are comparatively efficient. This quasi-war time pandemic has now given the government an unprecedented power to control. The situation has also brought about "rally 'round the flag" effect. The effect, which can also be referred to as patriotic, is a theoretical explanation as to people supporting the party in power to overcome crises. The effect was observed and proved in many nations even in the crisis.⁴ The party

2. Peter Gourevitch, "The second image reversed: the international sources of domestic politics," *International Organization* 32, 4, Autumn 1978.

3. Kenneth Waltz, *The Theory of International Politics*, McGraw-Hill, Boston, 1979.

4. Yam et al., "The rise of COVID-19 cases is associated with support for world leaders," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, volume 117, No 41, 2020, National Academy Sciences, pp. 25429–25433.

in power in was a beneficiary of this patriotic effect in the general election in April 2020.

As people directly ask for the state to take bold actions to protect them in times of the pandemic, so fumed is the political skepticism about the neoliberal globalization. This leads to the accelerated changes in state-society relationship. Historically, the worldwide state-societal change in 1930 triggered by the Great Depression of 1929 was social revolt against the transition that was projected through market after the Industrial Revolution, as Karl Polanyi says. Domestically, this led to the spread of Keynesianism.⁵ Internationally, this was connected to embedded liberalism, first coined by John Ruggie, as the concept of international political economic system after World War II.⁶

The movement of capital, which used to be subject to Bretton Woods system, became brisk after the 1970s according to the neoclassical Chicago School of economics. From the 1980s came the neoliberal globalization led by the privatization of governmental wings, and the globalization of trade and finance. For the past 40 years, the world has weaved its own highly interdependent realm based around the globalized trade and financial connections of neoliberalism. However, as the negative aspects of globalization worsen, those who were victimized began to raise their political voices. The 1999 laborers' protest against WTO in Seattle drew attention from across the globe, where protesters spoke out against globalization claiming that it sacrificed majority for the sake of few wealthy minority. It is no doubt that for the past 40 years since the globalization the wealth inequality has become severer. No economic choice occurs without cost, and so does the choice for globalization. Laborers working in fields without comparative advantage have suffered massive damage, and the resentment has led to the election of Trump in the U.S. and Brexit in the United Kingdoms.

The fact that such democratic resistance against the

neoliberalism occurred in the U.S. and the U.K., the very place of origin for the idea, indicates that the trend of neoliberal globalization is way ahead of the inflection point and is nearing critical point.

Paul Krugman, Nobel prize winner and economist, recently said in a New York Times editorial on the passing of the American Rescue Plan Act, "The era of 'the era of big government is over' is over."⁷ He sees that the Republicans' could not help but watch the passing which would not have been the case because such rescue is now so popular beyond political factions. The economist writes the passing is a sign that the United States turned away from the conservatism that has ruled over the domestic politics for the past 40 years though he is not sure what sparked the turning. It may be that the pandemic we now face has caused the most serious unemployment and recession since the Great Depression. Of course, there have been several crises between now and then, but never that which caused so huge a change in the state-society relationship. Thus, the COVID crisis is interpreted to have left a massive impact on the current generation, one so huge and extent to convulse the existing international political economy.

A state's power over the society, which became bulky after wars, has political and institutional inertia. Even after the crises has been dealt with by mobilizing its public, the intervention of state will still remain. Therefore, the reach of a state in an era of crises have been enlarged. The accelerated change in the state-society relationship is likely to last even after the virus has been put under control. Social welfare has seen a drastic increase in the cost, and

5. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, Farrar & Rinehart, 1944.

6. John Ruggie, "International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order," *International Organization*, 1982, 36, 2, pp. 379-415.

7. Paul Krugman, "Ending the End of the Welfare as We Know It", *Opinion*, New York Times, March 11, 2021

this also is likely to remain high for some time being. The change in the state-society relationship also implies the same in government-market relationship. As the society's demand for the role of state grows bigger in a democratic manner, voices will add against the unregulated market situation. An example of this is the growing public opinion in Korea to abolish short selling. At Wall Street, the collective investment of independent traders is seemingly transforming the place.⁸ This shows that haute finance, as Polanyi said, is now under the influence of democracy.

Conclusion: The need for a new international agreement for sustainable peace and inclusive prosperity

The discontent accumulated in the progress of the neoliberal globalization demanded a refreshment in the existing state-society relationship. The unprecedented unemployment and displacement triggered by the outbreak of COVID-19 led to an accelerating shift in the relationship between state and society as it required reinforced social welfare and protection by the state. The world is experiencing such aftermaths as reshoring, a major change in the global value chain. While many nations are returning to protectionism, that too cannot be any sound resolution to the pandemic and the harmful effect wrought by globalization. Protectionism is historically doubtful in that the failure in international cooperation in the 1930s after the Great Depression led to beggar-thy-neighbor policy, which further intensified and expanded the depression worldwide only to cause World War II. With borders closed as they are, protectionism will gain strength, and this might lead to nationalism, a closed one. While such concern can be dispelled believing that information technology exists to support communications over the globe, the

disinformation and misinformation rampaging online may still serve as causes for ideological extremism. What we need now is an international agreement for sustainable peace and inclusive prosperity, one that heals the scars of the neoliberal globalization. Political decisions are needed to set a new direction so that we will be able to discern the risk. Above all, a firm commitment at the state level is necessary to reach the new international agreement.

March 30, 2021

8. The Economist, "The Real Revolution on Wall Street," Leaders, Feb 6th, 2021.

Big Data Analysis on the International Society's Response to Taliban and the United States

Abstract

Since the Taliban's occupation of Kabul, major countries are urgently transporting refugees trying to escape Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and Kabul Airport is running into chaos with less than five days left until August 31, when US forces will withdraw completely. While US President Biden has maintained his firm stance on ending the war in Afghanistan and adhering to the deadline for withdrawal, the US domestic and international community have different views on the US decision to withdraw. This manuscript examines the international community's attitude toward the Taliban and the US government after the Taliban's occupation of Kabul on August 15 through article analysis of using GDELT.

*Opinions included hereby do not necessarily align with JPI's perspectives.

1. Introduction

Arms forces of the Taliban took over the capital city of Kabul in Afghanistan on August 15, and President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan fled overseas. This happened in only three months after the US Forces and NATO armies' withdrawal began in earnest last May. The Afghanistan War that lasted for 20 years ended with the United States' defeat. Over 2,400 US soldiers were killed, and a budget of over USD 1 trillion (approximately KRW 1,176 trillion) was put to use.

It is now about ten days from the Taliban's occupation of Kabul. Major states are hurrying to accept those who wish to escape from Afghanistan. With less than five days until the complete withdrawal of the US Forces,

that is until August 31, Kabul Airport is in chaos. A Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT Project)² is used for the article to investigate the response of international society on Taliban and the US Government after the occupation of Kabul on August 15. GDELT Project offers data about events searchable on Google. The data cluster includes not only articles from major sources, but also all the public


1. Ryu, Kieun is a post-doctoral research fellow of JPI. Ryu studied at Seoul National University, Department of Political Science and International Relations for bachelor's and master's degrees and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science at University of Iowa in the U.S. Major fields of interest include international laws, international treaties, propagation of policy and treaty, and the initiation and observation of human rights treaty of authoritarian states.
2. The GDELT Project (<https://www.gdeltproject.org/>)

announcement and news shown in Google News. There are more than 2.5 billion articles in the GDELT database that have been accumulated since January 1, 1979, with an update cycle of 15 minutes. The time range of this research is from August 10 to August 24, around August 15 when the Taliban took over Kabul.

2. Responses from major states and international organizations on Taliban's occupation over Kabul

As shown in [Graph 1], as the Taliban occupied Kabul on August 15, the number of articles about the Taliban rapidly increased from the next day. There were about 1,700 articles mentioning the Taliban on August 14. Two days later, on August 16, the number tripled to 5,000.

[Graph 1] Trend in the number of articles regarding Taliban




The content of articles differed depending on the state mentioned along with the Taliban. [Graph 2] shows the comparative number of articles where Taliban is depicted in a negative tone. It was found that the number of articles with a negative tone was extremely high when the Taliban was mentioned together with the United States. The number is also on the increase after the Taliban's takeover of Kabul on August 15. On the other hand, the number of

negative articles regarding other states saw a momentary rise on August 16, the second day of occupation, and decreased again. Especially, a fewer number of articles were reported in negative tones from China (CHN) compared to the articles on August 16 from the US (USA), the UK (GBR), and Russia (RUS).

While most of the world showed concerns immediately after the Taliban's occupation, China was careful to make an immediate statement. It even advocated China on the 21st.

According to China Central Television (CCTV) on August 21, State Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi said in a telephone call with Luigi Di Maio, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, "The decision about the future of Afghanistan should be made by the Afghan people and respected by all parties." He stressed that "Afghanistan should not be judged by the standards of the Western world."³ This is in line with China's principle of non-intervention.

[Graph 2] Number of articles with negative tone on Taliban



While international organizations (IGO) including the United Nations are criticizing the Taliban, the number of

3. Yonhap News article about China advocating Taliban for two days in a row... on Aug 21 (<https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20210821019100083>)

articles is relatively fewer than that of the states. Antonio Guterres, Secretary-General of the UN concerned that the withdrawal of the US Forces, and the resurfacing of Taliban may reinforce the influence of armed Islamic groups in Sahel, West Africa, and South Africa. Michelle Bachelet, High Commissioner for Human Rights also made a statement on August 24 saying, “The rapid seizure of much of the country, including the capital, by the Taliban has raised grave fears of a return to past patterns of human rights violations, and stoked desperation among many Afghans.”⁴

3. The United States' responsibility for the Taliban's occupation of Kabul


The United States spent more than USD 1 trillion to train and support Afghan Armed Forces for the past 20 years, only to decide troop withdrawal for the sake of the national interest of the US President Biden said in his speech on August 16, “Our only vital national interest in Afghanistan remains today what it has always been: preventing a terrorist attack on the American homeland. I’ve argued for many years that our mission should be narrowly focused on counterterrorism – not counterinsurgency or nation-building.”

Biden also criticized the government and army of Afghanistan who could not cover their vulnerability despite the 20 years of support. In fact, the reason why the Taliban were able to swiftly occupy Kabul was because of the deep-seated issues in the Afghanistan leadership, some even worsened over the 20 years: low morale, desertion, corruption, ethnic factionalism, substandard barracks, and too much dependence of Afghan forces on the US special ops forces.⁵ Even worse, Afghan forces have refused to fight the Taliban, sold classified information, and even weapons and

equipment. The people of Afghanistan have long discarded their trust on the Afghan Armed Forces. The Afghan leadership believed the United States will never leave them and spent the budget for their own good without any reforms in the military nor the government.⁶

Aside from the corruption incompetence of the Afghan leadership, there are criticisms from the international society on the US Forces as they pushed ahead troop withdrawal, leaving behind Afghanistan for the Taliban to take over. The graph below shows how international society’s response to the US government changed after the Taliban’s occupation of Afghanistan on August 15.

[Graph 3] Number of articles in a negative tone about the US after Taliban’s occupation over Kabul



According to the graph, the number of articles in a negative tone from the UK, China, And Russia increased after the occupation. Especially, the numbers keep on increasing in the UK and China. I also look into articles with sentences that ‘criticize’ or ‘denounce’ the


4. The Korea Economic Daily article about UN stating seriousness of Taliban’s human rights violation on Aug 25 (<https://www.hankyung.com/international/article/2021082562147>)

5. “Why the Taliban Won And What Washington Can Do about It Now”, 2021.8.17, Foreign Affairs (<https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20210817109600083>)

6. Why America keeps building corrupt client states, 2021.8.22, The Economist (<https://www.economist.com/international/2021/08/22/why-america-keeps-building-corrupt-client-states>)

US. [Graph 4] shows the result.

[Graph 4] Trend in the number of articles critical about the US.



According to the graph, articles critical about the US were found mostly in China, Iran, and the UK. Considering that the United States is in competition with China and hostility with Iran, it is interesting to find out that the UK, an ally, is showing an increasing number of criticism. China and Iran used the Afghan situation as a means to stand out the United States' failure. According to New China News Agency, State Councilor Wang Yi criticized the Afghan intervention of the United States on Aug 16 local time, "It has been proven again that a foreign model cannot be forcibly applied to another state with a different history, culture, and sentiment. A regime cannot stand on its own without the support of people. Military power alone does not solve a problem; it only worsens." On the other hand, he also mentioned, "The troop withdrawal of the US in a hurry left a severely negative impact on the Afghan politics." Iran, also supposedly pleased about the withdrawal of the US Forces, made a presidential statement of Ebrahim Raisi emphasizing that "the Afghan crisis is the defeat of the US."⁷

Meanwhile, the US allies in Europe are also giving out criticism. When President Biden said on the 24th that the US would stick to its plan to withdraw until the end of August, the European allies showed concerns.

The Guardian prospected that it is "likely to heighten criticism that America is abandoning Afghan partners to the Taliban." Charles Michel, President of European Council said, "the G7 leaders' meeting showed concerns about the time of withdrawal." However, as the US refused their pleas to extend the deadline, European media reported that the G7 session had 'failed.'

Especially, the public criticism of Tony Blair, former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom who decided for the troop's dispatch to Afghanistan 20 years ago, was a hot issue. According to BBC, Blair said in his statement through an official website that the troop withdrawal was "a tragic and risky decision. The decision was driven by imbecilic slogan about ending 'the forever wars.'" He also said that the withdrawal would have every jihadist group around the world cheering, with Russia, China and Iran taking advantage. He also added that anyone given commitments by Western leaders would understandably regard them as unstable currency.⁸

The decision to withdraw from Afghanistan might have been inevitable considering the national interest of the United States. As Biden pointed out, with the Afghan leadership and the Afghan Armed Forces lacking any will to protect themselves, one more year of station (or even five) would not make any difference. Despite all the justifications, the United States faces a burst of criticism from both its competitors and allies alike. To China, Russia, and Iran, the withdrawal has become a symbol of 'the United States' failure.' At the same time, to the allies of NATO and the people of Afghanistan, the decision was an act of abandonment against human rights and democracy.

7. Yonhap News article about China stressing the 'United States' failure' on Aug 17 (<https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20210817109600083>)

8. Yonhap News article on Tony Blair on Aug 21 (<https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20210823041500009>)

