

Peace & Policy
Dialogue
in Northeast Asia

Jeju Peace Institute Research Series [1]

Inaugural Conference of the Jeju Peace Institute

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Dialogue
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Preface

This book is a collection of papers presented at the Inaugural Conference of the Jeju Peace Institute, which was held on September 21-23, 2006. The Inaugural Conference was designed to commemorate the inauguration of the Jeju Peace Institute, with its principal objective being to bring together top experts on peace and security, so that they could exchange views on peace and common prosperity in Northeast Asia. The Inaugural Conference was intended to serve as a forum for the exchange of views on cooperation in Northeast Asia from which a consensus would be reached. It was hoped this forum would serve to lay a cornerstone necessary for promoting Northeast Asian cooperation.

In order to meet that goal, the following issues were addressed in depth. First, the concept of peace and the emerging security issues were comprehensively reviewed in order to seek joint efforts to address concerns on human security. Second, a range of perspectives regarding the six-party talks was shared to help find a solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis, and measures were proposed to build up cooperation in Northeast Asia as well as to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula. Third, the feasibility of Jeju becoming a facilitator for joint efforts toward multilateral security and prosperity in Northeast Asia was examined to seek possible ways of promoting Jeju Island as a peace hub of Northeast Asia. Lastly, the issue of the role of the Jeju Peace Institute in building

networks among experts engaged in Northeast Asian cooperation and world peace was examined.

In publishing the proceedings of the Inaugural Conference of the Jeju Peace Institute, we would like to extend our deep-felt, sincere appreciation to all those who took part in this constructive collaboration. Without their sincere contributions, it would have been impossible for this kind of collective effort to bear fruit.

Last but not least, last-minute efforts on the book were made by Dr. Tae-Ryong Yoon, Dr. Bong-Jun Ko, Dr. Seong-woo Yi, Prof. Douglas Hansen, and Ms. Jeongseon Ko. We are grateful for their hard work and dedication.

April 6, 2007

The Organizing Committee of the Inaugural Conference

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PART I

*Opening and
Welcoming Remarks*

Welcoming Remarks

Congratulatory Remarks

Opening Remarks

Keynote Speech

Special Address

Welcoming Remarks

Cae-One Kim

Mr. Lim Chae-jung, Honorable Speaker of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Bjorn Tore Godal, Distinguished Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway who is to deliver a keynote speech on this auspicious occasion, Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen, it's my great honor and pleasure to welcome all of you to this international conference on behalf of the International Peace Foundation (IPF).

I am very glad you have come, especially, here, to Jeju Island. At long last, we see now this year's unusually hot summer is packing to leave and a new pleasant season is greeting us with a smile. Yes, you're granted the privilege to enjoy the beautiful scenery of Jeju Island in this early fall.

Today, IPF intends to celebrate two events at the same time. On the one hand, it purports to domestically and internationally publicize the full-fledged activities of the Jeju Peace Institute (JPI) that was officially launched in March this year. On the other hand, it purports to hold the opening ceremony of the Jeju International Peace Center (JIPEC) that is to run a peace museum.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we have chosen 'Peace and Policy Dialogue in Northeast Asia' as the theme of the first international conference hosted by the Jeju Peace Institute (JPI). Peace is the supreme value human beings are pursuing, and peace is also the precondition for progress in human history made by human will and activi-

ties. Throughout human history and in all parts of this planet, people have been rendering their utmost efforts to attain and establish peace. However, world peace as an ideal still remains to be realized. As we are witnessing the turmoil in the Middle East these days, there have been endless disputes and conflicts in all the regions of the world.

In this difficult situation the best thing we can do is to make persistent efforts to foster conditions for the ultimate attainment of peace. Wars and conflicts originate from conflicting interests embedded in human relations. Therefore, I believe “peace breaks out” only when we human beings make conscious and common efforts ceaselessly so that we can build trust and expand mutual understanding through contacts and dialogues among ourselves. That’s why JPI stresses ‘Peace and Dialogue’ as the theme of the conference. This institute, making this international conference as the starting point, is to have this sort of dialogue continue afterwards.

One of the most important goals of the institute is to propose programs for strengthening security cooperation and stabilizing peace in Northeast Asia. In retrospect, in the early 1990’s Germans accomplished unification by overcoming the East-West division of their country, which symbolized the worldwide ideological confrontation during the Cold War period. However, despite the worldwide trends of declining totalitarianism in the post-Cold War era, we find in Northeast Asia continuing Cold War-style confrontation, conflict and tension in the security field as if a historical clock were stopped here. The Korean peninsula is the very flash-point of such confrontation. Therefore, peace on the Korean peninsula might be the first step towards the attainment of peace in the world as well as in the Northeast Asian region.

JPI hopes to contribute to the achievement of peace in Northeast Asia by developing policy alternatives through research, international conferences and educational programs. I ask for your warm concern and cooperation in this process.

Ladies and Gentlemen, our institute was established on Jeju Island because, more than anything else, Jeju is the symbol that represents the Korean people's yearning for peace. In the past, the Korean peninsula was thrust into the vortex of the ideological confrontation, hegemonic competition and disputes among great powers. As a result, the Korean people were victimized, suffering from external invasions. Bipolarized ideological antagonism forced Jeju people to go through a particularly devastating and miserable incident, the so-called April 3rd Uprising in 1948. The Korean government proclaimed Jeju as "The island of world peace" in January 2005. This official announcement is the very backdrop of the birth of IPF and JPI.

Jeju has favorable conditions that will allow JPI to conduct vigorous international activities. Jeju, with its beautiful natural scenery, has a great potential to evolve into an attractive international resort area. In addition, Jeju is enjoying a special legal status as an international free city. Moreover, as a 'Special Self-Governing Province,' Jeju started to sail towards a bright future from this July.

Ladies and Gentlemen, throughout the conference for today and tomorrow, we are having presentations and discussions on the matter of realizing peace on the Korean peninsula, in Northeast Asia, and in the world. In this vein, we are also holding discussions as to how Jeju Special Self-Governing Province and JPI can contribute to accelerating the process for the attainment of local, regional and worldwide peace. This time we invited highly esteemed scholars and policymakers for the international conference. I am pretty sure that they will provide various good ideas and policy alternatives.

Finally, I hope you will enjoy the beauty of Mother Nature while you're staying on Jeju Island.

Congratulatory Remarks

Su-Hoon Lee

Thank you very much and good morning! I am delighted to be here this morning and have an opportunity to speak to a distinguished audience from countries in the North-east Asian region. First of all, I would like to congratulate Dr. Kim Cae-One, the Chairman of the Korea International Peace Foundation for his able leadership to successfully guide the Jeju Peace Institute since its inception in March of this year. Today's international symposium is a historically significant event that allows the Jeju Peace Institute to be known domestically and internationally, although JPI has already shown its dynamic activities during the past several months. I would also like to congratulate Ambassador Kwon Young Min, the Acting Director and the staff of JPI for successfully organizing this symposium.

Northeast Asia is home to about one-fourth of the world's population and comprises approximately a quarter of the global GDP. Consequently, many futurists predict Northeast Asia will emerge as a new driving force for the global economy.

But as we can observe, both converging and diverging forces are at work in the region. On the plus side, the tide of regionalization is accelerating economic cooperation and integration in the NEA region. Socio-cultural exchanges are very active among countries in the region.

Conversely, this region is also suffering from the diverging

forces of mistrust and friction emanating from past history and differences in socio-political systems among the major powers. These destabilizing factors undermine not only regional harmony and security but also global peace and stability.

A new order in Northeast Asia will depend on the visions and policies of the region's political leaders. The principal players should work to overcome divisiveness and resentment while striving to make this region safer and more prosperous.

President Roh Moo-Hyun and his government launched the Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative to enhance regional cooperation so that we may build sustainable peace and bring greater prosperity to the region. The ultimate goal of the Initiative is to materialize a peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asia by building a regional community of mutual trust, reciprocity, and symbiosis.

Despite the confining structure of great power politics, the ROK can make a positive contribution to smoothing the regional order in Northeast Asia. The NEA Cooperation Initiative is not necessarily about 'the glory of Korea' but a vision for the future regional order. We believe that Korea can facilitate the reconstruction of a new order of peace and co-prosperity through cooperation.

More than anything else, the current, ongoing North Korean nuclear issue has to be resolved through peaceful means. And, to assure peace and stability in the region, multilateral security cooperation also needs to be formulated. To this end, I believe it is important to institutionalize a regional multilateral security dialogue and restore trust among the different parties.

The Six-party Talks is an unprecedented multilateral forum in the Northeast Asian region. As a forum for dealing with very important security issues surrounding North Korean nuclear programs, I believe the Six-party Talks will serve as a good example for the development of a multilateral dialogue mechanism to address regional security concerns.

But, it will take time to completely resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. The multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia

should not be held hostage to the North Korean nuclear issue. We should find ways and means to promote security cooperation and confidence building in Northeast Asia, by establishing a separate 'multilateral security cooperation council in Northeast Asia' consisting of six foreign ministers of the region. The South Korean government is willing to persuade North Korea to enter into such a framework.

For regional peace and stability, all the countries in Northeast Asia should work together. Dialogue and diplomacy should be the major tool to achieve this common goal. Through our joint effort, I hope that we will see a more peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia in the future.

The Jeju Peace Institute is an institution that is established by the vision provided by President Roh Moo-hyun to implement some part of his grand Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative. It will function as a meeting ground to promote research, dialogue and diplomacy of all types in our region. Jeju is a peace island that fits best for serving this purpose.

The Jeju Peace Institute's beginning was not grandiose. But its aspiration for the future is by no means mediocre. Through our joint efforts and cooperation, we can build JPI into one of the world's first-class research centers. Today, we have taken a small but significant first step toward the goal. Congratulations again and thank you very much.

Congratulatory Remarks

Tae-Hwan Kim

Chairman Lim, Chae-Jung, Chairman Lee, Su-hoon, Chancellor Ambassador Cho, Jung-pyo, and former Norwegian Minister Bjorn Tore Godal, distinguished scholars and experts from home and abroad, and ladies and gentlemen!

On March 24, the Jeju Peace Institute for peace research in Northeast Asia had its opening ceremony. It has realized Jeju people's hope for peace. I would like to extend my heartfelt welcome to you for visiting Jeju and attending this international conference in commemoration of its opening. And I would like to express my sincere appreciation to President Kim Cae-One and Ambassador Kwon Yeong-min for hosting the conference in Jeju. Until the proclamation of Jeju as an Island of World Peace, Jeju has overcome severe events in its history including the April 3rd Uprising. All the people in Jeju are said to be victims of the event and deserve the right to discuss peace and human rights. Now, the spirit of peace is to be the spirit of Jeju.

In line with the spirit of peace, Jeju tangerines were sent to people in North Korea, and the Jeju Peace Forum has been held biannually for the discussion on peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. And today, the historic opening of the Jeju International Peace Center is more evidence that Jeju is an Island of World Peace where peace is carried into practice. Therefore, the groundwork has been laid for Jeju's takeoff into the world as a carriage pulled by a pair of

horses, Island of World Peace and Free International City, in the first year of Jeju as a Special Self-Governing Province.

I hope that this international conference will establish a milestone for Jeju to realize its ideals as the Island of World Peace in the 21st century. Once again, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to you for the conference under the theme of "Peace & Policy Dialogue in Northeast Asia." And I wish you, peace-loving people, a great success in your work and future.

Thank you very much.

Opening Remarks

Youngmin Kwon

Your Excellency Lim, Che-Jung, the speaker of the National Assembly, Your Excellency Ambassador Bjorn Tore Godal, Former Minister of Trade and Shipping, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense of Norway, Dr. Lee, Su-Hoon, Chairman of the Presidential Committee on the Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, Governor of Jeju Special Self-governing province Kim, Tae-Hwan, President of Cheju National University Dr. Ko Choong-suk and Ambassador Cho, Jung-pyo, Chancellor of the Institute of Foreign Affairs & National Security and other distinguished guests. I wish to welcome all of you. Especially, I wish to express again my deepest gratitude and utmost respect to the speaker of the National Assembly who has squeezed his heavy commitments to come to this opening and Minister Godal who has come such a long way to attend the meeting.

In this part of the world, if a magpie chatters early in the morning it augurs well for the coming of a very dear and long-awaited guest. In other parts of the world, however, like Europe including Norway, Denmark and Germany where I was ambassador, the bird has been known as one of the mischievous creatures. Even King Harald V of Norway told me that his grandmother was very fretful over her suspicions about who was stealing silverware from the kitchen, even in the royal court in the late 19th century. The bird had taken every scintillating piece of kitchenware up to its nest in

the tree. The suspicions turned out wrong when the tree fell down in the court and the lost silverware came back. However, the magpie has been regarded as an auspicious bird which has heralded the advent of good luck in this part of the world for ages. On my way to this institute, I have heard the birds chirp very loudly for several days. All of you here today are very much welcome. You are really our highly-esteemed and long-awaited companions.

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen! It is my great pleasure and honour to announce the opening of the Inaugural Meeting of the Jeju Peace Institute. Even though the institute is a fledgling in its birth, it has at least strong intentions as well as a determination to become a leading internationally well-known peace institute. After designating and proclaiming Jeju as the "Island of World Peace" in January last year, the Korean government established the institute this March and asked it to fulfill this goal.

The institute is also assigned to perform the duty of contributing to the maintenance of peace, stability and prosperity on the Korean peninsula, and to the security cooperation and economic integration of Northeast Asia. This duty should be illuminated from the perspectives of regional and global dimensions. The institute will, therefore, develop and support a comprehensive program of research, international conferences, educational outreach activities and publications. Thanks to the strengthened and expanded role of Jeju Province as an "International Free Trade Zone" and the first "Autonomous Province" of the country as of the first of July this year, the institute is able to maximize its synergistic effect for peace research and related activities. The institute also makes every effort to become the center for not only regional but also global peace dialogues.

At the gateway of every hamlet, village and town on Jeju Island, it is not difficult to find round monuments of piled stones. The so-called 'Bang~sa~tab' symbolizes the protection of the inhabitants from vices so as to maintain the peace and well-being of the villages. Along with the historical heritage of the Sammu spirit, signifying the absence of three things: beggars, thieves and gates. This shamanism

also encapsulates the very essence of peace in this island which underwent several tragedies in the past. The enhanced peace through reconciliation would be the way to overcome the previous enmity including the “Jeju 4.3 incident.”

Encouraged by the continuous chirping of magpies, we are very much elated to extend our open arms to our guests. The institute will do its utmost to fulfill its task for peace and prosperity through various activities and cooperative efforts. I hope that every participant will be generous enough to support and cooperate with this newly-born institute. This support would be indispensable for stimulating and building an “Institute of Global Proportion” that brings about regional as well as global peace and prosperity.

I want to thank you for your sincere interests in and dedication to the cause. I appreciate your attention.

Keynote Speech

*– Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia
and the Importance of Inter-Korean Affairs*

Chae-Jung Lim

Honorable Kim, Cae-One, president of the International Peace Foundation, Lee, Su-Hoon, president of the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, Kim Tae-Hwan, Governor of the Jeju Special Self-governing province.

Distinguished guests and Scholars from all over the World, including Minister, H.E Bjorn Tore Godal!

Jeju is a place where grief still exists because a large number of innocent Jeju people were killed and sacrificed during the period of ideological confrontation between the right and the left 60 years ago. Not until recently has the truth of the event been revealed after long years of cover-up as the Korean Government undertook a project commemorating the souls of the victims with an official apology. Out of the bitter and sorrowful history of its past, Jeju is now positioned to become an Island of World Peace which will promote peace on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. I deeply appreciate that such an important conference to discuss peace in Northeast Asia is being held on Jeju, the Island of World Peace, with efforts to establish the Asia-Pacific Regional Center for UN Peace Operations which would be an international organization under the

auspices of the UN. In addition, I'd like to express my deep gratitude to the Vice Chancellor of the Jeju Peace Institute, Kwon, Youngmin and others involved who made it possible for me to deliver this speech today.

Introduction

Northeast Asia claims a strategic location that geographically links the powers of China, Russia and Japan, and serves as a gateway connecting the Pacific, Asia and Europe. However, since the Korean peninsula is situated in the center of Northeast Asia, it has played the role of a bridge for cultural exchange between the continents and the Pacific during peace time; but, also due to its geographical location, it has had to weather a great deal of troubles and conflicts caused by the powers in the era of reinventing world orders.

For example, in the competition between imperial countries 100 years ago, Korea had to weather the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War and ultimately endure Japan's colonial rule. After World War II ended, the one-sided decision made by the powers- the U.S and Russia- brought about the tragic division of the Korean peninsula. For half a century since then, the Korean peninsula lay at the juncture of a potential collision between the Capitalist block and the Communist block, being placed in the middle of the Cold War until the Communist block collapsed.

In addition, up until the present time of the post Cold War, the tension among the countries around the Korean peninsula has continued due to an intensification of competition for dominance in Northeast Asia since the end of the Cold War. What's more, the solution to North Korea's nuclear issue is not clear.

The Gravity of Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula

Whether we are able to achieve peace on the Korean peninsula will influence not only the destiny of our seventy million people but also the future of Northeast Asia in a broader sense. If tension were heightened on the Korean peninsula, it might cause neighboring countries to compete on the military front, ultimately leading to a threat to peace in Northeast Asia. In particular, Japan's rearmament, justified as a response to North Korea's threat, might provoke China, resulting in an escalation of military tension between Japan and China, and subsequently a buildup of Russia's military strength in the Far East. In that context, the issue of the role of U.S. troops in Northeast Asia would be the one of the most sensitive issues.

Increased military tension in Northeast Asia would lead to serious difficulty in achieving political and economic stability. On the contrary, if the tension on the Korean peninsula is defused and North Korea becomes an accepted member of the international community, Northeast Asia would be able to find a new way for regional development. Northeast Asia could become a new logistics hub connecting the Pacific and Asia with Europe by a Eurasian railway. The underground resources in Mongolia, Russia's Far East and China are recognized as a source of power to lead the world economy in the future. Moreover, not only is the economy of Japan, one of the top three world trading powers, strengthening along with Korea's, China and Russia are considered to be newly rising economic powers as well. As the political and military tension is reduced in Northeast Asia, the World economy will be affected in a positive way.

Therefore, we should make an unceasing effort to make the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia a so-called international peace zone. Most of all, while solving the North Korean nuclear issue in a peaceful way, to fundamentally eliminate the origin of the tension by assisting with the North's reform and openness will be the first step toward the peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia.

Efforts to Establish Peace on the Korean Peninsula

In past years the South Korean government has persistently pursued various cooperative exchanges with North Korea after deciding to put the first priority on establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula. Since the North-South Joint Declaration on June 15, 2000, we have attained not a few achievements in such fields as diversification of North-South dialogue channels, strengthening of economic-cultural exchanges and cooperation, and regularization of family reunions, which has led to visits to North Korea by more than one million South Koreans. Economic cooperation is also proceeding smoothly through development of the Kaesung industrial complex.

More significant than any other achievement is the belief spreading among Koreans that war will not break out once again in this land. That South Koreans were leading their usual lives without interruption despite North Korea's missile test-firing last July, is an example that shows their belief in and determination for peace.

We witnessed the process of German reunification in 1990 and its political and economic difficulties in the aftermath of that event. What we learned from the German experience is that we should not only minimize the possible disorder resulting from our reunification, but also stabilize the management of the reunification process. In case the North Korean system collapses abruptly, the resultant unexpected development might affect the neighboring states in negative ways. To prevent this situation, we should induce and support the North Korean change and pursue a step-by-step method of reunification.

Wary of any extreme reunification methods, most of the Korean people at the present time are rationally watching reunification as a process. Most people want an incremental and gradual process of reunification through practical exchanges and cooperation and the establishment of peace while not having to worry about the confusion from unprepared reunification. Therefore, gradually inducing

North Korea's change and supporting it are important tasks for stability and economic development on the Korean Peninsula.

Key to Peace on the Korean Peninsula: Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Issue

Distinguished Guests, and Ladies and Gentlemen! Since the North Korean nuclear problem became the pending issue in Northeast Asia, the ROK government has rendered persistent efforts for its peaceful settlement. However, regrettably, the North Korean nuclear issue is yet to be resolved.

Actually, we already came up with solutions through the North-South joint declaration on the nuclear free Korean Peninsula in 1991, the Geneva agreement in 1994, and the joint declaration of September 19 as agreed upon in the Six-party Talks in 2005. The complete dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programs and the normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations agreed upon in the Geneva agreement and the 9.19 joint declaration were the best cards North Korea and the United States could choose. Nevertheless, the two states have worsened the situation by engaging in a series of tugs of war in the process of implementing those agreements.

In my view, the primary reason for the failure is lack of trust between North Korea and the United States. The United States was not sure of North Korea's intentions regarding the relinquishment of its nuclear programs while North Korea did not trust the U.S. guarantee of the North's security. The second reason is the continuation of North Korea's brinkmanship and the raised hawkish voice in the U.S. decision making process.

South Korea is the ultimate country concerned. In case North Korea comes to hold nuclear weapons or the probability of military conflict is heightened, South Korea will be victimized as a result. Among the newly independent countries since World War II, South Korea is the only country that has achieved both democratization

and economic development. We South Koreans take pride in such an achievement and have a strong will to maintain it. Meanwhile, we are also worried about the possibility that such a national attainment will come to nothing due to the security crisis caused by the North Korean nuclear issue.

It is because we can never accept a situation where the national survival is threatened that we, on the principle of peaceful resolution, have urged North Korea and the United States to continue bilateral dialogues and to make reciprocal concessions. Therefore, we are urging the international society to pay heed to our voice and respect our will.

North Korean Missile Tests and the State of Affairs on the Korean Peninsula

North Korea test-fired seven missiles, including one Taepo-dong missile on July 4th. These missile tests gave the international community a great shock and complicated further the already delicate North Korean nuclear issue. Little has been learned regarding the background of the missile tests. However, it is obvious that the North Korean regime has much more to lose than to gain due to the tests.

First of all, due to the tests, the North has become more isolated from the international community. The international community now mostly maintains that the North is strictly accountable for the tests despite the international community's repeated efforts to dissuade it from test-firing. Secondly, the missile tests significantly reduced the tolerance of moderates in the United States and Japan as well as in South Korea.

Finally, even China and Russia, which have been close allies of North Korea, can no longer defend and support North Korea's position unconditionally. In fact, China agreed to the sanctions against North Korea determined by the UN Security Council, and

aligns itself with the international community in financial sanctions through a freeze of a North Korean account in a Macau bank.

After the missile tests by the North, international sanctions against the North have intensified. In addition to the UN Security Council Resolution, Japan and Australia recently announced their own economic sanctions against the North.

Now, it is certain that North Korea must make a wise choice. As this confrontation continues, the situation goes badly for the North. North Korea had better return to the Six-party Talks instead of isolating itself from the international community by raising international tension.

Building 'Peace Gains' and 'Peace Structure' by a 'Comprehensive Approach'

President Roh reaffirmed that the North Korean nuclear issue should be resolved in peaceful and diplomatic ways and agreed to a 'comprehensive approach' for resuming the Six-party Talks in the ROK-US summit on September 14th. I believe that this 'comprehensive approach' can play a vital role in breaking the current impasse on North Korean issues.

For the successful implementation of the approach, it is necessary for the concerned parties to demonstrate to their utmost a positive and flexible attitude and to achieve maximum comprehension of the pending problems. Now is the time not to talk about additional sanctions but to share understandings of ways to manage the situation and work on a possible solution to it.

Japan should take part in an effort to resume the Six-party Talks. I hope that Japan will change its position toward its history and the North Korean nuclear issue before the Abe administration's inauguration. China should also continue and strengthen its efforts to talk North Korea out of its dangerous adventure.

Establishment of a Peace System and Achievement of 'Peace Gains'

Security and peace based on the balance of power are incomplete and may provide another source of relentless tension and conflicts. We need to build a new peace order through cooperation and coexistence, not through the balance of power via arms build-up. The two Koreas and the other four concerned nations will be able to achieve 'peace gains' by cooperatively dealing with the common issue of peace on the Korean Peninsula. Those 'peace gains' will be 1) for North Korea, guarantees for the survival of the regime, energy supplies, and economic aid, 2) for the United States, the accomplishment of a policy goal to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles, 3) for China, uninterrupted economic growth based on stability in Northeast Asia, 4) for Japan, the removal of threats through the establishment of formal relations with North Korea and the solution of North Korean missile issues, 5) for Russia, the expansion of economic benefits through the development of the Russian Far East, and 6) finally, for South Korea, the stabilization of the economy and the increase of economic exchange with the North.

However, resolving problems between the two Koreas is the key to peace and economic prosperity in Northeast Asia. I believe economic benefits from cooperation between countries will prevail against any military-strategic interests of individual countries. The concerned parties should constructively make concessions to follow the principle of peace.

Thank you very much for your courteous listening.

Special Address

*– Toward a Realization of Global Peace & Prosperity
in the 21st Century: What Should We Do?*

Bjorn Tore Godal

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me start by a word of gratitude — and a word of modesty. I sincerely appreciate the kind invitation by the Jeju Peace Institute, probably inspired by my old friend ambassador Youngmin Kwon, who served in Oslo during several of my years as foreign minister of Norway and whom I met again as a diplomatic colleague in Berlin years later. To be thought of as someone who can possibly inspire others in the beautiful resort of Jeju and in the laborious land of Korea is a compliment indeed.

As for the modesty: If I truly knew exactly what we should do to promote global peace and prosperity and was generally renown for my ability to explain the secrecy or wonder to others, I would probably not be ambassador to Berlin, I would be touring the world on constant peace missions. My ambition here today is somewhat more modest, reinterpreting my commitment to be the following: Do I, against my background as minister and diplomat, being part and parcel of Norwegian peace and development initiatives and engagements since the early 1990's, have experiences of lasting value that can be of use to others, globally and regionally? And correspondingly: Why has Norway in recent years been such a desired

facilitator and partner in so many conflicts?

There are those who believe that peace, rule of law and democracy must be brought to other continents and regions of the world in a kind of missionary effort. I do not share that view.

In his Nobel peace prize lecture in Oslo on the 10th of December 2000 former President Kim Dae-Jung said: "In the decades of my struggle for democracy, I was constantly faced with the refutation that western-style democracy was not suitable for Asia, that Asia lacked the roots. This is far from true. In Asia, long before the west, the respect for human dignity was written into systems of thought, and intellectual traditions upholding the concept of "demos" took root. "The will of the people is the will of heaven..." This was the central tenet in the political thoughts of China and Korea as early as three thousand years ago. Five centuries later in India, Buddhism rose to preach the supreme importance of one's dignity and rights as a human being."

Although representative democracy in its present form is originally a western perception, the universal recognition of human rights has its roots in many civilisations. This recognition is a cornerstone in our efforts to build a society based on greater justice, equity and more equal opportunities for all.

Norway believes that without the rule of law, not only will power prevail over justice, but there will also be no prospect of long-term peace and prosperity. Our society has developed on the basis of the rule of law and the legal rights of the individual. Our vision is therefore to help the international community to develop along the same lines. We must increase security and enhance human rights by promoting the rule of law, placing it at the centre of any debate on peace and development, global trade, disarmament and non-proliferation.

After the scourge of the first and second world wars international law went through momentous developments. We saw the same happening in the 1990's. Mass atrocities have called for effective action. Thus, the full development of international human rights

and humanitarian law is a significant legacy of the violent century we have put behind us.

Human rights and international law enjoy a stronger position on paper than ever. But we are constantly reminded that those rights and principles need to be protected, defended and expanded.

Beyond that, history has shown us that we need the extraordinary, decisive efforts that can bring about peace, efforts that can make the difference when lawmakers are not listened to or resolutions are being neglected or seen as irrelevant. How is the global picture? There is some good news. The Human Security Report for 2005 shows that armed conflict, genocide, political crises and human rights abuses have fallen since the end of the Cold War. The number of armed conflicts and the average number of people reported killed as a direct consequence of each conflict have also declined. The decrease in political violence coincides with an increase in international efforts to end conflicts.

Norwegian policy for peace and reconciliation is, in this perspective, part of a general upsurge in conflict-resolution efforts by many countries, as well as in UN preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping missions. International activism seems to be yielding results. In other words, our efforts — your efforts — can make a difference. The bad news is that even though there are fewer conflicts, they are having a more profound effect on our societies. Local conflicts know no borders; they have become a global concern.

Creating peace is an art. It involves values, it involves visions, and it involves personal courage. “You don’t make peace with your friends, you make peace with your enemies,” said Yitzak Rabin. The former Prime Minister of Israel knew what he was talking about. He spoke these words, as we remember, in Washington D.C. during the signing of the first Oslo Agreement in August 1993, having just shaken the hand of PLO leader Yassir Arafat. The pictures of this event, broadcast all over the world, showed how difficult it was for Mr Rabin to make peace with an enemy he had been fighting against for so long. It was no easier for the Palestinians.

Norway has had a prominent role in several peace processes. But I believe we should approach the concept of peace, and the role we can play, with humility. It is not the case that there is something special about the Norwegian soul, our way of thinking or behavior that makes us a more peaceful people than others. Some may give this impression. But it is false. You can go to any neighborhood in Norway, any football team, local council or political party for that matter, and you will soon find that we too can easily become embroiled in conflict. The ships that set sail from Norway during the Viking era were not exactly manned by peace negotiators and development project workers. In those days Norway was associated with violence. So there is nothing special about Norwegians that from the outset made us a peace nation. Let us put that idea aside. Any claim to the contrary would be, in my view, a myth.

But there are a few factors of significance; our geographical situation, the efforts of many generations to build our society and develop international security around us, and — it must be added — a high level of political consensus about major social issues and core values. This consensus is inspired by two historically different traditions: Social democracy and Christianity. First, social democracy is based on the concept of joint responsibility for a joint future. No one becomes worse off when everyone becomes better off. Second, the traditions of solidarity and compassion that are found in both low and high church organizations. Norwegian international development policy, the desire to provide assistance, is based on a high degree of consensus between these movements.

Many Norwegians alive today have experienced war and occupation. But that chapter is now closed. We have been able to move on in peace and reconciliation, even in an alliance with the people who once occupied us. We are not involved in conflicts with other countries. We feel we have a duty and a responsibility to contribute to development and peace for others. The fact that public opinion wants Norway to have an active peace policy is a strength, a strength the Government wants to utilise to realise the concept of

Norway as a peace nation.

I am certainly not here to address specifically the Korean issue, where you are all better qualified than I am. I would, however, like to pay tribute to the remarkable strides that South Korea has made in the decades that have passed. Your economic and political development has created a peaceful and stable South Korea. And while the specific Norwegian challenges related to peace and security to a large extent belong to our past, you are facing these challenges every day. Reaching out to the north, as you have done, says a lot about the empathy and solidarity of South Koreans. In the field of peace, Norway is a far larger actor than the size of its population of 4.6 million inhabitants would indicate:

- We are the seventh largest financial contributor to the UN in absolute figures. Per capita we are the top contributor in almost all relevant UN contexts.
- More than 50,000 Norwegian personnel have taken part in peace-keeping forces over the last 50 years.
- We are involved in a number of peace and reconciliation processes.
- And we contribute a higher portion of our GDP to international development than any other country.

However, in a global context, our contribution is overshadowed by other actors who are far larger. In this perspective it is not the per capita amount that counts. So the truth is that Norwegian efforts in all international contexts depend just as much on our ability to influence others, work with others and share responsibility with others.

There are three tracks that are of paramount importance to Norway's foreign policy: *The first* track is our ambition to strengthen the international rule of law, and we will cooperate with others to find joint solutions to the greatest challenges of our time. Norway — perhaps more than other countries — is best served by a world order that is based on rules, not power. Where the large and power-

ful do not take the law into their own hands, where the use of power is regulated, where trade is subject to shared and predictable rules of play, where we can fight problems like human trafficking and overfishing by strengthening the international regulations. *The second* track is our recognition of where we are and what we need. We want to be the friend of our friends. We want to develop our partnerships with our friends and allies in the Nordic area, in NATO in the European cooperation and across the Atlantic, with the US and Canada. Our friends and allies must know where we stand, so that we also know where they stand in relation to us, in good times and in bad. And *thirdly*, we take action in situations where Norway has the opportunity to contribute towards peace, reconciliation and development. We will play an active role in the UN, and we will show willingness to provide assistance and support for development. And we will look for opportunities where we can make a difference, not in all places, but where we have a strategic point of entry.

Norway's peace policy follows all these tracks. They are interrelated. Much of what Norway does on its own is only possible thanks to the part we play in international cooperation, and through our partnerships and alliances. In several conflicts, Norway has preparatory, complementary and supportive roles to UN efforts. Guatemala is one example. The Middle East is another. Our efforts in the UN have given us credibility. Our peace and reconciliation efforts are built on our close ties with the UN, NATO and European cooperation. Although we have a high-profile role in some conflicts, we more frequently work together with others. Norway's peace efforts are not a one-man show. But there are also a number of conflicts where the UN for various reasons is unable to play a role. And it is particularly in these that countries such as Norway, with extensive resources and strong political resolve and visions, can make a difference. Our involvement in the processes in Sri Lanka, Sudan and the Middle East is well known. Some may also be familiar with the roles we play in the Philippines and Haiti, and, after several years of stag-

nation, we are again taking part in a group of friends to support the peace process between the ELN and the Government of Colombia. We are also involved in processes that are not in the public eye because the issues at stake are sensitive.

What is the trademark of Norway's approach in peace processes? We have identified five factors: firstly, it is important that we are consistent, that the nature of our involvement is clear — even through changes of government in our country. We concentrate our efforts on a small number of processes. We aim to bring these to a successful conclusion. Secondly, we take a long-term approach to our peace efforts. As I have already mentioned, there is broad political agreement on our peace policy, and that is important. When we take on the responsibility to act as a third party in a conflict, we must ensure that we remain a stable element throughout the process and do not give up before it has been completed. The long-term approach also applies to our relations with countries in which we are engaged. In Sudan we have been involved in the peace process since 1998, and we plan to continue to provide support until the interim period comes to an end in 2011. But our engagement in Sudan dates back even further. Norwegian Church Aid and the University of Bergen have been present in the country since the 1960s and Norwegian People's Aid since the 1980s.

Thirdly, we are aware of the interplay between humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and peace efforts. In many cases, the knowledge and contacts that have made it possible to take part in peace processes have developed through our humanitarian activities in conflict areas. This means that when we do take action, we can do so with a broad toolbox.

The fourth element I want to highlight is our cooperation with NGOs, with civil society. I have already mentioned the role played by Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian People's Aid in Sudan. FAFO — the Research Institute of the Norwegian Trade Union Movement — played a key role in the Oslo channel of the Middle East peace process and is an important partner together with Nor-

wegian Church Aid in Norway's peace efforts in Haiti. Norway was asked to take part in the peace process in Guatemala partly as a result of the efforts of Save the Children Norway and Norwegian Church Aid following the earthquake in 1976 and bishop Gunnar Stalsett's efforts in the Lutheran World Foundation.

Norwegian research centres, in particular the Peace Research Institute Oslo, the Norwegian Institute of Foreign Affairs, the Christian Michelsen Institute and FAFO, have made an important contribution as actors, providers of knowledge and network builders. What is particularly characteristic for the Norwegian model in this context is the way in which NGOs are involved. In many cases we work across boundaries, with close cooperation between state and independent actors. We can therefore ensure that as many resources as possible are utilised.

The fifth element is the importance of international cooperation. Our involvement in the UN and our close relations with many of the world's powerful countries are vital for Norway's role in peace efforts. Here credibility and motives are key factors. The importance of Norway not having a colonial past has also been highlighted, but I don't want to place too much emphasis on this point. There are several countries with a colonial history that have played and continue to play an important role in peace processes. The fact that Norway's economic and political interests are unambiguous in most corners of the world is perhaps more significant. This makes it easier for us to convince others that there are no other motives or hidden agenda behind our peace efforts. Due to our track record and our efforts in the international arena we are considered in many situations to be impartial, impartial, but not neutral. Our efforts are value oriented and those values are not kept as a secret. This has made it possible for us to act as facilitator in many contexts.

As facilitator of peace processes, we are often faced with difficult dilemmas. The choice is often between perfect war and imperfect peace. Lasting, viable peace usually means dealing with the past, and how we do this will vary greatly from one country to the

next. But forgetting without recognising and forgiving could undermine the stability of a peace agreement. Peace and justice do not amount to a choice between two paths — rather they are the same path.

Consider the question of amnesty. The challenge, in the short term, is to bring people to the table and silence the guns. But we must be able to act on many levels. It is difficult, for example, to justify allowing perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes to decide the terms of the peace and their own position in the society. This is, of course, a question of justice in its own right. But it is also a question of taking a holistic approach to bringing a country from war to peace. Ensuring justice is a means of alleviating anger, disclosing the truth and — most important — giving a clear message of what kind of society we want to build.

We want to lay the foundation for societies that do not discriminate, that do not instigate hatred. We want societies that are built on the rule of law, that are based on democratic institutions, and that protect every person's right to pursue his or her own happiness. We want societies that enable everyone to live in accordance with their own view of what gives life meaning and value. In short, we want societies that are based on respect for human rights.

Maintaining a strong and effective defence force is part of Norway's policy for peace. The fact that we have not needed to actively use our defence force to ensure peace within our borders for more than half a century does not mean that we do not need a strong defence. On the contrary, Norway's defence forces, together with our alliance commitments and rights, have secured peace in our country. And this has contributed to peace on our continent.

Some people maintain, and I listen to what they are saying, that it is a paradox that Norway — a peace nation — has 500 military personnel in Afghanistan, and even fighter aircraft. I do not agree. We have responded to an appeal from the democratically elected Afghan President and the democratically elected Afghan national assembly. We are not there to make war, but to help a state that is

impoverished and broken down by war and violence to start on the difficult path towards peace and development. We want to help to give the Afghan people the security they need to build this path and then to walk along it. We do not know if we will succeed. But we know that if we do not try to help, they will not succeed — and nor, in the end, will we.

The suicide bombers in London — a city visited by half a million Norwegians every year- were terrorists who had been trained in the Afghan mountains. Disbanding these groups will improve our security too. And the heroin that is sold on the streets of Oslo and elsewhere worldwide, and that we desperately hope our children will keep away from, comes from Afghanistan. The opium farmers will not grow other crops unless they are able to work in peace, are given support for new irrigation systems and have the opportunity to sell their produce. This is why we are needed there — for our sake too.

The UN has a role to play at all stages of a conflict, from before violence breaks out, to peace operations, support in the transition period following a peace agreement to long-term development and institution building with a view to ensuring lasting peace. We support the UN, but we are the friend of our friends in this area too. Friends tell each other when things are not as they should be. A good friend does not give blind, uncritical support. We are promoting necessary reforms in the UN. We must not allow the situation to arise where those that support the UN the least are setting the agenda for how the UN should be developed. Three areas are currently being examined: development, the environment and emergency relief. The Norwegian prime minister Jens Stoltenberg is one of three co-chairs on a reform panel that will submit its report this autumn. The panel is an important opportunity to examine UN efforts as a whole: What are we achieving? Are our efforts fragmented? Are the UN agencies pulling in the same direction?

Many of the major challenges of our time should be dealt with within a multilateral framework. Whether or not that framework

will be successful in Sudan remains to be seen, but we must do what we can. The conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians is one such challenge. Iran's development of a nuclear programme is another. I am convinced that at some point the problems in Iraq will have to be solved by the world community, probably by the UN. In this connection, Europe offers an interesting example from recent history. Collective security, economic and development organisations have brought about lasting peace in my continent. Asian regional organisations have played a stabilising role indeed. The role of interregional cooperation was very recently highlighted during the Asian-EU Summit in Helsinki, Finland, where President Rho Moo-hyun played a prominent role. The European Community (now the EU), NATO, the CSCE (now the OSCE) have taken different approaches, but have shown that a need for security on one side does not automatically make the other side feel insecure, in contrast to what we are seeing in the broader Middle East. As we seek to find solutions to the broader Middle East issues, we should keep these lessons in mind.

I would like to say a few final words about dialogue. For we hope that peace processes reach a stage where dialogue is possible. Some people have maintained that dialogue is a soft option for those who do not have the will, the courage or the ability to meet resistance with power. I disagree. One of the most dangerous things in the world today is the absence of dialogue.

We are in a fight against terror, and as I go about my life as a citizen in our society, I want to feel confident that the police and the security and intelligence units are making sure that it is safe to walk along streets and take the metro. But we cannot resolve complex conflicts that stem from social, economic and religious issues with special forces alone.

Being willing to enter into a dialogue is not a sign of weakness. On the contrary. Dialogue is based on values and principles; it is the strategy of the brave. Dialogue opens doors. Dialogue builds bridgeheads not positions of defence. People must meet — face to

face, around a table. They must be able to see this prospect, this alternative, somewhere ahead of them.

Excellencies, dear friends! I have concentrated on current challenges and unresolved problems. Are there success stories we could focus on to have some guidance in our concerns globally and regionally? That could inspire optimism? I believe so. Let me mention the two most prominent examples from our time.

The road to German unification and democracy and the South African liberation from racial and social oppression to reconciliation are such stories. None of those developments had been described in the textbooks of political recipes. But they both in the final analysis cemented human rights and democracy, not through violence, but through processes of dialogue, confidence building measures — and popular mobilisation of social forces.

Reading Nelson Mandela's biography, we see clearly that he could have pursued the path of violence when he was released from prison. He would have received overwhelming support from the angry, suppressed black population. But he asked people to turn their backs on "the grave insult to human dignity," as he referred to apartheid in his Nobel Peace Prize address in 1993. Nelson Mandela chose the path of dialogue, the path of peace, the path of values. And by making this choice, he probably saved South Africa from a devastating civil war. He knew that it is a brave leader who chooses a political solution sooner rather than later. Even in a situation seeped in suspicion, mistrust and internal political strife.

Germany is a different story. Wise leadership, Willy Brandt's "ostpolitik," popular pressure and the democratic example of the Federal Republic of Germany brought down the dictatorship of the German Democratic Republic. It is true: History has shown us that there are crossroads where aggression must be met by firm military measures, World War II being a prime case in point. But divided nations and social turmoil are not wisely handled in that fashion. The wounds will be too big and the suffering too immense. It is a

sad fact that the parties in most conflicts do not seek dialogue and negotiations until it is too late. "Too late" means too many deaths, too many injuries, too many people who are marked for life by violence. People who are unable to make the world a better place for their children. These are the lessons we must learn.

Leaders with courage and foresight have been successful in both Germany and South Africa. Elsewhere we are muddling through with mixed success and too often failure. But there is no other way. Peace and prosperity can only be brought about if we join forces in learning from the past in order to seek strategies for the future. I congratulate you on your splendid initiative to establish the Jeju Peace Institute and wish you every success in your endeavours!

PART II

*Peace Research
and Action Global:
Trends in the 21st Century*

Globalization and Human Security

Peace and Security in Contemporary Conditions

New Roles of Actors in Peace Activities in the 21st Century:
States, NGOs and Enlightened Individuals

Globalization and Human Security

Luc Reyhler

In 2005, several reports on the state of conflict, peace and human security suggested that the world has become a safer place; that violent conflicts were diminishing. Reyhler claims that these positive trends are no grounds for unqualified optimism about the future of world peace, because of the unreliable and incomplete nature of statistics; the greed and profits derived from armed violence; the continuing ignorance of environmental problems; the reactive nature of conflict prevention, and; the neglect of the impact of globalization on human security. In recent years, several books and articles have addressed the negative impacts of globalization on human security. In particular, it has been observed that globalization has increased specific threats and grievances; strengthened the opportunity structure for mobilization and violent strife, and; provoked inadequate responses of the rich and powerful. The U.S.-led 'war on terrorism' has been very counterproductive. Illustrative are the developments in Iraq, Lebanon and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A plea is therefore made for a radically new policy for sustainable peace building. This implies a new mindset, a critical mass of peace building leadership and enhanced professionalism.

I. A Careful Analysis of Good News

Recent reports observe significant progress in conflict prevention, peace building and human security. In their 2005 yearbook, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) recorded 19 major conflicts.¹ Furthermore, the

'Peace and Conflict 2005' report of Monty Marshall and Ted Gurr showed a marked decrease of major armed conflicts in the Post Cold War era.² This decline in the global magnitude of armed conflict, following a peak in early 1990's, has persisted and few of the many societal wars contained in the last decade have resumed. Indeed, major societal wars are down from twelve at the end of 2002 to eight in the early 2005; most of the democratic regimes established during the 1980's and the 1990's have endured despite political and economic crises; ethno-national wars for independence, which were the main threat to civil peace and regional security in the 1990's, have continued to decline to their lowest level since 1960, whilst; repression and political discrimination against ethnic minorities, as surveyed by V.Asal and A.Pate, has declined significantly, coinciding with the dramatic decline in autocratic regimes since the late 1980's.

These findings are supported by A. Mack's human security report 'War and Peace in the 21st Century.'³ In his report, Mack notes the following trends: the number of armed conflicts has declined by more than 40% since 1992; the deadliest conflicts (1000 or more battle-deaths in a year) dropped by 80%; the number of military coups and attempted coups has declined by some 60% since 1963 (in 2004, there were ten attempts and all failed); the drop in armed conflicts in the 1990's was associated with a worldwide decline in arms transfers, military spending and troop numbers; wars have become dramatically less deadly over the past five decades (the average number of people reported killed per conflict per year has dropped from 38,000 in 1950 to just 600 in 2002), and; the number of genocides and politicides has plummeted by 80% between a 1989 high point and 2001. In fact, international terrorism is the only form of political violence that

¹ SIPRI, Yearbook 2005, Stockholm.

² Monty Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, 'Peace and Conflict 2005,' Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2005.

³ Andrew Mack, 'Human security report,' University of British Columbia, 2005.

appears to be getting worse. Mack attributes these improvements to the end of colonialism (colonial wars made up 60-100% of all international conflicts, depending on the year), the end of the Cold War (one-third of all conflicts were proxy wars), and to the upsurge of international activities designed to stop ongoing wars and to prevent new ones. Examples of increased international efforts include: a six-fold increase in the UN preventive diplomatic missions (to prevent wars), a four-fold increase in UN peacemaking missions (to end ongoing conflicts), a four-fold increase in UN peace operations (to reduce the risk of wars restarting) and an eleven-fold increase in the number of states subject to UN sanctions (which aimed at pressuring parties into peace negotiations). In addition to the UN, several other actors joined the effort, including the World Bank, regional organizations, donor states and a plethora of NGO's. However, despite the seemingly good news, the authors of these reports make clear that there are no grounds for complacency. 'The positive trends are no ground for unqualified optimism about the future of world peace.'⁴ I share this cautious attitude for several reasons.

First, there is the problem of inadequate violence statistics. Such statistics are unreliable and incomplete, as a great deal of physical violence never reaches the statistics. This is especially true for second and third class victims. First class victims receive a great deal of attention. The cameras zoom in on their suffering and there are accurate updates on the number of people killed or maimed. For example, in Iraq, up until March 16, there were 2,318 killed and 16,653 wounded American soldiers. Similarly, in the last six years, we know that 427 Israelis have died in 58 suicide attacks. However, the second class victims, such as the Palestinians, are treated with less precision and at a greater distance. Moreover, the third class receives barely any attention. Thanks to the estimations of the medical journal "The Lancet" we can guesstimate that in Iraq approximately 100,000 Iraqi civilians died; in Congo between 3 and 4 mil-

⁴ M. Marshall and T.Gurr; op cit, p. 1.

lion died; in Chechnya, the estimates are around 100,000. These people have no face. They don't receive much attention.

The second problem with these reports is the use of a narrow definition of violence, which is defined solely in terms of people killed or maimed by weapons. A more complete picture defines violence as shortening the life expectancies of certain groups of people, not only with arms, but also by other means of violence, such as structural violence, psychological violence, ecological violence, bad governance (bad governance kills), and extra-legal transnational activities⁵ (such as trade of drugs, weapons, people and precious resources).⁶ To prevent violence and build peace more efficiently, we need to learn to listen to the violence. A significant amount of denial remains.

A third reason for caution is the continuing greed and profits derived from armed violence.⁷ If wars were costly for the stakeholders in a conflict, they would have disappeared a long time ago. Profiteering from political violence has many names: military industrial complex (MIC), fatal transactions, predatory regimes, conflict profiteers, peace spoilers, global shadow networks of exploitation, mercenaries, destructive minorities, imperialists, colonialists and neo-colonialists. Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler call it greed.⁸ They consider greed as a major predictor of civil war. Research should not only focus on actors who make use of violence (just war) to bring an end to aggression, repression, exploitation or occupation, but also on the actors who pursue their self-interests in conflicts and thereby — directly or indirectly — contribute to the esca-

⁵ Carolyn Nordstrom, *Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century*, 2004, University of California Press.

⁶ Luc Reyhler, 'Challenges of Peace Research,' in *International Journal of Peace Studies*, June 2006.

⁷ Luc Reyhler, 'The Benefits of Violence,' paper presented at the Centre for Peace and Human Security, Science Po, Paris, 8.12.2005.

⁸ Paul Collier et al, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, 2003, Oxford University Press. Rebellion is the use of resources to exploit others for an economic gain.

lation and prolongation of the conflict. War profiteers create a disintegrative climate, corrupt politicians, steal resources, enhance unequal relations and support authoritarian or anocratic regimes. They pursue economic-, political-, psychological- and moral-profits (4 P's). *Economic profits*: Carolyn Nordstrom estimates that violence generates trillions of dollars profits 'The cosmopolitan centers in the world depend in part on "shadow economics and politics," and are intricately linked to wildcatting in warzones.'⁹ *Political profits*: conflicts are used to manipulate fear and angst, to rally people around the flag, justify occupation and repression, or build political careers. *Moral profits*: conflicts can be used to raise the level of moral permissiveness, to legitimize their own violence and to de-legitimize the violence committed by others. *Psychological profits*: they use violence to generate feelings of superiority, hubris and of being the fittest. Chris Hedges, describes war as 'a force that gives meaning.'¹⁰ Probably, the best book written on the psychology of violence is Franz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*. Fanon gives the reader a deep understanding of the psychology of outrage, frustration and violence of the oppressed.¹¹

A fourth factor which advises caution is the critical environmental problems and the spread of untenable life-styles. Jared Diamond describes in his book, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*, twelve problems — varying from the destruction of natural habitats and the finite sources of energy to the per capita footprint of different people on the environment — as time bombs with fuses of less than fifty years.

A fifth reason for caution is the fact that most of the interventions are reactive rather than proactive, and that the means available for conflict prevention are insufficient. The yearly budget for conflict

⁹ Carolyn Nordstrom, op cit.

¹⁰ Chris Hedges, *War is Force That Gives us Meaning*, 2002, Public Affairs, New York.

¹¹ Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Les damnés de la terre, 1963), Grove Press, New York.

prevention and peace building is less than one percent of the yearly expenditures of the members of the international community for their own security. The Millennium goals and the requested means are a mere pittance; they will not reduce the tensions.

Finally, we should be careful because globalization is raising expectations and increasing the awareness of inequalities within and between states, and thereby amplifying feelings of relative deprivation. The disparities between the core countries and the gap countries are vast and are expected to increase if no serious measures are taken to reduce the gap. Madhav Gadgil, speaks of 'Islands of prosperity, oceans of poverty.'¹² The life in gap countries is poor, repressive, short, brutal and solitary.¹³

II. The Unprecedented Pace and Scale of Globalization

There are many and competing definitions of globalization. In essence, it boils down to processes whereby social relations acquire relatively distanceless and borderless qualities, so that human lives are increasingly played out in the world as a single place.¹⁴ A useful, more operational, definition of globalization is offered by the globalization index used by A.T. Kearney in his annual report published in *Foreign Policy*.¹⁵ The globalization index has four components: (1) Economic Integration: trade and direct investment, (2) Technological Connectivity: internet users, internet hosts and secure servers, (3) Personal Contact: international travel and tourism, international telephone traffic and remittances and personal trans-

¹² Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra, *Ecology and Equity*, 1995, Routledge, London.

¹³ Thomas Barnett, *The Pentagon's Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*, 2004, Putnam's sons, New York..

¹⁴ John Baylis and Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics*, 2001, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

¹⁵ A.T.Kearney, 'Measuring Globalization: The Global Top 20,' May/June, 2005.

fers (including worker remittances, compensation to employees and other person-to-person and non-governmental transfers), (4) Political Engagement: membership of international organizations, personnel and financial contributions to UN peace keeping missions, international treaties ratified and governmental transfers.

Thus, globalization is clearly a multifaceted force. It manifests itself in terms of communication, organizations, ecological issues, economics (trade, finance and production), military issues, political issues, migration, norms and culture, and every-day thinking.¹⁶ Perhaps the greatest spur to this shift in consciousness came in 1966, with the production of the first photographs taken from outer space showing planet Earth as one location.¹⁷ The current pace of globalization, though part of a trend that is thousands of years old, is something the world has never seen; the pace has been breathtaking.¹⁸ Some conclusions that can be drawn from a historical review are: (1) new technologies that reduce the costs of transportation and communication have been crucial in the globalization dynamics, (2) national policy choices are critical determinants of the inclusion or exclusion from the integration process, (3) globalization does not only produce positive outcomes, but also results in negative outcomes and, consequently, often resistance. An exponent of the positive outcomes is Jagdish Bhagwati, a formal special advisor to the United Nations on Globalization.¹⁹ In his book *In Defense of Globalization*, which focuses on the economic impacts of globalization, Bhagwati explains why the 'Gotcha' examples are often not as negative as they seem; that in fact, globalization often alleviates many of the problems for which it has been blamed. He examines the fal-

¹⁶ David Held, et al, *Global Transformations: Political Economics and Culture*, 1999, Polity Press, Cambridge.

¹⁷ Op cit, John Bailis, p.16.

¹⁸ Remarks by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke of the Federal Reserve Board on Global economic integration: What's new and what's not? in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 25, 2006.

¹⁹ Jagdish Bhagwati, *In Defense of Globalization*, 2004, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

lacies which underlie many of the critics' arguments and suggests that there is a good reason why most globalization protesters come from rich rather than poor countries. He demonstrates the beneficial effects of globalization in regard to poverty, child labor, women's rights, democracy, wage and labor standards, and the environment. He concludes that by focusing too much on the purported evils of globalization, we are missing the opportunity to focus on accelerating its achievements whilst coping with its downsides. In contrast to this defense of globalization, there are a great number of authors who warn of the negative impacts on human security (see part 4).

III. A High Level of Human Insecurity

The concept of human security is slowly but steadily revolutionizing the thinking of security in the 21st century. Human security is the best indicator of real security because it makes a broad assessment of the experience of violence at the personal level. Security is interpreted as: security of people, not just territory; security of individuals, not just states; security through sustainable peace building, not just through arms; security of all the people everywhere.²⁰ Human security can be measured on the basis of opinion polls and by means of objective indicators. Several operational definitions are currently in usage. For example, the UNDP Human Development Report of 1999,²¹ distinguishes seven dimensions of insecurity: economic, food, health, personal, environmental, community/cultural and political insecurity. Jeff George of the Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC) adds social security. 'Globalization has created a need for global human security partnership based on mutual interests, not charity; based on cooperation, not

²⁰ Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, 'Some Points for Brainstorming on Human Security in Central Asia,' December 11, 2000.

²¹ UNDP, 'Human Development Report 1999,' Oxford University Press, New York, NY, USA

confrontation; based on an equitable share of the market, not protectionism; based on far-sighted internationalism, not nationalism.²² Globalization is seen by many as a threat to human security. The levels of human insecurity are very high in developing and transitional countries. Despite the fact that there are no diachronic statistics of human security in the rich and powerful parts of the world, the growth of defense and anti-terrorism expenditures suggests the existence of a great deal of human insecurity. Exemplary are the USA and Israel, who have both become garrison states and seem to perceive the international environment as more and more threatening; as a fortress world.²³

IV. Warnings of Resentment and Global Violence

This part reviews eleven authors (most of whom are not anti-globalists) who have voiced concern about the relationship between globalization and the rise of insecurity, tension, terror and war.

Amy Chua (born 1962) is the John M. Duff, Jr. Professor of Law at Yale Law School. She joined the Yale faculty in 2001 after teaching at Duke Law School. She specializes in the study of international business transactions, law and development, ethnic conflict, and globalization and the law. Chua was a member of the highly successful Chinese Filipino minority before emigrating to the United States and has worked for the World Bank. In 2003 she authored, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability*,²⁴ which explores the tensions of the post-Cold War globalizing world. As global markets open, ethnic conflicts deteriorate and democracy in developing countries can

²² Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, op cit, p. 4.

²³ Allan Hammond, *Which World: Scenario's for the 21st Century*, 1998, Island Press, Washington, DC.

²⁴ Amy Chua, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability*, New York: Anchor Books.

turn ugly and violent. Chua shows how free markets have concentrated disproportionate, often spectacular, wealth in the hands of resented minorities: 'market dominant minorities.' Adding democracy to this volatile mix can unleash suppressed ethnic hatred and bring to power 'ethno-nationalist' governments that pursue aggressive policies of confiscation and revenge. Chua also shows how individual countries may also be viewed as market dominant minorities, a fact that may help to explain the rising tide of anti-American sentiment around the world and the visceral hatred of Americans as expressed in recent acts of terrorism. She suggests not to export markets in an unrestrained, laissez-faire form that the West itself has repudiated, just as it should not be promoting unrestrained overnight majority rule — a form of democracy that the West has again repudiated. Chua concludes that the best hope for democratic capitalism in the non-Western world lies with the market-dominant minorities themselves.

Hernando de Soto (born 1941) is a Peruvian economist and president of the Institute for Liberty and Democracy, headquartered in Lima, Peru. In 1989, he authored *The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism*, in which he observes that a massive social and economic revolution is taking place in the developing world. Some 4 billion people, who have previously been living in the hinterlands of developing countries, are migrating to large cities to participate in ever widening circles of economic and intellectual exchange. Instead of helping them, however, the law excludes them. The economic system oppressing most Peruvians is not democratic capitalism but mercantilism or a system of monopoly rights that excludes the poor. They become 'informals,' and if they wish to live, trade, manufacture, transport or even consume, then the cities' new inhabitants have to do so illegally. The extreme class differentiation gives rise to terrorists who will always be around to champion the cause of the excluded. De Soto does not believe that 'terrorism' is a manifestation of the famous clash of cultures, according to which many people in the third world just don't possess the cultural traits that would help

them to succeed. He concludes that the excluded hold the key to history. They are the overwhelming majority. 'Few people in the developing world are unaware how well their counterparts live in the market democracies of the West. If governments create the legal property tools that they require for their enterprises to prosper, they will become part of the legal expanded market. If governments do not take them seriously as economic agents, if governments see them only as a nuisance or passive recipients of charity, the resentment of the poor against the status quo will only increase.'²⁵

John Ralston Saul (born 1947) is a Canadian author, essayist and philosopher. In his book *The Collapse of Globalism*, he argues that globalization, like many great geopolitical ideologies before it, is now dead. The fading power of nation states would be replaced by global markets; economics and not politics and arms would determine the course of human events; and the growth in international trade would foster prosperous markets that would in turn, change dictatorships into democracies. Instead of surrendering or shedding sovereignty, governments and citizens are reasserting their national interest. For example, the United States appears to be determined to ignore its international critics, whilst Europe is faced with problems of immigration, racism, terrorism and renewed internal nationalism. Elsewhere, the world looks for answers to African debt, the AID's epidemic, the return of fundamentalism and terrorism, all of which perversely refuse to disappear despite the theoretical rise in global prosperity. Saul is especially concerned with the reemergence of negative nationalism, exclusion, scapegoat thinking and right-wing populism. 'We really only count the dead who come from our own community, or ... from our own civilisation.' He further dwells on the normalisation of irregular warfare and the inability of the industrialized countries to imagine another kind of war that is not regular. Saul is very critical about the sterile argu-

²⁵ Hernando de Soto, *The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism*, 1989, Basic Books, New York.

ment about root causes versus the middle class leaders of terrorist groups. The argument expressed is that irregular warfare cannot be taken as a serious expression of poverty or exclusion. 'One of the most dysfunctional of ideologues doesn't believe that you must concentrate on the realities of social disorder and poverty.' At the end of the book, he pleads for positive nationalism serving the public good. 'The more complicated our national and international relationships are, the more all of us will need to use our most complicated sense of belonging both to feel at home and to find multiple ways to be at home with the widest variety of people and situations.'²⁶

Thomas P.M. Barnett (born 1960) is an American strategic planner who has worked in national security affairs since the end of the Cold War and has operated his own consulting practice (Barnett Consulting) since 1998. In *The Pentagon's New Map*, Barnett divides the world into two parts: the functioning core countries and the non-integrating gap countries. The first group of countries recognizes a stable set of rules regarding war and peace; they are good countries, such as: the USA, Canada, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, the EU member states, Russia, India, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. The gap countries are disconnected and remain trapped in a cruel reality. Life in the gap is poor, nasty, short and solitary. You find significantly higher rates of poverty, less freedom and, on average, the lowest life expectancy rates. One of his major concerns is that 'the lesser included' make more use of asymmetric warfare. Reducing the instability in the world requires the control of four flows: (1) *The flow of people*: 'The flow of labor from the Gap to the Core is globalization's release valve. With it, the prosperity of the Core can be maintained and more of the world's people can participate. Without it, overpopulation and underperforming economies in the Gap will lead to explosive situations that spill over to the Core,' (2) *The flow of energy*: In

²⁶ John Ralston Saul, *The Collapse of Globalism*, 2005, Atlantic Books, London.

order to get access to cheap oil and reduce terrorism, the Core countries need to establish greater connectivity with the Middle East and raise the hope of the people. When you deny people hope in a better future, you leave them with nothing but the will to deny your desired future, (3) *The flow of money*: Of special importance is the continuous shift from a small minority (USA, EU and Japan) enjoying globalization's benefits to roughly two-thirds of the planet joining the party, (4) *The flow of security*: To improve security in conflict ridden countries, Barnett suggests a combination of more foreign direct investment (in order to raise a country above the \$3,000 dollar mark) and, if necessary, military intervention.²⁷

Joseph Stiglitz (born 1943) is a Jewish American economist. He is a recipient of the John Bates Clark Medal (1979) and the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (2001). Stiglitz is also a former Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank and is famous for his critical view of globalization and international institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In 2000, Stiglitz founded the Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD), a think tank on international development based at Columbia University. Since 2001, he has been a member of the Columbia faculty, and has held the rank of University Professor since 2003. In *Globalization and its Discontents*, Stiglitz states that globalization today is not beneficial for many of the world's poor, or for much of the environment or for the stability of the global economy. The transition from communism to a market economy has been so badly managed that, with the exception of China, Vietnam and a few Eastern European countries, poverty has soared as incomes have plummeted. He deplores the fact that economic science has too often been replaced by a set of doctrines (the Washington consensus policies) which are exclusively imposed. The recipient governments are deprived of making their own choices;

²⁷ Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*, 2004, Putnam's sons, New York.

they cannot mitigate the market failures and are unable to ensure social justice. He pleads for the empowerment of developing and transition countries by helping to fund think tanks — independent from the international economic organisations — that would help them formulate strategies and positions. In addition, Stiglitz stresses the importance of transparency. ‘Short of fundamental change in their governance, the most important way to ensure that the international economic organisations are more responsive to the poor, to the environment, to the broader political and social concerns... is to increase openness and transparency... to see the influence of corporate and other special interests.’²⁸

Mark Duffield is Professor of Development, Democratization and Conflict in the Institute for Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds. Prior to that, he taught at the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies in the School of Public Policy at the University of Birmingham. Trained in both anthropology and political economy, his field experience includes four years as Oxfam’s Country Representative in the Sudan during the latter half of the 1980s. In *Global Governance and the New Wars*, Duffield describes the consequences of the new logic of consolidation and exclusion in global capitalism as: (1) The widening gap in per capita income between Northern and Southern countries and also within the population of the North, and (2) The new security concerns about underdevelopment as a source of conflict, criminalized activity and international instability. Special attention is paid to the increase of new wars or nonterritorial network wars. ‘The south has effectively integrated itself into the liberal world system through the spread and deepening of all types of parallel and shadow transborder activity. This represents the site of new and expansive forms of local-global networking and innovative patterns of extra-legal and non-formal North-South integration.’²⁹ The new wars, as well as requiring the

²⁸ Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and its Discontents*, 2002, W.W.Norton, New York.

²⁹ Marc Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*, 2001, Zed books, London.

mobilization of networks to realize wealth and provision of violence, are similarly concerned with restricting the effectiveness of the other networks, taking them over or eliminating them altogether. Duffield also notes that abundant supplies of small arms currently exist within the networks of shadow economies. Duffield concludes that the liberal peace policy of the West misunderstands the origins of these networks and, in turn, inadequately responds to them. Indeed, most donor countries and aid agencies tend to see conflict as a form of regression, deepening poverty and weakening social and cultural cohesion. At the same time, through forms of analysis that delegitimise and criminalize the leadership of the new wars, the way is cleared for a radicalized development to attempt to change societies as a whole. He argues that donor countries and aid agencies have reinforced the relations of violence they oppose.

Richard A. Falk has been the Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice at Princeton University since 1965. In *Predatory Globalization: A Critique*, Falk addresses the cumulative adverse effects of neo-liberalism or 'globalization from above' on human well-being. Appreciating the critical differences with apartheid, he considers the metaphor of global apartheid useful, because it confronts the moral and political complacency of the North. It demands attention for certain disturbing racial features of perception and practice in international behavior. The metaphor represents a warning as well as a provocative line of critique, suggesting the urgency of taking far more serious steps to overcome the North-South cleavage. In addition to the reemergence of the dangerous class division, he expects the globalization from above to encourage a resurgence of support for right-wing extremism and a varied and evolving array of political movements that may scare governments dominated by moderate outlooks into rethinking their degree of acquiescence to the discipline of global capital. Falk pleads for a globalization from below. An immediate goal is to re-instrumentalize the state to the extent that it defines its role as mediating between the logic of capital and the priorities of its peo-

ple, including short-term and long-term goals. He further proposes the development of a unifying ideology capable of mobilizing and unifying the disparate social forces that constitute global civil society and the development of 'cosmopolitan democracy.'³⁰

Titus Alexander is an independent educator. Born in Germany, he went to the Rudolf Steiner School in Edinburgh and studied mathematics, physics and intellectual history at Sussex University, and at the University of Marburg wrote a thesis on the origin of Freud's thought. In *Unraveling Global Apartheid: An Overview of World Politics*, Alexander describes the negative impacts of the increased integration of the world economy (deregulation of finance, globalization of production, and greater free trade) on the fate of over a billion people in the 'Majority World.' According to Alexander, the liberalization of finance and trade is increasing economic insecurity and environmental pressures throughout the world. In many places it is producing a protectionist backlash and conflict. He sees disturbing parallels with the evolution of apartheid in South Africa which was a response by the European minority to growing economic competition from the African minority. The author describes the complex process which brought apartheid to an end in South Africa and draws lessons for overcoming global inequality. Particularly interesting is Alexander's analysis of South Africa's total security strategy and the war business. He concludes by presenting a strategy for global justice and warns the reader about 'determined and powerful opposition against every movement for human liberation. Too many people have a vested interest in ignorance, inequality, injustice, exploitation and unsustainable industries to permit change without a struggle.'³¹

Errol A. Henderson, is associate professor of political science at Wayne State University. In *Democracy and War: The End of an Illusion?*

³⁰ Richard Falk, *Predatory Globalization: A Critique*, 1999, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK.

³¹ Titus Alexander, *Unraveling Global Apartheid: An Overview of World Politics*, 1996, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK.

he critically examines what is nearly a law in world politics, the concept of democratic peace. He tests four propositions: (1) that democracies rarely fight each other, (2) that they are more peaceful in general than nondemocracies in interstate wars, (3) that they are more peaceful than nondemocracies with respect to (colonial) extra-state wars, and (4) that they are more peaceful with respect to civil wars in post-colonial states. Henderson's main finding is that democracy is not significantly associated with less violence. Henderson claims that his findings do not challenge the appropriateness of 'democracy' as a form of government or an ideal to be pursued within and between nations. Instead, his findings challenge the monocausal theories of foreign policy that emphasize a single factor to explain complex phenomena such as war and peace.³²

Walter Russell Mead (born 1952) is the H. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign policy at the Council on Foreign relations. He lives in New York City. In *Power, Terror, Peace and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk*, Russell examines the explosive American foreign policy of the Bush administration and the uproar that it has caused abroad and at home. Like Joseph Nye, he is greatly concerned with the loss of soft power by the US, particularly when faced with growing despair and decay in the Arab world, which is presenting America and its allies with an extraordinarily difficult challenge. Combined with the accelerating collapse of civilized life in a great deal of Africa and the looming disasters in central Asia, Mead believes that these trends threaten to create lawless, violent zones where terrorism can thrive and weapons of mass destruction can proliferate. To counter this, Mead proposes a new approach to threats involving a tough anti-terrorism policy (against what he calls Arabian fascism), outlines for a new initiative for the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and recommendations for sweeping changes and reforms of international institutions, including the

³² Errol A. Henderson, *Democracy and War: The End of an Illusion?*, 2002, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, London.

United Nations Security Council.³³

P. W. Singer (born 1946) is a national security fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. In *Corporate Warrior: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, Singer observes that the open military market is flooded with weaponry, that military capability outside the state continues to expand and that the demand from internal and external conflicts is not waning. At the same time, rebel movements, and other non-state actors might see the advantages of hiring military assistance to bolster their forces and there is little to stop private military firms (PMF's) working for them. Thus, contrary to the prevailing assumptions of international relations theory, warfare is no longer an exclusive affair of men in uniform fighting for their state's political causes. Singer stresses that it is important to recognize the tensions that exist between economic efficiency and military effectiveness on the one hand, and private motivation and political accountability on the other.³⁴

Chris Abbott (Research Officer at Oxford Research Group), Paul Rogers (Peace Studies, Bradford) and John Sloboda (Psychology, Keele), claim in a briefing paper — 'Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for the 21st Century' — that international terrorism is actually a relatively minor threat when compared to other more serious trends, and that current responses to those trends are likely to increase rather than decrease the risks of further terrorist attacks.³⁵ They identify four groups of factors as root causes of conflict and insecurity in today's world and the likely determinants of future conflict. First, the effects of climate change are likely to lead to severe natural disasters, increasing food short-

³³ Walter Russell Mead, *Power, Terror, Peace and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World of Risk*, 2004, Alfred Knopf, New York.

³⁴ P.W.Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, 2003, Cornell University Press, Ithica and London.

³⁵ Oxford Research Group, 'Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for the 21st Century,' briefing paper, June 2006.

ages and the displacement of peoples from coastlines and river delta areas. This would in turn lead to increased human suffering, greater social unrest, revised patterns of living and pressures associated with greatly increased levels of migration around the world. The World Health Organization has estimated that the current mortality attributable to man-made climate change is at least 150,000 people a year. Second, there is the competition over resources (energy and water). Oil is the main fossil fuel and the Persian Gulf is the dominant region with two thirds of world reserves. 'It is a deeply unstable region with continuing potential for conflict as the United States seeks to maintain control against the opposition from regional states and sub-state paramilitary groups.' Demand for fresh water is well beyond that which can be sustained at current levels and even less so at estimated future levels. Third, there is the marginalization of the majority world. The benefits of global wealth creation have not been equally shared. These divisions are being exacerbated by increasing oppression and political exclusion and a growing sense of marginalization as a result of education and world wide communication technologies. 815 million people are suffering from acute hunger and each year ten million die of hunger and hunger related diseases. Fourth, there is the global militarization. The current approach to international security by a vigorous use of military force is failing. The modernization and proliferation of nuclear weapons and the developments in the field of biological and toxic weapons need to be controlled. The analysts further claim that the present approach, influenced by a 'control paradigm,' is failing. It is characterized by the following responses to the above described threats (1) Competition over resources: an obsession with national energy through securing control to key resources in the Persian Gulf, (2) Climate change: an unrealistic belief in technical advances to solve what some still consider as the myth of climate change, (3) Marginalization of the majority world: denial of poverty and socio-economic divisions as sources of insecurity, and a belief that the free market will solve all the problems, (4) International ter-

rorism: An emphasis on counter-productive, controversial and often illegal counter terrorism measures and attacks on civil liberties, and (5) Global Militarization: A priority is placed on counter-proliferation measures for preventing WMD materials and pre-emptive military strikes.

In contrast to the above typical responses, these three authors recommend a 'sustainable security policy,' with the following responses: (1) Competition over resources: comprehensive energy efficiency and resource conservation and management policy and practices, (2) Climate change: rapid replacement of carbon-based sources by diversified local renewable energy sources, (3) Marginalization of the majority world: reform of global systems of trade, aid and debt relief in order to make poverty reduction a world priority, (4) International terrorism: addressing the legitimate political grievances and aspirations of marginalized groups, coupled with intelligence based counter terrorism and dialogue with terrorist leadership, and (5) Global militarization: horizontal and vertical non-proliferation measures and substantial steps towards disarmament with respect to nuclear weapons and biological weapons.

Most of the above analysts recognize the positive influence of the post Cold War globalization. They however also warn us about the confluence of negative impacts which could increase the probability of new conflicts. First, globalization has *increased human insecurity*. The human insecurity results from several socio-economic, resource, military and ecological threats. A large number of the analysts deal with mutually reinforcing negative impacts of socio-economic conditions: the high level of poverty, the gross vertical and horizontal inequalities within and between countries, the relative deprivation, and the feeling of exclusion or closure. The second source of human insecurity results from the competition over resources (oil-gas and fresh water). The third source of human insecurity relates to the global militarization: terrorism and the war on terror; the pre-emptive and preventive use of military force; barbarism, modernization and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The fourth source

Summary Table: Assessing the Impact of Globalization on Human Insecurity

Increasing grievances and threats	Strengthening the opportunity structure for mobilization and violent strife	Provoking inadequate responses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Socio-economic marginalization (poverty, inequality, relative deprivation and exclusion - closure.) • Competition over limited resources (land, oil-gas and fresh water) • Environmental deterioration (pollution and climate change) • Democratic deficit at national and international levels. • Violent conflicts and vigorous use of military force. • Psychological deprivation: humiliation, lack of respect and dignity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communication-transport facilitates awareness and mobilization efforts. • Modernization and proliferation of conventional forces and weapons of mass destruction • The perception of asymmetric warfare as an effective weapon • Inadequate arms control • Decreasing sovereignty and invulnerability of states. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Denial • Control policy. • Reactive violence prevention • Pre-emptive and preventive war against terrorism. • Strong unilateral / weak multilateral responses • Resurgence of support for right-wing extremism.

of human insecurity relates to environmental issues, such as the effects of climate change and pollution. Second, globalization also transforms the *opportunity structure or the capacity for mobilization and violent strife*. The communication, education, transport and organization facility enhances the awareness, mobilization potential and the capacity for fighting asymmetric wars. Finally, the *global responses to the global threats are counter productive*. First of all there is a great deal of denial. The war on terrorism pays attention to one aspect of human insecurity and overlooks the bigger picture of violence in the world. Second, the policy of the rich and powerful is based on the control paradigm and is not conducive to fostering sustainable peace.³⁶ The policies adopted do not tackle the root causes of human insecurity. Third, most of the conflict prevention efforts are of a

³⁶ Oxford Research Group , op cit, pp. 28-29.

reactive nature. The war in Lebanon is a recent example. Fourth, the recent cases of pre-emptive and preventive warfare create more civilian victims and destruction than the terrorism it claims to counter.

V. Conflicts with a High Global Impact: The Case of the Middle East³⁷

One of the consequences of globalization is that some conflicts, such as the regime change in Iraq and especially the Israeli treatment of Palestine and their war in Lebanon, have a great impact on the global political psychology and international public opinion. Since 9/11, all the peace efforts in the Middle East have been overshadowed by the war on terrorism. This has led to more destruction and instability in the region. The regime change in Iraq, the erection of the wall in the Palestinian territories and the violence in Gaza and Lebanon signal the failure of the peace policy of Israel and the USA.³⁸ It reminds us of Ambrose Bierce's definition of war as the side effect of the arts of peace. It is a peace policy based on the logic of war, and the assumption that you can attain peace and security at the expense of all other citizens in the region. The absurdity of such a policy is illustrated in the following three paradoxes.

Paradox 1: Barbarism is More Violent than Terrorism

Peace research tries to diagnose conflict and violence as objectively, unbiased and accurately as possible. This means to deconstruct the politically correct or propagated reality, and to carefully examine the 'existential reality.' The first paradox rests in distinc-

³⁷ Luc Reychler, 'Beyond Peace and War: On Violence Control and Sustainable Peace Building in the Middle East, paper, Center Peace research and Strategic Studies (CPRS-, Leuven, July 2006).

³⁸ Otherwise labeled as Pax Zionica or Pax Americana

tions between 'terrorism' and 'anti-terrorism.' It is clear that both policies kill innocent citizens, however, it is significant that the latter kills many more. Preliminary research suggests that by 26 July, 2006, the Israeli army had killed 410 people in Lebanon, of which 90% were civilians. In contrast, Hezbollah had killed 54 Israelis, of which 25% were civilians.³⁹ Despite the fact that 'terrorism' has been depicted as the greatest evil and threat in the 21st century, it is creating appreciably less violence than the wars on terrorism. The wars on terrorism and regime change are considerably more violent; they slaughter ten to one hundred times more people. Since the second intifada more than 4,000 Palestinians have been killed, more than 20,000 have been wounded and over 10,000 are incarcerated as political prisoners, many of whom have been tortured. In addition, thousands of houses and properties have been or are being destroyed, and economically and financially the occupied territories remain strangled. Israel has transformed itself into a garrison state running two open prisons in Gaza and on the West Bank. In Lebanon, nearly one million people are dislocated or forced into migration. The Syrian Golan Heights are still occupied and efforts are underway to expand the Israeli territories. The US 'regime change' in Iraq and the Russian 'anti-terrorist' operations in Chechnya are similar in many aspects. In the strategic literature, this type of warfare has been called 'barbarism.'⁴⁰ Barbarism is used in

³⁹ Rudi Vranckx, VRT News, 26.07.2006.

⁴⁰ I. Arreguin-Toft on asymmetric warfare. Barbarism can be defined as a type of warfare used by the strongest party. It is characterized by the killing and maiming of a disproportionate number of people (10-100 times the number of people killed by the insurgents), most of the victims are civilians, it includes the use of collective punishment, the incarceration of many political prisoners not protected by the Geneva Conventions, the removal of people from their homesteads, forced migration, the destruction of the military and civil infrastructure, neglect of historical treasures and efforts to control the discourse on the war. For more information, see: I. Arreguin-Toft, 'How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,' *International Security* V.26, N.1 (Summer, 2001): 93-128

asymmetric conflicts by the strongest party and is essentially large scale fighting without boundaries. In contrast to conventional warfare, it does not respect international or humanitarian laws and consciously targets citizens. The underlying assumptions are: that shock and awe can restore the standing of the regional or global superpower; that collective punishment can deter the people supporting the resistance or freedom fighters; and that collateral damage is an accepted part of the war. This aggression leaches the humanity, integrity and strength of democracy.

Paradox 2: Others See Terrorism and Extremism Differently

The second paradox concerns terrorism and extremism, or more accurately 'political terrorism and extremism.' A considerable cross-section of their compatriots and/or world public opinion sees them as 'freedom/resistance fighters,' heroes and martyrs. In stark contrast to the Western depiction of terrorists as cowards, they are commonly perceived as courageous and patriotic. Recent studies of 'suicide terrorism' show that there is little connection with Islamic fundamentalism and that such individuals share a specific and secular goal: to compel democracies to withdraw military forces from the territory which they consider their homeland. The aim of the Palestinian insurgency is to put an end to the occupation and colonization of its territories, especially the territories occupied after 1967. Similarly, the creation of Hezbollah was a reaction to the military intrusions and occupations by Israel of Lebanon. According to Marcus Yoel of Haaretz it is 'a force with a couple of hundred fighters, certainly not more than half a brigade.' The withdrawal from all the occupied territories after 1967 would take away one of the root causes of political terrorism, providing a more humane and effective anti-terrorist strategy. Terrorism is the logic of coercion applied by the weak actors in a conflict.⁴¹ It should also be noted

⁴¹ Robert Pape, *Dying to Win*, 2005, Random House.

that in comparison to the other types of violence committed in the world, political terrorism is a relatively small killer. On a yearly basis, it accounts worldwide for approximately 3,000 deaths a year.

Paradox 3: Renaming and Reframing Reality.

The third paradox relates to enormous efforts to rename, reframe and hide the reality of violence. This involves the definition of threats and policies, the distortion of data, the creation of politically correct language, a manipulation of media, and the assertion of pressure to conform. After 9/11, the U.S. government started to focus attention on two threats that were much more horrific together than they were separately: radical Islam and weapons of mass destruction. Violence became narrowly defined in terms of terrorism or weapons of mass destruction, with increasingly less attention paid to the larger picture of violence in the world. Some neocons, such as Charles Krauthammer, envisaged a World War IV, in which the civilized world would be attacked by an enemy potentially as dangerous and powerful as those faced in the two World Wars and the Cold War.⁴² Therefore, the argument follows, the best tools for protecting the U.S. and its allies would be: an overwhelming military superiority, dedication to the U.S. alliances, missile defense, and preventive/preemptive warfare to stop catastrophic terrorism and the proliferation of rogue states. This new strategy is characterized by a great deal of propaganda and the use of politically correct words, definitions, interpretations and evaluations. Steven Poole has written a seminal book on the use of 'unspeak,' which he defines as a mode of speech that tries to persuade by stealth. 'Names become weapons. Distinctions are deliberately blurred; realities are denied and punishments don't fit the crimes.'⁴³ Here are some examples from Steven Poole:

⁴² Francis Fukuyama, *After the Neocons*, 2006, Profile Books, p. 70.

⁴³ The following illustrations and many more can be found in: Steven Poole, *Unspeak*, 2006, Little Brown, Lancaster, UK.

- In order to avoid responsibility or pointing the finger, the killings of civilians are called 'tragic accidents.'
- Israel constructs what it calls a 'security fence' around its territory, thereby suggesting that it is not an unpleasant construction and that its motivation is solely 'security.' In fact, the wall is higher than the Berlin Wall built during the Cold War and it shifts 9.5% of the territory of the West Bank to the Israeli side.
- Ten thousand Palestinian political prisoners are called 'security prisoners,' in order to avoid recognizing the political dimension of the problem and to evade international and humanitarian law.
- The 'disengagement' from Gaza and a small part of the West Bank actually entailed: the evacuation of 9,000 settlers from a total of 240,000; the demolition of the evacuated homes, and; the maintenance of Israeli control over Gaza's airspace, offshore waters, and the majority of border crossings.
- Ethnic cleansing or attempted genocide has been used by the international community to evade the automatic duty to act. Since 1955, the world has seen more than 40 genocidal or politicial events, the majority of which have never officially been termed 'genocide' or 'politicide.' '...this betrays the erroneous opinion that genocide is total destruction, and ignorance of the fact that any 'attempt' at such destruction already constitutes genocide.' (S. Poole, p. 97).
- Calling the first operation in Vietnam a 'just cause' or the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 'peace in Galilee' did not succeed in persuading the local citizens that peace was the true motive. Interestingly, the U.S. invasion in Afghanistan was originally called 'Operation Infinite Justice,' but than changed to 'Operation Enduring Freedom.'
- The terms 'surgical' or 'precision' strikes and their 'collateral' damage hide their real functions: killing insurgents and deterring people to provide support.
- States fiercely resist any characterization of their actions as terrorism. They have won the battle of definitions by exempting its own violence against civilians from being treated and perceived as

'terrorism.' Instead it is referred to as 'self-defense,' 'retaliation,' and 'security measures.'

- Body bags are now 'transfer tubes.'
- The use of the term 'terrorist suspect' can make someone a terrorist without ever having committed an act of terrorism.
- When you are labeled an 'enemy combatant,' instead of a 'prisoner of war' you can be entombed indefinitely in Guantanamo and become the subject of some 'detainee abuse' or plain torture. The prisoners and their guards now both have first-hand experience of Alan Dershowitz's arguments for legalizing torture.
- Finally, there is the global struggle against the violent extremists, which all right thinking people would like to join. To label a person or a group of people as 'extremists' is to say that they have no right to ask what they want. An extremist is not only someone who holds an opinion with which we disagree, but also someone who is essentially extreme, impossible to talk to and impossible to welcome into civilization.

A great deal of the above looks ominously like the work of the Minitruues (Ministries of Truth) in George Orwell's book 1984. Complementing the efforts to control the 'hearts and minds' of their own constituencies and of the international community are the conformity pressures and the silencing of dissident voices. This is attained in several ways, as people who express criticism are stigmatized as unpatriotic, unrealistic, ivory tower-ish, anti-Semitic, anti-American, and sometimes even extreme-rightists.⁴⁴ The inflation of the use of the label anti-Semitism has become unproductive especially when it tries to silence well-intentioned people from criticizing the peace policies of Israel, the USA or the UK. Critique is not necessarily negative; it can be an act of respect or even love.

⁴⁴ Illustrative was a recent dispute in Belgium between Jean Marie De Decker and Claude Marinower, in *De Standaard*, 25.07.2005, or the reaction of Mia Doornaert (*De Standaard* 29-30.07.2006) to an article on the conflict in the Middle East written by Luc Reychler (20-21.07.2006).

Equally disturbing is the misuse of the Holocaust to justify what is happening. The Iranian people or government were not involved in the Holocaust, and employ other memories to justify their anger towards the USA and the West. For instance, they will remind you of the toppling in 1953 — with the help of CIA and British intelligence operatives — of their elected head of state Mohammed Mossadegh, because he wanted to nationalize the oil sector. They will also remind you about how the West supported Saddam Hussein's war against Iran; a war which left 1 million victims. A friend told me that she had a dream of the Holocaust. She overheard the souls of people, who died in concentration camps, talking about the Middle East. Some of them were disappointed that the world had not learned much from the horrendous event. Others were planning a march on Jerusalem to stop making new victims in their name and to plead for peace.

Another facet of the conformity pressure is the occupation of the 'moral high ground,' by depicting the conflict as a war between the axis of evil and the axis of good, and as a fight for civilization, freedom and democracy. Problems arise from the distinctions made between first, second, and third class victims. The first class victims (from the West) desire and receive most attention; the second class receives much less (for example, the Palestinians and Lebanese), and; the third class victims are completely negated (for example, the Congolese). There is also the doctrine of preventive war and the implicit recognition of Israel's and America's exceptionalism. Such a doctrine destabilizes the international system. All of the above efforts serve to reinforce groupthink and close-mindedness in the decision-making process, or what *Newsweek*, on July 31, 2006, called the 'delusional machismo.' The negative strategic impact of this mindset has been illustrated in several studies, such as Stoessinger's 'Why nations go to war' or Barbara Tuchman's 'The march of folly.' This mindset prevents a questioning of peace policies that generate more harm than good and slows down the learning curve. As a result, the same mistakes are consistently made time and time

again. Think of the non-recognition of the democratically elected FIS in Algeria and now Hamas in Palestine; or the support of the Taliban against the Soviets; or the creation of Hezbollah after the Israeli invasion in Lebanon. We fail to acknowledge that such actions create monsters that will later turn against their creator.

If Voltaire were around, he would no doubt cast a sardonic laugh and probably write a modern version of *Candide*. It would satirize the horrors of the 21st century and the pursuit by governments of peace policies contrary to their own interests. The peace policy of Israel, the USA and UK simply does not serve the interests of the people in the Middle East, the Americans and the Europeans. In the US the foreign policy is shaped by well-organized minorities who lobby for their particular interests. It has created more violence and instability in the region, whilst the arms escalation is on the rise and new layers of hate and despair are formed. The financial and the human price of the war on terror are excessive. The behavior of democratic countries has set back the democratization efforts in the region, as illustrated by: the unwillingness to deal with democratically related authorities such as Hamas, the imprisonment of elected Palestinian Parliamentarians, the interference in the political transition process in Lebanon in order to install a more friendly and collaborative regime; the support of 'friendly' authoritarian regimes (for example, Saudi Arabia and Egypt); Israel's mistreatment of the Palestinian people, and especially its destruction of the fragile democratic transition in Lebanon. The war on terrorism is a policy of denial; the denial of the greater picture of violence.⁴⁵ The price of such denial will be more shocking surprises. Last but not least, this conflict is also siphoning a great deal of time and resources which are needed in many other conflict zones in the world (for example, the Sudan, DR Congo, and the countless countries suffering with extreme poverty).

⁴⁵ See Luc Reychler, 'Challenges of Peace Research,' *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 2006.

The current peace policy is not adapted to the rapidly changing international environment. The globalization of world politics is not only the consequence of trade, technology, communications and environmental awareness; it also represents the growing consciousness of inequalities and conflict in the world. The conflict in the Middle East has become the 'Colosseum' of the 21st century. The whole world, willing or not, is watching the spectacle and judging the performance of the actors. Most battles are unequal, with the 'terrorists' confronting super and regional powers who boast air, land and sea forces. In the northwestern part of the theater the 'terrorists' are reproached as scum and cowards; whilst the rest of the spectators applaud them as brave characters, insurgents, resistance/freedom fighters and heroes. They notice that the Americans in the Lebanon spectacle expedite the delivery of precision missiles to Israel and humanitarian aid to its victims. Some spectators seem not to be disturbed by the use of double standards by the umpires; others are outraged. The weakest players are expected to disarm so that the strongest can feel at ease and continue to do what they want. The EU stands on the sidelines, as an innocent bystander and provider of humanitarian aid. This appears to be changing. The audience observes that most of the time '*might is right*,' that international and humanitarian law is not invited and that the UN is not taken seriously by a super power. During the performance, democracy carries many masks. The spectators see that the meaning of democracy as used by the West is changing from a way to be liberated, to a way to provide security to those perpetrating regime changes. Although, the latter may promote democracy at the national level, it also resists it at the international level. Every day, with the words of Frantz Fanon,⁴⁶ it is apparent that we are attending the striptease of humanism. There you can see it, quite naked, and it's not a pretty sight. It is an ideology of lies, a justification of power; its honeyed words and affectation of sensibility are merely

⁴⁶ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 1963, Grove Press, New York.

alibis for violence and aggression. A fine sight is the onlookers, who don't seem to support one or the other. They are perceived as cowards or traitors.

VI. Towards Sustainable Peace Building

The current responses to the global threats fail to produce sustainable development and peace building. They claim to pursue durable or sustainable security and peace, but their actions will only lead to less human security and a more unstable world. To deal with the global threats more effectively will require nothing less than a new policy pursuing 'sustainable peace building.' Peace building is about complex change; it involves concurrent activities by many people in different sectors, at several levels and in different time frames. It is a multi-level, multi-sector and multi-time activity. In peace research 'sustainable peace' is defined as a situation where (a) the armed violence has stopped, (b) the other types of violence (structural, psychological and cultural) are close to absent,⁴⁷ (c) conflicts are handled in a constructive way, and (d) the


<p>⁴⁷ Physical violence: terrorism, guerilla, conventional warfare, and barbarism</p>	<p>Psychological violence</p>	<p>Cultural – epistemic violence</p>
<p>Structural violence: political, economic and cultural exclusion. = less visible indirect-intentional</p>	<p>Violence is about shortening life or significantly lowering the quantitative and qualitative life expectancies of particular group(s)</p>	<p>Bad governance -Maladministration -Corruption -Indifference and neglect -Greed and self interest -Religious and ideological inspired misgovernance -unintended negative impacts of well-intentioned interventions.</p>
<p>Organized crime</p>	<p>Extra-legal economic activities</p>	<p>Environmental Violence</p>

Figure: The big picture of violence at the national and international levels

government has a high level of internal and external legitimacy. The European Union is a good example (and one which owes a great debt to the visionary leadership of the U.S.). Such a sustainable peace requires a series of conditions, which can be clustered into 'five + one' groups (the 'Sustainable peace building pentagon'⁴⁸). The first building block focuses on the establishment of an *effective communication, consultation and negotiation system at different levels* between the conflicting parties or members. In contrast to the negotiation styles used in most international organizations, the negotiation style, for example, in the European Union is predominantly integrative. Ample time and creativity is invested in generating mutually beneficial agreements. Without win-win agreements the Union would disintegrate.

The second building block consists of the core *peace-building structures*. In order to achieve a sustainable peace, (conflict) countries have to install political, economic and security structures and institutions which sustain peace. The political reform process aims at the establishment of political structures with a high level of legitimacy. The legitimacy status is influenced by two factors (a) the

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effectiveness of a regime to deliver vital basic needs, such as security, health services, jobs, etc., and (b) the democratic nature of the decision-making process. Initially, an authoritarian regime with high quality leaders and technocrats can obtain a high legitimacy score, but in the end, consolidated democracies are the best supports of sustainable peace building. It is crucial to note that the transition from one state (e.g. non-democratic structures) to another (e.g. consolidated democratic environment) is not without difficulties: the devil is in the transition.⁴⁹ The economic reform process envisions the establishment of an economic environment which stimulates sustainable development, the elimination of gross vertical and horizontal inequalities, and develops positive expectations about the future. The security structure safeguards and/or increases the population's objective and subjective security by effectively dealing with both internal and external threats. This implies a cooperative security system producing a high level of human security, collective defense and security, and proactive conflict prevention efforts.

The third necessary building block for establishing a sustainable peace process is an *integrative climate*.⁵⁰ This is the software of peace building. This building block stresses the importance of a favorable social-psychological environment. Although the climate is less tangible and observable than the other building blocks, it can be assessed by looking at the consequences. An integrative or disintegrative climate can express itself in the form of attitudes, behavior and institutions. Characteristic of an integrative climate are expectations of an attractive future as a consequence of cooperation, the development of a 'we-ness' feeling or multiple loyalties, reconciliation, trust, social capital and the dismantlement of sentimental walls.

The fourth building block consists of *systems supporting the devel-*

⁴⁹ Luc Reyhler, *Democratic Peace Building. The devil is in the Transition*, 1999, Leuven University Press.

⁵⁰ Luc Reyhler and Arnim Langer, *The Software of Peace building*, Canadian Journal of Peace Studies, November 2003.

opment and installation of the other peace building blocks: (a) an effective and legitimate legal system, (b) an empowering educational system, (c) peace media, (d) a well-functioning health system, and (e) humanitarian aid in the immediate post conflict phase.

The fifth building block is *a supportive regional and international environment*. The stability of a peace process is often dependent on the behavior and interests of neighboring countries or regional powers. These actors can have a positive influence on the peace process by providing political legitimacy or support, by assisting with the demobilization and demilitarization process, or by facilitating and stimulating regional trade and economic integration. However, these same actors can also inhibit the progress towards stability, for example, by supporting certain groups that do not subscribe to the peace process. Likewise, the larger international community plays a crucial role in most post-conflict countries. The international community by means of the UN agencies or other international (non-)governmental organizations can provide crucial resources and funding or even take direct responsibility for a wide variety of tasks, such as the (physical) rebuilding process, political transformation, humanitarian aid, development cooperation, third-party security guarantor, etc.

The installation of all the above described buildings blocks requires the presence of *a critical mass of peace building leadership*.⁵¹ There are leaders in different domains (politics, diplomacy, defence, economics, education, media, religion, health, etc.) and at different levels: the elite, middle and grassroots level.⁵² High on the agenda of architectural research is study of the characteristics of successful peace building leaders, such as Nelson Mandela, F. W. De Klerk, Mohandas Gandhi, Mikhail Gorbachev, Vaclav Havel, Jean Mon-

⁵¹ Luc Reyckler and Anton Stellamans, *Researching Peace Building Leadership in Cahier of the Center for Peace Research and Strategic Studies (CPRS)*, University of Leuven, nr 71, 2005.

⁵² John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, 1997, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C.

net, Helmut Kohl, George Marshal, Martin Luther King, Jacques Delors, and many others. This research involves differentiating successful and unsuccessful peace builders and identifying the similarities and differences between successful and unsuccessful peace builders, and between peace builders and peace destroyers.⁵³ Peace building leadership distinguishes itself by the way they lead the conflict transformation process. They envision a shared, clear and mutually attractive peaceful future for all who want to cooperate; they do everything to identify and get a full understanding of the challenge with which they are confronted; they frame the conflict in a reflexive way; their change behavior is adaptive, integrative and flexible; they are well acquainted with non-violent methods; they use a mix of intentional and consequential ethics and objectives; and are courageous men or women with a high level of integrity.

VII. Conclusion

To build sustainable peace at the global level requires dealing with all the main sources of violence and threats; not only the military, but also the economic, political, territorial, psychological, health and environmental threats. Today's U.S. led attempts to maintain the status quo through military means and violence control without addressing the root causes is not working; it is failing.⁵⁴ Short of the need for a radical paradigm shift as suggested by the Oxford Research Group, the most important way to ensure a greater responsiveness to the poor, to the environment and to the broader political and social issues is to increase openness and transparency of decision-making processes. This would allow us to see the influence of special interest groups and to prevent the conceal-

⁵³ Luc Reyhler and Anton Stellamans, *Peace Building Leaders and Spoilers*, paper presented at IPRA conference, July 2002, Korea.

⁵⁴ See Oxford research Group, op cit pp.28-29.

⁵⁵ J.Stiglitz, op cit, p.227-229.

ment of mistakes. The absence of open discourse means that models and policies are not subjected to timely criticism.⁵⁵ Peace and conflict impact assessments (P-CIAS) at the macro level, can allow us to anticipate the positive and negative impacts, and raise the level of accountability.⁵⁶ As mentioned earlier, sustainable peace building requires many efforts in different sectors and at different levels (see sustainable peace building pentagon). Of crucial importance are hope-raising measures, which make people believe that sustainable peace building is a realistic option. Reminding people of the many successful examples of conflict transformation and sustainable peace building (for example the creation of the European Union or the creation of peace in South Africa) can make a difference. At the same time, priority should be given to the transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, because of its global visibility and negative role modeling. Finally, the question of professionalism should be addressed; what does professionalism mean in the field of sustainable peace building? Violence prevention and peace building has become a booming field. It is offering jobs for peace makers, peace keepers, peace builders and peace researchers. In contrast to other more traditional and well-established fields, such as the legal, medical, economic or psychological field, there are no clear and widely accepted criteria for evaluating MA's and Ph.D's in peace studies and selecting professionals. I think it is time to open a serious discussion about what distinguishes a good from a bad peace worker in terms of talents, knowledge, skills, motivation, ethical thinking, mental and psychological health, etc. As in any other field, peace also attracts 'peace quacks' (in Dutch they are called 'paxzalvers'). Peace quacks are people who feign the skill and the knowledge — that they do not actually possess — to prevent violence, bring security and build peace. They generally promise too much. They claim to able to bring peace, with certain

⁵⁶ Luc Reyckler and Thania Paffenholz, 'Aid for Peace,' 2005, paper, Center for Peace Research and Strategic Studies, University of Leuven.

and infallible methods.⁵⁷ A serious discussion on professionalism can significantly contribute to the improvement of peace education and training and the selection of peace builders. However, one should not forget that peace building requires more than knowledge and skills; its also requires a great deal of creativity, love and courage.

⁵⁷ Luc Reyhler, *What Does Professionalism Mean in the Field of Peace Building?*, paper prepared for the APPRA conference at the University of Jaipur, January 2006.

Peace and Security in Contemporary Conditions

Ian Anthony

Although there has never been a consensus about what the appropriate elements of a peace research agenda should be, the scope for different views on this matter has become wider after the end of the Cold War because of changes in the international security environment.

In this paper the diverse elements that are now emerging as parts of a much broader debate on security are briefly described. Whereas military security issues were predominant in the Cold War, there is now a more balanced approach that takes into account a range of different human actions that can have negative outcomes for (and perhaps even present existential threats to) people and societies. Such actions include those that impact on the environment and on global public health.

This balance notwithstanding, violent conflict continues to be a persistent phenomenon, albeit one that is changing its character in important ways. The paper tries to identify briefly some main tendencies in military security that are of interest to peace researchers. In particular, the increasing diversity of actors found on the battlefield and the impact of the changing tactics being employed by warring parties.

Establishing rules and providing governance has always been a challenge in the security field. The challenge of developing and enforcing a system of rules is no less and may in fact be significantly greater in the complicated contemporary conditions. The paper examines some of the pressing current challenges to international humanitarian law and to arms control and disarmament.

Deliberate and purposeful violence against others of the same species has been a persistent human characteristic over millennia, and the question 'why do we kill each other?' has long been at the heart of peace research. One of the most important approaches of peace researchers in trying to address this question has been to try and bring to bear the findings of different disciplines to understand and explain human actions that have negative consequences, with a particular emphasis on violent behaviour.

Recognizing the destructive potential of humans, psychology has tried to provide insights based on the diagnosis of the human condition. Sociology has sought causal explanations by exploring whether organizing mass society creates an inherent tendency towards war, violence, and aggression as increasingly powerful public officials promote the interests of particular groups or of their organization above the wider community interest or the interests of individuals. Political scientists have tried to map the sets of conditions that seem to predispose violence both between and within states and international relations theorists have sought to explain this predisposition in terms of relations among states.

For much of the period after 1945 the effort to understand violence and conflict was intimately linked to the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the armed forces of major powers with an adversarial relationship. The simple equation "major power conflict + nuclear weapons = holocaust" created the imperative for war avoidance and structured the debate around the most effective way of minimizing the risk of major power confrontation. This created a natural hierarchy in both the operational and the academic aspects of peace and security.

With the end of the cold war this approach naturally had to change but the question of how to respond to the new conditions sparked lively debate. A traditionalist view held that the security agenda should continue to focus on violent conflict but be adapted to the changed conditions. Other scholars called for a widening of the debate to incorporate within the definition of peace and security

any and all aspects of human behaviour that cause harm.

The principal argument put forward by advocates of the first approach has probably been that although violent conflict has transformed, recent years have borne testimony to the fact that it has by no means disappeared. Understanding the nature of this transformation and analysing its implications is, according to this view, the main task of peace and security research. However, the advocates of the second approach have emphasized that human behaviour has led directly to four sets of existential threats to people and societies, each of which calls for urgent response if the broad objective of creating a safer world is to be achieved. Moreover, according to this logic, by narrowing the scope of research to violent conflict, traditionalists risk ignoring real or potential linkages between the four sets of issues. Incomplete understanding would not only undermine research findings, but could also slow the development of an integrated response.

Seen from this perspective existential threats that are a direct product of human behaviour now stem from four different directions:

First, a consensus has emerged in the scientific community on the reality of climate change and is emerging on its potential major consequences. These include continuous sea-level rise and an accompanying increase in the occurrence of extreme storms. Today, many millions of people live in areas that will be inundated by water. According to the emerging scientific prognoses, future rainfall patterns are likely to increase soil erosion and subsidence, and profoundly affect water availability and quality. In some areas changes in the type and yield of crops will increase the risk of famine.

Second, credible studies have suggested that new and re-emerging infectious diseases will pose a rising global health threat over the next 20 years. According to these studies some well known diseases thought to be on the edge of eradication (such as tuberculosis) have re-emerged in more virulent and drug-resistant forms while previously unknown disease agents for which no cures are avail-

able (of which HIV / AIDS is the best known) have appeared for the first time.

Third, the World Health Organisation has pointed out that the leading cause of death worldwide is now cardiovascular disease and has mapped its rapid spread beyond those parts of the world traditionally thought of as affluent into middle income countries such as China and India.

Fourth, there has been a metamorphosis in armed conflict so that today's conflicts tend to be either low-intensity civil wars, or 'asymmetric' wars in which high-tech forces fight poorly armed opponents. In both the cases warring parties are likely to include both state and non-state armed forces. A number of countries are adding delivery systems with progressively longer ranges to the inventories held by their armed forces, meaning that future interstate conflict may not resemble past wars involving huge armies using heavy conventional weapons to fight major battles.

Thinking about violent armed conflict is now overlaid by the impact of mass impact terrorism, in particular where attacks are perpetrated by groups that form international networks. Even though relatively few people have been killed by mass impact terrorism, the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 led to a radical change in security policy in the most powerful country in the world, which also led directly or indirectly to two major conflicts, in Afghanistan and Iraq. The full consequences of these changes probably have not yet been revealed, but the number of acts of mass impact terrorism appears to be increasing and attacks have taken place in developing as well as developed countries.

There are likely to be inter-relationships between the four sets of issues. Where conflict destroys public health infrastructure it may contribute to the spread of infectious disease. Apart from the global economic impact of mass impact terrorism, the various security-related responses to it might exacerbate political tensions. Health is likely to be affected by climate change, both directly (European studies have identified links between temperature change and

infectious disease in Europe) and indirectly (through the movement of displaced people). The demographic impact of infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS may in turn exacerbate social and political instability in countries and regions.

These linkages are not yet well understood, but in discussions of security within governments and in international processes the notion of threat is increasingly being supplemented by ideas of risk management. Risk is now taken to mean the probability of any adverse outcome, and encompasses the need for public policy to boost the safety of people from both violent and non-violent forms of human behaviour. The approach that is sometimes labelled 'human security' in the academic community, and which is different from traditional notions of threat, is becoming prominent in statements by political leaders when they meet in, for example, the European Union. The United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change took a human security perspective when they included economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease, and environmental degradation as well as transnational organized crime in the set of six groups of threats of particular concern at the present time.

This balanced approach towards security is a recent development. In a major survey of the greatest challenges to global security in the next decade addressed to world leaders in 1999 few respondents responded within the human security paradigm as sketched above—James Wolfenson of the World Bank and King Abdullah II of Jordan were perhaps the only two. Others focused on the need to adapt key aspects of the traditional security agenda, notably how and when to use military force.

Traditional assessments of threat combined military capability and the intention to use that capability. Capability was taken to mean the ability to undertake certain military tasks and so had both an absolute value (what particular forces have the technical capacity to do) and a relative value (what particular forces can do to a real or potential adversary). Intention reflected a judgement about political

decisions on how to use capabilities taken by those with command authority.

In light of the changing nature of violent conflict, many countries have found it necessary to update their traditional threat assessments. Whereas the bilateral confrontation and the system of alliances that were at the heart of the Cold War created a natural lens through which to view threats, the new security environment lacks such a compelling principle around which groups of states coalesce.

The previous imperative to avoid conflict because of the risk of escalation (however remote) into a central crisis gave way to a view that force could and in fact should be used to achieve positive political outcomes. The view that war could not be considered a continuation of politics by other means but rather as a means to universal suicide has been replaced by extensive debates about the need for rules to enable humanitarian intervention. Influential people such as Gareth Evans believe that the debate has now moved beyond the conditions that would justify intervention and make it legal and argue that all sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their citizens. If a state cannot or will not exercise this responsibility then there is a duty for others to take action against it to protect people from suffering grave harm. Evans asserts that this 'responsibility to protect' is being accepted as a new international norm, and predicts that it will become a new rule of customary international law. This is very far from the notion of limiting the use of force exclusively to wars of necessity waged in self-defence.

Another part of the cold war strategic landscape that is in need of fundamental revision is the notion of deterrence. Previously, the relationship between the main possessors of the most destructive military capabilities was characterized by bilateralism. Looking at the strategic relationship between the countries that either have or are developing long-range delivery systems, and in particular those that are developing significant missile forces, most of these relationships have a very different character from the Cold War. A number

of these countries do not have and have never had much by way of strategic interaction with one another.

The larger and more ambitious military modernization programmes seem to be driven by a range of factors including unresolved local conflicts, regional competition between rival states, efforts to deter intervention by outside powers (primarily the United States), changes in military technology development, and the difficulty of keeping pace with the cost and complexity of making and using advanced weapons effectively.

Collectively, we still do not have a single framework that can capture this changed environment, help to put the new issues, problems and patterns into a perspective and draw appropriate conclusions. Developing such a framework is a challenge for peace research. Some more specific challenges to our understanding can be highlighted.

The challenge of understanding what might be an appropriate role for armed force beyond responding to a direct attack has already been referred to above. However, as well as challenging thinking about when to use force, the changing nature of violent conflict requires continuous analysis of the system of rules needed to govern the combatants. There is widespread agreement that during conflict combatants need to apply to themselves rules of conduct based on the principles of discrimination and proportionality, and these principles are firmly established in legal texts. However, there is a new challenge related to the issue of how to apply these rules in increasingly asymmetric conflict conditions, and in particular where opponents are prepared to use terror tactics on a more widespread scale than was previously the case and where warring parties have no obvious or known affiliation.

Although the body of laws that has been developed in regard to armed conflict has been adapted to take into account the engagement of unconventional combatants, there will probably be a need for further evolution to take into account the diversity among warring parties. In particular, there are aspects of what the United

States has labelled a 'global war on terror' that are difficult to accommodate in existing sets of rules. In these conditions the application of laws of war, the criminal law and the relationship between the two needs to be analysed.

While existing rules bind military personnel, a spectrum of non-military agencies increasingly carry out counter-terrorism activities under the umbrella of a military operational plan to defeat terrorist groups. The security services, other types of police forces as well as non-governmental actors such as private companies increasingly undertake important combat related functions in locations where armed conflict is taking place. There is a need to address in a systematic way: first, which body of rules govern the activities of these different agencies; second, where there is an attempt to hold individuals to account for their behaviour what rules will apply to the treatment of those individuals? Third, do current developments threaten the general coherence of the rules governing behaviour in conflict locations? Fourth, do the existing sets of rules need to be adapted and extended and, if yes, in what ways?

In another important area for peace research—arms control and disarmament—the momentum generated in the period up to 1995 has been lost as arms control treaties have in general become less frequent, less ambitious and less binding. The USA set the precedent of withdrawal from nuclear arms control treaties by leaving the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM Treaty) in order to build defences against all classes and all ranges of ballistic missiles. As we know, many nuclear weapons with lower than intercontinental range have never been brought into arms control apart from a series of Russian and American unilateral declarations on them in 1991-2, without any real clarity on what has been done by way of follow-up. The latest U.S.-Russian agreement on strategic nuclear arms, the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) lacks detailed verification and monitoring provisions. China, France and Britain for their part have entered into few arms control commitments regarding their own nuclear weapon

stockpiles. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is being held up by a number of states who refuse to ratify it, above all by the USA. It is both worrying and frustrating that the idea of a treaty that would freeze the stocks of fissile materials owned by nuclear powers still cannot get off the drawing board after forty years of trying. Experienced observers are already asserting with confidence that at best the forthcoming conference to review the Biological Weapons Convention will produce modest results.

Since 1998—when India and Pakistan came into the open with their nuclear weapons programmes and North Korea demonstrated that it had made advancements in its ballistic missile programme—there has been a need to develop a balanced agenda in which 3 challenges for the 21st century are all addressed: the weapons of the 8 existing nuclear powers (including all those previously mentioned, and Israel); the risks of present and future proliferation underlined by developments in Iraq, Iran and North Korea; and the risks of sensitive materials and technologies getting into the hands of terrorists, or other criminal and dangerous non-state actors.

There is no authoritative global inventory of nuclear weapons, but SIPRI believes that there are about 12,300 operational weapons around the world, and thousands of these are on such high alert that they could be launched within minutes. If all spare warheads and weapons kept in some kind of storage are taken into account, the global total is estimated to be to some 27,000 warheads. The USA and Russia each has over 5,000 operational weapons deployed and thousands more held in reserve, while the nuclear arsenals of China, the UK and France are far smaller—numbering in the hundreds. It is hard to make reliable estimates of the arsenals of India, Pakistan and Israel.

Since the middle of the 1990's when there were vigorous protests against a series of nuclear tests made by France, there has been rather little publicity or evidence of popular concern about this still enormous number of enormously destructive weapons. People may

assume that in the Northern hemisphere at least, they are a kind of Cold War relic that is much less important now but is kept, as it were, in the back room as a kind of insurance. The trouble is that while all of the larger nuclear powers are cutting some of their weapons of their own accord as they become too old and inappropriate, all of them also have plans to reconfigure their nuclear capabilities so that they are not actually being eroded. It is actually quite a close parallel to the leading nations' conventional armed forces which are tending to go down in size but up in quality all the time. Some observers are worried that certain states, including Russia, may be tempted to rely more on nuclear weapons than they might have done in the past: because the best of their conventional forces now have to be sent away from the homeland for crisis management or because they are concerned about other relative weaknesses in their defences.

In the Cold War, both the West and the East in Europe had just one big threat to face, coming from the bloc on the other side; but now as noted earlier we have a different set of concerns. While the USA, Britain and France have never excluded the first use of nuclear weapons, statements in the 1990's stressed that the circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. Subsequently, Russia, France, India, the USA and the UK are moving gradually to give nuclear weapons a new core mission in their strategic planning: namely, to deter or respond to attacks by a non-nuclear weapon state armed with chemical or biological weapons. Britain and France have all indicated more recently that they are thinking about how nuclear forces could be used to deter or to respond to threats or acts of mass impact terrorism. Pakistan is another country that does not explicitly exclude the first use of nuclear weapons.

These ideas take us in a dangerous direction because they imagine using nuclear weapons for a practical and limited military purpose, in a context very different from the old third-world-war scenario where nations would have been fighting for their very existence and might

feel justified in taking the most desperate measures. There is a risk now of making nuclear weapons a tool that may be used, while forgetting their exceptionally horrifying and inhuman features, and forgetting what a terrifying situation we would face if there was no longer any effective taboo against their use. No practical way of using nuclear weapons in civil wars or minor wars has been explained and their capacity to deter a really reckless rogue state or a terrorist leader is difficult to reconcile with the terrorist mentality. Would an extremist terrorist group give up the fight because of the risk that a nuclear strike would hit one of their strongholds or might the worst of today's terrorists see gains to be made by provoking a respectable state into an act that would do more to undermine international order than to strengthen it?

A lot of the world's nuclear weapons are still being used by large powers to deter each other—e.g. between the USA and Russia, or India and Pakistan. However, after the Cold War the elements of predictability in major power relations are fewer and the institutional framework for dialogue has not been adapted to the new strategic configuration. The continued development of defences against the full spectrum of missiles raises further questions since we can only suspect what the impact could be on bilateral and local nuclear arms races in situations where one side declares that it now has an effective shield, and the other has not.

SIPRI has recently proposed the establishment of a Nuclear Armament Consultative Group (NACG) consisting initially of the five legally-recognized nuclear weapon states as well as three de facto nuclear weapons states India, Pakistan and Israel. The NACG would serve as a forum for a structured, focused and ongoing dialogue on both political and technical issues related to nuclear doctrines and force modernization.

During the Cold War military nuclear activities were heavily shrouded and the numbers, types, characteristics and locations of nuclear weapons were closely guarded secrets. For a brief period at the end of the Cold War the tendency towards secrecy in bilateral

U.S.-Russia nuclear dialogue was reversed but these gains in bilateral transparency could not be consolidated. The questions are obviously sensitive ones and even in democratic states with vigorous public debate, detailed information about the maintenance and modernization of nuclear forces remains highly classified. Hence, exchanges of information within the NACG would likely begin slowly, with a general exchange of views and gradually proceeding to more technical discussions as mutual confidence increases over time. This could serve as a modest but important and feasible step toward building a comprehensive nuclear transparency regime.

Turning to the challenge of nuclear proliferation between states, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider why the status of this issue has risen so dramatically up the global security agenda in recent years. It is not only because of objective reasons. Although it was not until 1998 that their military nuclear programmes were openly acknowledged, we have known about the nuclear potential of India and Pakistan since the 1970s. Iraq and Libya certainly were aiming for nuclear weapons while Iran and North Korea are posing the greatest challenges now. Thus there is a maximum total of six actual or suspected cases of proliferation from the recent past. But since Cold War times we have seen South Africa voluntarily abandon its nuclear weapons while Argentina and Brazil voluntarily abandoned programmes of research and development that were leading them towards a nuclear potential. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan all agreed in the end to return the nuclear objects on their territory peacefully to Russia after the break-up of the Soviet Union. Iraq and Libya have been deprived of their capabilities, making eight countries that have recently been in one way or another 'de-nuclearized.'

There appear to be subjective and historically determined reasons why the prospect of new nuclear powers should cause concern just now. As the risk of a global nuclear holocaust has been overcome, the nuclear shadow cast over the Middle East and East Asia now looks dark from regions like the integrated Europe, South-East

Asia, Latin America and quite a lot of Africa. These are places where states are going forward to build security through cooperative methods even, as noted above, through essentially constructive uses of military forces. Furthermore, the emergence of new nuclear weapon states challenge the belief of the largest world powers that they ought to be able to live relatively safe lives and order the world's affairs pretty much as they want to. Nuclear weapons in the hands of a regime like the one in Pyongyang, as well as in the hands of terrorists, would allow an essentially weak player to try to paralyse much stronger players by nuclear threats, and then severely wound them by actual nuclear use.

The line of argument that led to the use of military means to handle a perceived nuclear threat in Iraq can be understood from this perspective. Since Iraqi nuclear weapons would have challenged the coercive value of external military power, crushing the danger directly before it is too late was a natural response. However, this line of thinking makes it much harder to understand the different and perhaps partly logical reasons which each proliferating state has for considering the nuclear option.

There is a need for researchers to identify and analyse the technical background to the proliferation danger while continuing to preserve a broader security perspective.

Countries that have pursued nuclear weapons have created secret programmes to build a nuclear weapon complex that includes undeclared or disguised facilities. Secrecy has sometimes been achieved by hiding the parts of the nuclear weapons complex in remote locations and sometimes by disguising the true purpose of military-related nuclear activities.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been in the vanguard of the effort to increase nuclear transparency worldwide through a combination of enhanced legal authority, greater requirements for disclosure by states with nuclear programmes and a stronger emphasis on using existing authority (such as the right to conduct special inspections and the right of access to the UN Secu-

rity Council). Achieving this greater transparency by strengthening of the nuclear safeguards system depends critically on the process of concluding and bringing into force additional protocols to the safeguards agreements between IAEA and its member states based on the Model Additional Protocol agreed in 1997.

The techniques used for producing nuclear energy all around the world are adaptations of ones that were originally developed to enrich uranium and extract and recover plutonium for producing nuclear weapons. Actions by North Korea have highlighted the risk that countries may engage in proliferation-sensitive activities such as fuel-making and fuel reprocessing in the open and under safeguards, but then apply these same techniques for military purposes. Observing the machinery of production and applying nuclear material accountancy in declared parts of the nuclear complex may not be enough to determine whether facilities are intended purely for civil use or for potential weaponization.

These are sobering realities to reflect on, at a time when we must clearly expect a sustained and worldwide increase in the demand for civilian nuclear power. The growth of overall energy demand, especially in the 'rising giant' economies like China and India, will combine with concerns about climate protection and also about national control and autonomy to make nuclear power look like a very attractive or, in some cases, the only possible choice. Under these circumstances the size of the global nuclear complex will grow, and sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle might appear in greater numbers and in more locations.

In this perspective, one obvious line to explore is to see whether the world may be able to develop more 'proliferation-resistant' nuclear technologies. This is already a hot topic of research in the nuclear industry in connection with the planning of future nuclear reactors. One of the options being looked at is to use nuclear research methods, fuel cycles and methods of energy extraction that minimize the production of the materials most appropriate for use in weapons. A remedy that could be combined with these technical

modifications is to change the commercial organization and ownership structures of the nuclear power industry. The risk of proliferation, but also the difficulties of detecting and stopping it, are greatest in a country that is developing the whole fuel cycle itself and is also living with high levels of tension and suspicion and low levels of transparency. The opposite situation exists where several countries have come together in a joint governmental and commercial venture, like Urenco and Eurodif in Western Europe, to produce nuclear energy in a multilateral cooperative framework where only some possess the full technology to carry out the more sensitive stages of fuel handling, and thus even the first step towards proliferation for the other members can be avoided.

There is no reason why such cooperative schemes should not be set up, with both economic and strategic benefits, among neighbouring countries in different parts of the world. The Russian Federation has promoted such approaches to meet the Iranian nuclear challenge, and ideas put forward in the past—and perhaps in future, too?—for meeting North Korea's legitimate energy needs have been along these lines.

Of course, there are good and bad reasons why states might not want to alter their current nuclear plans in order to enter such deals. The bad reason is if they really do want to proliferate; but it is also possible that they would be genuinely worried about the good faith of the other parties and hence the security of their energy supply. In addition to their concerns about the pace of nuclear disarmament, many countries outside the developed West also feel strongly about the principle laid out in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that every state has an equal right to the development and peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy. Countries that own advanced nuclear technologies may see them as commercial assets, which they cannot be forced to share with people whom they disapprove of or who cannot pay the price. This attitude of the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' underpins export control groupings that set conditions for the supply of proliferation-sensitive items, the Nuclear Suppli-

ers Group and the Zangger Committee. Apart from any injustice involved, there is an obvious limit to how effective these controls can be when the new nuclear powers don't belong to the groups in question and when the general level of technical competence that makes proliferation possible is spreading more widely around the world. The recently discovered facts about the nuclear smuggling network of the Pakistani government scientist A.Q. Khan have illustrated this plainly enough. In SIPRI's view a system of trade controls with broader participation in the ownership and management of the system, and where private business would be brought in as a conscious and active partner would be better tuned to the political and commercial environment we expect in the not too distant future.

At the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT and also at the discussions leading up to the UN World Summit meeting in September 2005, broad participation did not facilitate positive outcomes. In those processes complaints against the established nuclear powers were immediately met by complaints from the U.S. and others about the failure of the NPT to provide foolproof ways of catching and stopping real proliferation cases. As a result the NPT review achieved practically nothing, while the UN Summit was not able to say anything at all about arms control and disarmament in its final declaration. The method of focussing so much attention on one particular piece of paper, the NPT, is not designed to get results in present-day conditions. It is not so much the international legal framework that needs to be in focus, but the dysfunctional elements in the security behaviour of states and in the relations between them.

Big powers and small powers, established nuclear states and potential proliferators today are still convinced that having nuclear weapons can help to solve the underlying challenge of insecurity, whereas unfortunately all the world's experience tells us that it cannot. At best it can produce a long, costly and dangerous stalemate, like the Cold War and the current India-Pakistan relationship; but in many more cases, the appearance of new weapons or techniques

either in new hands or old hands merely produces anxieties and counter-reactions that make the overall security situation worse. It follows that the only way out of what might be called the nuclear trap is something so fundamentally simple as finding what the underlying security problems are and trying to find other ways of dealing with them.

The European Union's strategy against WMD is actually based on this idea: as it says, 'The best solution to the problem of proliferation of WMD is that countries should no longer feel they need them.' This is not a vague and idealistic idea but can actually help us with detailed choices in the way we approach specific nuclear-related problems. For instance, if we accept that security is a part of Iranian and North Korean motives, it should be clear that threatening to attack them or overthrow their regimes can only make things worse. It should also be clear that the security perceptions of states like these are formed by their regional neighbourhoods as much as by their attitudes toward the global powers, and so there cannot be any good solutions that do not also try to regulate and improve the security conditions in their whole regional environments. The chaotic Iraq situation is part of the Iranian conundrum. It follows that the so-called problem states will never accept solutions that are convenient for external powers but that leave them weaker and more exposed themselves: so any package that we put together with the aim of changing their security perceptions and behaviour for the long term will need to contain positive prospects and incentives as well as warnings and sanctions. If Washington can never accept that Iran will remain one of the leading powers in West Asia, it can never expect to solve the Iranian problem or any other problem about Iranian behaviour either.

In past cases of 'de-nuclearization,' we can see that the states that pulled back from nuclear weapons all did so at a time when they were taking big steps forward on the global scene: towards guaranteed independence in the case of the post-Soviet states, or legitimate black majority rule in South Africa, or advances in democracy and

regional stabilization in the case of the Latin American countries. In every case the states concerned shifted the emphasis of their national policy to seek the political and economic benefits of participation and integration into wider international processes. In several cases some kind of security assurance from the great powers came into the picture. However, while we know of this formula, there is work that needs to be done to analyse how to apply it in the new way that is needed for each case. The initiative to set up the framework of 6-power talks for handling the North Korean challenge was a rational response to this logic in the East Asian area.

At the same time, we must of course be careful that a row of separate 'package' solutions does not end up creating new contradictions and tensions that will lead to new security problems sooner or later. The West's approach to past cases can already be criticized for several inconsistencies, for instance sanctioning India and Pakistan when they first broke out with nuclear weapons but not Israel, and offering Libya a much more attractive bargain than has ever been suggested for Iran. The current test-case for these issues is, of course, the recent nuclear cooperation agreement between the USA and India. The good side of it is that cooperation may bring tangible gains in nuclear safety and security. But there are legitimate concerns about whether the potential gains are enough to justify the bargain being offered; about the effect on Pakistan; and whether there is a risk that making special exceptions to the relevant rules of the NPT and Nuclear Suppliers Group will erode their value as a guide for well-behaved states and as a weapon against the bad.

The need for the world to maintain a united front and united standards is even more relevant as regards the danger of nuclear technologies leaking into terrorist hands. Terrorists, as we know, can use global networks of smuggling and financing and can launch their attacks in the most unexpected places. A step towards recognizing this reality was taken by the United Nations Security Council when in April 2004 it passed its Resolution No. 1540. This Resolution makes it a responsibility for every state to introduce

criminal penalties against companies or individuals that illegally possess or try to trade in WMD, and it demands in practice that every state should have effective physical protection measures, export controls and transit controls in place for the most dangerous items and technologies. It might one day provide the basis for building that more universal system of export controls and trade controls mentioned earlier.

Meanwhile, however, there are many other things that all countries of good will can do, and can help each other with, to minimize the risks of nuclear leakage. One approach that SIPRI has particularly studied and supported is the provision of financial and technical assistance to find, secure, collect and (wherever possible) destroy left-over and unwanted WMD and related materials. The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction agreed in 2002 by the group of eight industrialized countries established a basis for cooperation to pursue projects of this kind in the first instance in Russia. This has the merit of being a cooperative and open method which, if it succeeds, should build generally better security relationships and reduce the risks of nuclear accident and criminal theft as well as the main target of terrorism.

The Global Partnership can point to genuine successes in destroying chemical weapons and dismantling unwanted submarines but progress in efforts to manage and dispose of stocks of fissile materials designated as no longer required for defence purposes has been uneven. Ending the production of additional quantities of fissile material suitable for weapons should also have a very high priority. There is still a need for more widespread application of modern physical security and protection at all nuclear installations, more effective nuclear fuel disposal, a more coordinated and transparent way of organizing advanced nuclear research, and training for individual scientists and technicians in their personal responsibility to maintain control over dangerous technologies—to mention only the more obvious aspects of good ‘nuclear housekeeping.’ Implementing the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) launched by the

United States and Russia in 2004, in which the IAEA has a critical role, would help to minimize the total amount of nuclear material available that could be used for nuclear weapons.

SIPRI recently delivered a major report to the European Union authorities about how the EU should back up its policy strategy against proliferation by devoting more money and effort from its own resources to all the kinds of activities just mentioned. We suggested a very large increase in European spending between 2007-13 both to complete projects in the Russian Federation and to extend the same methods and cooperative approach to several other regions where the EU has partners and influence. The SIPRI Director personally recommended these measures to EU decision-makers from the podium of the European Parliament in December 2005.

There should be an important field of research to examine how to adapt and extend the geographical scope of application of practical approaches to reduce the nuclear danger and to understand the resource implications.

I would like to end by expressing in the warmest terms my gratitude to the Jeju Peace Institute for the opportunity to lay out some ideas about the main tendencies and questions that I believe should form an important part of the wide agenda for peace research. In 2006 SIPRI is celebrating its 40th birthday, and I know that my Director and all of my colleagues at SIPRI welcome allies that can help to deepen our understanding of security in the spirit of openness and partnership. This cooperation is a precondition for making progress with those very difficult issues we are talking about today!

New Roles of Actors in Peace Activities in the 21st Century: States, NGOs and Enlightened Individuals

Katsuya Kodama

The growth in the past years of the NGOs and new social movements is one of the political and social events of our time. This has had a significant impact not only on the political environment but also on many citizens' ways of thinking about peace and security issues. The world is rapidly changing with the amazing growth of citizen uprisings. When we think of world peace and democratization, one of the core elements in the current world is the activities of non-governmental organizations, or civil society. In 1945, there were only some hundreds of non-governmental organizations at the global level. The number of NGOs has constantly increased to be some thousands. Accordingly, they have acquired power not only in the economic field but also in international politics. They are now recognized as the actor to supplement the functions of the United Nations based on the units of states.

This paper aims to analyze the new actors and their new roles in peace activities in the 21st century. Thanks to rapid development of information technology, such as the internet and e-mails, it has become much easier to make possible the networking of global citizens who would like to be involved in the peacemaking process. In this context, a new networking movement called GPPAC (Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflicts) is worthy of consideration. The last part of this paper examines the background and meanings of the GPPAC process.

I. General Background

A. The New Wave of Peace Movements in the 1980s

The big swell of new peace movements that came to the fore during the first half of the 1980s had a strong impact not only on the political world but also on the academic world. Sociologists saw this wave within the framework of “new theories on social movements” and designated these new peace movements as being examples of global citizens’ initiatives aiming at autonomy and self-determination. Concepts of “citizens’ autonomy” and of “European independence from the United States” were put forward, and often heated discussions took place.

In the work of many sociologists, philosophers and political scientists, one can find a theoretical framework that is akin to this “new theories on social movements” approach. Among such researchers one could name, for example, Alain Touraine, Jurgen Habermas, Jean Cohen, and Klaus Offe. Northern Europe has also produced some unique researchers. Some of the work of Johan Galtung, Mats Friberg, and, Gunnar Olfsson are especially noteworthy for synthesizing currents of research into “new social movements” with the traditions of peace research in Northern Europe.

This “new social movements” type of approach, through a comparison with the older labor union movements, tries to make clear the peculiarities of movements for peace and for protecting the environment, but it cannot be said that sufficient consideration has yet been given to the positive and constructive mutual relationships between these two categories of new social movements. In studying movements aimed at peace and at environmental conservation, and in looking ahead to their further development in the arena of practical accomplishments, it is necessary to consider all their individual special characteristics — and also, for that matter, the special characteristics of the older labor union movements — and to look for the various mutually reinforcing interrelationships among them.

While incorporating considerations of diversity and definitional vagueness or versatility, European “new social movements” sociologists and peace researchers continued to build up a new paradigm for studying social movements. This can be said to be an extremely important “theoretical” development in the field of social movements research. Though the immediate surge of the new peace movements had withered already in the latter part of the 1980s, characteristics of movements have continued or even been strengthened yet today. The current paper largely depends on the new social movement theory in analyzing the new actors and their new roles in peace activities.

B. The Increasing Influence of Non-Governmental Organizations

Since the 1990s, the international NGOs (sometimes called “INGOs”) have come to front stage as actors in international relations, which means that there is now a need to assign them a definite standing in peace studies. At the same time, international NGOs come to play definite roles as powers in putting into practice many of the accomplishments of peace studies.

International NGOs’ activities have increased the importance especially in the fields of UN activities. The United Nations often calls world meetings, besides the usual deliberations in general meetings, at the Economic and Social Council on a series of global subjects, such as the human rights question, the environment, development, and disarmament. In the latest world meetings of the United Nations, the roles which international NGOs played are very large, and have received high attention. I would like to summarize only a few meetings that were significant for their influence from the viewpoint of the participation of NGOs to the United Nations.

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit) is worthy to note. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development was held for 12 days from

June 3rd, 1992, to the 14th in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, in order to tackle internationally the environmental problem which had deteriorated in the 1980s and has quickly formed into a worldwide problem. About 180 representatives of countries, "areas," and the U.N. organizations participated in the meeting. More importantly, about 8000 non-governmental organizations (NGO) gathered there, with the number of all participants exceeding an unprecedented 40,000 people.

This United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the so-called Earth Summit, was epoch-making in respect to citizens' participation in the UN conference. In the first place, it can be mentioned that the NGO came to be positioned as a "partner" rather than an "observer." During the Earth Summit, NGOs could participate not only in the meeting activities at the conference site but also in the preparation stage. NGOs could make a speech from the floor at formal task force meetings and at formal plenary sessions, could draft documents and place them now into a conference room so that a government representative could receive the message easily. Moreover, access to the drafting work of UN documents was also accepted. Their comments could now be handed to important personnel and important representatives.

The style of the Earth Summit by which NGOs led a meeting has been followed also at subsequent world conferences. NGOs carried out remarkable activities in the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 (Vienna), the International Population Conference in 1994 (Cairo), the World Summit for Social Development in 1995 (Copenhagen), the 4th World Conference on Women in 1995 (Beijing), the UN Conference on Human Settlements in 1996 (Habitat II, Istanbul), etc. The conventional system by which only the governments had determined most activities as formal participants is now almost completely changed.

However, some problems remain in some of the fields, such as security issues and the human rights issue. Although the contribution of NGOs in standard setting activities is accepted, it specifies

“final responsibility rests with a state” and assigns NGOs to a secondary role. In the fields of security and human rights issues, the stance of NGOs can lead to criticism of a government’s policy, for which reason many of the governments would like to keep NGOs away from UN decision making. However, the NGOs’ roles in the United Nations are so important just because of such situations.

Some NGOs have played important roles in the conclusion process of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. In Ottawa, Canada, the treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines was concluded on December 4, 1997. The Ottawa Process is the intergovernmental meeting which Canada et al. led towards prohibition of anti-personnel mines, their stockpiling, manufacture, and shipment. This process was proposed by the international conference held in Ottawa in October 1996 with the background of a movement of NGOs, such as an international mine prohibition campaign. The international mine prohibition campaign was the objective of a union of 1000 or more NGOs of 55 nations. Since it started the activity in 1991, it has held the NGO meeting in every corner of the earth. In the Ottawa meeting in October, 1996, the international mine prohibition campaign exhibited the pattern of debate by the Internet, and government representatives’ remarks were similarly exhibited by the Internet at the Oslo meeting in June 1997. At the Ottawa Process, NGOs proved to have the diplomatic-negotiations skill in the field relevant to security and disarmament. Especially, so called Middle Power countries, such as Canada, Sweden and Norway, have cooperated with NGOs. The cooperative relations between governments and NGOs are the big feature of the process.

II. Consideration over Actors

The movements are so diversified that generalization is not an easy task and there are some specific trends that apply to specific

countries and not to others. With these difficulties in mind, I would like to give some consideration to actors in the movements.

A. Well-Educated Middle Classes

A number of scholars have pointed out that the core of the peace movements and NGOs are the well-educated middle classes (e.g. Salmon, 1986). This is not, however, a completely new phenomenon in the current peace movements. Already in the 1960s, Frank Parkin (1968) showed that the members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) were mainly from highly educated people in the middle classes. In a similar way, Herman Schmid (1966), in the study of a Swedish peace organization, made clear the concentration of the well-educated middle class. It can be safely mentioned that this trend is continuing, or even becoming more and more conspicuous in the current movements. Formation of specialists groups with high social status and academic background, such as physicians for the prevention of nuclear war and teachers for peace, is one of the proofs.

B. Women

The current peace movements are surprisingly dominated by women. It is clear that women have been important activists in the peace movements. A crucial question, then, is why women. A number of women researchers attempt to explain the dominance of women in peace movements as women's "characteristics" e.g. Brock-Utne, 1984). They say that women, educated as a more peaceful sex, are more capable than men of solving conflicts in a non-violent way. In addition to this, they go further to say that women who bear children and in most cases take care of them more than men are seriously concerned with peace issues. Although this argumentation seems to merit some attention, I think this does not solely explain their recent high participation in peace movements. In my

understanding, the recent participation of women in peace movements reflects a basic disagreement with and a reaction against male-authoritarian society. Women's liberation movements, which were most active in the beginning of the 1970s, now take the form of peace movements, combining liberation issues and peace issues with a broader perspective.

C. Religious People (Organizations)

Some religious organizations have, in recent years, played an active role in the peace movements. This has something to do with the opposite factor that many recent conflicts are related to religions. There are of course traditional pacifist denominations which have actively been involved in peace movements, like the Society of Friends (Quakers). In the past, however, many religious organizations have chosen the 'conservative' position and accepted the policies of the national government. It is just a recent phenomenon that so many religious organizations have come to speak out for peace and security. In Europe and the USA, many religious organizations have served as the bases of peace movements. A recent trend is that the religious organizations themselves make peace actions as the International NGOs. Interfaith movements are worthy of note. "The Religions for Peace World Assembly" is a unique opportunity for religious leaders of all faith traditions to come together to discuss actions for peace. In August 2006, the Assembly convened 800 religious leaders from all major faith traditions in Kyoto. "The Religions for Peace World Assembly" is the world's largest and most diverse multi-religious assembly. The Assembly brings together religious leaders from zones of conflict — among them Palestine, Israel, Iraq, Lebanon, the Congo and Sudan — to begin the process of healing by finding common moral ground to end the violence that is taking place in religion's name.

D. Specialists (Groups)

During the last few decades, we have seen a growth of many occupational groups expressing their 'social responsibility' in terms of humanitarian assistance, intervention, and conflict prevention. These groups include teachers, physicians, journalists, lawyers, scientists, and many others. Their movements are of special significance, since 1) the knowledge of their specialty (e.g. scientists and physicians) provides crucial information to the public, 2) the occupational opportunities to educate children and the public (e.g. teachers and journalists) are no doubt important, 3) in many cases, their high social status makes it easier to approach the government as well as the public, 4) their rather solid organizations serve as financial bases, 5) their occupational identity makes it easier to cooperate beyond the blocks, and 6) they can use their occupational relations to recruit members.

Their contributions have been recognized by the Nobel Peace Prize: International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) in 1985, the Pugwash organization in 1995 and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) in 1999.

E. The Local Governments

Few studies have been carried out on the peace declaration movements of local governments. In my understanding, however, they are one of the most significant movements. Especially since 1982, the number of local communities which have adopted a peace declaration or nuclear free declaration has rapidly increased. Practical effects of such declarations are in many cases doubtful, though there are some significant exceptions, such as the case of Kobe. (The nuclear-free declaration of Kobe city, which has one of the largest harbours in the world, had wide-ranging effects. In 1975, the city assembly of Kobe passed the resolution that no ship is allowed to anchor at Kobe Harbour without certifying that it does not have

any nuclear weapons. Since then, no nuclear vessel has come to Kobe Harbour.) More important than the practical effects of a nuclear free declaration or peace declaration are its side effects. First, a peace declaration of local governments gives a sort of legitimization to peace movements, which would, otherwise, be criticized as anti-social movements. Secondly, local governments with a peace declaration can work as an intermediary of the peace movements and national governments.

III. New Roles of Actors in Peace Activities in the 21st Century

Here I would like to examine the new roles of peace movements and NGOs in creating world peace. The sovereign state has long been considered as almost the only actor in international relations. Even now, the state is one of the most important actors in this regard. However, there have come to exist some more actors in the fields of security and peace. The emergence of NGOs and the international people's community is an important element in the current days' world environment.

A. More Dynamic Participation of NGOs in the Activities of the UN

The United Nations is, needless to say, an organization made up of nation-state units, and as such it must be said to have great limitations. In other words, because the UN is an agglomeration of nation-states and governments, bureaucratization continues to be a major problem and people's real-life sufferings and immediate concerns tend to get diluted and overlooked. When we think carefully about the UN's inherent shortcomings, we see how very necessary are activities at the level of ordinary citizens. There has been much enthusiastic discussion of possibilities for international NGOs to

participate in UN-centered peace activities. Today, when so much is being said about the need for “international contributions,” what sorts of things do people have in mind when they talk about participation by NGOs in the real world? There have been a number of proposals relating the UN and civil society to NGOs. The Canadian peace researcher Hanna Newcombe, for example, has proposed UN citizens’ bodies that would function with NGOs. Such citizens’ groups would have the right to voice their opinions and ideas on world politics and governance, and ought as an extension of this, play an important role in the search for a new global order. Possibilities are being suggested for a dynamic transition from an international politics “among nation-states” to an international politics “among citizens.” It may not be easy formally to set up a second chamber of the UN or People’s chamber of the UN, whatever you want to call it. However, we see the closer relationship between organs of the UN and INGOs even in the field of security and peace.

In this context, the Hague Appeal for Peace may be worthy to note. In 1999, NGOs that have special interests in security and peace held the International Conference of the Hague Appeal for Peace 1999. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, participated in the conference and stated, ‘I congratulate the organizers of this timely and important meeting. It is heartening that people from so many parts of the world have come together to make a global appeal for peace.’ The conference sent a clear message to the world’s policy makers on issues which they failed to address in the first two peace conferences of the Hague Appeal of 1899 and 1907: How to eliminate the causes of war; including racism, colonialism, poverty and other human rights violations, the limitation of arsenals to a reasonable level for territorial defense, the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction including nuclear ones, the establishment and utilization of conflict resolution mechanisms as an interim measure on the way to abolish war, improvements in humanitarian law, and most importantly, the creation of a

culture of peace for the world's war-oppressed people. The conference attracted nearly 10,000 participants and included hundreds of civil society leaders and representatives from 80 governments and international bodies.

The closer cooperation has just started between INGOs and the UN in the field of security and peace. A few years later, the GPPAC (Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflicts) process emerged, which I would like to examine in a later part of the paper.

B. Prevention of Armed Conflicts and Intervention

The issues relating to armed conflicts have been regarded almost completely as matters of the central governments. This conception is being changed rapidly. Community leaders, women's groups, academics, journalists and businessmen demonstrated that their influence could sometimes extend beyond that of soldiers and diplomats. Political leaders across the world became increasingly aware of civil society's potential to anticipate and resolve its own tensions. Academics began to give theoretical shape to methods developed in an impromptu manner on the ground. Networks of NGOs and practitioners began to form. Experience was pooled. Lessons were learned.

There are of course a number of difficulties in the process wherein civil society performs its role in the fields of security and peace. Questions of NGOs' accountability, legitimacy and transparency have yet to be faced. The relations between NGOs and the governments are still in many cases antagonistic. Many of such NGOs face difficulties in fund-raising. However, some NGOs have at least partly solved these problems and started the dynamic process for the prevention of armed conflicts and even intervention actions.

The Carnegie Commission has argued: "The prevention of deadly conflict is, over the long term, too hard — intellectually, technically and politically — to be the responsibility of any single institution or

government, no matter how powerful. Strengths must be pooled, burdens shared and labour divided among actors. This is a practical necessity." With this awareness prevailing, some INGOs have succeeded in establishing cooperative relations with national governments, UN agencies, and international donors, and have developed their professional skills for the prevention of armed conflicts and intervention actions. They have succeeded in getting pretty large financial resources from international donors, foundations, national governments, the European Union, etc.

International NGOs have now been recognized as one of the important key actors of conflict prevention. The Helsingbor Agenda of the European Union states: "Our common ambition is to enhance our co-operation with NGOs, civil society, the business community and research institutions in the implementation of the conflict prevention agenda." These NGOs include; International Alert (UK), the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD; South Africa), Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa (NPI-A; Kenya), European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP; the Netherlands), International Center on Conflict and Negotiation (ICCN; Georgia).

C. Advocacy and Creation of International Opinion

The rapid strides being made by new means of communication are having a great influence on NGO activities and other peace-related activities. Through the spread of computers and the establishment of electronic mail systems, one gap between "South" and "North" has, to a large extent, been filled in. There were voices from some activists and researchers from "southern" countries to the effect that "to stress the role of electronic mail and the like means that our environment, where we don't even have fax machines, is not being understood." However, it would seem that in fact the number of "southern" activists already using e-mail (often having skipped entirely the use of faxes) is increasing, and e-mail, partly

because of its low cost, seems likely to become an effective means of overcoming the communications gap between North and South. Many major NGOs have already started international "e-mail conferences," or even TV conferences, using the internet and these will probably become more common in the future. The creative utilization of new means of communication in response to fluid world conditions has become an important task for peace activists.

What is needed in response to the current problems of our age is the most effective possible means for discussing them together and to search for various ways to come to close grips with them and help devise workable solutions. The development of e-mail and the Internet can surely be a great help to this practical side of peace activities. Peace organizations as well as individual peace activists have often achieved smooth communications in spite of limited financial resources. I feel that in our current "information age" new conditions are in place that will contribute in a dynamic way to help peace activities develop as a "practical weapon" and to better help resolve some of the thorny problems of today's world.

Through the development of information tools, it becomes much easier for INGOs to mobilize international opinion. In fact, it has largely contributed to the big success of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in the 1990s. In the Ottawa process, civil society in the form of the international mine prohibition campaign exhibited the pattern of debate by the Internet. Many major NGOs have brushed up on their skills in utilizing the internet, making their own video films, and newspapers, and having friendly relations with mass media. This is clearly an important skill in fulfilling their role as mobilizers of international opinion. The worldwide networking of people is the advantage of INGOs.

Some NGOs have started to make alternative proposals in solving regional conflicts. Their roles are not confined only to "movements." They are challenging the current difficult situation intellectually too. The International Peace Research Association, which is the only peace researchers' association on a global scale, submitted

their proposal to the UN with regard to the Gulf War situation.

On August 2, 1990, Iraq's army invaded and occupied Kuwait. In response, the UN Security Council approved a series of resolutions which imposed economic sanctions and demanded the unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi army from Kuwait. At the same time there was put together a 500,000-strong multinational military force, known as "Operation Desert Shield," with members not only from the United States but also from Saudi Arabia, the UK, Egypt, Syria, France, and other countries. In September, when the Iraqi government did not opt to withdraw from Kuwait, a new UN Security Council resolution authorized the use of military force, which led to the initiation of "Operation Desert Storm."

In response to this strained situation, IPRA set up a "Working Committee to Research Peace Building in the Middle East." This committee quickly put together an international network of researchers and set to work on producing scenarios for avoiding war. In January 1991, war broke out when the multinational force commenced bombardment from airplanes and missiles against sites in Iraq. The above-mentioned IPRA committee was now busy working on scenarios for bringing peace at the earliest possible juncture. On February 26, Kuwait was liberated and two days later attacks against Iraq by the multinational force were ended. The interval between the war's beginning and end was short, and the IPRA committee's "Scenario for Peace" presented to the UN was not completed prior to the ending of hostilities. However, in the process of producing this scenario, a variety of papers and opinions were exchanged and some significant results were achieved. These can be said to have constituted a groundbreaking activity by which IPRA, an international NGO, addressed a real, ongoing war from a standpoint informed by careful thinking and scholarship. As the case shows, some INGOs are now trying to propose peaceful solution scenarios.

IV. GPPAC Process

A. International Process

Acknowledging the roles of international civil societies, I think it worthy to give consideration to the GPPAC (Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict) process, especially their implementation in the East Asia region. This is an ongoing process and needs some more years to make an evaluation. I would here like to introduce the activities.

In 2003, in response to the Secretary-General's Recommendation 27, the worldwide conflict prevention community joined to form a Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC). I was on the international board of this process in the beginning stage. All sectors and disciplines working in conflict prevention were involved, from the community level to the international level. The Global Partnership developed a three-year global programme called *The Role of Civil Society in the Prevention of Armed Conflict*, in which conflict prevention networks were built and existing ones strengthened. The Programme is well under way, with lessons learned being collected regionally about the role of civil society in conflict prevention and also its interaction with IGOs. This process culminated in an International Conference at the UN in 2005. The International Conference at the UN attracted nearly 1000 participants and resulted in a big success. The conference and the international activities were meaningful in the following points:

1) They Raised the Profile of Conflict Prevention and Peace Building.

The conference at the United Nations in July 2005 as well as the global level process contributed to a greater recognition of the field of conflict prevention and peace building and the role of civil society in it.

2) They Stimulated Networking and Networks.

The Global Partnership provided an excellent opportunity to strengthen regional networking, and to stimulate the creation of a regional network. Furthermore, the Global Partnership also led to the creation of several national networks. After the conference at UN Headquarters in 2005, these networks are continuing co-operating within the framework of the Global Partnership, developing and defining new tasks for the future.

3) They Improved Interaction between Civil Society Organisations and Governments, Regional Organisations, and the United Nations

On a regional level, the Global Partnership motivated civil society organisations to involve UN agencies, governmental officials and representatives from Regional Organisations in the regional process. We have seen that valuable proposals and recommendations have been developed to improve future interaction between civil society organisations and governments, regional organisations and the UN.

B. Regional Process; Northeast Asia

The programme is structured by a series of parallel regional processes, flexible enough to encompass regional differences but sufficiently aligned to give coherence to the whole. The programme is under way in fifteen regions world-wide. In our region, i.e., Northeast Asia, we have already had a few regional meetings of NGOs, are now preparing for other ones and are trying to create networking. The core members for this process are from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China and Russia. Peace Boat, which is located in Japan, takes the role of coordinator. The last conference was held in Kungansan, North Korea in March 2006 with about 30 participants.

The challenge ahead for the Northeast Asian region in terms of the GPPAC process is awesome. Besides being home to a population of approximately 1.527 billion people, or one-quarter of the world's population, the Northeast Asian region is geographically vast and comprises seven different official languages within China, Hong Kong, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, Far East Russia, South Korea and Taiwan.

Politically, a post-Cold War situation prevails in Northeast Asia, with numerous border disputes and heightened tension over nuclear capabilities and militarization in the region. United States foreign policy is highly relevant in Northeast Asia and further contributes to the political complexity of the region.

The state of civil society generally in Northeast Asia is weak — and accordingly, the state of civil society actors with a conflict prevention agenda even weaker. The existence and level of development of civil society organizations varies greatly between members of the region.

Although we acknowledge the difficulties in this Northeast Asia region, we also firmly believe in the importance of creating stronger civil society and utilizing it for more a peaceful society. There is a need to advocate for global policy change, to create a paradigm shift from reaction to prevention. To be able to do that, there is a need for a globally connected network on conflict prevention and peace building from the grassroots to the international level, bringing together NGOs, academics, governments, and the UN. We need to start in our region first.

First of all, we need to establish regional peace building networks and to strengthen the existing ones. Networking is essential for creating peace. With the development of the internet and e-mail, the networking among the NGOs has become much easier. We need to make stronger networking beyond country boundaries.

Second, we should identify mechanisms for interaction between civil society, the UN, regional organisations and governments.

Third, we should create a coherent body of research and theory

that will help the conflict prevention community to play its full part in international debate.

The whole process is underway, and all we need to do is to make the process stronger and quicker. The role of civil society in creating peace and democracy is obviously becoming more and more important. I think the GPPAC process will consolidate the trend and create a new paradigm of thinking with regard to peace and conflict prevention, not only in Northeast Asia but also in the whole world.

C. Future Planning

The GPPAC process in Northeast Asia is tackling the extremely difficult task of creating a peaceful environment in the region. We acknowledge the difficulties that exist in the region. Under this difficult situation, the roles of civil society and NGOs are becoming crucial. GPPAC-Northeast Asia has proposed the following actions. Although there are some proposals which may be a bit far from realization, there are others that we should be attentive to. The energy and efforts devoted by NGOs may be able to realize those proposals which appear unrealistic under the current situation.

Objective 1: Organize Solidarity Actions to Promote Conflict Prevention Goals of GPPAC Action Agendas.

- Towards reconciliation and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula
- Civilian Round of 6-Party Talks
- Onboard Peace Boat in East Sea of Korea
- Academic 6-Party Talks in China
- Public Support for Inter-Korean Exchange Projects
- Mt Kumgang Tourism Project for mutual exchange and peace education purposes
- Host inter-Korean cultural events onboard Peace Boat's pas-

senger ship around the world

- Global Article 9 Campaign,
- Launch international solidarity day of action on November 3, 2006, to mark the 60th anniversary of the Japanese Peace Constitution and call for preservation of Article 9
- Global Article 9 Conference in 2008 in Tokyo
- Campaign and seminars to create Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in NE Asia
- Feasibility study on creation of single-state NWFZs
- Normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan & the DPRK
- Annual public awareness campaign on September 17 in Tokyo to commemorate Pyongyang Declaration
- Joint inter-cultural exchange between North Korean and Japanese youth at Mt Kumgang
- International Day of Peace September 21
- Joint symbolic action for peace-building in Northeast Asia and contribution to the “Peace One Day” documentary project

Objective 2: Strengthen Confidence Building Platforms towards Conflict Prevention

- Historical recognition and overcoming the past, including history textbook, military sexual slavery, and Yasukuni Shrine issues.
- Host Northeast Asia Forum for Students and School Teachers
- Promote usage of the Common History Textbook throughout Northeast Asia
- Organize training workshops for journalists, peace activists and parliamentarians on the above themes
- Offer space for open dialogue about the Taiwan Strait for mutual understanding
- Kuril Islands / Northern Territories dispute
- Vladivostok-based joint research program on territorial disputes

- Develop peace park / eco tourism
- Senkaku / Diaoyu / Tiaoyutai Islands dispute
- Organize forum for young diplomats from the region to exchange views

Objective 3: Lobbying Governments & Building Networks to Promote Policies & Structures for Conflict Prevention

- Engage the United Nations
- United Nations Security Council, General Assembly, Peace Building Commission
- Monitor Peace Building Commission and its Asian relations
- Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
- Submit joint paper by NEA groups on NWFZ, missile defense systems, and weaponization of outer space
- Millennium Development Goals (MDG) related process
- Join public education on MDGs in NE Asia and integrate peace education into awareness raising efforts
- Strengthen alliance between peace & development CSO communities to work for common goal
- Election of New UN Secretary-General
- Send open letter to all candidates surveying their commitment to conflict prevention, disarmament and peace
- Engage Regional Governments
- Governments of Six-Party Talks
- Approach governments of the region committed to conflict prevention, including GPPAC Group of Friends and Human Security Network
- Make lobby efforts through inter-governmental bodies including ASEAN (+3); APEC and ASEM.

Objective 4: Regional Capacity-Building for Conflict Prevention

- Multi-stakeholder Roundtable Meetings with officials from

governments and UN agencies, media, and other civil society actors, including academics

- Seminars at universities, such as the United Nations University, Tokyo
- Promote Peace Education within NE Asia
- Establish a Regional Peace Building Institute, and disseminate resources throughout the region on peace education pedagogy
- Promote conflict prevention issues relevant to Northeast Asia at the World Social Forum in Bangkok, October 2006

Objective 5: Knowledge Sharing and Dissemination

- Launch Northeast Asia Online Peace Forum in summer 2006 to share views and experiences on conflict prevention efforts in the region and with the international community. Host e-symposium in October 2006.
- Organize a GPPAC NE Asia Regional Conference focusing on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in Ulaanbaatar, 2006-07.

V. Concluding Remarks

We are living in a world full of violence. The new creation of a peace culture which aims at a new life style of independent participation and autonomy is called for. A big surge of international NGOs shall be regarded as the first step in the creation of the new peace culture. Global citizens are promoting exchanges on an individual level, and the identity as a global-citizen is being gained partly thanks to the Internet revolution. Moreover, international companies being asked keenly about social responsibility have become important players in building global culture in fields such as environmental protection and peace. Although only the states were once considered as main actors in international politics, local governments have now started to work in the field of international cooperation and world

peace. International NGOs, companies with an international scope, local governments and enlightened individuals are forming a solidarity for achieving peace by combining to produce a new global culture, which is desperately needed if humanity wishes to survive.

The future of the earth looks dark. However, there is still hope. We, as global citizens are faced with an intellectual challenge to realize this hope.

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PART III

*Peace on the Korean Peninsula
and Cooperation
in Northeast Asia*

The Prospects for Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Issue
and Institutionalizing the Six-Party Talks

Building a Northeast Asian Community:
Challenges and Visions

The Prospects for Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Issue and Institutionalizing the Six-Party Talks

Keun-sik Kim

South Korea must find a point of commonality between America's desire for system transformation and North Korea's desire to preserve its system, between the former's insistence on continuing the Six-Party Talks and financial sanctions and the latter's demand for bilateral negotiations and the removal of sanctions. It must take on the role of facilitator, utilizing ROK-U.S. cooperation and inter-Korean relations to open the way for negotiations and compromise on these two major issues.

First, South Korea must actively persuade both North Korea and the U.S. to ease the confrontation. The primary point of contention between the two countries since the signing of the joint statement has been America's principle of spreading democracy. The South Korean government should support this policy in principle, but insist that it not be directly applied to North Korea. At the same time, it must persuade North Korea to take more active steps to reform and open its doors in order to demonstrate the possibility of self-motivated, long-term transformation in its system and prevent America from taking the offensive on democratization.

Second, South Korea must find common ground between North Korea and the U.S. over the issue of financial sanctions and multilateral vs. bilateral talks. Since the two countries have not been able to reach a compromise, the South must seek to solve the conflict by utilizing the restoration of inter-Korean relations, and reducing unnecessary ROK-U.S. friction while calling upon the spirit of mutual cooperation.

A bilateral meeting within the forum of the Six-Party Talks as suggested by

the U.S. will not be accepted by North Korea. And the existing framework of the talks cannot be completely discarded. Bilateral negotiations should pick up where the September 19th joint statement left off, progressing in parallel with the continuing Six-Party Talks. A possible compromise is for North Korea and the U.S. to discuss financial sanctions and the suspension of missile tests at a bilateral meeting, separate from but simultaneous with the North's return to the Six-Party Talks in exchange for a U.S. statement of good faith regarding sanctions.

It is still possible for the Six-Party Talks to develop into a framework for Northeast Asian security cooperation, but first the talks must be reopened, going beyond the missile crisis. The road to institutionalizing the Six-Party Talks and creating a genuine cooperative security regime is not an easy one. The talks, being the first step to regional security cooperation, possess both promise and significance, but they also have structural limitations under the present conditions.

Multilateral security cooperation should be pursued concomitantly with easing instability in the region, rather than considering the latter to be a precondition for the former. Given that political and military instability, as well as traditional and nontraditional security threats, still exist in Northeast Asia, it may be advisable to first foster cooperation on nontraditional security affairs, such as terrorism and WMD, natural disasters, environmental concerns, drug trafficking, human rights, prevention of infectious diseases like bird flu, and refugees. In the context of the complex, conflicting relations in Northeast Asia, it is more efficient to promote cooperation on postmodern, nontraditional security affairs that can be more easily agreed upon. By the same logic, it is hoped that collaborative discussion of the North Korean nuclear issue at the Six-Party Talks will lead to multilateral cooperation on a variety of issues.

The sense of peace and security in Northeast Asia is sure to increase in the event that the Six-Party Talks successfully resolve the nuclear issue and are developed into a productive institution for discussing matters of regional interest. Once formed, an international institution, whose main function is to make cooperation possible, carries its own momentum. The creation of an institution for multilateral security cooperation that originates from the Six-Party Talks could become the first step to peace and stability in the region.

I. Introduction

The North Korean nuclear issue remains unresolved, and prospects for any solution remain dim. Almost four years have passed since the crisis began in October 2002, but rather than nearing a resolution, the situation has only worsened. The joint statement issued on September 19, 2005, offered the possibility of a solution, but the state of distrust and confrontation between North Korea (DPRK) and the United States has not changed. After signing the joint statement, the two countries continued to wrangle over the issue of the light-water reactors. However, the financial sanctions imposed by the U.S. on the North are becoming the primary point of contention. America, which views the sanctions as a justified measure to combat counterfeiting, is completely at odds with the North, which perceives them as an attempt to strangle its very existence. It is against this background that the Six-Party Talks have stalled and implementation of the September 19th joint statement has taken a backseat. Finally, North Korea test-fired its missiles as part of its strategy of brinkmanship, and the U.S. has continued to apply pressure through the passage of a Security Council resolution, thereby raising the possibility of full-fledged sanctions. Under these circumstances, the North Korean nuclear issue could well become an extreme crisis situation.

The DPRK-U.S. confrontation has worsened since the first half of 2005, when the Six-Party Talks were underway. Last year, direct contact between the two countries offered a way for a breakthrough, but now even a bilateral meeting would not be enough to break the stalemate.¹ Also, there were several advocates for negotiation as the Bush administration entered its second term in 2005 and Condoleezza

¹ North Korea and the U.S. have been unable to reach a compromise, in spite of a meeting between Assistant Secretary Hill and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan in Beijing in January 2006, Director Lee Geun's visit to the U.S. in March, and a meeting of representatives to the Six-Party Talks at the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) in Tokyo in April.

Rice was named Secretary of State, but these voices are now silent in light of the North's counterfeiting and missile test. The situation is more serious than ever before.

There is no doubt that the Korean Peninsula can achieve neither peace nor prosperity without the resolution of the nuclear issue. The talks have been through many ups and downs, but the road to a peaceful solution still exists, even if it is long. It is clear that if the nuclear issue does not change course, it will be a source of instability not only in inter-Korean relations but also for all of Northeast Asia.

If the nuclear crisis continues, it will inevitably place limitations on relations between South and North Korea. Although the Roh Moo-hyun administration clarified early on that it would deal with the nuclear issue and inter-Korean relations separately, in reality the South Korean government cannot develop better relations unless the issue is satisfactorily resolved. Separate track or no, the nuclear issue will never have a positive effect on inter-Korean relations.

Similarly, the issue can only hinder the establishment of a peaceful Korean Peninsula and a stable Northeast Asian order. In spite of the trend toward increased cooperation in Northeast Asia, which was made possible by the promotion of peace and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula after the end of the cold war, the very existence of the nuclear issue has placed the peninsula in a tense crisis situation and even threatens the peace in the region. In the event that the multilateral framework of the Six-Party Talks is unable to bring about a successful outcome, it will be difficult to achieve meaningful progress on Northeast Asian security and cooperation in the future. The resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue is a necessary condition for true progress in inter-Korean relations and a new, peaceful Northeast Asia in the post-cold war era.

II. The Essence of the North Korean Nuclear Issue and Principles for Its Resolution

In order to formulate a solution to the nuclear issue, it is first necessary to examine its fundamental character. The issue, triggered in 2002 by North Korea's admission of its uranium enrichment program, cannot be settled by simply blocking the North's intention to develop a nuclear program.² This was also true in the case of the 1993 North Korean nuclear crisis, and this time around the problem is fundamentally connected to larger issues. That is, the nuclear standoff is certainly a result of the clash between North Korea's intentions and America's initiative for nonproliferation, but at the root level it is also related to DPRK-U.S. relations in the post-cold war era and linked to the construction of a peaceful system on the Korean Peninsula and the fixing of the Northeast Asian order.³ This can be seen in how North Korea is attempting to use its nuclear card to obtain security assurances from the United States and ultimately to improve relations between the two countries. It is also shown by the fact that America must consider the future of the

² For an analysis of security for North Korea's development of a nuclear program, suggesting that the issue be resolved through ROK-U.S. pressure against the North, see Kim Young-ho, "The North Korean Nuclear Issue and ROK-U.S. Relations: Current Issues and Prospects," *Unification Policy Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2003. A different article in the same issue analyzes North Korea's strategic motives in using its nuclear card to improve relations with the U.S. and obtain security assurances. Park Jong-chul, "U.S.-DPRK Conflict Structure on the Nuclear Issue Prospects for Compromise," *Unification Policy Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2003, p. 142.

³ This can also be expressed as a clash between international society's norms of nonproliferation and North Korea's standard of sovereignty. Suh Bo-hyuk, "North Korea's Identity Politics toward the United States in the Post-Cold War Era," *Korean Political Science Review*, Vol. 37, No. 1, Spring 2003. For an explanation of the nuclear issue as the conflict between America's hegemonic strategy and the DPRK's strategy of survival, see Huh Moon-young, *North Korea's Admission of Its Nuclear Development Program and South Korea's Policy Direction: Changes in Negotiations with the U.S.*, Korea Institute for National Unification, 2002.

Northeast Asian order and the direction of its relations with the DPRK through the lens of the present crisis.⁴ The nuclear issue is not just about the nuclear program; it is directly related to DPRK-U.S. relations and a new order in Northeast Asia.

As such this must serve as the point of departure for any guiding principle to solving the nuclear issue. If it were as simple as incapacitating North Korea's efforts, then the use of sanctions, pressure, and even military means would be able to achieve a resolution. However, if the nuclear issue is indeed linked to post-cold war DPRK-U.S. relations and a conception of a new regime in Northeast Asia, then a more comprehensive approach must be adopted.

Keeping this in mind, the following three principles must be adhered to in dealing with the nuclear issue: First, North Korea must verifiably give up its intent and its ability to develop nuclear weapons. As the primary point of contention with the U.S. and a major security issue for the Korean Peninsula, this is a prerequisite for improved relations and the formation of a peaceful Northeast Asian order. It is undoubtedly the first principle in approaching the nuclear issue and cannot be overemphasized. Without the verifiable dismantling of North Korea's nuclear program, normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations and peace on the Korean Peninsula are but empty phrases.

Second, the resolution of the nuclear issue must aim to bring about normalized relations between North Korea and the U.S., which in turn should bring about a peaceful regional system. Of course, one could argue that improved relations and regional peace could be achieved through regime change or North Korea's collapse, but in reality this is both undesirable and impossible.⁵ This

⁴ Disagreement within the Bush administration between hardliners advocating regime change and moderates advocating selective engagement originates from differences in opinion on the direction for DPRK-U.S. relations in the post-cold war era.

⁵ Inducing North Korea's collapse or regime change is impractical for the following reasons: the difficulty of causing its immediate collapse; doubt over South

type of strategy presents not only a moral dilemma before the collapse,⁶ but also a problem of strategic efficiency,⁷ given that the blockading nation is unlikely to attain its policy goals regarding the blockaded nation. Although North Korea's collapse could be induced over the long term by allowing it to wither, this would only serve to sever relations between the two Koreas and raise the level of tension on the peninsula. As such, any attempt to use the nuclear issue as an opportunity to bring about regime change or collapse would be doomed from the start. If the nuclear issue goes beyond the goal of hindering the North's nuclear program and takes account of the larger dimension of DPRK-U.S. relations, then naturally any solution would have to include acknowledging the North Korean government's sovereignty and normalizing relations between the DPRK and the U.S..

Third, North Korea must be persuaded to give up its nuclear program through peaceful, diplomatic means, not through force or military action. Although military means or even war may achieve the temporary goal of North Korea abandoning its nuclear ambitions, they will not lead to the fundamental solution of normalized relations and peace on the peninsula. Mobilizing military forces would quickly bring about the worst-case scenario of war on the Korean Peninsula. According to an American analysis of hypothetical military action against North Korea during the 1994 nuclear crisis, if war were to break out, Seoul would be hit by over 5,000 bombs within the first twelve hours. It was estimated that about 490,000 Korean and 52,000 American soldiers would be killed with-

Korea's ability to absorb the North; the interests of neighboring countries, who do not want collapse or unification by absorption; the strain on inter-Korean relations and increase in tension due to regime change theory.

⁶ Under the policy of containment and pressure it is the citizens who will suffer, not the Kim Jong Il regime.

⁷ There is no guarantee that a strategy of isolating North Korea will bring about its collapse in the near future. South Korea was hoping for collapse in 1994 after Kim Il Sung's death, but instead North Korea muddled through. Today, most experts on the subject advocate change rather than collapse.

in the first three months of combat and that damage to civilians would be immense.⁸ These numbers demonstrate that war is indeed a worst case scenario that is not just undesirable but completely unacceptable. If the principle of preventing war at all costs is to be followed, then even any slight pressure that could possibly escalate into military conflict should be avoided under all circumstances. Even if there is only a 1% chance that a tough response will lead to actual war, such a method will never bring about peace and normalized relations.

III. Resolving the Nuclear Issue: Bargaining and the Six-Party Talks

The North Korean nuclear issue can ultimately only be resolved through the principle of bargaining. In the end, in order to solve the nuclear problem, North Korea must at some point give up its nuclear program as demanded by the U.S., and the latter must offer the security assurances and recognition of sovereignty as demanded by the former. Taking this as a premise, the two countries must agree to make a deal that can feasibly be implemented in order to peacefully resolve the issue. If bargaining is indeed a realistic way to settle the crisis, then the already existing framework of the Six-Party Talks offers a useful forum where these transactions can take place.

Since the first meeting of the Six-Party Talks opened dramatically in August 2003, they have come to be regarded as the key to resolving the nuclear issue. The talks, which have been held five times, are now acknowledged as the only path to settling the issue through negotiations. At the first meeting, North Korea and the U.S. came to the understanding that they would seek to resolve the situation through dialogue rather than confrontation over the nuclear

⁸ Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, Seoul: Gilsan, 2002, pp. 461-463.

issue. In particular, America took the fact that North Korea agreed to participate in multilateral talks rather than insisting on a bilateral meeting as a positive sign for a peaceful settlement. During the first meeting, North Korea concretely expressed its espousal of a package deal and synchronous or parallel implementation, while the U.S. consistently insisted that North Korea first dismantle its nuclear program. The second meeting, held in February 2004, maintained the momentum of the talks and was significant in that the parties agreed to establish a working group, but the U.S. still did not offer concrete steps for negotiations and instead demanded that North Korea accept a Libya-style model of disarmament. At the third meeting of the talks, held in June 2004 after a hiatus of four months, the U.S. presented a five-step process for the first time and its position on North Korea's demands in exchange for freezing its nuclear program. It appeared that the two countries were making definite progress on substantive issues. However, the fourth meeting, originally scheduled to be held in September 2004, was not held until July 2005 due to North Korean resistance and criticism of America's insistence on a Libya-style model and the presidential election in the United States. The parties agreed on an approach to addressing the particular demands of North Korea and the U.S. but the draft agreement was abandoned at the eleventh hour. The September 19th joint statement was finally signed at the second phase of the fourth meeting, which reopened in September 2005. North Korea agreed to give up all of its nuclear weapons and dismantle its existing nuclear program, while the United States agreed to grant security assurances to the North, which in turn would lead to normalization of relations. However, the fifth meeting of the talks in November 2005 was stalled by the issue of financial sanctions imposed by the U.S. Treasury Department over North Korea's counterfeiting activities. The talks broke down before a discussion of how to execute the joint statement, and no further meetings have been held since then. North Korea has cited the removal of financial sanctions as a precondition for returning to the talks, while the U.S.

counters that this is not possible, demanding the North's unconditional return to the bargaining table. The situation has deteriorated to the point where even the future of the Six-Party Talks themselves is in jeopardy.

Up to this point, the Six-Party Talks have prevented the worsening of the nuclear situation and managed the crisis through a framework of dialogue. The talks have also been fruitful in that the participating countries have all agreed upon an approach for resolving the issue as outlined in the joint statement. The statement already contains the elements for negotiating a realistic solution based on a deal between North Korea and the U.S. Even now, a peaceful settlement to the nuclear issue is still possible if the Six-Party Talks are reopened and discussion continues on how to implement the September 19th statement.

In reality, the joint statement issued in 2005 is a transactional agreement that addresses the reciprocal demands of North Korea and the U.S. However, although the two countries agreed on the principle of making a deal, they have been unable to translate this into execution due to mutual distrust. The bitter debate over the timing of construction of a light-water reactor demonstrates the extent of this mistrust. At this point, the U.S. is hoping for North Korea's complete capitulation or fundamental change rather than implementation of the agreement, and the North is refusing to even return to the bargaining table where any such implementation must be discussed. However, both countries must ultimately return to the process of bargaining if the nuclear issue is to be resolved in a peaceful manner. As such, the Six-Party Talks must be restored and the spirit of the September 19th joint statement revived, in spite of America's hopes for system transformation in North Korea and the North's ongoing confrontation with the U.S.

IV. After the September 19th Joint Statement: The DPRK-U.S. Standoff and the Missile Crisis

After the September 19th joint statement, the U.S. strengthened its policy of applying pressure on North Korea with the purpose of bringing about system change, starting with financial sanctions. Apart from the nuclear issue, America is applying pressure on multiple fronts, such as counterfeiting, human rights, and drug trafficking. The sanctions have not only had the direct and prominent effect of blocking North Korea's access to financial resources, they have also carried the indirect result of restricting its regular economic transactions with other countries.⁹ On top of this, President Bush has met with North Korean refugees and granted them entry to the States, in contrast with previous policy.

According to its second-term goals of "spreading democracy" and "ending tyranny," the Bush administration is attempting to induce system change in North Korea through a so-called "transformational diplomacy," which goes beyond the nuclear issue and includes pressure on the issues of human rights, democracy, and illegal activities. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which seeks to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the financial sanctions are examples of this comprehensive pressure. America's policy has gone from resolving the nuclear issue to bringing about fundamental change in North Korea, and DPRK-U.S. relations have worsened as the North Korean nuclear issue has become a broader "North Korea problem."

From America's point of view, the September 19th joint statement has maintained the present situation and prevented the nuclear

⁹ After the freezing of accounts in the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia, most of the banks that do business with North Korea suspended transactions. The U.S. Treasury Department even demanded the freezing of new accounts that North Korea opened in Vietnam, Mongolia, and Russia. After Treasury Undersecretary Stuart Levy visited Vietnam last July, the accounts that North Korea had opened there were closed.

crisis from worsening. Since the statement was issued, the North Korean nuclear issue has taken a backseat to America's foreign policy priorities in the Middle East, due to the nuclear standoff in Iran, Hamas' rise to power, and the conflict in Lebanon. In North Korea, the U.S. is hoping to manage the nuclear crisis through the framework of the joint statement while simultaneously applying diplomatic pressure for democratization. That is, it does not perceive any need to rush the nuclear issue and intends to continue exerting pressure for system transformation. The expansion of financial sanctions demonstrates that the U.S. can utilize to great effect the "North Korea problem" separate from the nuclear issue.

As the financial sanctions, which have been in place since last fall, have produced greater results than expected, the U.S. has realized the effectiveness of wielding diplomatic pressure separate from the nuclear issue.

In response to this pressure, North Korea announced its refusal to participate in the Six-Party Talks until the sanctions are lifted, but America's position has not changed as of yet. Chairman Kim Jong Il had hoped to reach a political compromise through a surprise visit to China at the beginning of this year, but the U.S. has not revised its current policy of dealing with the nuclear issue separate from "the North Korea problem."

It appears that North Korea has adopted a strategy of "muddling through" the remainder of the Bush administration and is thus drawing out its standoff with the U.S. It is not expecting either a resolution to the nuclear issue or improved relations with the Bush administration and so has strategically opted to focus its efforts on maintaining its system until the next administration enters office. Against the backdrop of widening American pressure for system transformation and stiff North Korean resistance, the confrontation on the Korean Peninsula became even more serious with North Korea's missile tests, plunging the face-off into a worse situation.

In response to broadening American pressure, North Korea eventually gave up its passive approach of "muddling through three

years” and chose to threaten the U.S. by actively going on the offensive, which eventually led to the missile tests. The tests were part of North Korea’s brinkmanship tactics in the face of pressure for fundamental change and were motivated by their desire to engage in bilateral talks with the States instead of the Six-Party Talks.

In order to find a way to break through the current deadlock, it is necessary to understand what constitutes the debate over the Six-Party Talks vs. bilateral negotiations, which lies at the heart of the missile crisis. After test-firing the missiles, North Korea made the strategic demand of holding bilateral negotiations, which the U.S. refused as customary.

Since the inception of the second North Korean nuclear crisis, the U.S. has had several reasons for maintaining its insistence on the Six-Party Talks, but most important is its overall approach to the nuclear issue. It does not consider the second crisis to be the result of antagonistic DPRK-U.S. relations; rather it regards North Korea as a rogue state that is disregarding the nonproliferation norms of international society. As such, America sees the Six-Party Talks as a justified method of applying these international standards to North Korea’s WMD program and does not perceive any reason to yield or take responsibility. On the other hand, from North Korea’s perspective, the second nuclear crisis is certainly a product of America’s antagonistic policy toward the North: The crisis is a result of America’s violation of the Agreed Framework signed in Geneva, and therefore it should be resolved through direct negotiations. North Korea’s insistence on bilateral talks is also tied to its demands for a nonaggression pact with the U.S., which continued from the start of the second crisis until the first half of 2003.¹⁰

¹⁰ At the trilateral meeting in April 2003 between China, North Korea, and the U.S., the North took the view that it was a bilateral meeting and that China was merely providing the location. North Korea continued to insist on bilateral talks before multilateral negotiations, but in May eventually accepted America’s demands for the Six-Party Talks. The first meeting of the talks was held in August 2003.

This fundamental difference in perceptions of the nuclear crisis has brought about the multilateral vs. bilateral debate, and it is no surprise that America's and North Korea's ideas differ on how to resolve the issue. According to international norms of nonproliferation, there could be no other way than for North Korea to first unconditionally surrender its nuclear program, like Libya. However, North Korea perceives a lump settlement based on reciprocal measures, such as improved relations, security guarantees, and economic aid from the U.S. in exchange for dismantling its nuclear program, as a more reasonable solution.

At the time the joint statement was issued, North Korea had reason to believe that it could achieve its objectives through the Six-Party Talks. The statement, negotiated through great difficulty, corresponded fairly well with North Korea's strategic demands. However, in light of the dispute over the timing of construction of the light-water reactor and the freezing of its BDA assets, North Korea came to believe that America's antagonistic policy would not be easily amended and that "respect[ing] each other's sovereignty, exist[ing] peacefully together" as elucidated in the joint statement would be difficult to achieve. As a result, North Korea announced its intention not to participate in the talks until the sanctions were removed, perceiving that it would be impossible to have its demands met under widening American pressure. The missile tests on July 5th were part of North Korea's strategy of brinkmanship, meant to break the stalemate and induce America to agree to bilateral talks.

However, the tests did not have the desired effect; with the involvement of the United Nations, the issue has gone from a six-party framework to a truly multilateral structure, "the international society vs. North Korea," if you will. At this point, America does not have the breathing room to expend its energy on matters outside of the Middle East. From the American standpoint, it is beneficial for the North Korean nuclear crisis to be managed and kept at the status quo through the multilateral framework of the Six-Party Talks and the UN. Not only will America continue to refuse bilater-

al negotiations, if the situation allows, it may attempt to effect systemic transformation by pursuing full-fledged sanctions against North Korea through a multilateral process that will inevitably involve both South Korea and China. Ultimately, the current crisis situation is the result of the clash between America's desire for fundamental change in North Korea and insistence on the Six-Party Talks, and North Korea's resistance and refusal to return to the talks.

V. South Korea's Role in Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Issue

The North Korean nuclear issue is reaching its climax, but it is still a manageable crisis that can be resolved through mutual DPRK and U.S. concessions, given the right conditions and environment. The situation demands more active consideration and tangible effort on the part of South Korea. South Korea must firmly maintain its original position of strengthening its attempts to persuade both North Korea and the U.S.

South Korea must find a point of commonality between America's desire for system transformation and North Korea's desire to preserve its system, between the former's insistence on continuing the Six-Party Talks and financial sanctions and the latter's demand for bilateral negotiations and the removal of sanctions. It must take on the role of facilitator, utilizing ROK-U.S. cooperation and inter-Korean relations to open the way for negotiations and compromise on these two major issues.

First, South Korea must actively persuade both North Korea and the U.S. to ease the confrontation. The primary point of contention between the two countries since the signing of the joint statement has been America's principle of spreading democracy. The South Korean government should support this policy in principle, but insist that it not be directly applied to North Korea. At the same

time, it must persuade North Korea to take more active steps to reform and open its doors in order to demonstrate the possibility of self-motivated, long-term transformation in its system and prevent America from taking the offensive on democratization.

The Bush administration's slogan of "spreading democracy, ending tyranny" is closely linked to its anti-terror war and its attempts to democratize authoritarian regimes that may harbor terrorists. America's efforts to root out terrorism and democratize dictatorial states in the Middle East are justifiable and upright, and the Korean government should support this aspect of their foreign policy. However, the situation is different on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, of which the U.S. must be clearly persuaded. That is, it would not be reasonable for America to include North Korea as a target of its policy to end tyranny, since it has no connection to terrorism in the Middle East. If America were motivated by a desire to democratize North Korea rather than fight terrorism, then this would also become an issue for China and Russia, which are not completely democratic societies. Even more importantly, if America were unable to succeed in transforming North Korea's system, then in the interim the North would be able to accumulate nuclear weapons and expand its nuclear capabilities, a clear policy failure for the U.S. The South Korean government must persuade America that continuing its policy of pressure is not an appropriate measure. South Korea should sympathize with and support Bush's principle of spreading democracy and ending tyranny in the war against terrorism, but should also make clear that this cannot be applied in Northeast Asia with the intent of interfering in a particular state's affairs or bringing about regime change.

Similarly, South Korea should recommend that North Korea actively reform its system and open its doors in the fashion of China so that America's push for democratization does not develop into a more aggressive policy of seeking regime change or structural transformation. The North should move first and elucidate its intent to introduce reform. Projects of inter-Korean economic coop-

eration such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex are not only necessary for developing North-South relations, they also serve as an important shortcut to North Korea's opening and demonstrate the possibility of systemic change. North Korea must be persuaded to openly declare its willingness to reform and open up. The South should advise that North Korea respond to America's push for democratization by making clear its intentions.

Second, South Korea must find common ground between North Korea and the U.S. over the issue of financial sanctions and multi-lateral vs. bilateral talks. Since the two countries have not been able to reach a compromise, the South must seek to solve the conflict by utilizing the restoration of inter-Korean relations, and reducing unnecessary ROK-U.S. friction while calling upon the spirit of mutual cooperation.

A bilateral meeting within the forum of the Six-Party Talks as suggested by the U.S. will not be accepted by North Korea. And the existing framework of the talks cannot be completely discarded. Bilateral negotiations should pick up where the September 19th joint statement left off, progressing in parallel with the continuing Six-Party Talks. A possible compromise is for North Korea and the U.S. to discuss financial sanctions and the suspension of missile tests at a bilateral meeting, separate from but simultaneous with the North's return to the Six-Party Talks in exchange for a U.S. statement of good faith regarding sanctions.

More specifically, with respect to the pivotal issue of financial sanctions, the U.S. should make a distinction between 'legal and illegal' category, applying strict sanctions to accounts for illegal activities and allowing accounts for routine economic transactions.¹¹ North Korea would not object to returning to the Six-Party Talks if America were to issue a statement of good faith on lifting the sanc-

¹¹ Treasury Undersecretary Levy stated that "it is difficult to distinguish the boundary between North Korea's illegal and legal funds," but this is all the more reason to engage in bilateral negotiations and come to an agreement on the scope of the sanctions. *The Chosun Ilbo*, August 23, 2006.

tions.¹² North Korea has repeatedly mentioned its willingness to cooperate with the international community in preventing money laundering.¹³ As such, it should be willing to admit the existence of accounts clearly associated with illegal activities and pledge to prevent any reoccurrence. During his visit to the U.S. in March, Director Lee Geun requested that North Korea be legally allowed to open accounts in American banks for normal economic activity, which suggests that approving such accounts may be another means of reaching compromise. If America distinguishes between accounts for legal and illegal activities and the two countries are able to find a point of common ground, then the reopening of the Six-Party Talks, irrespective of the North's demand for bilateral negotiations, is entirely possible. However, the Six-Party Talks must be accompanied by separate bilateral meetings where the issue of financial sanctions can be discussed.

If America refuses to remove the sanctions and accept bilateral talks, then it is highly possible that North Korea will adopt a tougher strategy of brinksmanship. If North Korea continues to refuse to return to the Six-Party Talks, then the U.S. will not suddenly agree to the North's demands. In the end, the parties involved must seek a reasonable compromise that opens a path to resolving the crisis and allows both the U.S. and North Korea to save face.

South Korea can help make such a compromise possible by working to improve inter-Korean relations and convincing the North to return to the Six-Party Talks, while utilizing its relationship of trust with the U.S. to promote bilateral negotiations. The South can use the opportunity presented by the North's flood

¹² According to a spokesman for North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "there is much to be gained from the Six-Party Talks." He emphasized their utility, citing that the only reason for their nonparticipation is the financial sanctions. This suggests that although North Korea would prefer bilateral talks, if the issue of sanctions is resolved then their return to the Six-Party Talks is possible. *Korean Central News Agency*, August 26, 2006.

¹³ Interview with a spokesman of North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. February 9, 2006.

recovery efforts to rehabilitate North-South relations. Similarly, at the ROK-U.S. dialogue, the Korean government should reconfirm the principle of peacefully resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and persuade the U.S. to enter bilateral talks.

South Korea's efforts should begin with reviving the currently suspended dialogue with the North and seeking to bring about a turning point that will improve the crisis situation. The much-discussed North-South summit meeting can still be considered an appropriate measure, aside from questions of likelihood. If the crisis worsens, it is more likely that it will be settled in some dramatic fashion. The overly passive and discreet posture adopted by the Korean government will never serve to resolve the issue. Rather, South Korea should recognize the current situation as a crisis and actively do its utmost to find a solution.

During the extended lull before the fourth meeting of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, the South Korean government maintained its relations with the North and thus was able to win a dialogue with Kim Jong Il on June 17th, which ultimately induced North Korea to return to the talks. At the ROK-U.S. summit meeting on June 11th, Bush publicly affirmed the principle of peacefully resolving the nuclear issue and used the respectful title "Mr." when referring to Kim Jong Il. As a result, the fourth meeting was finally opened, and the September 19th roadmap was produced. The nuclear issue is certainly limiting the progress of inter-Korean relations, but on the other hand the peace process on the Korean Peninsula is also fostering favorable conditions for its resolution. The South has maintained its relations with the North in spite of the nuclear issue; now it must endeavor to further develop these relations in service of its resolution. That is, South Korea must take on an active role in creating a breakthrough and improving the situation by advancing inter-Korean relations.

VI. Prospects for Institutionalizing the Six-Party Talks

When the joint statement was issued on September 19, 2005, the future of the Six-Party Talks seemed bright: it was even hoped that the talks would go beyond their original purpose of resolving the nuclear issue and develop into a framework for multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. It is readily apparent that the six participant countries did engage in multilateral cooperation during the course of the negotiations.

Generally speaking, multilateralism can be defined as an institutional form in which three or more states with differing interests participate and coordinate their respective policies according to certain principles or norms. The relations between these states are mediated through "generalized principles of conduct."¹⁴ A multilateral system promotes international cooperation by offering a forum where policy can be adjusted and fine-tuned.

From this perspective, it is undeniable that the Six-Party Talks developed a multilateral nature through the process of negotiations. Multilateralism is premised on the fact that participating countries must be willing to lay aside their individual demands in order to reach agreement on a common goal. The Six-Party Talks were indeed characterized by this type of negotiation, where both North Korea and the U.S. yielded on some of their demands to arrive at the joint statement.

Furthermore, the multilateral character of the talks can be inferred from the fact that the negotiations possess their own inherent dynamic and logic that have evolved over the course of the five

¹⁴ For more on multilateralism, see John Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1992); Robert Keohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research," *International Journal*, Vol. 45 (Autumn, 1990); James Caporaso, "International Relation Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundation," *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1992); John Ruggie (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University press, 1993).

meetings. In particular, America found itself outnumbered five-to-one on the final revision presented by China at the fourth meeting and ended up accepting North Korea's peaceful use of nuclear power and the provision of a light-water reactor. The Six-Party Talks function according to a logic of their own, outside of America's political purposes. If America alone were to have refused the plan formulated through a collaborative process and approved by the other five parties, then it would have to shoulder the political burden and assume responsibility for rupturing the talks.

Although the Six-Party Talks exhibit a certain degree of multilateralism, they do not embody the principle in a complete sense. The fundamental character of the talks is still dominated by the confrontational DPRK vs. U.S. paradigm.¹⁵ Not all parties have equal standing in the negotiations, which are overwhelmingly led by North Korea and the U.S. The participant countries have not settled on either principles or norms for the talks, nor have they formed an agenda relevant to all parties outside of the nuclear issue. The Six-Party Talks are multilateral in the sense that several states have negotiated and come to some agreement on the nuclear issue, but lack other characteristic elements, such as generalized principles of conduct, equal standing between participants, and an inclusive common agenda.¹⁶

In spite of this, the prospects for multilateral development are still very much alive. If the parties are able to build trust by solving the nuclear issue, create a common agenda, and form basic principles for collaboration, then the Six-Party Talks could even evolve into an institutional apparatus for multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. Given that multilateralism is closely tied to insti-

¹⁵ America is utilizing the Six-Party Talks to induce the North to give up its nuclear program; North Korea is utilizing the talks and playing its nuclear card to gain security assurances and economic assistance.

¹⁶ Kim Tae-woon, "A Study of Multilateralism in Practice at the Six-Party Talks and Plans to Develop a Base of Multilateral Cooperation," *North Korean Studies Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2005, pp. 11-13.

tutions, a regional cooperative security regime could be institutionalized if the talks were to be established as a permanent body for discussing a common agenda.

It is still possible for the Six-Party Talks to develop into a framework for Northeast Asian security cooperation, but first the talks must be reopened, going beyond the missile crisis. Through the September 19th statement, the participant countries have already “committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia” and “agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.” In other words, if the statement is put into practice then the six-party forum could function as a meaningful framework for regional multilateral cooperation. In fact, the parties are already contemplating the policy implications for the development of the talks into a multilateral security body in the event of their favorable progress. The South Korean government has revealed its intention to “investigate a plan for developing the Six-Party Talks into a framework for security dialogue in Northeast Asia,”¹⁷ which has been directly corroborated by President Roh Moo-hyun himself.¹⁸ It has been reported on multiple occasions that several high-ranking American officials have mentioned the possibility of developing the talks into a regional security body.¹⁹ China, Japan, and Russia also appear to be in support of such a scheme. North Korea’s position remains undisclosed, but it

¹⁷ National Security Council, *Peace, Prosperity, and National Security: Plans for Security Policy*, 2004, p. 56.

¹⁸ At the ROK-Japanese summit meeting on Jeju Island in July 2004, President Roh stated that, “If the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved, then it would be desirable for the Six-Party Talks to be utilized as a framework for dialogue and negotiations on security issues in Northeast Asia.” *The Chosun Ilbo*, July 22, 2004.

¹⁹ It is reported that during a visit in July 2004, then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice sounded out China’s views on elevating the Six-Party Talks into a permanent institution for discussing security guarantees in Northeast Asia. During his Senate confirmation hearing, former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick cited the Six-Party Talks as an example of a security structure that could be kept in the future.

stands to reason that it would not have any objections, given the general theory that “from the point of view of weaker states, an international institution is the only means of restraining stronger states from exercising their power according to their will.”²⁰ The talks could offer a check on America’s power if they evolved into a multilateral security forum that guarantees participants’ equal standing.

However, the road to institutionalizing the Six-Party Talks and creating a genuine cooperative security regime is not an easy one. The talks, being the first step to regional security cooperation, possess both promise and significance, but they also have structural limitations under the present conditions.

As such, it is difficult to be entirely optimistic about the possibility of institutionalizing the Six-Party Talks. More than anything, this is due to the extant barriers to resolving the nuclear issue and the persisting state of confrontation between North Korea and the U.S. If the six parties are unable to achieve their original goal of peacefully settling the nuclear crisis, then the talks are unlikely to develop in a positive direction. In particular, if America and North Korea are unable to establish a new relationship in which they can peacefully coexist, then multilateral security cooperation in North-east Asia does not stand a chance.

The most pressing tasks for fostering the creation of a collaborative regional security regime are accumulating experience in multilateral cooperation through the process of solving the nuclear issue and paving the way for peaceful coexistence of the DPRK and the U.S. However, the nuclear standoff remains unresolved and relations between the two countries have actually worsened. Plans to develop security cooperation cannot even begin to be implemented unless the North Korean nuclear issue is settled.

Furthermore, developing a cooperative framework for military

²⁰ Choi Young-jong, “International Institution Theory,” Woo Chul-gu and Park Gun-young (ed.), *Modern International Relations Theory and Korea*, Seoul: Society Review, 2004, p. 355.

and security matters will not prove to be easy, given the particular characteristics of Northeast Asian affairs. In spite of dynamic regional economic cooperation and the possibility of economic integration, Northeast Asia is still plagued by political and military instability. More than anything, the latent causes for dispute between China and the U.S. could hinder multilateral cooperation in the region. In addition to Sino-American competition, the struggle for dominance between China and Japan is expanding. The deepening confrontation between the American-Japanese alliance and Sino-Russian cooperation is also a factor in hindering political and military collaboration. Moreover, the fact that latent disagreements over territory and interpretations of history still exist between Japan and China, Russia, and South Korea demonstrates the difficulty of cooperation in Northeast Asia. In light of these dormant disputes and regional instability, one should not be overly optimistic about the prospects for security cooperation in the region.

The institutionalization of the talks and promotion of multilateral security cooperation demand a peaceful resolution to the nuclear issue as well as simultaneous efforts to ease political and military instability in the region. China and America must settle on a cooperative relationship, while China and Japan must mitigate their competition over hegemony and the arms race. The Japan-America vs. China-Russia face-off must be managed so as to prevent the level of tension from increasing, and Japan should settle the issues of its past, which lie at the heart of territorial and historical disputes in the region.

Of course, all this will not be easily achieved. Multilateral security cooperation should be pursued concomitantly with easing instability in the region, rather than considering the latter to be a precondition for the former. Given that political and military instability, as well as traditional and nontraditional security threats, still exist in Northeast Asia, it may be advisable to first foster cooperation on nontraditional security affairs, such as terrorism and WMD, natural disasters, environmental concerns, drug trafficking, human rights,

prevention of infectious diseases like bird flu, and refugees. In the context of the complex, conflicting relations in Northeast Asia, it is more efficient to promote cooperation on postmodern, nontraditional security affairs that can be more easily agreed upon. By the same logic, it is hoped that collaborative discussion of the North Korean nuclear issue at the Six-Party Talks will lead to multilateral cooperation on a variety of issues.

The sense of peace and security in Northeast Asia is sure to increase in the event that the Six-Party Talks successfully resolve the nuclear issue and are developed into a productive institution for discussing matters of regional interest. Once formed, an international institution, whose main function is to make cooperation possible, carries its own momentum. The creation of an institution for multilateral security cooperation that originates from the Six-Party Talks could become the first step to peace and stability in the region.

The 1975 Helsinki Accord, which included provisions for mutual respect of sovereignty, security guarantees, economic cooperation and human rights, offered a framework for the end of cold war hostilities between East and West. In the same way, it is hoped that the success of the Six-Party Talks and their development into an institution for multilateral security cooperation will serve to promote peace, security, and integration in Northeast Asia.

Building a Northeast Asian Community: Challenges and Visions

T. J. Pempel

This paper explores the mix of obstacles and possibilities for creating a Northeast Asian community. It concentrates on two major obstacles. First is the rising nationalism in Northeast Asia coupled with competing visions of what an ideal Northeast Asian community would involve. The second obstacle concerns the necessity for any future Northeast Asian community to be open to the outside, both regionally and globally. This has both positive and negative consequences, the most recent negative consequences being the ability of the new U.S. unilateralism to wreak havoc on pre-existing patterns of cooperation in Northeast Asia.

At the same time, the paper argues that by focusing on a Northeast Asia embedded in East Asia as a whole, and possibly the Asia-Pacific as well, it will be possible to defuse some of the existing nationalist tensions. Additionally, by limiting the formal institutionalization of any regional arrangements and by working for spill-over effects from one issue to another, it will be possible to build a deeper Northeast Asian community, albeit one that would be far less clear cut in its boundaries and far less institutionalized than the European Union.

I. Introduction

Considerable evidence suggests the expansion and deepening of cross-border cooperation in Northeast Asia. Such evidence is strongest in the economic sphere. For example, bilateral trade and investment ties between China and

Japan have moved forward at a rapid pace, with China having outstripped the U.S. as Japan's major trade partner in 2004. South Korea is the number three export market for Japanese goods while Taiwan ranks fourth. Meanwhile, China is the major destination for outgoing South Korean exports while Japan is Korea's third largest market. For Taiwan, Japan, China and Korea are the third, fourth and fifth largest trade partners and Taiwanese investments in China are such as to be creating virtually an undifferentiated single business bloc.

In keeping with the broader patterns across East Asia as a whole, non-governmentally energized, bottom-up, largely corporate- and market-driven processes have been the key drivers of the new connections knitting Northeast Asia together (Hamilton, 1996; Katzenstein and Shiraishi, 1997, 2006; Pempel, 2003, *inter alia*). Increasing amounts of foreign direct investment from firms based in Japan, the ROK, Taiwan, and to a small but growing extent, China have created a criss-crossing web of transnational production networks, investment corridors, export processing zones, and growth triangles within the region, leading to substantial jumps in intra-regional trade and an escalation of economic interdependence.

Cooperation has also moved forward on a number of additional issues such as pollution control, disease management, communication, and transportation. Previous barriers to cultural and information sharing, such as those banning Japanese popular songs in Korea, have also been dropped so that today numerous examples of common popular culture from soap operas to comics to pop groups enjoy multinational audiences across many parts of Northeast Asia.

In all of these ways, Northeast Asia is far more cohesive as a region that it was one or two decades ago, let alone at the height of the Cold War. More deeply, geographical proximity; historical, cultural and social homogeneity, increased economic interdependence and the generally improved security climate should all be conducive to closer regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. Still, any such pictures of centripetality must contend with the even more

visible examples of recent, nationally-based hostilities. This point will be taken up at greater length below, but for the moment one need only be reminded of the growing diplomatic tensions between Japan on the one hand and the ROK, DPRK and China on the other; the longstanding cross-Straits problems involving Taiwan and the PRC; the host of security problems surrounding the DPRK; and the overall competition for regional leadership between Japan and China. In all of these areas, developments across Northeast Asia during the past few years in particular expose the still substantial barriers hindering closer cross border cooperation, let alone the formulation of an actual Northeast Asian Community or a cohesive security community.

Given this mixed picture, what are the short- and medium-term prospects for creating a deeper and more communal Northeast Asia? And in a related way, what are the major obstacles that need to be overcome to achieve such a community? Different shards of evidence could be put together to provide competing evidence for either side in the long running debate across the region, as well as in other corners, about whether it is “ripe for rivalry” or “ripe for cooperation” (Pempel, 2005: 1-3).

In my view resolving this polarity requires one to confront two outstanding obstacles. This will form the next section of this essay. But to anticipate my broader conclusion, these obstacles, while formidable, are not so overwhelming as to foreclose all prospects for enhanced community development. But developing a Northeast Asian regional community must, I will argue, be done in ways that work around the immediate challenges rather than confronting them head on. As such, I will argue in the third section of the paper, that any Northeast Asian community must be intimately part of both the broader East Asian region and also be open, rather than closed, to the broader range of global activities. In addition, formal institutionalization, which is often seen as a forerunner to region building, must be kept to a minimum in favor of building on existing networks and on informality as guidelines to trust building.

I. Major Challenges

In my view there are two overriding challenges that must be dealt with before any Northeast Asian Regional Community can be created. The first of these involves the different national interests and competing regional visions held by Japan, the ROK and China. The second is the danger of trying, and the inability, to isolate Northeast Asia from the broader regional and global activities within which activities in Northeast Asia are nested.

Sweeping xenophobia has recently been seriously impeding regional ties, as is clear from the frequent outbursts pitting China, the ROK, DPRK and Japan against one another. Clearly, governmental, diplomatic and security relations in Northeast Asia have gotten worse rather than better. Ties among the major powers in Northeast Asia were relatively calm, if not overtly friendly, until the very end of the 1990s. The visit of Chinese Prime Minister Jiang to Japan in November 1998 might have marked the beginning of the recent deterioration. On his arrival and at virtually every stop he made, Jiang kept insisting on a written apology from Japan for its past treatment of China, which Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi rebuffed. Bilateral relations deteriorated from there. Japan, meanwhile, demonstrated increased skepticism about continuing its high levels of long-term ODA to a country whose GNP growth rates dwarfed those of recession-plagued Japan. Subsequently, Japan announced in October 2001 that it would reduce and redirect its ODA to China in recognition of the country's rising economic success and diminished need. The result was an overall curtailment of aid combined with a shift from multi-year pledges of ODA in favor of a single-year pledge system and a revised focus away from infrastructure and construction to environmental protection, increased living standards, education, institution building, and technology transfer. This naturally irritated bilateral ties.

Bilateral China-Japan ties—as well as ROK-Japan ties—sour even more as a result of Prime Minister Koizumi's continued visits

to Yasukuni Shrine, the last coming on August 15, 2006—the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II—as well as the Japanese government’s continual political rewritings of prewar and wartime history texts and the exacerbation of competing territorial claims. Tensions were further worsened by anti-Japanese demonstrations at soccer matches in Chongqing, China in July 2004, a Chinese submarine intrusion into Japanese waters in November 2004, a statement by U.S. and Japanese officials in February 2005 that Chinese officials responded to as hostile; protests at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing in April 2005, cancellations of visits by Chinese leaders to Japan, and Chinese opposition (along with Korea’s) to supporting Japan’s bid for a seat on the UN Security Council. No high level diplomatic visits were exchanged between Japan and either China or South Korea for several years, largely as a consequence. Only with the selection of Abe Shinzo as Japan’s prime minister and his quick trips to both Beijing and Seoul in October 2006 was the diplomatic ice thawed.

The Asian Barometer surveys underscore the widespread mutual distrust among the general populations of these three countries. (See Inoguchi *et al.* 2006: 482-485 for detailed data). Such attitudes make it extremely problematic for governmental leaders in these countries to initiate cooperative contacts.

Even more strongly militating against Northeast Asian Community development have been the DPRK’s launch of Nodong missiles over Japan, the Japanese Coast Guard’s sinking in December 2001 of a DPRK ship which had entered Japanese territorial waters, the regime’s announcement that it was pursuing a program of nuclear weapons development and its subsequent missile and nuclear tests, disputes over DPRK abductees from Japan, allegations of DPRK counterfeiting and smuggling and a host of other items are continual manifestations of the deep impediments to regional security cooperation posed by North Korea. Although the ROK continues to pursue closer ties with the DPRK, these have stalled with the DPRK’s refusal to enhance transportation links while the slowness

and stalling in the Six Party Talks and the North's nuclear tests in October 2006 have also led to increased frustrations with the DPRK even by China.

Similarly the continued political and diplomatic tensions between China and Taiwan, Japan's territorial claims against Dokdo and mutual and conflicting claims by both China and Japan for potentially oil rich waters in the China Seas multiply the sources of friction impeding cooperation among the major governments of the region.

All of these actions are quite specific to Northeast Asia. But it is important to realize that they are part of, and are catalyzed by, broader regional and global trends. It is important to acknowledge that creating a Northeast Asian community can not be done in a global vacuum. Thus, a good deal of the current nationalism in Northeast Asia concerns how best to form, not only a Northeast Asian community, but more broadly, how Northeast Asia will (or will not) be part of a broader East Asian region and/or the broader Asia-Pacific. One of the most forbidding barriers to Northeast Asian regional community is what Chung-in Moon (2002:11) has called the "divergent national calculus on gains from institutionalized regional cooperation."

In this context, China, the ROK and Japan have very different conceptions of what their ideal regional arrangements will be. China clearly wants a Northeast Asia—and a broader East Asia—in which current U.S. influence will be reduced while China's influence will be enhanced. The core of this vision lies in the economic circles of "Greater China," including Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and also the ethnic Chinese business networks that are spread throughout Southeast Asia. Furthermore, China, with the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has demonstrated that its overall conception of "region" includes resource-rich and potentially ethnically destabilizing countries in Central Asia. Meanwhile, although China wishes to maintain good economic ties with the U.S., it remains highly skeptical of continued U.S. security influence

within the region as is manifest in various Chinese National Defense White Papers.

South Korea on the other hand is anxious to create an integrated Korean economic community as the bedrock on which a Northeast Asian community can be founded. This means reuniting North and South Korea, a goal which continues to be the mainspring of ROK foreign policy. South Korea, particularly under former President Kim Dae-jung, was an active proponent of a Northeast Asian regional community. President Roh Moo-hyun has argued for turning South Korea into the Northeast Asian business hub as part of a broader emphasis on creating a Northeast Asian community. Critical to the ROK vision, however, is the creation of a national North-South Korean economic community. Under this vision, a unified Korea should be at the center of the region in banking, finance, logistics, information and communication (Moon, 2002: 15).

Finally, Japan has been perhaps the most skeptical of any formalized Northeast Asian community. Although economically it shares numerous compatibilities with both the ROK and China, Japan is also unshakingly linked to the United States as its major security and diplomatic ally and as one of its most critical markets. Furthermore, in its competition for leadership in Asia as a whole, Japan (like China) focuses much of its regional effort, not just on Northeast Asia, but East Asia as a whole. As such, virtually any Japanese conception of "region" is typically based on the Asia-Pacific, or at least on a conceptualization that includes Southeast Asia and does not alienate the United States.

This mixture of different goals and resurgent nationalisms prevents all three countries—along with the DPRK and Taiwan for different reasons—from working toward enhanced cooperation and formalized and institutionalized Northeast Asian regional ties.

These intra-regional differences are compounded by the fact that, important as Northeast Asia is as a collective economy and a cultural unit, it remains incapable of insulating itself as a region from broader global (and regional) trends. Most particularly in

recent years have been the actions of the United States, especially under the unilateralist and anti-multilateralist policies of the Bush Administration.

Bush was heir to fifty years of U.S. policies toward Asia that had been largely anti-regional. From the beginnings of the Cold War, and in contrast to its support for regional approaches to economic and security cooperation in Europe such as NATO and the European Coal and Steel Community, in Asia, America generally resisted the creation of any intra-regional ties thereby affording it maximum influence over each of its allies individually. Almost all connections tied individual Asian countries back to the U.S.; unmediated links among America's Asian allies were rare. Asian regionalism and integration were pipe dreams in the face of such overwhelming military and strategic pressures toward fragmentation. This changed to some extent with America's embrace of APEC and eventually ARF. In addition, the Clinton Administration managed to deal with the DPRK nuclear problem in 1993-94 through the establishment of KEDO—a flawed, but nonetheless effective regional instrument that contained DPRK plutonium programs and the prospect of nuclear proliferation. But the Bush administration reversed even these tentative American bolsterings of closer Asian ties.

The details of U.S. policies should be broadly familiar to most readers but it is well to recap the most important elements. The Bush administration has defined U.S. national interests unilaterally, assuming that the end of the Cold War has given the country a unique opportunity to transform the world (Soeya, 2005: 74). Thus, when the Bush administration took office early in 2001, it quickly moved to shuck off any constraints that might be placed on it by international organizations or global treaties (except notably within the economic area where it continued to support WTO, IMF and other such bodies).

Early in the administration, and reflecting the new dominance of neoconservatives and classic realists, the U.S. explicitly renounced a host of longstanding and relatively new global agreements from the

ABM treaty to the Kyoto Accord to the Convention Against Small Arms, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the International Court of Justice and many others. (Ironically, however, the U.S. decision to resist such institutions did not lead to their demise as many predicted; indeed some, such as the Kyoto Protocol, were forged in the absence of U.S. commitments (Tiberghien and Dierkes: 2006).) In a series of unilateral strategic and foreign policy actions aimed at reshaping the global status quo, the Bush administration engineered a sharp break with the prior fifty years of a predominantly multilateral and status quo oriented U.S. foreign policy (Daadler and Lindsey, 2003: 13; Ikenberry, 2001).

This is not the place to devote serious analysis to the broad sweep of American policies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and North Korea. But for the purposes of understanding relations in Northeast Asia, it is critical to highlight a few particular points. First, in keeping with its new unilateral and preventative military actions, U.S. military and strategic thinking also underwent a comprehensive overhaul with the move from a “threat-based” to “capabilities-based” military. The new U.S. doctrines were laid out in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2001, the Bush speech at West Point, June 2002, and the National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002 and February 2006.

The QDR argued that new, post Cold War challenges would require massive changes in the existing U.S. basing system. Forces would need to be closer to what the U.S. identified as the “arc of instability” stretching from Northern Africa to Southeast Asia. It would also require additional bases and stations in the Middle East and Central Asia (Katzenstein, 2005: 213). Certain “bedrock” allies such as Japan and probably Australia would be home to central U.S. basing hubs. These hubs would be supplemented by a large number of “lily pads” holding pre-positioned equipment to which rapidly deployable forces can deploy and/or ‘leap to and from’ in response to contingencies in a wide variety of geographical locations. This shift in basing structure had important effects on U.S. policies toward

Japan, the ROK, and China.

In addition, in his January 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush said the U.S. was threatened by three nations, labeled the “axis of evil”: Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. At that time Iraq was contained and growing weaker on a daily basis and neither Iraq nor the DPRK had nuclear weapons. But as of this writing the situation had changed dramatically and at least the DPRK was explicitly touting its nuclear weapons successes while Iran was presumed to be in pursuit of such weapons, presumably in direct response to the Bush speech and the subsequent invasion of Iraq. The lesson apparently taken by both Iran and North Korea has been that nuclear weapons could provide an effective deterrent to unwanted U.S. military actions.

In turn, the situation in North Korea has been a powerful force in the deteriorating relations among the major powers in Northeast Asia, most recently in the breakdown of the Six Party Talks and the DPRK’s subsequent missile testing on July 4-5, 2006, and its nuclear tests on October 9. Meanwhile, in a Chinese response of sorts, Iran was welcomed as an observer in the SCO meetings in 2006 and seemed poised to forge closer ties with SCO members—including China—presumably in ways that could challenge U.S. policies.

Furthermore, by failing to do any serious cost-benefit analysis of the dangers of its new policies, the U.S. ignored the possibility of creating failed states, setting precedents for other powers wishing to take aggressive military actions, or of damage to its overall global alliances and prestige (Korb and Wadhams, 2006: 1-5). The result was a radical decline in the previously positive images of the U.S. across East Asia, as well as the rest of the world and a diminished capacity of the U.S. to rely on its ‘soft power’ in lieu of harder versions (Pew, 2006).

In summary, any future Northeast Asian community must contend with the serious obstacles presented by different national interests and competing visions among the major powers of Northeast Asia plus extra regional and global pressures not always con-

ducive to closer regional linkages. At the same time, there are effective mechanisms that can be utilized to overcome these hurdles. Three in particular seem worth exploring. First, there is a need to embed any Northeast Asian community in a larger East Asian community, and perhaps, an Asia-Pacific community. Second, formal institutionalization of Northeast Asia should be kept to a minimum in favor of a series of loosely coordinated and overlapping networks of cooperation. Third and finally, advocates of a Northeast Asian community should search for easy areas of cooperation and work toward functional spill-overs that eventually can include some of the more difficult issues faced by Northeast Asia, including security.

II. Overcoming the Obstacles

Any Northeast Asian community in the short to medium run is likely to be best achieved only as an element in a broader East Asian community. The current tensions among the major powers of Northeast Asia make it highly unlikely that, say, China, Japan and the ROK—not to mention the DPRK, Mongolia, and perhaps Russia—could agree on common goals that would be anything but bland and irrelevant to the tangible problems they all face. The economic and production linkages to Southeast Asia, as well as to the United States, make both areas impossible to ignore in any Northeast Asian regional project. Nor is it likely that economics and business cooperation—regionalization—will operate from the bottom up to forge a Northeast Asian community. Government actions and policies will be critical in aiding or impeding East Asian regionalism. Despite the importance of technology, revolutions in communications and transportation, and breakthroughs in trade and investment patterns, Katzenstein has argued correctly that (2005: 105) “...for the foreseeable future, states will remain the main guarantors of national security and the basic building blocks of international order.... For good

or ill, states remain the ultimate repository of power." And with the governments of Northeast Asia so skeptical of one another, it is far better to broaden the conception of "region" to mirror economic and security realities, and in the process defuse some of the current nationalist tensions.

In this regard the experiences of Southeast Asia, and the importance of that part of the world to the important powers of Northeast Asia should be built upon. The formation of ASEAN was particularly important in connecting the countries of Southeast Asia. In 1967, the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand formed the association, nominally as a non-communist arrangement to promote economic, social and cultural cooperation and development among its members, but simultaneously as a way to resolve regional disputes and reduce the opportunities for big power interventions in Southeast Asia (Acharya, 2001; Leifer, 1989; Alagappa, 1993). The Asia Development Bank accompanied ASEAN's creation. As problems of internal security receded, the wars in Indochina ended, and the Cold War itself cooled, attention within ASEAN turned more explicitly to issues of trade, stabilization of commodity prices, market openings and the effort to attract development assistance from the industrialized countries. Quite explicitly, most of the ASEAN countries were quite anxious to maintain trade and investment links with the outside world. In terms of exports, they clearly pursued a strategy similar to that of Japan. But unlike Japan and more like China, these countries with relatively small domestic markets and limited capital resources, were far more accepting of the need for incoming foreign direct investment.

In 1977, the ASEAN countries signed a series of preferential trade arrangements that liberalized and expanded intra-ASEAN trade. Additionally, ASEAN used its collective bargaining powers to negotiate better commodity prices for its exports such as natural rubber. They also sought to maintain a united front on trade issues in multilateral trade negotiations (Acharya, 2001: 141-42). In all these ways,

elites across Southeast Asia tied their countries' fortunes increasingly to one another and began a collective concentration on economic development. For the most part, such Southeast Asian efforts remained predominantly informal and highly sensitive to any actions that could be seen as interference with national sovereignty.

ASEAN has taken a leading role in fostering APEC, ARF, and more recently the ASEAN plus Three (APT). The ASEAN+3 (APT) dialogue was institutionalized in 1999, and, two years later, its leaders were presented with the East Asia Vision Group's recommendations including the establishment of an East Asia FTA (EAFTA). In addition, because of its market potential ASEAN has been an important target for both China and Japan as they play out their competition for regional leadership. Thus, a China-ASEAN Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation was signed in 2002. This permitted an 'early harvest' of tariff cuts by China in favor of the less-developed ASEAN countries and a China-ASEAN FTA (CAFTA) to be implemented in 2010.

Japan reacted to the announced CAFTA plan by proposing a model of regional integration focused on the Asia-Pacific region rather than East Asia, which would include Australia and New Zealand as core members and enjoy close partnership with the United States. In 2004 at the annual APEC trade ministers meeting in Chile, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada along with Chile, Singapore, and Taipei pushed an Asia Pacific FTA—something the APEC business lobby (APEC Business Advisory Group or ABAG) had argued for as a way to overcome the 'spaghetti bowl' effect of the rising number of FTAs.

The recent moves toward FTAs are also important in fostering an Asian community. Despite the competing FTA initiatives, several East Asian states have mentioned in both bilateral and multilateral forums that they are optimistic about transforming bilateral FTAs into a region-wide multilateral trade body. For instance, the final report of the East Asia Study Group, revealed at the APT Summit in November 2002, asserted that "the establishment of an EAFTA could

be achieved by adopting a building block approach, and consolidating the existing bilateral and sub-regional FTAs in the region." "In this regard, the ongoing progress in the discussions of establishing many bilateral and sub-regional FTAs could pave the way for establishing an EAFTA" (p. 43). Also, the Joint Study Group of Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement (JKFTA) argued that "the JKFTA might eventually serve as a catalyst in strengthening regional cooperation in East Asia and in turn a stepping-stone for establishing the EAFTA (East Asian Free Trade Agreement)... The vision of the EAFTA is to create an East Asian Community (EAC) of peace, prosperity and progress based on the full-fledged development of all peoples in the region."

Equally important, either as part of any institutional process, or at least as part of the overall schema within which East Asian regional efforts proceed, is recognition of the tremendous dependence of much of East Asia on the U.S. On a bilateral basis, the United States has long been the largest or second largest market for the exports of nearly a dozen Asian countries. In most instances, the United States absorbed from twice to six times as much of the exports of these Asian countries as did their second largest markets. Asian regionalism can not be a closed loop. Despite the enhancement of intra-Asian trade, overall Asian economic success continues to depend heavily on access to non-Asian markets, most particularly those of the United States (Kokuseisha, 1997/98: 387).

Not only trade, but also finance, keeps the region's members dependent on the outside. Again, the economic importance of the United States and broader global financial markets was evident as vast amounts of U.S. capital flowed into Asia in the form of short-term loans and portfolio investment, particularly during the early to mid-1990s and the IMF loans that occurred following the economic crisis of 1997-98.

The Chiang-Mai Initiative and the Asian bond market efforts are further examples of institutions that include Northeast Asian players at their core, but which are structured rather loosely and more

broadly than just Northeast Asia.

Finally, the East Asian Summit (EAS) held in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005, indicates still one more possible format within which Northeast Asian regionalism might develop. In attendance were leaders from sixteen countries—the ten ASEAN members, the additional “three” from the APT (ASEAN Plus Three)—China, Japan and the Republic of Korea—plus Australia, New Zealand and India. The final announcement was sweeping and upbeat: “We have established the East Asia Summit as a forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia.” (ASEAN Secretariat; Cody, 2005: A25).

The Summit was, in numerous ways, a metaphorical manifestation of many of the struggles involved in creating a more cohesive East Asian region. The attendees reflected East Asia’s breadth and diversity—a concatenation of dissimilar religions, social systems, cultural and historical traditions, political systems, and levels of economic development. Yet, all advocated further pursuit of additional community-building. At the same time, reflective of the ambiguous nature of many existing East Asian linkages, it was not clear, beyond the photo-op and the final communique, how much substantive cooperation would result from the Summit. Certainly no painful commitments, no explicit rules, and no particular institutions were agreed to, nor were any officially anticipated.

Equally interesting, of the sixteen nations represented, three—Australia, New Zealand and India—were relatively late additions not usually a part of conventional definitions of “East Asia.” Conversely, both Taiwan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), undeniably visible on any East Asian map, were not in attendance, while Russia which spans eleven time zones across Europe and Asia, attended as an observer. Perhaps most tellingly, the United States, though not geographically in East Asia but arguably the strongest shaper of economic and strategic developments in the region, as well as a member of previously-established

Asia-Pacific groupings as APEC and the ARF, had not been invited to attend.

Considerable criticism has been leveled at the Summit as yielding few practical results. But it served a major role in showing one more way by which different combinations of countries in East Asia could be brought together for cooperation. Including the three non-APT members meant also that some of the tensions between Japan and China over regional leadership were alleviated. Explicitly by not answering the question “who’s in the region?” a series of overlapping and sometimes reinforcing organizations can provide alternative forums within which the different countries in the region might pursue their interests.

A second important mechanism for advancing Northeast Asian regional ties involves explicitly limiting the levels of formal institutionalization. Europe and the European Union have moved toward ever deeper institutionalization and legalization. Thousands of pages of rules and regulations spell out the terms of intra-regional interactions. In contrast, Asia has relied almost exclusively on informal networks of collaboration. Existing Asia organizations are characterized by thin institutions and few requirements. That the legalized and formalized European situation is unusual must be acknowledged (Kahler 2000). The disparity in expectations and goals of member states makes it unsurprising that East Asia has opted for vastly less formality.

APEC, ARF and APT have all been structured around similarly minimalist frameworks and secretariats. Instead, in the phrasing of Etel Solingen (2005: 32): “Three core characteristics—informality, consensus, and ‘open’ regionalism—...capture the emphasis of East Asian institutions on process rather than outcome.”

Informality is likely to continue in the near future. There is little probability to create formal, rule-bound institutions. Although informality has the drawback of fuzzy ambiguity, it offers the flexibility to encourage wider participation and ad hoc problem resolution. And if East Asian regionalism is to advance, the first requirement is

that the countries of the region show up for organizational activities.

Finally, any efforts to develop a deeper Northeast Asian regional community must be built around overlapping networks in search of functional spill-overs. In this regard, the networks should focus on solving simpler, rather than more complex problems. It is virtually impossible to envision high levels of security cooperation within Northeast Asia or East Asia within the near term. This is by far the area where regional cooperation has been least evident. In stark contrast to Western Europe facing the Soviet Union and its allies for the first forty-five years after World War II, or the perception of many Arab countries in the Middle East concerning Israel, East Asia faces no commonly perceived external threat. Rather, as Michael Yahuda (2004: 229) points out, "the defenses of most East Asian countries are directed against one another."

It is far more plausible to build cooperation around less contentious issues on the theory that cooperation in one field may engender cooperation in others. To date East Asian regional ties have been moving forward at different paces depending on the specific issues being faced. Functional spill-overs occur and these may increase over time. Cooperation in trade and investment almost certainly contributed to and benefited from the absence of shooting wars in Asian since 1979. Enhanced cooperation on areas such as regional health problems may well facilitate cooperation on more politically difficult areas such as immigration or environmental pollution. But equally plausibly interactions across issues can be negative: sudden security problems might well unravel cooperative efforts in economics or cross-border crime; the failure to resolve cross-border environmental issues may generate diplomatic breakdowns. But in the long run, cooperation on one issue is far more likely to build confidence and trust on others.

Equally importantly, starting small may well allow for subsequent enlargement. This is particularly true of the recent explosion of FTAs involving the countries of East Asia. East Asian countries were slow to embrace FTAs, relying instead on global trade agreements

negotiated in conjunction with the WTO. As of October 1, 2002, of the thirty top economies in the world, only five were not members of any such FTAs—Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong (Pempel & Urata 2006). Since then, and particularly since the collapse of the Doha Round in Seattle and Cancun, an explosion of bilateral, regional, and other preferential free trade pacts involving East Asian nations have been concluded or explored.

There is a strong debate as to whether or not FTAs will serve as building blocks for a larger integrated trade region or will instead become stumbling blocks that impede broader free trade. Baldwin (1995) and Suzuki (2005) have demonstrated the powerful incentives that build up for states not included in FTAs to join, particularly as the markets covered by a succession of FTAs become ever larger. In such situations, countries not included find themselves facing continual discriminatory barriers making the incentives to allow increased competition within their home markets ever greater as the promises of preferential access grow ever greater. But such a domino theory of increased momentum toward deepening market integration ignores the tremendous political counter pressures that are often mobilized against such economically rational arguments.

III. Conclusion

For the foreseeable future, Northeast Asia will remain a subsystem with multiple connections to the broader regional and global systems of state relations and global processes (Alagappa 2003: 179). Internal regional cohesion might well increase but Northeast Asia is unable or unlikely to wall itself off from the broader global arena. Increased cohesion might well develop, enhancing its ability to shape international and global pressures more to its collective liking. But the extra-regional world will remain an unmistakable and powerful influence.

Furthermore, Northeast Asia will benefit considerably as a regional entity if it does not seek to become self-contained. Rather different bodies linking Northeast and Southeast Asia, and perhaps Northeast Asia and South Asia, Australasia and/or the U.S. will prove to be functionally beneficial. Clearly different organizations, institutions, and networks have coexisted reasonably well, despite quite different central hubs and outer boundaries. Instead of idealizing some improbable single set of fixed boundaries such as those shaping the European Union, it may be best to acknowledge that competing concerns face East Asia and these may well be best served by overlapping bodies with different memberships. In the long run porosity may trump rigidity.

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PART IV

*Collective Wisdom & New
Vision for Peace & Prosperity
on the Korean Peninsula
and in Northeast Asia
and the World*

Democracy and Peace:

Is Democratic Peace Theory Still Valid?

Main Issues and Tasks Regarding Peace-making
in Northeast Asia

Engagement Policy and Inter-Korean Relations:
Development and Future Tasks

Democracy and Peace: Is the Democratic Peace Theory Still Valid?

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The theory of democratic peace argues that democracies are more peaceful, either generally or in their relations with other democracies. Democracies, however, differ in important ways in their political cultures and political institutions. Moreover, their frequency of resorting to arms abroad varies considerably. This paper explores these differences, focusing on the United States as a special case. The motivation behind this exploration, of course, is to develop more clearly the micro-foundations of the democratic-peace theory. How exactly do the political cultures and institutions of democracies contribute to their more peaceful disposition? And, can the differences found among the democracies help to account for their differences in war involvement?

The title of my paper assignment reminds me of a panel discussion at a recent annual meeting of the International Studies Association. The panel's topic was democratic peace, and several of the participants remarked about an "elephant in the room." Their statements were of course a reference to the United States and its frequent involvement in foreign conflicts. How can one reconcile the democratic peace theory with this U.S. behavior?

At one level, the incidence of U.S. conflict involvement does not contradict the democratic peace theory, and there is therefore no need for any reconciliation — if one is only concerned with the so-called dyadic version of this theory. According to this dyadic version, democracies rarely, if ever, find themselves on opposite sides of a militarized conflict.¹ That the U.S. — or, for that matter, any other democracy — has not fought another democracy in recent memory is of course congruent with the democratic peace theory's expectation.² The "elephant in the room" remarks only point to a puzzle, even a challenge, if one pursues the monadic version of this theory. This monadic version claims that democracies are more peaceful in general; that is, they are less likely to get into fights regardless of whether they find themselves dealing with other democracies (as in the case of the dyadic claim) or with autocracies.

If there are only democracies in the world, the distinction between the monadic and dyadic versions of the democratic peace theory should not matter. Democracies would not fight all others, which all happen to be democratic. In a world consisting of both democracies and non-democracies, however, this distinction is important — not the least for understanding how one can or should get from the present situation to a world made up entirely of democracies. The reason is not difficult to grasp. The use of military force to promote democracy abroad is sometimes justified on the grounds of making the world more democratic and, according to this rationale, also more peaceful. The rhetoric and, to many, the reality of democratic peace is used to legitimate the use of force for

¹ For an earlier effort that draws the monadic versus dyadic distinction, see Steve Chan, "Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall... : Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28 (1984): 617-648.

² Much ink has been spilled over whether a country was democratic when it fought a war. Plausible contradictions to the democratic theory include the U.S. war against Britain in 1812 and against Spain in 1898. Were Britain and Spain "democratic" at the time of these conflicts? Indeed, was the Confederacy in the American Civil War a democracy, albeit an illiberal one? I will side-step these questions in this paper.

regime change abroad.

The U.S. surely figures prominently in this policy debate as its leaders have on many occasions, most recently when deciding to invade Iraq, justified the use of military force in the name of protecting or promoting democracy. The U.S. may not have fought the largest number of wars according to some technical definitions of warfare such as that adopted by the developers of the Correlates of War Project (who consider wars to be military conflicts producing at least 1,000 battlefield fatalities). Among contemporary democracies, Israel, India, and even France and Britain have fought more wars since 1945 (especially if one includes the latter countries' colonial wars in the frequency count). Yet by any reasonable standard, the U.S. has engaged in more foreign interventions, overt or covert, than any other country. Moreover, because the U.S. possesses such overwhelming military superiority in these encounters, its opponents were often quickly dispatched so that their conflict usually ended before reaching the threshold of 1,000 combat deaths (such as on the occasions of U.S. interventions in Grenada, Panama, and the Dominican Republic). Hence, the "elephant" tends to be invisible because it is much more powerful, not necessarily more peaceful, in its foreign relations. The "elephant" is more efficient at crushing its opponents. Realizing the "elephant's" overwhelming power, its opponents often make anticipatory concessions in order to avoid being crushed, tending thus again to make the "elephant" appear more peaceful than it actually is. The powerful often does not have to fight in order to get what it wants.³ Manuel Noriega, Slobodan Milosevic, and Saddam Hussein are the exceptions that prove the rule.

There is strong evidence supporting the dyadic version of the

³ Kenneth A. Schultz, "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War," *International Organization* 53 (1999): 133-162; "Looking for Audience Costs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (2001): 32-60; and "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," *American Political Science Review* 92 (1998): 829-844.

democratic peace theory and, for most industrialized democracies, increasingly support for the monadic version as well. Nevertheless, although the statistical data showing an absence of warfare and even serious disputes threatening military escalation among the established democracies are quite compelling, the explanation for this phenomenon requires further revision and development. Rather than focusing on some problematic aspects in the current practice in “operationalizing” the dependent variable (war, as already alluded to above), I will direct my attention in the rest of this paper to the independent variable (democracy). Many quantitative researchers have used the Polity data for their statistical analysis. They often include in their analyses years before World War II and even World War I, when some of the “democratic” countries did not even allow their women and minority citizens to vote. In so doing, these colleagues “stretch” the concept of democracy.⁴ Parenthetically, their practice of counting each country’s war involvement also overlooks the lack of statistical independence among many such observations (thus, for example, that Britain and France decided to fight Germany in 1939 was not unrelated to Germany’s decision to invade Poland; similarly, the Dutch and Belgian decisions to join the Korean War in 1950 were not unrelated to the U.S. intervention in that conflict).

But to return to a focus on the independent variable, my chief argument in this paper is that there is substantial variation in the political institutions and cultures of the industrialized democracies to account for the weakness of the monadic version of the democra-

⁴ Some time ago, Giovanni Sartori warned researchers to avoid the temptation to measure “how much” before they answer the question of “what kind.” His argument is that qualitative distinctions (such as is this country a democracy) should be made prior to quantitative measurements (such as how democratic is this country). Quantitative measurements can only pertain to items of the same kind (or category such as democracy). Thus, can the U.S. at the time of its revolutionary war, its civil war and World Wars I and II qualify as a democracy? See Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” *American Political Science Review* 64 (1970):1033-1053.

tic peace theory, and especially for the “American exceptionalism” that has been the source of many skeptical comments about the “elephant in the room.” A seminal article by Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett points to a fruitful direction for this discussion.⁵ These colleagues proposed a “structural” and a “normative” model to explain the dyadic version of democratic peace.

By the structural model, they meant constitutional constraints on the power of government. The legal limits placed on a chief executive’s discretionary authority and the extent to which a government’s authority is centralized offer two examples of such structural constraints against possible arbitrary application of power. Decentralized and divided government power provides a check against an impulsive leap to war. As for the normative model, Maoz and Russett considered the stability of a political system, reasoning that democratic norms take time to develop and systemic longevity is conducive to the development of such norms. They assumed that officials internalize democratic norms of compromise and tolerance, and extend these domestic norms to their foreign relations when dealing with like-minded democracies. This externalization is therefore seen to contribute to the peaceful resolution of disputes among democracies. In addition to the stability of a political system, Maoz and Russett used the number of violent deaths caused by domestic instability and political execution as indicators pointing to a country’s relative lack of democratic norms.

While the focus of Maoz and Russett was on differentiating democracies *from* non-democracies and on explaining the peaceful relations *between* democracies, their “structural” and “normative” models can be developed further to underscore the differences existing *among* democracies. I emphasize especially *political values* and *electoral institutions* that tend to distinguish the West European democracies from the English-speaking democracies, and most of

⁵ Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,” *American Political Science Review* 87 (1993): 624-638.

the latter countries in some important respects from the U.S. These intra-democratic differences help to shed light on the “American exceptionalism” and the debate about whether democracies are generically more peaceful in their foreign relations.

Although contemporary democracies obviously share basic similarities such as contested elections, competitive parties, universal adult suffrage, and the rule of law, there are also important differences among them that tend to be concealed in large-N statistical analyses. In his book on American exceptionalism, Seymour Martin Lipset demonstrated how the revolutionary heritage of the U.S. distinguished it from its European counterparts and even its neighbor to the north, Canada, where those loyal to the British monarchy had fled.⁶ A survey of cross-national statistics on any number of sociological phenomena — such as the incidence of crime (including the rate of homicide), litigation, divorce, teenage pregnancy, voter turnout, church attendance, feelings about abortion and gay rights — would lead to the conclusion that the United States has a rather different political culture from those of other democracies.⁷ Americans pay the least income taxes, but complain the loudest about “big government.” They see themselves as compassionate and contribute much to private charity, but they frown upon the “welfare state” and accept a highly unequal distribution of income. They champion cosmopolitan causes but are the most nationalistic among the citizens of industrialized democracies. Americans cherish individual liberty, but record the highest rate of prison incarceration and, unlike the people of other industrialized democracies, support and routinely carry out capital punishment. These proclivi-

⁶ Seymour Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York: Norton, 1996); and *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

⁷ In addition to the seminal work by Lipset already cited, see a recent collection of papers for *Growing Apart? America, Europe, and Canada in the 21st Century* being edited by Jeffrey Kopstein and Sven Steinmo. See also the acclaimed book by Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Random House, 2003).

ties represent the duality of American values or, as characterized by Lipset, a double-edged sword.⁸

The American culture is classically liberal — in that Americans show a prevalent opposition to government intervention in their lives and in the marketplace. They place an extraordinary emphasis on the value of individual liberty. Americans, however, are less “liberal” than the West Europeans and Canadians in the contemporary sense of this concept, suggesting a rejection of traditional values and a willingness to accept social or political non-conformity. There tends to be a strong conservative and moralistic streak in American attitudes on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, prostitution, gambling, and extra-marital affairs. Vehement opposition to private vices — such as the use of alcohol and drugs — can overcome a general reluctance to government intervention as in the case of Prohibition. Abortion rights and stem-cell research are even more salient controversies in the U.S. than in the catholic democracies. An inclination to cast disputes in moralistic terms, to impose universal standards, and to launch militant crusades against perceived vices seems to be uniquely American among the industrialized democracies. In Lipset’s words, “unlike the church countries, the United States rarely sees itself merely defending national interests. Foreign conflicts invariably involve a battle of good versus evil.”⁹

As already noted, Maoz and Russett reminded us that norms and practices learned from domestic politics can be extended to foreign conduct. Although the norms they focused on were meant to suggest a fostering of mutual peace among democracies, the same

⁸ He wrote “many negative traits that currently characterize the [American] society, such as income inequality, high crime rates, low levels of electoral participation, a powerful tendency to moralize which at times verges on intolerance toward political and ethnic minorities, are inherently linked to the norms and behavior of an open democratic society that appear to be admirable.” Lipset, *op.cit.*, 1996, 13.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, 1996, 66.

externalization of domestic values can incline the U.S. to assume a particularly intense missionary zeal in fighting designated foreign devils. Washington is disposed to take on a self-appointed role to make the world safe for democracy, not just for the U.S. A combative tendency co-exists with a seeming allergy to the “welfare state” on the global scene, accounting for the fact that as a share of its gross national product, the U.S. gives less to foreign aid than almost all other industrialized democracies. With the exception of Italy, this “welfare” aspect of democratic peace again sets the West Europeans and Japanese apart from the Americans. By “welfare” aspect, I mean that the peaceful disposition of a democracy can perhaps be reflected by the proportion of its economic output devoted to international assistance compared to military expenditures.

One of the strong conclusions reached by Ronald Inglehart on the basis of his massive cross-national surveys of social and political values is that as countries become industrialized, their peoples’ ethos undergoes a major transformation switching from an emphasis on traditional to secular-rational values.¹⁰ With increasing economic development, there is a strong tendency for declining religiosity, national pride, and respect for authority to set in.¹¹ In contrast to these generalizations, however, Americans tend to be the most religious, nationalistic, and deferential to authority among the people of industrialized democracies. Summarizing their survey results, Ronald Inglehart and Wayne Baker noted “the United States is a deviant case, having a much more traditional value system than

¹⁰ Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Ronald Inglehart (ed.), *Human Values and Social Change: Findings from the Value Surveys* (Leiden: Brill, 2003).

¹¹ Ronald Inglehart, “Postmodernization Erodes Respect for Authority, but Increases Support for Democracy,” in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, ed. Pippa Norris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 236-256.

any other advanced industrial society. On the traditional/secular-rational dimension, the United States ranks far below other rich societies, with levels of religiosity and national pride comparable to those found in developing societies."¹²

The evangelical religious right plays an active and prominent role in American politics. Moreover, practically unique among the industrialized democracies, the U.S. does not have a socialist party, and Americans do not join labor unions nearly as much as their counterparts in other countries. A consistent and striking result from the different waves of the World Values Survey and the European Values Study Surveys is that, although their countries have been industrialized for some time, the citizens of English-speaking democracies (Britain, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, the U.S., and Ireland) are much more likely to hold traditional values compared to those of Germany, France, and the Nordic and Benelux countries. Among the English-speaking democracies, only the Irish are more tradition-bound in their value outlook than the Americans. The United States is located at about the same level as India and Vietnam on the traditional/secular-rational dimension of values. Compared to their European, Japanese, and even most other English-speaking counterparts, Americans are more likely to profess deference to "God, Fatherland and Family." To that extent, Americans are more conservative — and less liberal in the sense of this term's contemporary usage in juxtaposition to a more conservative or tradition-bound outlook — than the people of other industrialized democracies.

The latter remark is significant in that earlier writers on the democratic peace theory had actually emphasized not so much the concept of democracy as the idea of liberalism. Their discussion can be more accurately characterized to focus on "liberal peace" than on "democratic peace."¹³ By liberalism, they had in mind a value

¹² Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review* 65 (2000): 31.

system that gives central importance to people as individuals (versus the state as a corporate entity) and also to the people's rights to privacy and free choice. As already noted above, the American political culture celebrates individual rights but can at the same time be intolerant of non-conformist or "immoral" behavior. Moreover, although the rule of law is cherished as an important ideal, the incidence of breaking the law (including interpersonal violence) is several times higher on a per capita basis in the U.S. than in Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan. The double-edged nature of Americans' emphasis on individualism points to a culture that promotes achievement and competition based on personal merit, but one that also adopts a more cavalier attitude toward criminal behavior (as any casual observer of the incidence of jaywalking in Europe and America can verify), social inequality, and collective well-being. There is a greater tendency for Americans to stress "winning" and "litigating" than "compromising" and "negotiating," as any number of studies comparing social and political processes in the U.S. with those prevailing in Western Europe and Japan can attest.

Table 1 presents information from cross-national value surveys that compare Americans' attitudes with those of their counterparts in the other industrialized democracies. Americans are much more likely to emphasize freedom (or personal liberty) at the expense of equality. Seventy-one percent of them would put freedom above equality, compared to 61% of Canadians, their neighbors to the north. Americans are more likely to dichotomize political controversies, framing them in moralistic terms as a struggle between good and evil. Whereas 49% of Americans adopt an absolutist and

¹³ See, for example, Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (1983): 205-235 and 323-353; and Rudolph J. Rummel, "Libertarian Propositions on Violence Within and Between Nations: A Test Against Published Research Results," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29 (1983): 419-455; and "Libertarianism and International Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27 (1981): 27-71.

Table 1. Political Values Among Industrialized Democracies, 2000

	A	B	C	D	E
Australia	n.a.	87	42	73	73
Austria	56	96	20	53	39
Belgium	46	89	31	23	63
Canada	61*	88	42	67	66
Denmark	69	98	10	48	38
Finland	53	87	29	56	39
France	50	89	25	40	69
Germany	62	95	35	17	46
Great Britain	60	88	42	51	71
Greece	n.a.	98	16	55	17
Iceland	46	98	9	67	47
Ireland	48	91	39	72	76
Italy	40	97	36	39	51
Japan	46*	92	19	23	4
Luxembourg	49	92	23	49	53
Netherlands	56	97	27	20	67
New Zealand	n.a.	87	42	64	50
Norway	67*	96	29	50	32
Portugal	49	91	39	79	78
Spain	49	95	39	53	59
Sweden	62	97	16	41	22
Switzerland	58*	93	28	25	31
United States	71*	89	49	72	70

1. Both freedom and equality are important, but if you were to choose one or the other, which of these two statements comes closer to your opinion? Personal freedom is more important, or equality is more important? Figures in Column A report the percent of respondents putting freedom above equality in each national sample. [survey question E032]
2. I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. Figures in Column B report the percent of respondents agreeing to "having a democratic system is very good or fairly good." [survey question E117]
3. Here are two statements which people sometimes make when discussing good and evil. Which one comes closer to your own point of view? Figures in Column C report the percent of respondents agreeing with the statement "there are absolutely clear guidelines about what is good and evil." [survey question F022]
4. How proud are you to be (nationality)? Figures in Column D report the percent of respondents saying that they are "very proud." [survey question G006]
5. I'm going to read out a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. If it were to happen, do you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind? Figures in Column E report the percent of respondents saying that "greater respect for authority" would be a good thing. [survey question E018]

*Data from 1990 survey.

Source: Ronald Inglehart, Miguel Basanez, Jaime Diez-Medrano, Loek Halman, and Ruud Luijkx (eds.), *Human Beliefs and Values: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook based on the 1999-2002 Values Surveys* (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno Editorias, 2004).

universalistic outlook on controversies about social and political values, only 9% of the respondents in Iceland and 16% in Sweden hold a similar attitude. Americans also tend to be much more nationalistic than the citizens of other democracies. Seventy-two percent of them say that they are proud to be Americans (only in the U.S. do automobiles carry such bumper stickers), whereas the comparable figures in Germany and Japan are only 17% and 23% respectively. Seventy percent of Americans think that it would be a good thing if there is greater respect for authority, compared to 38% of the Danes, 39% of the Finns, 32% of the Norwegians, and 22% of the Swedes. Remarkably, only 89% of Americans agree with the statement "having a democratic system is very good or fairly good." This statement is supposed to determine a respondent's support for the democratic principle — and not satisfaction with the actual performance of a democracy. Americans are thus not in complete agreement that democracy is in principle the best form of government.¹⁴ This level of support for the democratic principle is comparable to those indicated by the British, Canadians, and French. In contrast, democracy as a system of government enjoys much more support among the Germans, Swedes, and Italians, whose affirmative response to the same survey question is nearly 10% higher. Still, there appears to be a general secular trend among almost all the industrialized democracies, whereby "growing numbers of citizens have become increasingly critical of major institutions of representative government."¹⁵

It is clear from Table 1 that Americans are not always the most

¹⁴ An alternative question produced a similar percentage of positive response from Americans on their support for democracy as a form of government. The question asked "I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government." Eighty-eight percent of the American respondents indicated that they strongly agree or agree with this statement.

¹⁵ Pippa Norris, "Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens," in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, ed. Pippa Norris (Oxford:

extreme outlier on the values reported. For example, the Portuguese are even more nationalistic, and the Australians show an even lower level of allegiance to democracy as a system of government. As well, the Irish are more in favor of greater respect for authority. However, the combination of attitudes, rather than each attitude in isolation, is what matters for the normative model. The attitudes interact to produce a general value outlook that, in the case of the U.S., promotes a more militant posture and messianic role in international relations. Naturally, among the industrialized democracies included in Table 1, the U.S. is the only country that has sufficient power to undertake protracted and, if need be, unilateral military operations abroad. That the U.S. has this capability is hardly subject to dispute. Where the democratic peace theory as a liberal formulation differs from realism is its claim that even when a democracy has the capability and opportunity to use force, it eschews such policy because domestic political culture or institutions incline it to act peacefully.

In contrast to the normative model that focuses on a democracy's political culture as an influence that discourages war, the structural model directs attention to its political institutions. Why should these institutions matter? The simple answer is *accountability*. In a democracy, leaders have to answer to the voters. They are subject to recall if they fail to follow popular wishes. In his classic treatise, Immanuel Kant argued that it is only natural for citizens in a republic to favor a peaceful foreign policy because they will have to pay the costs of waging a war (not only in taxes, but also in life, limb, property, and liberty).¹⁶ Conversely, because leaders do not have to

Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 27. Popular confidence in politicians and political institutions has declined in all established democracies, but these declines appear to be more pronounced in the U.S. than elsewhere. See Russell J. Dalton, "Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies," in *ibid.*, pp. 57-77.

¹⁶ Significantly, Kant spoke of republicanism and not democracy. He was more concerned about the rule of law than mass popularity. See Immanuel Kant [1795], *Perpetual Peace*, translated by Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-

pay this price, autocrats who cannot be sanctioned by the voters are more likely to engage in wanton and frivolous foreign belligerence.¹⁷ The lynchpin of this argument is of course the claim that public opinion in democracies generally favors peace. The available evidence suggests that in the case of the American people, "prudent" rather than "peaceful" is perhaps a more accurate adjective.¹⁸ There is much evidence pointing to the "rally 'round the flag" syndrome, whereby a president's popularity receives a substantial, albeit often temporary, boost at the outset of a foreign conflict.¹⁹

How does public opinion, whether prudent or peaceful, incline officials to refrain from starting or joining wars? Surely, the electoral and party systems of democracies can be expected to make an

Merrill, 1975).

¹⁷ Several studies have shown that democratic leaders who fight wars, even victorious ones, are likely to have their office tenure cut short. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," *American Political Science Review* 89 (1995): 841-853; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and Gary Woller "War and the Fate of Regimes: A Comparative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 86 (1992): 638-646; and Giacomo Chiozza and H.E. Goemans, "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still Ex Post Inefficient?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (2004): 604-619; and "Peace Through Insecurity: Tenure and International Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47 (2003): 443-467.

¹⁸ Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public: Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force," *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (1992): 47-74; Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42 (1998): 395-417; and Richard C. Eichenberg, "Victory Has Many Friends: U.S. Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force, 1981-2005," *International Security* 30 (2005): 140-177.

¹⁹ See Barry B. Hughes, *The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1978). On the opposite tendency for presidential popularity to sap as casualties mount, see John Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York: Wiley, 1973). For a general discussion on the relationship between wars and elections, see Kurt T. Gaubatz, *Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

important difference. The nature of these systems can increase or decrease the officials' sensitivity and, correspondingly, vulnerability to popular backlash. Put starkly, the principal-agent problem is sometimes exacerbated in a two-party system. This remark characterizes the political landscape in the U.S. and U.K. before and after their invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The Republican and Democratic parties in the former country, and the Labour and Conservative parties in the latter country were both supportive of the war (even though there were dissident voices). Popular opinion in the U.S. initially favored fighting the war but as casualties mounted and allegations about terrorist connections and weapons of mass destruction proved to be false, a majority of Americans turned against the war. In the British case, a majority of voters were against the war at the outset. In both countries, public opinion failed to restrain their government from going to war against Iraq and, once the war started, to force a termination of involvement in that conflict.²⁰

Why? The U.S. and U.K. both have a single-member, plurality system of election. This means that the candidate with the largest number of votes from each voting district will be declared the winner, and there can be only one winning candidate from each district. A vote for a third-party candidate — such as the Liberal Democrats in the U.K., who opposed the Iraqi war — tends to be seen as “wasted.” A traditional supporter of the Labour Party would be discouraged from supporting this third-party candidate because her support might have the effect of helping to elect a Conservative politician, who happens to be her least-preferred candidate. Thus, this electoral system tends to work against the minor parties, and inclines citizens to engage in negative voting (casting their ballots in opposition to a candidate rather than in favor of one). When both major parties agree on a pro-war platform, dissenting voters are in effect disenfranchised. Significantly, politicians worry about being sanc-

²⁰ For a more extensive treatment of this topic, see Steve Chan and William Safran, “Public Opinion as a Constraint against War: Democracies; Responses to Operation Iraqi Freedom,” *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2 (2006): 137-156.

tioned by the voters when their opponents are poised to exploit their betrayal of public opinion. In the absence of this threat, however, democratic accountability suffers. As V.O. Key remarked some time ago, the political salience and relevance of public opinion depend ultimately on the incumbent politicians' concern for the voters being mobilized by their challengers.²¹

It is therefore too simple to just claim that public opinion matters in democracies. One needs to look more closely at how electoral and party institutions affect the way in which public opinion makes itself felt. If the politicians' fear of electoral retribution encourages them to be sensitive to public opinion, then one would want to ask whether the major political parties offer coherent and contrasting positions on matters of war and peace. Moreover, how does the tradition of party discipline in the U.K., and how does the decentralization of American parties help or hinder the politicians' accountability? How can voters hold officials accountable if they are term-limited, as in the case of second-term U.S. presidents who are no longer eligible for re-election? Finally, how accurately do election outcomes reflect public opinion?

In the U.S. presidential race, campaign efforts are focused most intensely on the ten or so pivotal states. Because of the nature of a winner-take-all system, presidential candidates do not waste their time or money on those states they expect to win or they expect their opponent to win. They concentrate instead on a few states — such as Ohio, Iowa, and Pennsylvania — that can provide them with the critical margin to carry an election. Consequently, presidential elections are not decided on a national basis but are rather determined by the voters' choice in a few select states. Because the Electoral College (and not the count of popular votes) decides presidential races in the U.S. and because this institution systematically favors the less populous and urban states, public opinion is not necessarily accurately reflected in the final outcome (if that were the

²¹ V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961).

case, Al Gore would have won the Oval Office in 2000). Furthermore, the typically low voter turnout in even presidential contests requires another leap of faith to take the election outcome as a reflection of popular mandate. Indeed, elections in Britain and New Zealand have been known to produce minority governments — that is, producing a parliamentary majority for a party that has actually received fewer popular votes than its opposition.

It is well known that the single-member, plurality system of election introduces a systematic distortion that exaggerates the winning margin of the major parties and that diminishes the legislative representation of the minor parties.²² Simply put, these electoral rules produce unrepresentative outcomes in comparison with countries that have adopted a multi-party, proportional representation system of election. As just noted, in some extreme cases, the party winning fewer popular votes in a national contest has been known to gain parliamentary majority or capture the presidency. In contrast with the U.S. and other English-speaking democracies, the predominant European system of proportional representation and disciplined parties offer voters a clearer political choice, and it produces electoral outcomes that reflect more accurately the public sentiment. As a result of their electoral rules, the continental European democracies tend to have a multi-party system and be ruled by coalition governments.²³ Even when the minority parties are not included in a ruling coalition, they have a voice in the legislature more commensurate with their actual electoral strength. And, when they are a part of the ruling coalition, they exercise a restraining or moderating influence on the majority party inside the government in contrast to the winner-take-all situation in the U.S. and generally the other English-speaking democracies. This explanation accounts

²² The classic study on this subject is by Douglas W. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967).

²³ As Maurice Duverger has been frequently quoted, “*the simple-majority, single-ballot system favours the two-party system.*” See his *Party Politics* (London: Methuen, 1954), p. 217.

for a consistently strong statistical pattern associating mature democracies with a proportional representation system of election to a lower incidence of foreign war.²⁴

It has been generally assumed that although they have the liability of causing electoral disproportionality (that is, giving more legislative seats to the majority party than its popular support deserves, and allocating fewer seats to minority parties than their level of popular support warrants), a two-party system with a plurality rule at least has the virtue of encouraging political campaigns to focus on the median voter. Moreover, the parties should supposedly be more responsive to a change in the position of this median voter. This effect is in turn supposed to enable elected officials to adjust policies more quickly in line with changing public opinion.

These hypothesized effects do not, however, pan out in reality. Even though the two major parties may adopt similar policy positions (as in the case of the British Labour and Conservative parties on joining the Iraqi war), their convergence does not necessarily imply responsiveness to the largest number of voters. The responsiveness and moderation attributed to the pursuit of the median voter only obtain when the electorate is characterized by a relatively "tall," bell-shaped distribution. When the electorate is distributed bimodally — recent evidence points in the direction of increasing left-right polarization of the American electorate — a campaign strategy catering to the median voter can actually cause more alienation on the part of a larger number of voters. Bingham Powell's extensive study of election returns led him to conclude "contrary to expectations from a Downsian image of two-party competition and majorities, competition even in majoritarian design systems is rarely confined to only two parties, seldom results in vote majorities for one of them, and infrequently finds both main contenders offering policy commitments close to the median voter."²⁵ In the

²⁴ David Leblang and Steve Chan, "Explaining Wars Fought by Established Democracies: Do Institutional Constraints Matter?" *Political Research Quarterly* 56 (2003): 385-400.

same vein, Arend Lijphart observed “there is no evidence that coalition cabinets in multi-party systems are less responsive than one-party majority cabinets; on the contrary, coalition cabinets are usually closer to the centre of the political spectrum — and hence closer in their policy outlook to the average citizen — than one-party cabinets representing either the left or the right.”²⁶

Differences in the political institutions of democracies afford anti-war voices different opportunities for political access and representation. From this structural perspective, the U.S. is again more different from the other industrialized democracies, especially the continental European ones, than they are from each other. Many continental European democracies are ruled by multi-party coalitions, and this fact is consequential for the theory of democratic peace. The presence of multiple partisan voices within the ruling coalition offers a constant source for political moderation, and provides a safeguard for accountability during the period *between* elections. In contrast, the winner-take-all system of electing government officials — whatever its other merits — is less well adapted to responding to changing public opinion when officials are not actively campaigning for office. This is not to deny that these officials pay attention to polls when they are not seeking re-election, but rather that they do not face the same demand as their counterparts working in proportional representation systems. The nature of multi-party ruling coalitions is such that the partners have to negotiate and compromise constantly in response to their respective constituencies, lest defection from any key member causes the government to fall. Thus in a proportional representation system, popular mandate is more a continuing project of mutual adjustment rather than a challenge occasioned by the election cycle.

Naturally, compromise and negotiation are also present in U.S.

²⁵ G. Bingham Powell, *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 245.

²⁶ Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Survey of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 144.

politics. A tangible difference, however, is that in the U.S. case these processes occur as much within political parties as between them. American parties are decentralized, and they seek to encompass as many interest groups as possible in order to win the largest number of votes. The former tendency accounts in part for the lack of party discipline, and the latter tendency helps to preserve the two-party system and makes them non-ideological. In explaining why in contrast to the U.S., Canada has a multi-party system, Seymour Martin Lipset observed that "it maintains a form of government that requires disciplined parliamentary parties, that does not permit cross-party alignments in the House of Commons or sharp divergences among a party's federal MPs from province to province, and that does not provide primaries to resolve internal party cleavages."²⁷ Weak party discipline and a divided government based on the principle of checks and balances have the further implication of reducing the citizens' ability to hold officials accountable because it is difficult for them to pinpoint responsibility for policy failures.²⁸

To return to the question posed by this paper's title, is the democratic peace theory still valid? It is important to recognize the heterogeneity of political cultures and institutions that exists among the democracies. Given this variety, the causal mechanisms posited for making democracies more peaceful cannot be expected to operate in the same fashion in all countries. It is also important to

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, 1989, 204.

²⁸ Consider the following example: "Clinton was elected in 1992 on a platform that included a commitment to introducing universal national health insurance. He signally failed to do so. But who was to blame? The president? His wife? The Republicans in Congress? Conservative Democrats in Congress? The private health insurance lobby? Even the experts cannot agree on the answers to these questions; no wonder ordinary voters are baffled." Anthony King, "Distrust of Government: Explaining American Exceptionalism," in *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries*, ed. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 95.

account for the special role played by the U.S. in the genesis and evolution of the democratic peace theory. I suspect that the paper topic assigned to me with its emphasis on the word still and its question mark (Is the Democratic Peace Theory Still Valid?) has something to do with the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. American leaders, supported by their British allies, proclaimed a unilateral right to initiate preventive war without United Nations approval and in the absence of a direct and imminent threat to their own national security. Surely, the decisions and public rhetoric of these two democracies engender questions about the monadic version of democratic peace. This paper suggests that Iraq may be symptomatic of a more pervasive phenomenon of active and frequent U.S. military intervention abroad. Washington's readiness and, in the case of Iraq, even eagerness to resort to force, covert or overt, requires people to study more closely the peculiar nature of American political culture and institutions. The U.S. has been described as exceptional in its political culture and institutions, and among the industrialized democracies American exceptionalism extends seemingly to its frequent involvement in military conflicts (Israel is the other obvious case). Of course, the U.S. is also exceptional in the preponderance of its power — no other country in the modern era has ever enjoyed a comparable amount of supremacy in its international profile. Therefore, a thorough examination of the democratic peace theory can hardly afford to overlook the American elephant.

Main Issues and Tasks Regarding Peace-making in Northeast Asia

Yuanhong Ding

In order to realize lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia, there are three main issues, namely denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Japan's relationship with neighboring nations and the U.S.-led military alliance that need to be addressed. For denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the key is for the main parties to show necessary goodwill and enough flexibility. For Japan, its national efforts to become an influential "normal nation" in the international arena are fully understandable. However, this can only be realized through a foreign policy of a friendly neighborhood, peace and development, rather than an expansion approach relying on nationalism and enmity towards neighboring countries. For the U.S.-led military alliance in Northeast Asia, China neither agrees with nor opposes these bilateral arrangements, as long as they remain as such. But it's worth noting that the new development of a U.S.-Japan military alliance may destabilize the whole region.

Lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia will be propitious to the mutual interests of the six countries in this region. A series of issues need to be addressed in order to achieve this goal. From the political perspective, I believe there are three main issues, namely denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Japan's relationship with neighboring nations and the U.S.-led military alliance.

I. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

The Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks concluded with a Joint Statement on Sep. 19, 2005, not the Chairman's Statement of the previous rounds of talks. The Joint Statement not only has moved a step further in its form, but also states that the DPRK has committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and all aspects regarding "reasonable concerns" for the DPRK. It also defines the responsibility of each relevant party in order to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Joint Statement is a creed document. This arduous achievement owes thanks to the joint efforts and great endeavor of all six countries. Unexpectedly, on the second day after the announcement of the Joint Statement, some U.S. media published articles accusing North Korea of engaging in illicit financial activities including counterfeiting and money laundering. Then, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, envoy and chief negotiator of the U.S. delegation to the Six-Party Talks, publicly denounced North Korea for seeking "only the survival of the administration" and doubted "the existence reasons" for North Korea, which actually was a denial to the DPRK government. Following this, the U.S. government implemented financial sanctions against the DPRK and refused its requirement to hold bilateral negotiations on financial issues. The U.S. Ambassador to Seoul even called Pyongyang "a criminal regime." These actions irritated the DPRK again and pushed it to believe that the U.S. intends to block the Six-Party Talks. North Korea has boycotted the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks until the withdrawal of the financial sanctions by the U.S. This has put the promising Six-Party Talks in jeopardy and stalemate. Under these circumstances, the DPRK tested its missiles, which makes the resumption of the Six-Party Talks even more difficult.

There are numerous disputes and big differences between the U.S. and North Korea, which can be resolved gradually at an appropriate later time through negotiations. The priority right now is to concentrate on propelling denuclearization, the primary con-

cern of all six countries, through the channel of the Six-Party Talks. China has tried to persuade both the U.S. and North Korea not to “lose the focus because of trivia,” but regrettably there has been no obvious improvement so far. This event makes us realize the greatest obstacle to any breakthrough in the Six-Party Talks and achievement of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is due to a lack of trust and a deeply rooted, mutual hostility between the U.S. and North Korea, the two key parties. This is inseparable due to the half-century-long cold war mechanism on the Korean Peninsula.

Objectively speaking, the United States has inescapable responsibilities for the emergence of the current nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. During the Clinton administration, the Agreed Framework between the United States and the DPRK was reached in 1994 after bilateral negotiations with the method of “economic compensation for dismantlement of nuclear weapons.” The nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula was not totally solved but the 1993-94 nuclear crisis was over. As a result, it provided a favorable environment for South Korea to pursue the Sunshine Policy towards North Korea. Since the Bush administration came to power, U.S. foreign policy towards North Korea took a 180 turn owing to the domestic political needs and global strategic concerns. The United States has labeled the DPRK as part of the “Axis of Evil,” similar to Iran and Iraq, a target of the U.S. preventive strike, including the possible use of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the U.S. stopped the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework and refused any bilateral contacts with North Korea. U.S. leaders expressed more than once “strong dislikes” towards Kim Jong Il on public occasions and emphasized that North Korea must undergo regime change. Right before air attacks and the invasion of Iraq, during Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang, he accused North Korea of resuming nuclear weapon R& D, in violation of the agreement between the U.S. and North Korea. He asserted that North Korea has to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs before the resumption of negotiations. The issues of

human rights, missile tests and conventional weaponry all need to be discussed as well. This aggressive attitude can not be accepted by any nation with sovereignty and dignity. These series of absurdities caused the new nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

All these years, there have been ups and downs over the North Korean nuclear issue. The multilateral talk which focused on a solution to the nuclear free issue have been on a devious route. Reflecting on this flexuous process, any unbiased person will easily realize that the United States seems not in a hurry to solve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. Whenever talks seemed promising, the U.S. would make some troubles and brought obstacles to the talks. Some famous American scholars and former politicians published lots of articles to criticize the current North Korea policy of the Bush administration. *Foreign Affairs* magazine on Feb. 1, 2005, printed an article by a renowned U.S. expert on North Korea issues, Selig S. Harrison. It said that there was no credible evidence found about North Korea secretly developing a program to enrich uranium to weapons grade during the visit to Pyongyang by James Kelly. The asserted accusation aims at termination of the 1994 accord (known as the Agreed Framework) and using weapons-grade uranium enrichment to scare Japan and South Korea, ultimately forcing them to reverse their conciliatory North Korea policy. This is because the U.S. is unhappy about South Korea's "Sunshine Policy" and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang to discuss normalization of relations—a visit that Japan had been quietly exploring without telling the United States. Washington worried that the policy of the Republic of Korea and Japan toward North Korea had "slipped out of U.S. control." This exposure plus the words and actions of the U.S. government regarding the North Korea nuclear issue over years can easily lead us to the following conclusion: the U.S. government seems not to care about a proper solution to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. On the contrary, the U.S. wants to take advantage of this issue to maintain enough tension on the Korean Peninsula, keep pressure on North Korea, con-

tain other relevant countries and hinder the unification process, in order to retain the leading U.S. position on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia affairs.

It is regrettable for the U.S. to take the above approach while from time to time accusing China and the Republic of Korea of inadequate cooperation for not adopting a high pressure policy towards North Korea. This is obviously unfair and deliberate. In order to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, China has strived toward denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through peaceful negotiations. China never pursues any self-interest, which is obvious to all. Being against the current deadlock of the Six-Party Talks, China will keep close contacts with all the other parties and continue to make a constructive contribution to the resumption and new progress of the talks as early as possible. Of course, the key is for the main parties to show goodwill and flexibility.

II. Japan's Relationships with Neighboring Nations

In order to build peace and security in Northeast Asia, an unavoidable reality puzzle is general tensions between Japan and its neighbors, like China, the Republic of Korea, the DPRK and Russia. Japan deliberately took provocative actions on the issues of Yasukuni shrine visits, the publication of history textbooks that whitewash Japanese wartime atrocities, and on border disputes and resource exploitation, resulting in deteriorating bilateral relations. This is the inevitable consequence of foreign policy adjustments by the Japanese government which were taken due to domestic and international reasons over a period of time.

Since the 1990's, the Japanese economy has gone through a continuous slump and stagnation, Hawkish right thoughts have flourished and right-wing forces have become resurgent. In order to maintain a ruling position, the nationalist shift under the office of

Prime Minister Koizumi of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has moved Japan toward a broader use of its military and a more muscular diplomacy in East Asia. Foreign policy adjustments were applied to accommodate right-wing forces and divert the attention of the Japanese public. As the globe's second-largest economy, inferior only to the U.S., Japan attempts to recover the big power status in the international realm through its economic ability, especially by maintaining its dominance in Asia, second to the U.S.'s influence. In recent years, economic globalization has caused fast developments in China, South Korea and Russia, but this is an unhappy reality for Japan to face. In order to achieve its "big power dream," Japan intends to ignite the spirit of nationalism among the public. Meanwhile, the U.S. affirmed Japan as a reliable force and ally to break away from the isolation in the international realm because of the invasion in Iraq and to further advance its hegemony status in the world. Therefore, the U.S. turned on the "green light" for Japan's earnest dream to regenerate as a political and military big power. The U.S. supported Japan's campaign for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, urged it to revise its "Peaceful Constitution," pushed the Japanese Self-Defense Force to go abroad and worked together on a "joint missile-defense shield," promoted Japan's role and position in U.S. military deployment in the Asian Pacific region and made it the backbone of a U.S.-designed "Asia NATO." All these actions and intentions meet Japan's aggressive mentality and have been regarded as a rare opportunity for fulfilling its "big power dream." Against this backdrop, the Japanese government applied a lopsided foreign policy to accommodate its "new role" defined by the U.S. Facing criticism within and outside regarding the tense ties with neighbors, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi publicly lauded the "most indispensable" friendship with the U.S. He portrayed the Japan-U.S. alliance as the foundation for better relationships with China and South Korea. He said that the stronger the Japan-U.S. relations, the easier it would be to build good ties with China, South Asia and other Asian countries as well

as the rest of the world. This remark revealed that he is obsessed with the alliance and despises relations with neighboring countries, which reflected his political short-sightedness.

Due to geopolitics and geo-economics, properly handling neighborly relations is bound to be a vitally important aspect of each country's national policy. The relations are of paramount importance to the immediate long-term interests of Japan, while the deteriorating relational ties will bring a loss to Japan first. As a developed nation, it is understandable that Japan wants to become an influential "normal nation" in the international arena. But this can only be realized through a foreign policy of a friendly neighborhood and peaceful development, not through an expansion approach relying on nationalism and enmity towards neighboring countries. The latter approach only brings an opposite consequence and blocks Japan's prospect to transform into a so-called "normal nation."

III. The U.S. – led Military Alliance

The United States formed a military alliance around the world, including Northeast Asia as an important policy component in the cold war confrontation period with the Soviet Union. The U.S.-led military alliances with Japan and South Korea are a Cold War legacy. With the end of the Cold War, this military alliance is inappropriate and goes entirely against the aspiration of the world seeking peace and development. However, considering its global strategic needs, the U.S. does not abort its military alliance policy, but also takes various actions to strengthen the existing alliances in Europe as well as in Asia. This is a reflection of Cold War mentality. Facts show that the U.S. has two goals for strengthening its military alliances: one is to control its allies through this special relationship; the second is to use these alliances as a tool to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries and foster the U.S. hegemony strategy. It is a vivid example that France and Germany received

“punishment” because of their disapproval of the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Regarding the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea military alliances, as long as each serves as a bilateral arrangement between the U.S. and its ally, China does not agree with it but will not oppose it. However, to China’s dismay, the U.S. continues to strengthen the U.S.-Japan military alliance under the excuse of the alleged “China Threats Theory,” while Japan’s expansion ambition unfolded under the banner of this military alliance. Joint Statements by ministers of the U.S. Department of Defense and Japan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry and related actions have surpassed the bilateral scope. More obvious is that the military alliance has become a tool to be used to interfere with China’s internal affairs and the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese government and people uncompromisingly opposed this intention. Taiwan is China’s inseparable territory. Therefore, China will not allow any external force to interfere with China’s domestic affairs and divide Taiwan from China. Consolidating the U.S.-Japan military alliance has constituted the main threat in Northeast Asia regional security and is the biggest obstacle to constructing a peace and security mechanism in Northeast Asia.

China’s attitude towards the U.S.-South Korea military alliance as a legacy of the Cold War is that it should be restricted to the bilateral relationship. Even though China does not agree, China will not oppose this bilateral arrangement. We notice that the Republic of Korea leaders stated clearly that U.S. military forces stationed in South Korea will not be involved automatically in a Taiwan Strait conflict, according to comments regarding Joint Statements by ministers of Japan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry and the U.S. Department of Defense. This is a wise statement. As a close neighbor and friendly country, China expects the Republic of Korea to consider more what is beneficial to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in NE Asia while implementing the U.S.-South Korean military alliance, and she should avoid any detrimental actions.

China insists on peace and development. China’s development

will not cause threats to anyone, but only be beneficial to lasting universal peace and mutual development. China stresses developing friendly cooperative relations with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. China pursues a foreign policy of building a good-neighbor relationship and partnership with its neighbors, trying to create an amicable, secure and prosperous neighborhood, and vigorously pushing forward to build a security dialogue and cooperation mechanism in this region. China has made and will continue to make efforts with all parties concerned to promote peace, stability, security and development on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

Engagement Policy and Inter-Korean Relations: Developments and Tasks for the Future

Young-Kyu Park

This paper consists of three parts: 1) Rationale for an engagement policy toward North Korea. The paper emphasizes that we must take the unique situation of the Korean peninsula into account in formulating a North Korea policy. As for the uniqueness, the paper points out that while South Korea and North Korea remain technically at war, we are still ethnically homogeneous and have to figure out ways to coexist. In addition, our demographic distribution, a disproportionate 25 million out of 47 million South Koreans, living within 70 miles of the military demarcation line is another uniqueness. In this regard, our North Korean policy is bound to take on different forms and characteristics in comparison with North Korean policies of other countries. However, the paper also suggests that we must pursue a two-fold strategy of deterrence/embrace and security/cooperation until Pyongyang relinquishes its strategy to revolutionize the South and create military provocation against the South. 2) The second part of the paper discusses outcomes of developments in inter-Korean relations since the implementation of the engagement policy: Establishment of a substantive and cooperative relationship, Significant changes in North Korea, and effect on peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. 3) The final part of the paper suggests future tasks regarding inter-Korean relations and the unification of the Korean peninsula. Economic and military cooperation should be forged in equilibrium since without progress on the military front, relations in economic, social, and cultural areas are bound to be restricted. The ramifications of potential Korean unification are not confined to the two Koreas. The stakes are high for the international community as well.

Therefore, international support is required and the basis of international support is inarguably the strength of the alliance between South Korea and the U.S. For this very reason, our strong alliance with the U.S. should be sustained in the future and developed to establish peace in the Northeast Asian region by responding to the changing strategic environment.

I. The Rationale for an Engagement Policy toward North Korea

South Korea has, for six decades, been faced with territorial division and we have thus been compelled to take this unique situation into account in formulating a policy approach toward North Korea.

While South Korea and North Korea remain technically at war, we are still an ethnically homogeneous people and will have to continue to search for ways to coexist for many years to come. In this regard, our North Korean policy is bound to differ in both form and characteristics in comparison with diplomatic policies that deal comprehensively with other countries, and defense policies which focus on national security.

Throughout the past half century, shaped as it was by the context of the Cold War, we had no other choice but to adopt a North Korean policy geared toward maintaining its political regime and accordingly maintained an antagonistic position against the North until the 1980s. Pyongyang also took advantage of the division of the South and the North as a means to prop up its regime.

The fall of communism and the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early '90s, however, created an amicable atmosphere where South Korea was able to proactively pursue its North Korea policies and seek progress in inter-Korean relations.

Nevertheless, fearing possible regime collapse, North Korea stayed out of the transformation of the post-Cold War era and instead chose the path of isolation and seclusion. In addition, the

death of its founder Kim Il Sung and recurring droughts and floods for 3~4 years from 1995 took a heavy toll on North Korea's economy, the damage to it being almost irreparable.

Amid North Korea's worsening predicament, we couldn't expect any significant policy change from the North and improvement of relations between the two Koreas appeared to be remote. It was not until 1998, when we implemented policies encouraging reconciliation and cooperation, that North Korea started to overcome its insecurity regarding perceived or real threats to the stability of the regime and began to pursue change in its own right.

Some favored the idea of accelerating North Korea's disintegration by applying pressure and adopting a containment policy. However, this was not a viable option, since Pyongyang, driven into a corner, could resort to military adventurism or a so-called 'suicidal provocation.' Moreover, the feasibility of such policies appeared doubtful as North Korea remained politically unified despite its economic hardship, and neighboring countries did not favor the sudden downfall of North Korea, either.

Accordingly, while bolstering the nation's strong security posture, we could only pursue a policy aimed at inducing North Korea to change its hardline stance via reconciliation and cooperation with a goal of achieving peace in the process.

This approach was probably the only realistic option on our part, in the light of our economic circumstances and the reality of our demographic distribution, with over half the population, a disproportionate 25 million out of 47 million South Koreans, living within 70 miles of the military demarcation line.

What should be emphasized here is that we should not forget the unique situation of the Korean peninsula. If we work to understand this uniqueness, I believe we can understand why we must implement an engagement policy toward North Korea and try to solve the North Korean nuclear issue with a policy focusing in particular on dialogue.

Historically, the end of the Cold War dawned in Europe not

because of containment and pressure against East European countries and the Soviet Union, but because of active engagement efforts by the United States and Western countries.

Our North Korean policy is also based on this historical backdrop, although we must inevitably pursue a two-fold strategy of deterrence/embrace and security/cooperation until Pyongyang relinquishes its strategy to revolutionize the South and its posture of military provocation against the South.

Therefore, we must maintain our current peacekeeping strategy by maintaining a robust security system to deter military provocation by North Korea, whilst simultaneously and proactively supporting a peacemaking policy.

Negative peace, or passive peace, is not sufficient for maintaining peace and security on the Korean peninsula. We must make dual efforts to both create trust through a process of exchanges and cooperation, and to establish a substantive cooperative relationship based on that trust to reduce mutual threats.

In this regard, we can call our North Korean policy a “positive peace policy,” in the sense that the nation seeks to boost exchanges and cooperation with North Korea in order to expand the fundamental basis for peace.

The question now arises as to whether it is possible to maintain an engagement policy toward North Korea under the current situation of North Korea’s missile test-launching conducted on the fourth of July this year. I would argue that although South Korea should not neglect the intensely negative reactions of the international community, South Korea must continue to make an effort on the diplomatic front to bring North Korea back to the six-party talks, and by so doing, hopefully prevent further unnecessary provocative moves by the North.

In other words, South Korea should continue to advance its foreign policy to ease tensions on the Korean peninsula. It goes without saying that maintaining multi-dimensional dialogue channels are essential if the South is to avoid any further aggravation or esca-

lation of tensions. South Korea also needs to gear its policy toward North Korea so that inter-Korean relations are developed through a process which is essentially peaceful and stable.

Based on the above, the rationale for maintaining the engagement policy toward North Korea still remains valid, although it must be said that it is not being argued that implementation of the engagement policy should be unconditional. If North Korea defies international warnings and exacerbates current tensions by, for example, conducting a nuclear weapons test or engaging in military provocations against the South, current South Korean policy toward the North should go through a reexamination.

II. Outcomes of Developments in Inter-Korean Relations

A. Establishment of a Substantive and Cooperative Relationship

The implementation of the engagement policy and the South-North Korea summit meeting in 2000 prompted the transformation of the inter-Korean relationship, marked by confrontation, a relic of the Cold War era, to one of peace and coexistence. It also served as a milestone in moving South-North relations into a more practical phase. During this time, mutual trust between Pyongyang and Seoul grew, enabling enhanced exchanges and cooperation between the two Koreas.

Dialogue with the North has increased in frequency, with 33 contacts in 2002, 38 times in 2003 (in the space of 106 days), 25 times prior to the suspension of talks in July 2004, 34 times in 2005, and 20 times this year.

Not only has there been an increase in the number of contacts, but also an expansion in the areas which the dialogue covered, demonstrating that substantive communication took place. Areas include, but are not limited to, fisheries, marine policy, light indus-

try, development of mineral resources, and agriculture. This is a testament to the fact that the dialogue between the South and the North is not being used as a forum solely for political propaganda, but also for 'substantive negotiations.' The continuous flow of communications is an indicator that one dialogue leads to another and relations are developing in various areas.

There has also been a rapid increase in the number of South Koreans visiting the North. From 2002 to last year 128,000 South Koreans, excluding Mt. Geumgang tourists, have visited the North. Among them, 87,000 visited the North in 2005 alone. This is a 58-fold increase from some 2,200 who visited between 1991 and 1997.

Exchanges including trade grew to US\$720 million in 2003, positioning South Korea as a major trading partner of the North, importing one-third of North Korea's exports (as of 2005, worth US\$1.05 billion).

There is visible progress in major projects involving the two Koreas, such as the construction projects aimed at linking the railroads and highways of the South and the North and the development of the Gaesung Industrial Complex, and Mt. Geumgang special district.

The construction of the Gaesung Industrial Complex has commenced in earnest, and it is not only a project aimed at economic cooperation but a symbolic gateway to joint prosperity and peace on the Korean peninsula.

In particular, inter-Korean military cooperation will be inevitable, although sporadic, as goods and personnel will be exchanged, passing across the demilitarized zone, and a wider geographic area will be affected by such exchanges as a result of the increased points of contact.

It is noteworthy that while we are pursuing economic cooperation across the Korean peninsula, we are thereby increasing the probability of military cooperation and an easing of tension. It is well-known that Gaesung and Jangjun port are strategic military strongholds for North Korea. Nevertheless, North Korea opened

them up in order to promote economic cooperation. This new emerging openness also includes the construction of railroads and highways, the development of the Gaesung Industrial Complex, and the Mt. Geumgang tour project.

In order to ensure militarily secure economic cooperation across the DMZ, several rounds of working level talks between military working level officers have taken place, and a direct military hotline was set up in the 10 years following the initiation of these talks. It is encouraging to see signs of thawing tensions amid the process of economic cooperation.

In addition, we are making all-out efforts to establish a mechanism to ease tensions and build military trust by elevating military cooperation to a higher level. As a first step to achieve this, the two Koreas agreed, in principle, to promptly hold a general-level meeting during the 13th ministerial meeting (Feb. 3~6, 2004), followed by general-level meetings and working-level meetings, in which both parties agreed to prevent accidental military conflicts in the West Sea, halt mutual propaganda activities along the demarcation line and remove propaganda signs across the border.

I believe that these peacekeeping efforts are producing real peacemaking results and each reinforces the other in turn. It is through this process that an increased likelihood of eventual peace on the Korean peninsula can be ensured.

B. Changes in North Korea: Significant Change

In parallel with the substantive turnaround in inter-Korean relations, there are signs of significant internal changes in North Korea.

It is natural that we are interested in even minor changes occurring in the North, as our North Korean policy focuses on "support of North Korean change through inter-Korean exchange."

In the past, we tended to view those changes from a dichotomous perspective: 'strategic change vs. tactical change'; or 'symbolic change vs. fundamental shift.' However, this black and white type

of interpretation can result in analytical inaccuracies and miscalculations, as this view considers only the results and not the process by which change is occurring in North Korea.

Accordingly, I believe there is a stage we should not neglect in the process of change of inter-Korean relations and internal change within Pyongyang. That is, 'significant change' as an intermediate stage from tactical or symbolic change to strategic or fundamental change.

In the light of changes occurring in North Korea, I believe there are signs of 'significant change' in North Korea's economy. Recently, and continuing for several years now, North Korea has been implementing realistic foreign exchange, wage, and price policies to overcome its economic predicament, and has been giving more economic leeway to individuals and businesses.

Some 40 general markets have been set up in Pyongyang alone and around 350 in major cities across the country since March 2003, providing a wider outlet for private economic activities, albeit still limited.

In addition, special economic zones have been designated to serve as a buffer for economic openness, and the North is actively exploring models for reform by sending delegates specializing in market economy and law to countries like China, Vietnam, as well as a number of states in Europe. Our assessment is that this move is designed to foster and actively pursue the development of professional working-level personnel to support its reforms and policy of increased openness.

The recent move by North Korea to pursue pragmatism is reminiscent of the reform and openness introduced in China and Vietnam in the early days of reform which both countries underwent in the 1990s.

Changes in the social and cultural sectors are proceeding apace, along with economic reform. A growing number of North Koreans are opening their eyes toward practical values and the market economy. More North Koreans are adopting capitalistic values, as individuals start to trade in the marketplace. Their working attitude has

become more active and positive with the adoption of incentive systems.

Furthermore, North Koreans are exhibiting less distrust and hostility toward their Southern counterparts. In some parts of the North, South Korean songs and commodities are being sold, with growing preference for South Korean products and a heightened interest in the South's popular culture. Sacks of rice, sent to North Korea as humanitarian aid, labeled 'Made in Republic of Korea,' and fertilizer sacks marked with names of South Korean manufacturers, are being recycled across North Korea.

Changes in North Koreans' attitudes have become possible with facilitated exchanges in goods and personnel between the two Koreas and increased awareness among North Koreans of humanitarian relief from the South.

It is true that there are areas where even symbolic changes are yet to be seen, specifically in politics and the military. However, it would be unfair to say that North Korea has not changed at all, just because changes in those areas have been minimal. In light of the characteristics of the North Korean regime, these are the sectors where change will be the last to be witnessed. We argue that the ongoing changes taking place in North Korea will eventually affect the political and military sectors as well.

Continuity and change are two sides of the same coin, which is why it is as important to pay attention to the side where change is not occurring as to focus on the side where change is occurring.

Nevertheless, I believe we can achieve joint prosperity and peace by pursuing policies supporting reconciliation and cooperation to induce positive changes in North Korea by maintaining a watchful eye on both sides of the coin; continuity and change. In other words, the groundwork for peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula can be achieved by encouraging change in North Korea to develop positive inter-Korean relations, rather than simply applying pressure against the North.

C. Towards a Peaceful Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue

While the previous government's North Korean 'sunshine policy' was developed to lure North Korea from the shadows into the sun, the current government's policy toward the North is to solidify and develop change in Pyongyang within the framework of the Northeast Asian region. The current administration's North Korean policy, therefore, stressing peace and prosperity, aims to build on the tone and accomplishments of the 'sunshine policy' and expand its scope and agenda.

If North Korea participates as a responsible member of the Northeast Asian network with the help of other countries in this region, based on improved inter-Korean relations, peace and prosperity in the Northeast Asian region can be secured. To this end, North Korea should strive to revive its economy through reform and openness and cast off its defensive stance and overwhelming sense of insecurity, which in turn is fundamentally rooted in the fear of regime collapse.

North Korea should be a proactive player on the international stage by addressing the issue of WMD, as inter-Korean cooperation and aid to the North will be limited unless the North addresses the issue of nuclear weapons and the perceived threat they pose to the international community.

While it has been agreed in principle that the escalating nuclear issue should be resolved peacefully in the fourth round of the six-party talks, the details of resolving several critical issues are still open-ended.

It can be safely assumed that considerable time and effort will be required before the complete resolution of the nuclear issue, since North Korea considers the nuclear card a last resort to prop up the current regime. Nevertheless, North Korea should hear our message loud and clear that its plans for the development of nuclear weapons are unacceptable.

However, it is clear that the nuclear issue cannot be resolved and will only be aggravated if North Korea is driven to the brink. North Korea should reduce the level of its demands, while the global community should create the necessary conditions conducive to North Korea's voluntary abandonment of its nuclear weapons program.

Seoul is making concerted diplomatic efforts to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully, while expecting North Korea to change its nuclear stance through improved inter-Korean relations. Since October 2002, when North Korea's uranium development plan was unveiled, Seoul has been seeking dialogue with the North through various communication channels, such as ministerial and working-level meetings, in order to prevent the crisis from escalating further.

Against this backdrop, if inter-Korean relations are frozen altogether, uncertainty regarding North Korea's actions will rise, with South Korea's economy and security being adversely affected by every word and every move emanating from North Korea.

Therefore, despite the lingering nuclear issue, we must maintain amicable relations with the North so that improved relations in turn can assist the resolution of the nuclear issue. As improved inter-Korean relations in turn facilitate the six-way talks, and the talks address the nuclear threat, we can expect that peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula will eventually come in the not too distant future.

III. Future Tasks

Unification of the Korean peninsula has not only an economic aspect, but also security implications, which is why economic and peaceful cooperation should be forged in tandem and in equilibrium. As such, the current military cooperation, still in its nascent stage, should be elevated to a reduction of military tension, confidence-building, and eventually to arms reduction. Without progress

on the military front, relations in economic, social, and cultural areas are bound to be restricted. North Korea's missile test-launch is a good example of this reality.

Sustainable peace will remain a pipe dream without defusing inter-Korean military tensions. We must therefore commit ourselves to laying the groundwork for peace, cooperation, and trust, through ongoing meetings between military personnel of both sides.

The ramifications of potential Korean unification are certainly not confined to the two Koreas. The stakes are high for the international community as well. Although the North undesirably tends to define unification as a task that should be resolved by both Koreas alone, citing promotion of ethnic homogeneity, it should be achieved in harmony with inter-Korean cooperation bolstered by international support so that the fruits of peace and prosperity can be reaped.

The basis of international support is inarguably the strength of the alliance between South Korea and the United States. The Korea-U.S. alliance has served as the basis for economic development and security and has made significant contributions to our political and economic progress.

Today's improved state of inter-Korean relations stemming from peace and stability would not have been possible without the close alliance with the United States. For this very reason, our strong alliance with the United States should be sustained in the future and developed to establish peace in the Northeast Asian region by responding to an ever changing and evolving strategic environment.

Based on this future-oriented alliance with the United States and by addressing North Korea's nuclear program and improved inter-Korean relations, we must spare no efforts in establishing sustainable peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. It should be noted that without peace in this region, peace on the Korean peninsula is unthinkable and vice versa.

A positive security environment which promotes peace and pros-

perity in the Northeast Asian region is thus essential. It would also do no harm to learn from the successes of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In addition, a comprehensive security mechanism that covers the economy, trade, the environment, terrorism, and international crime should be developed.

In short, I would like to stress that the South Korean government is committed to strengthening its alliance with the United States in this new era and to developing a Northeast Asian security system which aims to promote peace and stability on the Korean peninsula as well as throughout the entire Northeast Asian region.

PART V

*The Role of Jeju Island
for Peace Promotion
in the 21st Century*

Development of Jeju and Pursuit of World Peace

World Peace and Military Base:
From the Perspective of Jeju, Island of World Peace

A Suggestion for the Establishment of a Jeju International
Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Centre

Development of Jeju-do and Pursuit of World Peace

Dae-hwa Chung

This paper has two primary objectives: one is to introduce how Jeju Province, as the first autonomous province in Korea (except in the areas of national defense and diplomacy), will steer its course in developing Jeju-do physically and as a self-governing administrative unit. The second objective is to outline how Jeju Province and the City ought to proceed from the base of this administrative and physical infrastructure so developed to pursue peace in the world. In this exercise, the spirit of “Shanti (Peace with Self), Shanti (Peace with others), Shanti (Peace with Nature)” is explored to evaluate pursuit of peace with self in Jeju-do after the 4.3 or April 3rd (1948) Massacre, pursuit of peace on the Korean peninsula, pursuit of peace and integration in Northeast Asia and, finally, pursuit of peace in the world.

I. Introduction

The objectives of this paper are as follows: (1) Firstly, its focus is on the development of Jeju-do¹ itself (“do” here meaning either “province” or “island” in Korean, depending on usage) as (1) “Jeju Free International City,” (2) an “Island of World Peace, and (3) the first “Self-governing Province” in Korea.

¹ “Jeju” used to be spelled “Cheju” according to the McCune Reischauer system.

(II) Secondly, other foci are, as a logical outgrowth of the infrastructure Jeju Province and Jeju City have constructed, on prospects of (1) peace and reconciliation of Jeju Island itself (at long last, arising from the wounds of massacres that started on April 3, 1948, and ended in 1953), (2) peace of the divided Koreas in reunification, (3) peace and integration of Northeast Asia, and (4) ultimately peace of the world in the 21st Century.

For these objectives, I will try to apply perspectives of Johan Galtung, President of the TRANSCEND (Norway), in *Peace by Peaceful Means*² espousing: (1) “Diagnosis, (2) prescriptions (& prognosis), and (3) therapy” as means of conflict transformation and conflict resolution. His suggestion for resolution of the Korean problem through “Confederation → Federation → Unification” and his suggestion for East Asian Community (EAC) building for peace and integration of East Asia/Northeast Asia through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (OSCAP) will be explored.

Secondly, I will also try to draw from perspectives of Glenn D. Paige, President of the Center for Global Nonviolence, Honolulu, Hawaii, concerning his (1) “Nonviolence,” (2) *Nonkilling Global Political Science*,³ and (3) especially, “Nonkilling Korea.” I also use (4) the Hindu philosophy of “Shanti, Shanti, Shanti,”⁴ (“Peace with self, peace with others, and peace with nature”) as elaborated and introduced to me by Paige.

² Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means* (London: SAGE Publications, 1996)

³ Glenn D. Paige, *Nonkilling Global Political Science* (Xlibris Corp., 2002).

⁴ <http://www.wildmind.org/meditation/mantra/shanti.htm>

II. Development of Jeju City as a “Free International City” and Development Of Jeju Province as an “Island of World Peace”

A. Development of Jeju City as a “Free International City” and Development of Jeju Province as an “Island of World Peace.”

The province of Jeju enacted a “Special Law for Jeju Free International City” in 2002 as a vision for the 21st century and proceeded ever since to develop a (1) *free international city* and an island of world peace. President Rho Moo-Hyun of the Republic of Korea declared Jeju Province as (2) an “*Island of World Peace*” on January 27, 2005. Another significant development was that Jeju was launched as a (3) “*Special Self-governing Province*” on July 1, 2006, for the first time in Korea, endowing the province full self-government (like a state government in the United States of America) with the exception of rights pertaining to national defense/security and foreign policy.⁵

Especially significant, as of this writing, is the designation by the government of this Special Self-governing Province as the only official “International Conference Site” in Korea on September 13, 2006. Also, steps are currently being taken to register many parts of this island, such as Mt. Halla and the Sungsan Ilchulbong (the Sungsan Sunrise Peak) as UNESCO World heritage sites and also the Jeju women divers as one of the World’s Intangible Assets.⁶ We shall now elaborate on these three aspects of Jeju in the following order: (1) *The Jeju Free International City Project* is designed to propel Jeju Island into the Northeast Asian hub of tourism, finance, logistics, and high-tech science by 2011. It hopes to create a free trade zone and also induce foreign investment with a lot of incentives

⁵ “2006 Nyun 7 wol 1 il Jeju Tukbyul Jachido Iruke Dalajimmida” (Jeju Special Self-governing Province will Change Like This on July 1, 2006), published by Jeju Special Self-governing Province, 2006, pp. 3-4.

⁶ *The Jemin Ilbo*, September 15, 2006, p. 2.

(we may elaborate on these later) to promote BT and IT industries, among others. Jeju Province is 1,846 square kilometers in area (thus it is three times larger than the city of Seoul, it being close to 600 square kilometers; and larger than the island of Oahu, Hawaii, which is approximately 600 square miles). It has 2,800 kilometers of highways and roads, 80.6% of which are paved, with a population of some 550,000+ people. It is within two (2) air hours of at least 18 cities with a population of 5 million or more, including the cities of Tokyo, Osaka, Beijing, Shanghai, and Taipei.⁷

What is free about the city? Jeju Free International City will be a place where the movement of goods, services, and people and transactions of foreign investment are conducted with a minimum amount of restriction, and corporate activities are guaranteed with the fewest regulations possible. All pertinent regulations regarding these activities will insure the maximum freedom by the legal status permitted by the Special Law governing the Jeju Free International City enacted in 2002.⁸ In addition, the Jeju International Airport free trade zone is envisaged and a lot of incentives for investments and tax breaks are allowed, as we shall elaborate on later in the part on the Jeju Special Self-governing Province. In addition to all the above, traffic is virtually unhindered and free in this city and province (except for a small downtown rush hour), with free highways without congestion.

Jeju's traditional "Sam Moo (Three-No) Spirit" deserves a special mention here: It involves (1) "no beggars," (meaning economic self-sufficiency and self-help on the island), (2) "no thieves," (implying security), and (3) "no gates" (meaning mutual trust and com-

⁷ ChulIn Yoo, "Jeju Free International City: A New Future," in *Peace Island*, published by World Association for Island Studies, Jeju, Vol. 1, summer, 2002, p. 112; *101 Things to Do*, published by 101 Inc, Honolulu, Hawaii, May-Sept., 2006, pp. 10, 24.

⁸ Cae-One Kim, "Peace in Northeast Asia, Economic Integration, and the Role of Jeju," The 6th Peace Island Forum, July 6-7, 2006, KAL Hotel, Seogwipo, Jeju, p. 31.

munity spirit) among the people of Jeju. I would like to add here a lot more. They are (4) no railways, (5) no subways, (6) no tunnels, (7) no toll roads or toll gates, (8) no parking meters (instead, there are “free” municipal parking lots in this city), (9) no potholes, (10) no cops on the street, (11) no homeless, (12) no visas for most foreign travelers, (13) no war-making facilities or a military base worthy of the name, (14) no serious violence or crimes (compared to other major cities of similar size in the world), and (15) no terrorism. How much more free can you get?

(2) *The “Island of World Peace”* plans originated in the then Special Law governing Development of Jeju Province in 1999 (it is transformed into the current “Special Law governing Jeju Free International City”). In May of 2001, a Committee for Promotion of the “Island of World Peace” was organized and finally on January 27, 2005, President Roh Moo-Hyun of Korea declared Jeju as an “Island of World Peace.” The declaration stated:

The Government of the Republic of Korea designates Jeju as an Island of World Peace in accordance with Article 12, Special Law establishing Jeju Free International City in order that Jeju may make its contribution to international peace, creatively inheriting Jeju’s “Three-No-Spirits,” uplifting the April 3rd (1948) tragedy into a loftier and higher level with mutual reconciliation, mutual co-existence and life together, continuing the spirit of various summit diplomacies held on the island.

The Government of the Republic of Korea affirms that it will carry out the following into action in order that Jeju may be able to perform its designated functions and practice its required roles as an Island of World Peace:

- Proclaim world-over that Jeju is designated as an Island of World Peace by the Government of the Republic of Korea and carry out various projects without fail, in order to materialize the ideals of the Island of World Peace.
- Through the Declaration of the Island of World Peace, the

Government of the Republic of Korea will help Jeju develop into Jeju Free International City with free international exchanges and cooperation.

- The Government of the Republic of Korea will actively assist Jeju to attain its programs of promotion and expansion of peace.

On the occasion of declaring Jeju as an Island of World Peace the Government of the Republic of Korea reaffirms its resolve to the world that it will take the lead in the promotion of peace throughout the world.⁹

I think this proclamation of “Island of World Peace” is self-explanatory.

(3) *The “Special Self-governing Province”* status and reorganization and administrative reforms of the whole island deserve a mention now. Since December 4, 2002, when a Jeju Province ordinance regarding administrative reorganization was enacted and a Reform Committee was established, steps toward a Special Self-governing Province were jump started. A referendum by the residents of the province for this plan was conducted on July 27, 2005, with 57% of voters approving. President Rho expressed his support for the plan on February 12, 2003, and the plans were finally approved by the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea on February 9, 2006, and finally, the Jeju Special Self-governing Province was launched on July 1, 2006, with rights to self-govern itself, with the exception of rights pertaining to national defense/security and diplomacy.¹⁰

Worthy of special mention also is that four former administrative units, namely two cities and two counties of Jeju Province, have been reorganized into only two cities — indeed a gigantic reform and a step forward — for the people and history of Jeju. These reforms entailed tremendous and overwhelming changes in the

⁹ *Island of World Peace*, published by Bureau of Tourism, Jeju Free International City, 2006?, pp. 8-9. The translation is author’s.

¹⁰ 2006 Nyun 7 wol 1 il, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

areas of education (permitting foreign schools), tourism, medical services (permitting foreigners to practice), taxation, civil servants (including hiring of foreigners as civil servants), many inducements for foreign investments, such as tax breaks (exemption of 100% of income tax for 5 years and property tax for 7 years and exemption of 100% of local tax for 15 years for foreigners in investing areas, to name just a few), long-term reduction of fees for lease of public and government properties, and housing privileges such as providing apartments for qualified foreigners.¹¹

Thus, the Jeju Special Self-governing Province can relish the administrative freedom that it has obtained within the authority outlined by the central government. "Therefore, Jeju will have the same advantages of autonomy that Hong Kong or any state in America is entitled to."¹²

B. Physical Development Plans of Jeju Province and the Jeju Free International City Development Center (JDC) in action¹³

Since 2001, the Korean Government has initiated the development of the Jeju Free International City Project to foster Jeju Island as a free international city. To this end, the Jeju Free International City Development Center (JDC) has been established as a government-run organization. It has served as an exclusive support system for the Jeju Free International City which includes a special legal system and various investment incentives. The JDC is going to be headed by new leadership, Kyoung-T'aek Kim of Cheju National University, who will take over as new Chairman of the Board in the near future (Oct. 2006).¹⁴

The Korean Government along with the JDC has selected the

¹¹ 2006 *Nyun. op. cit.*, pp. 32-40.

¹² Cae-One Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

¹³ Readers are invited to consult www.jdcenter.com;invest-jdc@jdcenter.com

¹⁴ *The Jemin Ilbo*, Sept., 15, p. 3.

following seven leading projects to activate the development of the Jeju Free International City and to supplement the tourism infrastructure on Jeju Island. More than *\$4.5 billion U.S. dollars* are expected to be invested, including public funds and private investment from Korea and around the world.

Five of these projects are for leisure and tourism development while two are geared toward the high-tech industry. That way, the entire development will dovetail with the regional characteristics, needs, and the natural environment. These ambitious projects are as follows:¹⁵

Project 1: the development of a High-Tech Science and Technology Complex, adjacent to Cheju National University. This future-oriented science-technology complex will integrate the functions of education, R&D, and high-tech businesses that may utilize the biological resources, pristine environment, and geographical features of Jeju Island.

Project 2: the development of a resort-style residential complex in Yere-dong. A world-class resort-style residential complex will be developed that combines residential and medical services for high-income senior citizens and tourists who come to Jeju Island for recreation and medical care from around the world.

Project 3: the construction of the Ecological Park and the Myths and History Park, in Daejong. These theme parks will become fascinating tourist attractions that are based on the unique cultural heritage, history, legends, natural environment, and mystical "oreums" (secondary volcanic cones), native characteristics of Jeju Island.

Project 4: the development of world-class shopping outlets in Aewol. This multi-purpose shopping complex will provide shop-

¹⁵ *Peace Island* published by World Association of Island Studies, Jeju, Korea, Vol. 1, 2005, pp. 47-53.

ping opportunities for world-renowned name brand goods along with specialized restaurants surrounded by beaches and scenic views.

Project 5: the re-development of the Seogwipo Tourist Port. The Seogwipo Port will become a "Beautiful Port" that harmonizes its magnificent surroundings with marine tourism and leisure facilities, including a marine museum, a fish market, a seafood center, and a beneath-the-ocean-tour aboard commercial submarines.

Project 6: the establishment of the Jeju Airport Free Trade Zone. The Free Trade Zone will be established as a base for the promotion, processing, and export of Jeju products as well as to further develop the air logistics industry. It would be a base for environment-friendly production and a high value-added logistics industry. It will also induce international high value-added businesses to locate on Jeju Island, thus securing a base for free trade in the competitive global market place.

Project 7: the expansion of the Jungmun Tourist Complex. The Jungmun Tourist Complex, one of the best known tourist destinations of Jeju Island, and venue for international summit conferences (heads of states of Russia, the U.S.A., China, and Japan came here), will be expanded and upgraded by adding more hotels, a marine park with aquariums, and other entertainment facilities.

C. Korea's Tourist Mecca: Honeymooners, School Children, and Chinese

Since about 1980, Jeju Island has been a honeymooner's haven for Koreans and a destination for school children as well as college students before graduation. Also, Chinese mainlanders as well as Taiwanese and Japanese are allowed to visit Jeju Island without visa, along with Americans and many others. This particularly

enabled an “onslaught” of mainland Chinese to Jeju, as Shanghai is perhaps the closest point to Jeju.

Jeju is a semi-tropical area with tangerines covering the whole island with the color of gold in the fall. The tangerine industry is second only to tourism. Jeju boasts pristine beaches, mountains with 368 volcanic cones, and natural caves unique to the island. It has many sites of movie locations, where young people of Japan, China, and other countries love to visit. Jeju has at least 40 museums of various sorts¹⁶ and ongoing festivals of many kinds all throughout the year. Weather is the mildest in all of Korea.

As mentioned previously, at least 18 cities with a population of 5 million or more are within two (2) air hours or less (in case of Fukuoka, Japan, approximately 45 minutes). This results in a lot of mainland Chinese as well as Taiwanese (they together outnumber the Japanese tourists) and Japanese coming to this island, as it is a short hop from their countries. It was just announced today (September 8, 2006) that Fushing (phonetic) Airline of Taiwan increased its twice weekly flights to Jeju to 14 flights a week and in October, it will be increased to 28 flights a week. Also, beginning in October, the Shanghai-Jeju route also will have 28 flights per week, resulting in a total number of 78 flights on this route. The tourist industry in Jeju is already concerned with keeping everything the way it is without reduction.¹⁷ This is an almost breath-taking development and an “amazing” indication of the increase of tourism from Taiwan and China.¹⁸

Jeju International Airport will be expanded by 2010 and a new shuttle air service exclusively named “Jeju Air”(with mostly Jeju funds) started service on June 5, 2006,¹⁹ adding to the two national airlines, Korean Air and Asiana, and other international lines in

¹⁶ *The Hankyoreh*, July 3, 2006, Education Section, pp. 2-3.

¹⁷ *The Jemin Ilbo*, Sept. 15, 2006, editorial on p. 2.

¹⁸ *The Hankyoreh*, Sept. 8, 2006, p. 11.

¹⁹ *The Jemin*, September 12, 2006. *Jemin* reported the 100 day celebration of the air line.

service already. The travel time to Korea's famous Mt. Gungang ("Diamond Mt.") used to be 18 hours by boat and car in 1998. In 2001, this was reduced to 6 hours by land and Jeju Air reduced it to 3 hours, 1 hour by air and 2 hours by car.²⁰ This is a remarkable new development in tourism in Korea along with the bullet train connecting Seoul and Busan. As previously mentioned, a world-class shopping mall and a free trade zone are underway and are to be completed near the international airport by 2012. Jeju is a very safe place with road conditions as good as OECD countries.

Traditionally, Jeju has been noted for "Sam Da" or "Three Plenties," (1) Plenty of wind, (2) plenty of rocks, and (3) plenty of women. Jeju now has (4) plenty of museums, (5) plenty of festivals, (6) plenty of roads, (7) plenty of wild flowers, (8) plenty of pheasants, (9) plenty of deer, (10) plenty of horses, (11) plenty of volcanic cones, and (12) plenty of tourists, among others...

D. Hawaii (Oahu) and Jeju: A "War Island" and an "Island Of World Peace" with 5 million Tourists per Year Each

Jeju is 271 square kilometers larger than the Island of Oahu where Honolulu is located which is 596.7 square miles. According to *101 Things To Do on Oahu*,²¹ and the statistics of Jeju Province, tourists to both Honolulu, Oahu and Jeju were estimated to be approximately 5 million respectively in 2004 and remain more or less the same. The total number of tourists to the state of Hawaii, consisting of some 7 islands, is estimated to be around 7 million a year. Approximately ninety per cent (90%) of tourists to Jeju consisted of Koreans and less than 10% foreigners, while approximately 70% of tourists to Honolulu were U.S. mainlanders and the other 30% consisted of foreigners.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Sept. 15, 2006, p. 9.

²¹ *101 Things To Do, Oahu* (Honolulu: 101 Inc., 2004), also see www.101thingstodo.com; *Jeju has its own 101 Things to do in Jeju*, published by the Tourist Bureau of Jeju City.

The 5 million tourists figure both to Jeju and Honolulu is remarkable in that Jeju is a late comer to tourism compared to Honolulu. Tourism started in Honolulu after WWII in 1945; however, tourism in Jeju probably started in 1980, some 35 years later than Honolulu. Where Oahu's population is estimated to be around 900,000 to a million, Jeju's population is slightly more than a half million, it being 530,000 plus (in 2001). It is this writer's estimate that Jeju, therefore, has much less traffic, while its paved roads (80.6% of all roads) may be longer than that of Honolulu/Oahu.

Jeju is declared as the "Island of World Peace" without any military base worthy of the name (there is the Jeju Naval Defense Command) and with at the least 1 or 2 peace museums (including a forthcoming peace park), whereas Hawaii is described as an "Island of War" by Glenn Paige. Paige states that:

In exploring the possibility of nonkilling island societies in the context of Korea's pioneering project to develop Jeju as a "Peace Island," comparison with a "War Island" is inevitable. Hawaii provides an example: a war-fighting military base; large land, sea, and air forces; high military land use; patriotic war monuments (Pearl Harbor, Battleship Missouri, and Punchbowl National Cemetery of the Pacific); an Army Museum in Waikiki; no peace museum; a large military veteran population (14% of the civilian population over age 18); numerous specially purchased automobile license plates proclaiming pride in service, sometimes "combat wounded" in WWII, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf, and now coming, Iraq;

Symbols of Hawaii's militarization are the proud participation by Hawaii's governor and a U.S. senator in the June 17, 2006, dedication of the new 2.6 billion dollar stealth nuclear submarine, named the "USS Hawaii." ...The USS Hawaii now joins the 2 billion dollar nuclear-weapon-capable B-2 stealth bomber named the "Spirit of Hawaii." For over a century Hawaii has been a base for projecting American military power into the Asia-Pacific region and is now capable of extending it anywhere in the world.²²

In Honolulu, Oahu, the most densely populated island in the Hawaiian archipelago (900,000 or some 75% of a total population of 1,257,608 in 2003), the military controls 85,718 acres out of 382,148 acres or 22.4% of the island. According to the State of Hawaii in 2003, there were 44,458 active duty military personnel and 56,572 military dependents living in Hawaii, the combined total of which amounted to 8% of Hawaii's population of 1,257,608. Combined with 116,000 retired military personnel living in Hawaii, the military-connected population totaled 217,030 or 17% of Hawaii's total population.²³

According to Kaleikoa Kaeo, a Kanaka Maoli activist, "The U.S. military in Hawaii is a monster *he'e* (octopus). Its head is represented by the Pacific Command, its eyes the mountaintop telescopes and radar facilities, and its brain and nervous system the supercomputers and fiber optic networks that crisscross the islands. The tentacles of the *he'e* stretch from the west coast of North America to the East coast of Africa, from Alaska to Antarctica."²⁴ By contrast, Jeju, as an 'Island of World Peace' does not currently have military bases worthy of name, except a small Jeju Naval Defense Command, as mentioned previously.

²² Glenn D. Paige, "Is a Nonkilling Island Society Possible?," A Key Note Speech at the 6th Peace Island Forum held in Seogwipo KAL Hotel, Jeju, July 6-7, 2006, pp. 5-6.

²³ State of Hawaii, Department of Business, Economic Development & Tourism, *State of Hawaii Data Book 2003*, Table 1.03 - Resident Population by Military Status, 1990 to 2003. Or for general information, click www.hawaii.gov/dbedt or www.hawaii.gov/dot.

²⁴ Kyle Kajihiro, "An overview of the U.S. Military in Hawaii," published by the American Friends Service Committee, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 9, 2006.

III. Jeju as a “Hub” of Peace in Northeast Asia and the World

Jeju has been a venue for international summit conferences since Mikhail Gorbachev visited Jeju on April 18, 1991. This was followed by Bill Clinton, Jang Je-min of China, and Hashimoto and Koizumi of Japan. Jeju also was used by Cabinet-member level meetings of North and South Korea.²⁵ Thus, Jeju Island has been reborn as the “Island of World Peace” with the commitment to deliver messages of peace to the world. The Jeju Peace Institute (JPI), established on March 24, 2006, will be a nucleus and a clearinghouse for peace-related activities, such as research, education/training, conferences, networking and thus become a hub of peace in Northeast Asia and the world. It aims to be a world-class peace institute, an independent non-profit research center (initially, however, with financial help of the national government, Jeju provincial government, and private funds). It hopes to be financially and otherwise independent in the years to come. JPI will oversee the Jeju Peace Forum which has been held bi-annually since 2001.

JPI also has a Peace Center under the same wing with the purpose to provide peace education with a wax museum of international dignitaries who participated in the summit conferences in Jeju, mentioned above, and other prominent peace-makers/activists, such as former President Nelson Mandella of South Africa, Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. of the United States, Mr. Mohandas Gandhi of India, Ham Suk-Hon of Korea, and many others. A proposed “Peace Tour” is designed to end here at the Peace Center. JPI is thus charged with, among others tasks, a historic mission to carry out a comprehensive program of research, international conferences and educational outreach activities to promote peace and prosperity on Jeju Island, the Korean Peninsula, in Northeast Asia and the world at large for all humankind.²⁶ We shall now discuss how this mission

²⁵ *Island of World Peace*, op. cit., p. 8.

will unfold and be expanded in the years to come.

A. "Peace with Self": Peace and Reconciliation in Jeju after the 4.3 Massacre

Diagnosis: the people of Jeju have come a long way. Jeju was once an independent Kingdom, named Tamna in ancient times (as was Hawaii once an island Kingdom). It was occupied by the Mongol Army for almost 100 years. The Mongol Armada failed to invade Japan due to a typhoon the Japanese called "Kamikaze" or "Divine Wind." During the Japanese occupation of Korea, Jeju was fortified as a last stand and stronghold (like Okinawa) of defense against the American military onslaught to Japan proper. It was ironical that it was here in Jeju that Japanese suicide bombers named "Kamikaze" flew sorties to bomb Nanjing, China — the closest point from Jeju. Jeju is closer to Nanjing than Japan proper is to Nanjing.

During the United States Military Government in Korea (USMGIK) and military occupation, a massacre occurred in Jeju, starting on April 3, 1948, and ending on September 21, 1954 (by ending the prohibition to go to Halla Mountain), killing approximately 30,000 young and old, men and women — mostly civilians — as Jeju people resisted separate election in South Korea alone.²⁷ These people were oppressed and persecuted, resulting in some of them taking to the mountains of Halla to be resistance fighters or guerrillas. The U.S. Governor-General in Jeju, Colonel John S. Mansfield, is known to have told then Korean garrison (the Korean 9th regiment) commander Lt. Col. Kim Ik-Ruhl that "the Cheju rebellion must be painted as a Communist rebellion in order to counter the Soviet propaganda."²⁸

²⁶ *Jeju Peace Institute: The Hub of World Peace*, published by Jeju Peace Institute, 2006, p. 6

²⁷ Kwon Gissok, *Giokui Jungchi (Politics of Memory: Social Memory of Genocide and Historical Truth)* (Seoul: Munhakgwa Jisungsa, 2006), p. 71.

²⁸ Lt. Gen. Kim Ik-Ruhl, *The Truth about Cheju 4.3*, published by Korea Web Weekly, www.kimsoft.com/1997/43kima.htm Ch. 9, p. 3.

The U.S. Army in Korea looked away as wanton massacres were perpetrated by the Korean army garrison, police, and gangsters from North Korea known as North-West Youths (or Sobuk Ch'unghnyon-dan). This struggle is known as the first resistance in Asia against the U.S. occupation policies in the words of John Merrill who said, "Nowhere else did such a violent outpouring of popular opposition to a postwar occupation occur."²⁹ American responsibility in this carnage is unmistakable. John Merrill states that:

"Americans were present as advisors throughout the pacification campaign and should have attempted to modify the excessive brutality with which the operations were often conducted. The excuse that these excesses were inevitable in any case, and that they should not detract from the main goal of defeating the insurgency is unconvincing."³⁰

I want to also quote Bruce Cumings on the question of American responsibility on this matter. He stated at a Tokyo conference that

"I wish to address a single question in my lecture, which is the legal and moral responsibility of the United States for widespread massacres and unsparing brutality with which the Chejudo rebellion was suppressed."³¹

Prescriptions: the tragedy of the April 3rd (1948) Massacre is now gradually being transformed into reconciliation in the spirit of "Sam Moo" and mutual life together — for peace, transcending the unfortunate past. The fact-finding efforts that started in 1960 were

²⁹ John Merrill, *Journal of Korean Studies* (Seattle: Washington: Univ. of Washington), Vol. 2, 1890, p. 196.

³⁰ John Merrill, *Ibid.*

³¹ Bruce Cumings, "The Question of American Responsibility for the Suppression of the Chejudo Uprising" presented at the 50th Anniversary Conference of the April 3, 1948 Chejudo Rebellion, Tokyo, March 14, 1998, p. 1.

rekindled in 1988 (after the demise of the military dictatorships in Korea and some 40 years after the massacre). In 2000, a special law regarding the 4.3 was enacted and in 2003 (and as of this writing in September 2006, this law is being revised with expansion of the rights of victims)³² a report was published about the fact-finding, and finally President Roh Moo-Hyun himself apologized officially for the incident. Compensation for the victims has started and a huge Peace Park in commemoration of the incident is now nearing completion.

This is an exemplary effort to settle the past problems of invasions and violence through “nonviolence” and not through retribution, or creation of new conflicts.³³ One outstanding example is transforming the Mongolian horses (The Mongols made Jeju their National Ranch for breeding Mongolian horses) raised for invasion and warfare into “horses for cultivation and agriculture.”³⁴ Indeed a splendid conflict transformation process!

It goes without saying that the people of Jejudo suffered immensely under the Mongols, Japanese, Americans, and their own governments with a 200-year prohibition policy of Jeju inhabitants not to leave the island, and making Jejudo a venue for exiles. After the demise of the Cold War and military dictatorships in Korea, the people of Jejudo have been working hard (like the fierce women divers who rose against the Japanese occupation) this time to reach reconciliation and harmony — only in the last couple of decades or so — (as they had been “forbidden” to even talk about it for over 40 years under successive civilian and military dictatorships, including that of Syngman Rhee). The people of Jejudo have been working very hard to heal wounds of the past, to achieve reconciliation and peace among themselves — arising like a phoenix....Indeed, they have come a long way to achieve peace with others and especially, “Peace

³² *The Jemin Ilbo*, Sept. 8, 2006.

³³ *Island of World Peace*, published by the Tourist Bureau of Jeju Free International City, 2006, p. 7.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

with Self.”

Therapy: what now for the peaceful Jeju is our question. On this question, I would like to derive from insights of Glenn Paige from his article, “Is A Nonkilling Island Society Possible?” He suggests three characteristics of a nonkilling island society:

- (1) There is no killing of humans and no threats to kill. (2) There are no weapons for killing humans and no justifications for killing; i.e., no “hardware” and no “software” for killing humans. (3) There are no conditions of island society that can only be maintained or changed by threat or use of killing force.³⁵

He notes that Jeju Island traditions of “a kingdom without weapons,” the “Sam Moo” or “three nos” (no gates, no beggars, no thieves), and the more egalitarian social role of women, provide glimpses of nonkilling island capabilities. He further suggests the following for Jeju.³⁶

On security: the need for nonkilling island security (no killing of islanders by each other, by outsiders, or by islanders of outsiders), can be creatively pursued by drawing upon global nonviolent political-military theory, practice, and institutional developments. These range from nonviolent childhood socialization, through populations and police without firearms, rehabilitative prison alternatives, and preparations for massive nonviolent civilian defense — to worst-case employment of nonlethal weapons.

On Economy: Nonkilling island societies need nonkilling economies. This means to refuse to profit from economies and cultures of killing. For example, Japanese friends of Korea have expressed concerns that Yakuza gangsters are coming to Jeju for firearm practice in businesses offering guns and shooting galleries that are banned in Japan. Hawaii offers the same kind of “shooting”

³⁵ Glenn D. Paige, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

³⁶ Paige, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5. On this part, I quote from him quite liberally.

galleries or businesses.

Paige states that “More positively, island societies should seek to become prosperous by the creation, consumption, and export of nonkilling goods and services. In sum, “nonkilling should be profitable” (emphasis added). The concept of Jeju as a Peace Island supported by national, provincial, and local governments offers extraordinary economic opportunities. The people of Jeju can become creators and exporters of nonkilling ideas, goods, arts, and experiences of great value to themselves and a violence-weary world. Diffused through information technologies these could range from Peace Island T-shirts and nonkilling TV dramas drawing upon Korean filmmaking genius, to nonkilling leadership and citizen summits that can help shift “colossally wasted” billions of violent dollars to service human needs. Paige further advocates needs for nonkilling education and establishment of a “Nonkilling Leadership Academy” in all sectors of island life — in government, law enforcement, business, labor, education, media, culture, and civil society organizations.³⁷

B. Peace of Two Korea thru Confederation->Federation->Unification.

This I consider to be a very important part and, therefore, I want to dwell at some length.

Diagnosis: as we expand from peace with self, the larger self is peace within the Korean peninsula. The division of Korea by the United States and the former Soviet Union, the war in Korea (1950-1953), and uneasy truce (1953-up to the present) caused much suffering and trauma for Koreans as well as foreigners. What we need is reconciliation on the Korean peninsula. The logical next step would seem a “Peace Treaty” among the Koreans themselves and other protagonists in the war. In this case, however, the signatories

³⁷ Paige, *Ibid.*, p. 5.

of the 1953 truce were North Korea and China on one side and the United Nations side on the other, represented by the United Nations Command, headed by a U.S. general without South Korean participation. This peace treaty, however, would require withdrawal of foreign troops, i.e., the United States military force in Korea. The U.S. troops have stayed in Korea for almost 60 years and they seem prepared to stay for the foreseeable future, in spite of the usual lip service to the contrary, as China is emerging as a power to reckon with in this part of the world.

It is my opinion that the United States forces and continuing joint military exercises have hindered rather than promoted Korean reunification efforts over the years. You can say that a thaw on the peninsula also began in the aftermath of the demise of the Cold War and dictatorships in South Korea, and that the emergence of the civilian regimes of Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung, and now Roh Moo-Hyun had a change of heart, so to speak, as regards to North Korea.

The current stalemate on the Korean peninsula concerns the so called "North Korean nuclear problem or threats" which are blown out of proportion by neo-cons led by Dick Cheney or what Chalmers Johnson calls "The chicken hawks of the Bush administration."³⁸ Johnson also believes "the bellicosity of North Korea has been greatly exaggerated too."³⁹

Prognosis: I believe that the North Korean nuclear problem can be resolved in one stroke if the President of the United States meets with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il face to face with determination to settle the problem. According to Johnson, the Clinton administration stalled implementing the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework (to scrap the North Korean nuke programs in exchange for security guarantees, etc.), hoping that the North Korean regime would simply collapse⁴⁰ which we all know never happened.

³⁸ Media Daum, August 17, 2006.

³⁹ Chalmers Johnson, "Korea, South and North at Risk," www.tomdispatch.com (a weblog of the Nations Institute), pp. 1, 4, 6.

Then in October 2000, Clinton sent U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang to meet the North Korean leader, and a North Korean Marshal Cho Myong-Rok visited Clinton in the White House in full North Korean Army uniform. According to former Secretary of State Colin Powell, everything was on the table ready to sign. Clinton's anticipated visit to Pyongyang, which would have sealed the North Korean nuclear program once and for all, unfortunately never materialized in the last moments of his term as President. In the early days of the Bush administration, however, these favorable trends in Korea and in Washington came to a screeching halt. In his state-of-the-union address of January 2002, Bush identified North Korea as one of the three nations belonging to an "Axis of Evil" The speech writer was David Frum and he regretted it.⁴¹

I believe that behind Bush's policy speech and incessant North Korean bashing are Jewish lobbying against the proliferation of North Korean missile and nuclear technology which could end up in the hands of the "terrorists." They may be the neo-cons headed by Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, formerly of the Department of Defense; Stuart Levi, Assistant Secretary in charge of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Department of the Treasury; Mathew Waxman, Deputy Director of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of State to name just a few.⁴² Bush in September 2002 asserted as a "national security strategy" a right to wage "preemptive war." Watching Iraq being destroyed subsequently, North Korea, a target of regime change itself, prepared to defend itself in the only way it thought the Americans could understand. It withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, expelled international inspectors, and restarted its old power reactor.⁴³

⁴⁰ Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁴¹ *Ibid.* The regret was expressed on CNN, televised in Korean time, Nov. 20, 2006 at 20:40 a.m.

⁴² *The Hangyoreh*, Sept. 12, 2006, p. 6. Some of these position titles were translated from Korean.

It is my belief that the “Washington chicken hawks” had a change of heart and have no intention to resolve the North Korean problem. They need an enemy to implement the Missile Defense program for one. Recently (as of Sept. 14, 2006), this point was eloquently amplified by former president Kim Dae-Jung, Korea’s first Nobel Peace laureate who said that “The biggest problem in the U.S.-North Korea debacle on nukes is the neo-cons in America. They refuse dialogue with North Korea and push it to a wrong path with the purpose to expand military armaments such as the MD program along with rearming the Japanese, with China as their hypothetical enemy. For these aims, they need pretexts and excuses and North Korea just provides that.”⁴⁴

They are currently squeezing and strangling North Korea financially, freezing or closing bank accounts of North Korea in many countries; and North Korea has made it abundantly clear that they have no intention of returning to the Six-Party Nuclear Talks unless the United States lifts these bans on North Korean accounts. President Roh Moo-Hyun and President George Bush met in Washington September 12-16, 2006. However, the meeting largely ended in dismay, with more of the same thing in that the operational control of the South Korean Army would be transferred to the South Koreans from an American general; however, the American forces would continue to be stationed in Korea with a right to intervene in case of an emergency. Kim further related his conversation with Bill Clinton after his retirement. Kim said Clinton had told him that “had he been in office one more year, the whole Korean problem, including the North Korean nuclear issue, could have been resolved in one stroke.” Kim was heartbroken to hear that.⁴⁵ An alternative to this impasse may be that Americans will elect Hillary in the next presidential election.

The Bush administration is expected to continue to “strangu-

⁴³ Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁴⁴ *The Hankyoreh*, Sept. 15, 2006, p. 2; Media daum, www.daum/ same date.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

late" North Korea further with all its might with an all-out effort to blockade North Korean accounts everywhere, legal or illegal. It is reported that both Don Oberdorfer, a journalist turned professor at Johns Hopkins University, and Donald Gregg, former ambassador to Korea, warned in *the Washington Post* "the day before yesterday" that the only way for the United States to succeed with North Korea was through negotiations.⁴⁶ It seems obvious that the "chicken-hawks" in Washington pose problems. With victory of Democrats in the House and Senate of the United States in the midterm elections in 2006, winds of change seem to be in the air as Bush announced it would "consider" official termination of the Korean War if North Korea scraps all its nuclear programs.

I would like to recall at this juncture that human loss (dead, wounded, and missing) during the Korean war was staggering in that a total of 5.27 million Koreans,⁴⁷ North(2.92 million) and South (2.3 million), were sacrificed. The United States dead is listed at some 30,000 men, whereas, Chinese human loss is listed at 900,000.⁴⁸

Kim Hak-Joon concludes, citing another Kim⁴⁹ that the loss of non-combatants has been unprecedentedly high in the Korean War in the history of human warfare. I believe this was caused by saturation bombing of the U.S. air force (as Johan Galtung told me repeatedly that the United States Air Force targeted civilian population in Europe and asked me what was the case in Korea. My considered answer was "Yes"). I also think that the loss of "non-combatants" was high in Korea due to participation of 16 UN member nation troops. The foreign troops of a hitherto unprecedented num-

⁴⁶ *The Hankyoreh*, September 8, 2006, editorial, quoting the *Washington Post* of Sept., 2006, p. A-15.

⁴⁷ Young Whan Kihl, *Politics and Policies in Divided Korea* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). On page 42.

⁴⁸ For a similar number and more detailed account of figures, see Kim Hak-Joon, *Hanguk Jonjaeng: Wonin, Gwajung, Hyujon, Yonghyang* (The Korean War: Its Cause, Process, Armistice, and Impact) (Seoul: Bakyungsa, 1989), pp. 345-6.

⁴⁹ Kyong-Dong Kim, "Toward a Sociology of War: The Social Impact of the Korean War," in *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer, 1981), p. 251.

ber of nations had difficulty distinguishing civilians from plain-clothed “volunteers.”

To underline the fact that American administrations, both Democratic and Republican, have not been telling “the whole truth and nothing but the truth” to the American public with regard to North Korea, I would like to cite the following three sources of three eminent analysts of North Korea to make the point:

- (1): “The Taepodong-2 [missile] test is no bolt from the blue just to get attention. It is Pyongyang’s reaction to backtracking by Washington in the ten months since a breakthrough was reached in six-party talks.... [The Joint statement of September 19, 2005] requires Washington to take phased reciprocal steps to reconcile — end enmity — as Pyongyang eliminates its nuclear programs.... [That is just what hard-liners in the Bush administration refuse to do].”⁵⁰
- (2): “[The] Agreed Framework was signed in October 1994. The Republican Right railed against this for the next six years, until George W. Bush brought a host of the Agreement’s critics into his Administration, and they set about dismantling it, thus fulfilling their own prophesy and initiating another dangerous confrontation with Pyongyang. The same folks who brought us the invasion of Iraq and a menu of hyped-up warning about Saddam Hussein’s weapons have similarly exaggerated the North Korean threat: indeed, the second North Korean nuclear crisis began in October 2002, when ‘sexed-up’ intelligence was used to push Pyongyang against the wall and make bilateral negotiations impossible.”⁵¹
- (3): “Much has been written about the North Korean nuclear dan-

⁵⁰ Leon V. Sigal, “What North Korea’s Missile Test Means,” p.1. This article was published at the Nautilus Institute’s Policy Forum Online on July 27th, 2006 and at Japan Focus on July 31, 2006.

⁵¹ Bruce Cumings, “Wrong Again: U.S. policy on North Korea.” This article appeared in *The London Review of Books*, December 4, 2003.

ger, but one crucial issue has been ignored: just how much credible evidence is there to back up Washington's uranium accusation?... A review of the available evidence suggests that this is just what happened. Relying on sketchy data, the Bush administration presented a worst-case scenario as an incontrovertible truth and distorted its intelligence on North Korea (much as it did on Iraq), seriously exaggerating the danger that Pyongyang is secretly making uranium based nuclear weapons."⁵²

What is alarming is the fact that BBC reported on September 15, 2006, at 17:07 GMT and 1807 UK time under the title "U.S. Iran report branded dishonest," further reporting that "The UN nuclear watchdog has protested to the U.S. government over a report on Iran's nuclear programme, calling it "erroneous" and "misleading." It said, "the IAEA said a congressional report contained serious distortions of the agency's own finding on Iran's nuclear activity.... It says the report was wrong to say that Iran had enriched uranium [689KB] to weapons-grade level when the IAEA had only found small quantities of enrichment at far lower levels."⁵³

It is my view that these kinds of manipulation and deception (I have taught students that U.S. foreign policy is tantamount to a policy of "deception and manipulation.") and continued stationing of the United States troops in Korea have hindered the reunification process on the Korean peninsula. Especially, the existence of the Bush administration has hindered peaceful resolution of the reunification problem as well as the nuclear problem with North Korea, as of this writing. The American objective on the Korean peninsula appears to be to maintain the status-quo, which is highly unsatisfactory for Koreans — North and South. America, overall, therefore, has been an obstacle to peace on the Korean peninsula more than any other power, or even more than the North Korean regime.

⁵² Selig S. Harrison, "Did North Korea Cheat?," p. 1. This article appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2005.

⁵³ BBC, Sept. 14, 2006.

America wanted to attack North Korea several times, including Bill Clinton, who came close to launching a preemptive strike against North Korea's nuclear reactors at Yongbyon in June 1994.⁵⁴ Negotiated settlement appears the only solution, however, this the Washington radicals refuse to do, as Leon Sigal, stated so succinctly above.

Therapy: it goes without saying that the 2+4 (6-party) nuclear talks appear to be getting nowhere as of this writing. An alternative to this, according to Johan Galtung, is 2+3 (China, Japan, Vietnam) formula in forming an East Asian Community. We shall discuss this in the next part (Peace and Integration in Northeast Asia). Paige suggests an Exploratory Six-Culture Conference on Nonkilling Korea. I plan to hold this conference along with the Jeju Peace Institute in the future. For the peninsula of Korea, Galtung states that the U.S./Soviet "crime" of dividing a people in 1945 is compounded by the crime of denying Korea conflict autonomy in the four-power field (consisting of the U.S., the former Soviet Union, Japan, and China) and suggests a standard prognosis or (even therapy) as follows:⁵⁵

(1) Collapse of one or the other Koreas, the takeover of one by the other, or the Korean War 1950-53 (actually starting from the 1948 Jeju "incidents") repeated with some modifications. (2) Then there is another prognosis that seems to be more valid: status quo, and (3) A more optimistic prognosis: there will be a slow move from small steps of cooperation via an associative relationship, then confederation, then federation, and finally unification.

This is an alternative we should all work toward. Glenn Paige, for his part, suggests the following for nonkilling and peace on the Korean peninsula and I quote:⁵⁶ First, there is no killing of Koreans

⁵⁴ Bruce Cumings, *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁵⁵ Johan Galtung, *Peace and Conflict: Transcend Workshop*, held at Manhae NGO Office, Seoul, May 27, 2006. I cite quite extensively from this work.

⁵⁶ Glenn D. Paige, "Nonkilling Korea: Building a Peace Structure on the Korean Peninsula," in Dong-Sung Kim, et al., eds., *FIFTY YEARS AFTER THE KOREAN*

by Koreans and no threats to kill; Second, there is no killing of Koreans by foreigners: Americans, Chinese, Japanese, Russians, various UN contingents, or by any other people and no threats to kill; Third, there is no killing or threats to kill by Koreans of foreigners; Fourth, there are no weapons for killing targeted by Koreans against each other, by foreigners against Koreans, and by Koreans against foreigners; Fifth, there are no ideological doctrines political, religious, military, economic, legal, customary, or academic that provide permission for Koreans to kill Koreans, for foreigners to kill Koreans, and for Koreans to kill foreigners; and Sixth, there are no conditions of Korean society: political, economic, social, and cultural or relationships between Koreans and foreigners that can only be maintained or changed by threat or use of killing force.

According to Soon-Sung Cho, who wrote about the period 1940-1950,⁵⁷ the Korean debacle was an American responsibility and it still seems largely true even today.

C. Peace and Integration in Northeast Asia thru OSCP (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Asia-Pacific)

Diagnosis: we foresee challenges as well as opportunities in Northeast Asia in the 21st Century. There are major and lesser actors in this arena and one can argue that "integration candidates" in Northeast Asia, depending on analysts, comprise the two Koreas, China (including Taiwan), Japan, and possibly the United States and Russia (both claim to be Pacific powers). Some like to include here Mongolia and Vietnam. There are enormous challenges and obstacles ahead for peace and prosperity and possible integration in

WAR: From Cold-War Confrontation to Peaceful Coexistence, The KAIS International Conference Series No. 11, Seoul, The Korean Association of International Studies, 2000.

⁵⁷ Soon-Sung Cho, *Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950: An American Responsibility* (Berkeley: University of Calif. Press, 1967)

the future.

Challenges seem quite obvious: (1) North and South Korean problems of reconciliation and reunification, (2) the North Korean nuclear problem and the United States on the one hand and Japan on the other, (3) Korea-Japan problem (Burden of history, Yasukuni, territorial/Dokdo, etc.), (4) China-Korea problems (nukes, historical claims regarding territory), (5) China-Japan problems (Burden of the past, Yasukuni, territorial, Taiwan, etc.), (6) China-U.S. problems (Taiwan, potential trade frictions, security)

These are some of the potential areas of distrust and conflicts in the region surrounding history, security, territory, trade, and emerging nationalism. With these challenges and opportunities in mind, a Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation was first established on April 7, 2003 (under a slightly different title then), with a national strategy and regional vision creating a new order from conflict and confrontation to peace and prosperity and possible integration in the future. Its three strategies can be summed up as follow:⁵⁸

(1) National Strategy: Strategy for strengthening national competitiveness through innovation and reform that is responsive to changes in Northeast Asia and also for ensuring the happiness and well-being of the people. (2) Inter-Korean Strategy: Strategy for establishing peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula based on the premise that peace on the peninsula is crucial for building regional peace through the cooperative participation of nations. (3) Regional Strategy: Strategy for regional cooperation designed to create a virtuous circle of peace and prosperity by establishing a new order of integration and cooperation.

This grand vision of cooperation and ultimate community building in Northeast Asia is marred by lack of “political will” of certain

⁵⁸ Taken from the Presidential Committee for Northeast Asia Cooperation Initiative website.

members, such as the United States and Japan. The integration literature and experiences of the European Community and the European Union tell us that there are various background variables (essential and non-essential variables) which induce integrative movements such as geographical proximity, pluralism (of governments and people), common value orientation (compatibility of main values) in the region (such as common cultural heritage), mutual adaptability and responsiveness, mutual predictability, size of integration candidates, expectation of gain or “pragmatic interests” etc. However, there have been many retarding factors, decelerators, and setbacks as well.⁵⁹

Prescription: the biggest hurdle in the European integration experience was that there always was a limit of cooperation on sensitive matters such as security — cooperation in non-sensitive, non-political areas, such as functional collaboration in the technical, low political areas had more prospect of success. This being the case, the South Korean vision for regional cooperation and eventual integration in Northeast Asia also confronted similar stalemate — lacking an integration “catalyst” such as the role of external elites (such as the United States) or external foreign policy (such as the Marshall Plan and NATO) in the European case.

We will have to further identify along the tumultuous road to Northeast Asian integration such factors or background variables as decelerators, set-backs, retarders, obstacles, spill-back factors, etc. The vision is there, however “political will” seems lacking on the part of important candidates, the United States and Japan, while China and Russia appear to be bystanders at this time.

Japan, in particular, seems in a crisis of its own making in its relation to its neighbors, China and the Koreas (and others). The issue is Japanese failure to “clean up” the past, removing the Japanese

⁵⁹ Dae-hwa Chung, “Dong Asea Gongdong Sijangui Ganungsung Yongu”(A Feasibility Study of East Asian Common Market) in the *Journal of the 21st Century Political Science*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 21st Century Political Science Association, 1999, pp. 195-202.

atrocities (genocide, slave labor, forced prostitution, robbery, acts of war in general) during the Pacific War from the political agenda. This is indispensable for East Asia to follow the general world trend toward regionalization of geographical and cultural neighbors, like the EU, the African Union, the ASEAN, to name just a few.

But major shadows of the past, the textbook and the Yasukuni Shrine issues, darken the future. The visits of the Japanese PM Koizumi to a shrine dedicated to uniformed war dead, including Class A war criminals, has been compared to the German Chancellor visiting a monument dedicated to Hitler and Himmler, Goering and Goebbels. But why does Koizumi visit only the uniformed; why not also civilians? And why only Japanese, why not Chinese and Koreans and others who were the Pacific War victims of Japanese aggression?

The latest development in the U.S. Congress is that the House Committee on International Relations passed H. Res. 759 in a consensus vote to say "Japan should unambiguously acknowledge and accept responsibility for enslaving young women, known as comfort women." This resolution asks Japan to acknowledge it, educate the Japanese about it, and compensate the victims.⁶⁰

It is about time the "chicken-hawks in Tokyo," namely Abe Shin-jo, who replaced Koizumi as the new Japanese PM, who even denies there were such comfort women for the Japanese army, and Ishihara Shintaro, the current mayor of Tokyo, who denies there was ever any Nanjing massacre, listen to the U.S. Congress, the United Nations, and in particular, the plain voice of human conscience.

Therapy: economic integration before political integration is highly seductive as a theory. Some argue that such models as NET (Natural Economic Territory) may indeed exist or are in the process of being formed in Northeast Asia.⁶¹ Or the "Geese" Model or

⁶⁰ <http://english.hani.co.kr/popups/print.hani?ksn=157157>.

⁶¹ Cho I-Je, "Dongbuka Gyongjegwonkwa Nambuk Gyongje Hyupruk Jonmang" (Prospects of North-South Economic Cooperation and Northeast Asian Economic

“Locomotive” Model seem appealing, if and only if there is a leading “goose” or a “locomotive” engine to lead or pull others toward a common goal, such as a common market or economic community. The problem of Northeast Asia right now (in 2006) seems to be that there are none, except the Republic of Korea Government, headed by President Roh Moo-Hyun.

A new approach, in addition to the 2+4 (6-party talks we already mentioned), that appears highly desirable is parallel 2+3 Talks pointing towards an East Asian Community (EAC), involving the two Koreas with the other three Confucian-Buddhist countries, China (with Taiwan), Japan and Vietnam; with the USA and Russia as observers. Such talks would point toward an East Asian Community, akin to Northeast Asian integration ideas, which is bound to come sooner or later anyhow, as one more regionalization process, like the European Union, the African Union and incipient movements like the OIC, Organization of the Islamic Conference — with the “C” shifting via “Countries” to “Community,” starting with a common market — and what is happening right now in Latin America/Caribbean. If the EU has been able to accommodate former enemies, different sizes, and bridge fault lines, so can the East (North-east) Asians.

Needless to say, the USA may initially not welcome such processes, but like for the EC/EU process, would come to accept that these are processes other countries are as entitled to as were once the 13 colonies on the Atlantic seaboard, and that equality might increase, not decrease equitable, cooperative, relations with the USA. Galtung, a proponent of this idea, states that “In fact, as an outside observer I am sometimes amazed by how quickly the idea of EAC is now catching on in the area, actually also beyond the 2+3 range.”⁶²

Sphere), in *Prospects of the Nation in the 21st Century*, presented at an international symposium in commemoration the 50th anniversary of Wongwang University, October 11-12, 1996, p. 93.

⁶² Galtung, *Peace and Conflict: Transcend Workshop*, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-26.

The East Asian region has 1.5 billion inhabitants, a shared history which is less, not more problematic than the history of European nations in the EU, with a rapidly increasing part that is tri-cultural: a Chinese base including Chinese characters, and a Euro/American opening in English, and French for Vietnam. More people in the region are fluent in European languages than Euramerica can ever hope to become in Asian languages. They know so much more about the West than the West about them.⁶³

The preferred future argued here, the EAC, (or for that matter Northeast Asian integration) has as a condition the most likely scenario for progress in the intra-Korean stalemate: opening of the rail and road connections, starting with free flow of goods. This could be combined with a very rapid Busan-Kyushu with Okinawa and Taiwan, rail to China and Europe (thru Trans-Siberian, trans-Asian, China railways) then to South-East/South Asia. Once the gap between the two Koreas has been filled we can safely assume that by 2025 there will be an enormous and free flow of services and people. There will be frequent "bullet" train connections between Tokyo-Beijing and beyond. Air travel will prevail for people, but for goods, a rail/road will link continents in ever-widening contexts. The Korean Peninsula holds the key, according to Galtung, and holds the rest of Eurasia hostage.

This solution for Korea will also link poor mainland East Asia and rich (pen)insular East Asia(Japan-Ryukyu)/Okinawa-Taiwan, and South Korea; and link core EAC to the context of OSCAP (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Asia/Pacific. OSCAP would be very meaningful, covering not only East but also Southeast, Central, South and West Asia, based on equality, one country one vote, and probably often on consensus.⁶⁴ OSCNA (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Northeast Asia) appears rather limited in number and scope since OSCE consists of some 53 members.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁶⁴ Galtung, *Op. cit.*, p. 25.

President Roh Moo-Hyun of Korea suggested a similar multilateral security system, modeled after the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), for Northeast Asia on September 10, 2006, when he visited Helsinki for an Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM).⁶⁵

D. Peace of the World in the 21st Century

Peace of the world in the 21st Century hinges on a multitude of factors to say the least. More than anything else, it seems a lot depends on “regime change” in the United States. Peace of the World seems to require a change of foreign policies on the part of the United States in the Middle East, and elsewhere, facilitating face to face resolution of impending issues between the Palestinians and the Jews on the one hand and resolution of life and death issues of Iraq and Iran, and the world over. As a first order of business, a lot will depend on who will succeed George Bush in America and how the United States and its Arab and Islamic counterparts will resolve the thorny issues facing them through nonviolence. A lot will also depend on U.S. foreign policy in East Asia, involving its security issues in North and South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and most of all China. The United States also faces serious challenges along its southern border with Central and South America. Whoever the new leadership, they will do well to open dialogue with leaders of South America and the Caribbean, including Cuba, and also continue good neighbor policies on the African continent.

One stumbling block for the Korean peninsula and East Asia (and elsewhere) seems Japan’s inability and unwillingness to acknowledge what happened in the past. Even if there are buts and howevers, this situation makes Japan an outsider to East Asia. With right wing elements steadily on the rise, Japan is increasingly treated by others as outside the “kaya,” the coziness of the shared mosquito net. What Japan risks is not so much war as exclusion. China turns to a more

⁶⁵ *The Hankyoreh*, September 11, 2006, p. 2.

interesting economic giant, India, and will probably spawn China style economies in North Korea and Myanmar, and build bridges to ASEAN and SAARC rather than to Japan. Japan may turn to 3A, the Anglo-American-Australian community, hoping to be accepted as an honorary member, but may “fall between two chairs rather than being a bridge.”⁶⁶ Galtung is talking about highly likely but also time consuming processes with EAC with a time horizon of, say, 10-20 years “unless” some special events would serve as accelerators — like major changes in foreign policies of Japan and the United States.⁶⁷

A few misguided men can lead humanity to carnage and disaster. I am against “mass killing” of human beings by human beings whatever the reason, as espoused in *Nonkilling Global Political Science* by Glenn Paige. I am particularly against mass killings by the United States as a Christian state. I would like to end this part by quoting Paige’s “Toward Liberation from Lethality” in the above book by Paige:

The time has come to set forth human killing as a problem to be solved rather than to accept enslavement by it as a condition to be endured forever. The deliberate killing of human beings, one by one, mass by mass, and the many by machines, has reached a stage of pathological self-destruction. Killing that has been expected to liberate, protect, and enrich has become instead a source of insecurity, impoverishment, and threat to human and planetary survival. Humanity is suffering from what Craig Comstock has termed the “pathology of defense” when that which is intended to defend becomes itself the source of self-destruction.

Defensive guns in the home kill family members, bodyguards kill their own heads of state, armies violate and impoverish their own peoples, and nuclear weapons proliferate to threaten their inventors and possessors. A Nonkilling Declaration of Independence from violence within ourselves and our societies is needed.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Galtung, *Peace and Conflict*, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-32.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

IV. Conclusion

An attempt was made in this paper to evaluate and introduce physical development plans/policies of Jeju Free International City and Jeju — Island of World Peace, and the Jeju Special Self-governing Province. It is also designated as the only World Conference Site/City in Korea and many assets of Jeju are now in the process of being registered as UNESCO World Heritage sites. Jeju women divers are also applying for status as a World Non-tangible Asset.

The ambitious seven grand projects of the Jeju Development Center are to be carried out by 2012, the target year of completion. I trust that most, if not all, of the projects will be completed and Jeju indeed will have a new face and have transformed herself into a beautiful metropolis and a grand province with new infrastructure.

I want to underline the fact that Jeju has come a long way historically and physically. She is a little larger than the island of Oahu where Honolulu is located; the population is a little over a half of Honolulu's, Honolulu's population being 900,000 and Jeju's being 550,000 plus. Jeju is three times the size of Seoul as I previously mentioned in Part II. The condition and rate of Jeju's highways and byways equals those of OECD levels/standards and Jeju also has at the least 40 museums and some 40 festivals annually.⁶⁹ The headcount of Jeju's tourists equals that of Honolulu, both having five (5) million odd tourists per year. We must remember that Jeju was a late comer to tourism compared to Honolulu, Hawaii, although there are marked differences in tourism revenues at this time.

With a new face and infrastructure thus consolidated, Jeju will soar to another level by 2012 or beyond as a hub of peace in the world. The Jeju Special Self-governing Province along with the newly established Jeju Peace Institute (JPI) will work together for

⁶⁸ Glenn D. Paige, *Nonkilling Global Political Science* (Xlibris Corporation, 2002), pp. 145-6.

⁶⁹ *The Hankyoreh*, Education Section, July 3, 2006, pp. 2-3.

the peace of the world, jump starting various activities related to peace research, peace education, and peace-making in Northeast Asia, the Korean Peninsula, and the peace of Jeju. The Korean Government and the Jeju Special Self-governing Province, the Jeju Peace Institute, and the people of Jeju are determined and committed to work for peace together.

It is my belief that to succeed in these endeavors, we need the support and blessings of major powers surrounding us and the support of the United States of America in particular. It is regrettable that at the present time, however, the United States Government under the leadership of George W. Bush continues to lie about the nuclear capabilities of North Korea and Iran (after Iraq) and appears to be on a collision course with almost everybody because its diagnosis of the ills of world politics, such as “terrorism” and “terrorists” and the nukes proliferation problem, is misleading and misdirected, if not dead wrong. Because the diagnosis is misleading or wrong, its prescriptions for the world’s body politics have been also misdirected and therapy could not be accurate. The current course of wrong diagnosis, prescriptions, and therapy is likely to lead to failure, like in Vietnam....

A USA bent on world hegemony, seeing the control of Central Asia as crucial, is another point. The 3A (Anglo-American-Australian) countries and Japan, joined by Israel as reliable clients and with their own far from peaceful agendas make this world far from peaceful.

The United States must provide leadership in the world arena with respect. It must lead in stopping the current vicious circle of violence throughout the world — with creative altruism, not just for self-interest, in the Middle East in particular. I see failure for their assumptions and consider this an intellectual failure on the part of the United States. We see no signs of such leadership on the horizon, unless a meaningful change of heart and change of foreign policy take place in the United States and the Judeo-Christian world in particular in the foreseeable future. Lacking this, we have to look

elsewhere for an alternative world leadership. What is abundantly clear is that we definitely need a change of policy and/or an alternative leadership in the U.S. and in the world, away from the current carnage and madness — which will not take humanity to a calamity — but to a more peaceful and tranquil path, in the years ahead.

In conclusion, (1) Jejudo appears to find peace with itself at long last after the traumas of the 4.3 massacre, with reconciliation, harmony, and peace; (2) It seems that the Korean peninsula also will do well by increasing contacts between North and South Korea (in functional and neo-functional terms) and pursue “Confederation → Federation → Unification with an increase in cross-border transactions in goods and services. This will increase bonding in such a way as to prevent “spill-back” or “deceleration” and outwit eventually the power preoccupied politicians and achieve a working peace system, à la, David Mitran; (if a political solution is not within reach in the foreseeable future); (3) Northeast Asia, however defined, may be well advised to pursue a course toward a common market and then eventually toward a community and beyond. through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (OSCAP); and (4) finally, it appears that we need, more than anything else, a new policy or a new leadership in the United States in particular for peace the world over at the beginning of the 21st century.

Again, there is a glimpse of hope, with the victory of the Democrats in the U.S. Congress in the aftermath of the midterm election in November, 2006, that things might change for the better for peace on the Korean Peninsula and for the peace of the world in general. I trust that Jejudo and the Jeju Peace Institute will play a significant role in achieving the goal of peace in this region as well as in the world.

World Peace and Military Base: From the Perspective of Jeju, Island of World Peace

Gil-Hyun Yang

This paper aims at presenting four themes. First, I present the background of why the Roh administration designated Jeju as the Island of World Peace from the environmental, cultural, historical, geopolitical and geo-economic perspectives. Second, I am going to review the meanings of 'Jeju, Island of World Peace' as a plan whose policy goal is twofold: one is to contribute to peace and prosperity in East Asia, including the Korean peninsula, the other is to make Jeju Island the model of a peaceful and prosperous city. Third, I argue that the military establishment does not fit into the vision of the Island of World Peace. Fourth, from the perspective of globalism, I suggest that the Hwasoon seaport will be the East Asian Peace Seaport that brings about peace and prosperity through the free movement of people, goods and capital, which is the goal of Jeju Free International City and Jeju, Island of World Peace.

I. Introduction

Peace and prosperity are two of the main themes in the 21st century. Peace and prosperity are more highlighted than in the past because of the growing consciousness that peace cannot be sustained without prosperity while prosperity is not possible without peace. During the cold war, peace was 'cold

peace' based upon the balance of powers. But peace of the post-cold war means 'warm peace' supported by close cooperation among the nations. In the 21st century, beyond establishing a warless world, we are going to step toward a co-prosperous world village which has two goals: one is to build up a world village with a lot of 'human security,' the other is to set up a world village with a high level of 'quality of life.'

South Korea faces three world trends of 'Democratization, Globalization and Information Networking.'" At the same time South Korea is required to play a role in establishing world peace in East Asia with the help of a vigorous civil society. In this vein President Roh Moo-Hyun designated Jeju as the 'Island of World Peace' on January 27, 2005. Jeju is the first case of a world city so designated by the central government while Hiroshima of Japan, Osnabruck of Germany, and Geneva of Switzerland were named as peace cities by local government (*The Jeju Provincial Newsletter*, February 1, 2005, 3). This means that Jeju, Island of World Peace is a model for others to follow.

When designating Jeju as the Island of World Peace, the Roh administration paid attention to the following factors. First, the Roh administration gave its appreciation and encouragement to the people of Jeju, who have endeavored to get over the tragedy of the April 3 Incident with a spirit of coexistence and conciliation. Second, while paying attention to the geopolitical status of Jeju where many top leaders from America, China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea, to name a few, have come to meet, the Roh administration intended to take advantage of the geopolitical merit of Jeju for peace and prosperity. Third, the Roh administration is interested in the model of 'globalization with humanity' on the one hand and balanced development among local regions on the other hand, for which Jeju, Island of World Peace has strengths due to the preservation of a clean natural environment, demilitarization, increasing cultural diversity, sustainable development, and the deemphasis of regional rivalry. Finally, the Roh administration aimed to support

the grand economic project of Jeju Free International City by increasing international exchanges and cooperation among East Asian countries with the brand of the Island of World Peace.

Jeju set sail as a 'Special Self-Governing Province' on July 1, 2006. Jeju is the first case of a province to be empowered to pursue special autonomy in all areas except for diplomacy, military defense and the judiciary.¹ But it is not easy for Jeju to set sail as a special self-governing province because there is no previous case and its goals seem to be a bigger bite than Jeju can chew. Jeju is waiting for the special support from the central government because the Roh administration has taken the initiative to create this new model of a special self-governing province and the special governing will be only possible with the substantial assistance of the central government. Jeju appears passive in making the vision of the Island of World Peace come true. Furthermore, in the case of the establishment of a military base in Hwasoon seaport, some people of Jeju intend to approve the plan in the hope of getting economic benefits.

In 2006, we are compelled to tackle the issue of establishing a military base in Hwasoon seaport when discussing the vision and tasks of Jeju, Island of World Peace. Technically, there are at least two positions: the realist approach and the pluralist approach,²

¹ With regards to diplomacy of special autonomy, Jeju governor Tae-Hwan Kim said that "I am trying to get even the diplomatic rights transferred from the central government as much as possible in order to implement the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province" at the open forum of Inhabitants Unity for Jeju Free International City on July 27, 2006 (*Issue Jeju*, internet newspaper, July 27, 2006). I agree with governor Kim on the grounds that Jeju needs the special status beyond that of localism and statism in diplomacy (Yang 2006, 103).

² For example, concerning the present and future of international situations in East Asia, the realist approach "puts the emphasis on the state as the most important actor... and regards that the military expansion and balance of power guarantee peace" while the pluralist approach "puts the emphasis on various actors including the state and is optimistic about the possibility of reformation in the international society including the regional integration through various programs with various actors" (Kim 2006, 14-15).

which conflict with each other on international relations involving the establishment of a military base in Hwasoon seaport. According to the respective theories, there are two different ways to establish peace: one is focusing on military power such as the establishment of the military base in Hwasoon seaport, the other is to rely on diplomacy as in Jeju, Island of World Peace. The issue of establishing a heavily armed Hwasoon seaport has become more complex because of the different views on its accompanying economic benefits and environmental damage, so that the debate of development versus preservation, first aired during discussion on the Special Law of Jeju Development during the 1990s, is recurring.

Another reason why the issue of establishing a military base in Hwasoon seaport is more complex is the Air Force's revised move to set up another air base in the name of a 'South Unit for Search & Rescue' (*Yonhapnews*, August 13, 2006). According to the *Yonhapnews*, 'the South Unit' is planned to consist of rescue helicopters, including the HH-60P and HH-47D, and transport aircraft, including the CN-235 and C-130, at the level of a battalion. If the Ministry of National Defense tries to establish all the sea and air bases in the southwestern area of Jeju, its attempt will be confronted by widespread opposition from Jeju people.

This paper aims at presenting four themes. First, it discusses the background of why the Roh administration designated Jeju as the Island of World Peace, considering environmental, cultural, historical, geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions. Second, it reviews the meanings of 'Jeju, Island of World Peace' as a plan,³ which poses a twofold policy goal: one is to contribute to the peace and prosperity in East Asia including the Korean peninsula, the other is to make Jeju Island a model of a peaceful and prosperous city. Third, it argues that the military establishment does not match well

³ The island of world peace as a plan is distinguished from the island of world peace as an inheritance. This distinction is borrowed from the one suggested by Dirlik (2000, 110-111), who made a distinction between East Asia as a plan and East Asia as an inheritance.

with the vision of the Island of World Peace. Fourth, from the perspective of globalism, it makes suggestions that the Hwasoon seaport should be the East Asian Peace Seaport that would promote peace and prosperity through the free movement of people, goods and capital, which is the goal of Jeju Free International City and Jeju, Island of World Peace.

II. The Bases for Jeju, Island of World Peace

Why is Jeju the Island of World Peace? In answering the question, I have to make it clear that it is not only Jeju, but also all other cities that could be a candidate for an Island of World Peace.⁴ But if we start to make one city the peace community without necessary resources, then Jeju, Island of World Peace could become subject to just one policy option.

Jeju, Island of World Peace is not a mere policy that the scholars and professionals of Jeju or Jeju province proposed after two or three meetings. Jeju, Island of World Peace is based on the nature-culture-history and geopolitics and geoeconomic considerations made by the civil society of Jeju continuously at least since the 1980s. I think that Jeju, Island of World Peace has a more solid foundation than does Jeju Free International City or Jeju Special Self-Governing Province for the following reasons.

First, Jeju, Island of World Peace was originally set up with a bottom-up approach. The vision of world peace relies on the spontaneous awakening and reflections on the past and the initiative in searching for the future at the grass roots level. Second, Jeju, Island of World Peace prefers the cooperation of a diplomatic approach while Jeju Free International City and Jeju Special Self-Governing Province are based on the competition of neoliberalist economic

⁴ In addition to Jeju, the DMZ, Cheolwon city of Gangwon province, Pyeongtaek city of Gyeonggi province present the vision of a world city while presenting their own reason and meanings.

logic. Cooperation will bring about sustainable and long-term benefits. But competition can be carried out for a long time, but still result in a significant level of inhumanity. The utility of competition will be found in maintaining comparative advantages through continuous improvement.

Though Jeju, Island of World Peace should be accomplished in the long-term, Jeju people are eager to taste the fruits of world peace in the near future. Thus, if the Island of World Peace is a torch of the Jeju people, Jeju, Island of World Peace as a policy will be carried out relying on the geoeconomics beyond mere images or symbol. When the Roh administration designated Jeju as the Island of World peace, the state should have been able to give a more detailed blueprint.⁵ But Jeju province did not make effective use of President Roh's designation of Jeju as the Island of World Peace.

Nevertheless, the vision of world peace is valued highly. And so Jeju, Island of World Peace as a policy is regarded as an attempt to upgrade and refresh the future of Jeju from the various perspectives of environment, culture, history, economics and geopolitics. On January 27, 2005, the Roh administration and the Jeju people are thought to have made an agreement about the vision of Jeju, Island of World Peace as a policy that follows: 1) review and revival of unique traditional culture and the clean environment of Jeju, and reinterpretation and reconciliation of the April 3 Incident, 2) reflection and reformation of the developmental tracks as an international tourist resort since the 1970s, 3) using the geopolitics of Jeju which has played a networking role in upgrading exchange and cooperation in East Asia, including the Korean peninsula, since the 1990s post-cold war, 4) making Jeju the model of decentralized and balanced development by opening up to the foreign community as a

⁵ The Roh administration approved the 17 projects that Jeju province proposed as the projects of world peace. But the Jeju people don't seem to be satisfied with the 17 projects, because most of the 17 projects are not new projects nor easy to pick the fruits from and the 17 projects don't make a sufficient impression on Jeju people.

response to the challenges of globalization.

A. The Background of Nature-Culture-History

The vision of Jeju, Island of World Peace is first of all supported by Jeju's unique background of nature-culture-history. The primary concern for nature in Jeju, Island of World Peace has two aspects. One is in its philosophy. Nature's eternity is contrasted with human beings' mortality. Nature has to be preserved securely from reckless exploitation so that human life is stable and fruitful. For example, if trees are cut down recklessly, then flooding is inevitable. So if nature is well preserved, humans will enjoy peace. Preservation of nature provides the foundation for the Jeju community and then nature becomes the backbone of Jeju, Island of World Peace.

The other aspect is tourism. Jeju is one of the best tourist attractions in East Asia. One secret that can contribute to Jeju becoming a leading international tourist site is Jeju's unique and clean nature. Jeju is not a good place for the manufacturing industry because of the heavy costs of logistics. But this is 'the advantage of disadvantage' for Jeju tourism. That is, as the tourism industry and agriculture go hand in hand, its synergistic effects are much higher. In the case of Jeju, Mt. Halla with its clean sea and fresh air provides a beautiful view in harmony with the abundance of mandarin orange trees all over Jeju.

Likewise, culture has put forward two aspects. One is Jeju's identity, the other is tourism. Jeju people acknowledge the uniqueness of their culture well enough to be proud of their traditional culture. The Three Nothings, Woman-divers, stone walls, persimmon-made clothes and poker latrines are examples different from those of the outside world. Traditional cultural features tend to fade away because of urbanization and industrialization. So Jeju people understand that such cultural features will eventually disappear, but they try to reshape and cherish these cultures through new interpretation. One example of such attempts is the reinterpretation

tation of the Three Nothings. The Three Nothings mean that in the past there were no thieves, no beggars and no gates in Jeju, so that the Three Nothings have been regarded as unique characteristics of Jeju's traditional life. Many scholars of Jeju culture such as Yang & Hyun (1983, 14-18) explained the modernized meanings of the Three Nothings as norms as well as actual realization of the 'cooperative communalism.' No thieves means peaceful life through the realization of social justice as well as exclusion of violence. No beggars means creative and diligent labors as self-realization processes and self-relying lives. No gates means a trustworthy community based on the autonomous maintenance of law and order as well as respect for the life of others. These reinterpreted characters are relevant to all passive and positive peace. When based upon these spirits of mutual trust, cooperation and non-violence, Jeju, Island of World Peace launches the project to take advantage of the cultural traditions of Jeju.

The idea of culture tourism promotes the concerns in culture. Culture tourism is the alternative to the simple sightseeing tourism that visitors are becoming fed up with. There is sometimes criticism that culture is too commercialized and loses the human dignity involved in culture itself. But insofar as visitors are fond of tourism interwoven with local cultures, culture tourism will be highly appreciated as a strategy to upgrade Jeju's tourism.

The concerns about Jeju history are focused on the April 3 Incident, which is the most terrible tragedy in modern Korean history because one out of ten people was killed without being informed of any reason for being killed. Nobody was permitted to say anything about the April 3 Incident, but since the 1990s, the April 3 Incident has been regarded as a scapegoat sacrifice in the process of establishing the Cold War in East Asia. Even now there are two conflicting positions on the reasons for the occurrence of the April 3 Incident. One bases its explanation on the reckless revolt by the communists while the other blames suppression by the U.S. Military Government and Seungman Rhee administration. Even though the

Special Law of the April 3 Incident was enacted and the central government published the official reports on the April 3 Incident, to outsiders, how to view and understand the April 3 Incident still remains a hot issue.⁶

But now Jeju people agree with the need first of all to cure the pains and sorrows of the victims, preferring the solution of curing the injuries by searching for the cause of the April 3 Incident. The former is in the area of policy while the latter is in the area of academics. Jeju people have decided to pursue the peace and prosperity of the East Asian Community through solving the conflicting views around the April 3 Incident. According to the motto of 'Do not forget the incident, but forgive and conciliate,' Jeju, Island of World Peace is going to get over the tragedy and enter into the post-cold war era.

B. The background of the Geoeconomy

Jeju, Island of World Peace is stipulated in the Special Law of Jeju Free International City. This means that the central government has the intention of taking advantage of the Island of World Peace for helping further Jeju Free International City. The idea that peace and prosperity are two sides of one coin is awakening the dimension of Geoeconomy in the process of designating Jeju as the Island of World Peace.

The concept of Jeju, Island of World Peace can be traced back to the period of Ancient Tamna when Jeju played the bridging role of connecting China-Korea-Japan from B.C. 100 to A.D. 1000 accord-

⁶ For example what the real facts of the April 3 Incident are has been debated. In relation to this debate, Seong-Ho Che, professor of Chung-Ang University, and Yeong-Joong Kim, the chairman of the Association of Retired Policemen of Jeju, called for the reexamination of the April 3 Incident by the right camp because they thought the government's official reports on the April 3 Incident are made by the leftist camp, while the majority of Jeju criticized this argument as distorted (*Jejusori*, August 22, 2006).

ing to the Korean Section and Japan Section of Wei Kingdom Book among the Three Kingdoms Book (*Jeminilbo*, November 13, 2002). But the utility of Jeju's geoeconomics was neglected by all the Shilla-Koryo-Chosun Dynasties that had oriented themselves toward the continent rather than the sea.

Since the Shilla Dynasty, Jeju had been neglected because of its sterile soil, geographical separation, and the exploitation of the central government. The sayings 'If a man is born, he has to go to Seoul,' 'If a horse is born, it has to be delivered to Jeju' epitomized the image and reality of Jeju's status. During the Chosun Dynasty, Jeju was famous as a place of exile for dissidents expelled from power.⁷

At that time it was true that all the Jeju people were poor because the central government neglected or exploited Jeju. Its extreme poverty prevented the thieves, beggars and gates from being present because there was nothing extra that Jeju people could give, protect and exploit. From such a point of view, the cooperative community of Jeju is natural and inevitable because the community is not possible without the cooperation with neighbors, which at first enforced the networks of cooperation based upon blood and geography.

But after the passage of one millennium, Jeju shows the potential for again playing the bridging role. Japan let Jeju people go outward and under the Japanese colonial rule a lot of Jeju people went to Japan as well as to the Korean peninsula. As for those being able to leave Jeju, the Korean peninsula and Japan were not differently perceived by Jeju people. Thus, Jeju had direct relations with the outside world including Japan. One fortunate thing among a lot of unfortunate aspects of the division of the Korean peninsula is South Korea's change in its foreign policy from the continent-orientation to a sea-orientation. As animosity between North and South Korea blocked South Korea from going to the continent, South Korea had

⁷ The exiles gave Jeju people two kinds of attitudes : one is center-oriented, the other is anti-centered. These inherited conflicting attitudes towards center seem to be alive now in the consciousness of Jeju people.

to move to the west including the USA, Japan and Southeast Asia. As Jeju is situated at the street corner to the west, Jeju has one role as the advance guard in the marine era. This was why the Park Chung-Hee, Chun Doo-Hwan, and Kim Dae-Jung administrations searched and pursued a strategy to take advantage of Jeju as a free port or free international city.

Thus, the modern history of Jeju mainly consisted of the tourist development especially since the 1970s. The tourist development boom changed the status of Jeju from that of a desolate island to the newly rising tourist attraction. Whether its aims are to exploit the foot areas of Mt. Halla or enjoy old age in Jeju while managing the mandarin orange trees and/or playing golf, many people from outside are interested in Jeju, which contributes to making Jeju more valuable.

These tourism developments raised two conflicting viewpoints: the continuous developmental perspective and the preservationist perspective. Just as the growing value of Jeju increases the interest of speculators, so do the consciousness and movements to preserve Jeju from reckless exploitation go into motion. Fortunately the two developmental and preservationist approaches go hand in hand as learned when the two approaches confronted each other around the time of passage of the Special Laws for Jeju Development in the 1990s. The idea of sustainable development helps make the two approaches compatible⁸ so that now the idea of sustainable development prevails and leads the direction of development of Jeju.

C. The Background of Geopolitics

The dimension of geopolitics is the most important foundation on which Jeju, Island of World Peace is based because the post-cold

⁸ But I think that this idea of sustainable development is preferable to the notion of development above preservation. In the world of capitalist domination, it is inevitable for the logic of development to prevail while compromising on the acceptance of limiting reckless exploitation.

war has been followed by an era of diplomacy and economic relations. Since military power is less influential than in the past, diplomacy, including summit meetings, is more crucial in international relations. Jeju has been highlighted as a new meeting place because of its geographical merits and developed infrastructure as follows. First, Jeju is able to link China-Korea-Japan geographically due to being an equal distance from the three states. In addition, Jeju is located at a distance of one hour's flight from Seoul.⁹ Second, Jeju has clean and beautiful landscapes and a well-developed infrastructure, including well-maintained roads, many kinds of hotels as well as famous international tourist attractions.

Throughout the 1990s, quite a few summits of East Asia visited Jeju to discuss the peace and prosperity of East Asia. They include Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991, Jiang Zemin in 1995, Bill Clinton and Hashimoto Ryutaro 1996 and Obuchi Keizo in 1999. They met with the Presidents of South Korea in Jeju. In addition, after the summit meeting between Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Il in 1990, the first meeting of North and South Korean Ministers of National Defense and the third meeting of North and South Korean Ministerial officials were held in Jeju. Thus, Jeju has been expected to play a linking role while hosting and facilitating summits in East Asia.

Another aspect of the geopolitics of Jeju, Island of World Peace is found in the tourism perspective that even North Korean people hope to visit Jeju if permitted.¹⁰ Kim Jong-Il told South Korean journalists that he would visit Jeju some time. So many people have expected Kim Jong-Il to visit Jeju and meet Kim Dae-Jung or Roh Moo-Hyun because Kim Jong-Il had promised Kim Dae-Jung to visit Seoul sooner or later when Kim Jong-Il met with Kim Dae-

⁹ Jeju has 18 neighboring cities that are situated at a distance of two hours by airplane including Beijing, Shanghai, Tokyo, Osaka of East Asia (Chung 2002, 23).

¹⁰ On July 16, 2005, Kim Jong-Il is said to have told Hyun Jeong-Eun, who is chair of the Hyundai Group, that you should prepare Mt. Halla for a visit by a North Korean delegation (*Ohmy News*, August 22, 2005).

Jung in Pyongyang; but Kim Jong-Il has not made a visit to anyplace in South Korea. In addition, it is suggested that the six-party talks to solve North Korean nuclear negotiations will be held in Jeju.

In retrospect, though it has been often discussed how to make economic use of Jeju since the Park Chung-Hee administration, there has been little concern about the political use of Jeju because of the structural constraints enforced by the cold war. But in the process of transition from the cold war to the post-cold war era in East Asia in the 1990s, it is acknowledged that Jeju has become more competitive than any other place. In order to take advantage of Jeju politically, the central government has to establish the institutional arrangements. The designation of Jeju as the Island of World Peace by the government is the official confirmation to back Jeju with administrative and financial support because the vision of the Island of World Peace is not confined to Jeju but is relevant to the future of East Asia including the Korean peninsula.

In this vein, we need to bring 'world peace' to our notice. The issue here is not simply 'peace' but 'world peace.' It means that the meanings of peace in the vision of Jeju, Island of World Peace is focusing on the international peace of East Asia rather than that of Jeju at the local level. In other words, the dimension of geopolitics is the essence of Jeju, Island of World Peace. Then, we are faced with the task of what and how to take advantage of Jeju as a concept in the geopolitical dimension.

III. Jeju, Island of World Peace as a Concept

Jeju, Island of World Peace is a strategy to make Jeju peaceful and prosperous. Originally 'Jeju Island of World Peace' comes from the geopolitical consideration of Jeju, but in the process of legislation it was combined with the geoeconomy of Jeju Free International City. Thus the Roh administration is to promote Jeju economically, but a lot of NGOs of Jeju are more concerned with the dimension of

the Nature-Culture-History of Jeju. These discordances make it hard for concerted efforts to realize the vision of Jeju.

However, overall, the meanings of Jeju, Island of World Peace as a concept are still significant. In relation to the sustainable development of Jeju, the vision of Jeju, Island of World Peace suggests some alternatives to simple sightseeing tourism. The so-called hands-on tourism means that visitors will be involved interactively in local culture and enjoy well-preserved clean nature. Business tourism refers to a combined activity in which tourist locales provide for business functions such as economic transactions as well as serving as sites for diplomatic forums, academic conferences and NGOs' meetings besides providing the normal tourism role.

In the process of pursuing the Jeju model of sustainable development, Jeju, Island of World Peace was absorbed into Jeju Free International City in 2002 so that other possibilities of logistics and finance are suggested as competitive elements along with tourism. But the problems remain: It is not easy to show clear outcomes for Jeju Free International City, so it does not meet the expectations of Jeju people. The specialization of logistics and finance is also questioned owing to its difficulties and unsuitability. The central administration did not provide substantial support but mere verbal promise. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration renamed Kim Dae-Jung's Jeju Free International City the Jeju Special Self-governing Province, that would focus on education and medical services instead of logistics and finance. The real purpose of the Special Self-governing Province is to prepare in advance for the opening of education and medical services.¹¹ Of course the strategy to open education and medical services can be an alternative to helping the econo-

¹¹ According to Representative Sang-Chung Shim who made public the report of the third meeting agenda of the Committee on Foreign Economy, the strategy of supporting the industrialization of education and medical services is only a case of experimentation to prepare for and deal with the Free Trade Agreement by grasping in advance the bright and dark sides of the market opening (*Jejusori*, August 22, 2006).

my of Jeju survive because it is hard to attract manufacturing enterprises; so it will be a 'blue ocean'¹² strategy for Jeju to take the initiative in opening markets in advance. But it is not yet certain whether 4+1 projects of Jeju Special Self-governing Province will succeed or not in spite of the government's promise.

What is the specialty of Jeju Self-governing Province? I also think it is not a simple experiment to pass through the trial and error of market opening, but it is an effort to realize and strengthen the coexistence of peace and prosperity beyond the economic logic of neoliberalism. In other words, whether they are logistics and finance or 4+1 projects, the dimension of the geoeconomy has to be based upon the philosophy of peace logic to make the geopolitical dimension of Jeju, Island of World Peace more effective.

As explained above, the vision of Jeju, Island of World Peace is based on the life-respecting movement at the grass roots level. The central government is noticing the grass roots and is trying to combine the grass roots and professionals. But in transforming the vision into policy, the professionals and bureaucracies have poured the contents of the neoliberalist view of the economy into concrete projects, neglecting the philosophy of peace. The key problems lie in the atmosphere of the predominant growth-centered viewpoint that supports the rationale of professionals as well as that of the grass roots, so that the vision of Jeju, Island of World Peace has not come true yet.

Notwithstanding the uncertain future of Jeju Special Self-governing Province, Jeju, Island of World Peace as a concept is still valid because of its potential contribution to creating a unique brand of Jeju. The upgrading image of the Island of World Peace will help improve foreign confidence in Jeju and assure investors of stability and honesty. If Jeju establishes the networks of peace by special self-governing, it will allow Jeju to be connected with many

¹² The blue ocean means 'the new frontier market without competition... through the differentiation and comparative advantage in costs' (Kim & Boan 2005, 8, 17).

kinds of international actors including governments, enterprises and NGOs. Thus, if Jeju continues to play the roles of “conveying the communication and exchanges between the continent and sea, buffering the competition and conflict among the various actors, and reducing the gaps between the developed economy and backward economy” (Park 2002, 178), it will promote Jeju Free International City or Jeju Special Self-governing Province to be a unique model or special strategy for development.¹³

The development of air-space technology and the Internet makes Jeju Island able to play a new role for promoting cooperation and exchanges among the East Asian countries. At the same time the strong voice of the local people stimulates Jeju to try to go beyond its geographical confinement and grasp the opportunity of participating directly in the world economy. So Jeju Special Self-governing Province should be permitted to enjoy diplomatic autonomy through peace and business, but not by war or military engagement.

IV. Military Base in the Perspective of Jeju, Island of World Peace

In relation to peace and security, Jeju is confronted with the issue of establishing an air base and a marine corps base around Hwasoon seaport. I'd like to oppose the heavily militarized Hwasoon seaport for the following reasons:

The vision of Jeju, Island of World Peace is more than a passive peace which is maintained with the absence of war and violence. A passive peace is still important. However, while all the people are pursuing a passive peace, the vision of Jeju, Island of World Peace has to be more than passive peace in order to show a unique brand as the Island of World Peace. In other words, the designation of Jeju

¹³ For example, the uniqueness of Jeju Free International City consists in pursuing two targets of Peace & Prosperity different from the Economic Free Zone of Songdo and Yeongjongdo of Incheon.

as the Island of World Peace sets up a positive peace or 'human security'¹⁴ as its target. The concept of Jeju, Island of World Peace as a positive peace are based on two considerations: One is the evaluative view that a positive peace is superior to a passive peace, the other is a realistic view that a passive peace secured by military means is too vulnerable to be sustained unless the passive peace is supported by a positive peace.¹⁵ In the perspective of the vision of Jeju, Island of World Peace searching for a positive peace, the proposition of arming Hwasoon seaport should be opposed.

But the issue of arming the Hwasoon area is not simple because we have to consider another realistic view on security in that a passive peace is of primary importance due to two reasons. First, the vision of Jeju, Island of World Peace is to ensure a passive peace as the premise to pursue a positive peace. It is clear that the positive peace is not possible without a passive peace. Second, in spite of the post-cold war, the international circumstances of East Asia including the Korean peninsula are not stable enough to neglect a passive peace. The Korean peninsula is one of the most unstable places owing to the animosity between the USA and North Korea surrounding North Korea's attempts to produce nuclear weapons. Thus, many South Korean people regard a passive peace as the necessary means while hoping strongly to constrain the use of force. Thus, the issue of arming Hwasoon seaport is supported by many people.

Since Jeju, Island of World Peace cherishes both a positive and passive peace, there exist two different points of view about the heavily armed Hwasoon seaport depending on the preference for

¹⁴ According to *Human Development Report 1994* published by UNDP, human security means 'safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression' and 'protection from sudden and harmful disruption in the pattern of our daily lives, whether in our homes, in our jobs, in our communities or in our environment' (Overview of HDR 1994, 5).

¹⁵ For example, September 11 Terror in 2001 can be explained as the outcome of the unilateralism of the USA that has been neglecting the positive peace.

type of peace. In fact, the two viewpoints are only different in their perspectives because which group is right or wrong does not matter. It means that it is difficult for Jeju people to reach any consensus¹⁶ because their viewpoints reflect their identities or philosophies. So first of all it is necessary for the Naval Forces and Jeju people including Hwasoon residents to have a meeting and conversation, and then to proceed with the political process to negotiate. But the issue of arming Hwasoon seaport has remained unresolved since 2002 due to the absence of politics.

The issue of heavily arming Hwasoon seaport is more complex because of the gap between the intent of government and the expectation of Jeju people. Jeju people expect two tasks to be accomplished: One is 'to contribute to world peace'; the other is to make Jeju the island of peace' (Hyun 2006, 73). When reviewing the military base of Hwasoon seaport in relation to the above-mentioned two tasks, the issue is restated as follows: (1) whether the military base of Hwasoon seaport can contribute to world peace, and (2) whether the military base of Hwasoon seaport will contribute to making the vision of Jeju the Island of World Peace come true. I think that when Jeju people applauded the designation of Jeju as the Island of World Peace, Jeju people preferred making and establishing the peace by peaceful means.¹⁷ If it is the case, the military base of Hwasoon seaport does not fit into the expectations of Jeju people.

On the other hand, when designating Jeju as the Island of World Peace, the intent of the central government leans toward the geo-economic consideration so that the Law of Jeju, Island of World Peace is enacted within the Special Law of Jeju Free International City. In other words, the central government is to take advantage of

¹⁶ Prime Minister Hae-Chan Lee had remarked of the need for consensus among Jeju people in order to build the military base in Hwasoon seaport when answering the questions about arming Hwasoon seaport in the parliament in 2005 (*Jejusori*, June 9, 2005).

¹⁷ For the meanings of 'peace by peaceful means' in Jeju Island of World Peace, see Yang & Chang (2002, 199-226).

Jeju, Island of World Peace in order to realize the goals of Jeju Free International City.

Of course it will be desirable to consider the combination of peace and prosperity by integrating the law of world peace into the special law of a free international city. With this combination, a positive cycle between peace and prosperity will be set up and the idea of sustainable development will be pervasive, which can become the differentiated brand of Jeju Free International City. But until now it is not certain whether the combination of peace and prosperity can help Jeju take these expected directions — these are sustainable development focusing on the harmony with nature, the extension of security towards human security more than state security, and leading the cooperation and exchanges among East Asian countries by open regionalism — because the policy orientation of the Roh administration is dominated by the economic logic of neoliberalism which is largely backed up by statism.

If we view the military base of Hwasoon seaport in the perspective of a geoeconomy that the central government focused on, the heavily armed Hwasoon seaport does not seem to contribute to the success of Jeju Free International City. While free international city means the free movement of people, goods and capital, a military base is likely to constrain the free movement at any time if necessary for the military operations. If Hwasoon seaport is developed as a tourist or logistics seaport for attracting people, goods and capital from East Asia according to the original blue print, it will best suit the vision of Jeju Free International City.

In spite of the undesirability of heavily arming Hwasoon seaport, some people of Jeju are beginning to concede the military base of Hwasoon seaport for the purpose of getting the economic benefits. For example, Hong-Ik Moon, who is the chair of the Jeju Chamber of Commerce and Industry, consented to the proposal of the military base of Hwasoon seaport, saying that “we cannot make money if considering the opposite function” (*Jejusori*, June 19, 2006). Moon’s remarks reflect partly the milieu in which they might post-

pone or even give up the Island of World Peace if necessary to make money under the condition of continuous economic impasses. Moon Hong-ik typically represented the economic approach to the military base that will contribute to bringing about economic benefits by the effectiveness of constructing a 'back city.'¹⁸

The emergence of economic viewpoint¹⁹ on the military base is in part owing to the central government. First, as explained earlier, the Roh administration approached Jeju, Island of World Peace with the logic of the geoeconomy. It is natural for some people of Jeju to approach the Island of World Peace from an economic perspective. If Jeju, Island of World Peace is limited to playing an auxiliary role to provide places for meetings and conferences arranged by the central government without a certain level of autonomy in diplomacy, it cannot satisfy the mounting expectations of Jeju people. To the extent that Jeju, Island of World Peace cannot perform its roles as a Free International City positively and progressively, the gap between expectation and frustration will grow wider, which will pose the question about the utility of the Island of World Peace. In fact, there are a lot of Jeju people wondering whether Jeju, Island of World Peace is merely a symbol, and inclining to be supportive of inviting the military base of Hwasoon seaport for revival of the economy while sustaining the desirability of Jeju, Island of World Peace in the long run.

The problem lies in the fact that the economic benefits of the military base are not projected to be as big as expected even though it would contribute to a construction boom in the short term. First, in

¹⁸ Ko (2006, 40-41) criticized the effectiveness of the city at the back of the military base on the grounds that a military base does not have the developmental sources such as free movement of people, goods and capital which is the goal of Jeju Free International City.

¹⁹ The issue of arming Hwasoon seaport shifted its focus from security to economy in August 2005 when some people from Wimiru of Jeju formed the Promotion Committee for Inviting the Marine Military Base for the purpose of getting economic benefits while calling for building up the military base in Wimi seaport instead of Hwasoon seaport.

spite of the grand construction project with investment of 800 billion won for 8 years, the actual share for Jeju is about 20% of the total investment because the other 80% is going to the big enterprises that will make contracts with the Ministry of National Defense. Second, on reviewing the relation between the military base and tourism, the analysis published by the Jeju Development Institute (2005, 81-86) suggests a negative influence for the following reasons: 1) empirically most military bases do not play a tourist role in themselves; 2) the number of visitors to meet soldiers would not be large enough because of the expensive costs to visit Jeju; 3) the stipulation of the Law of Protecting the Military Establishment hinders the free use of the Hwasoon area such as Mt. Sanbang and the seaside of Yongmeori; 4) if the heavily militarized Hwasoon seaport is connected with the MD program of the USA, it will inevitably give visitors anxiety and bad images.

Though its benefits are not big enough and the 2002 survey on the opinions of Jeju people already showed that 58.2% of Jeju people opposed the project of arming Hwasoon seaport (*Hallailbo*, October 25, 2002), the issue of arming Hwasoon seaport is continuously debated for economic concerns. This debate poses two things to think about. First, the reason why Jeju people are moving toward economic benefits, though in the short term, is a policy failure of the Roh administration. The Roh administration announced Jeju as the Island of World Peace without thorough preparation, but has neglected to promote the peace industry, although it is not easily achieved. It is now considered that the vision of Jeju, Island of World Peace seems to be more than South Korea including Jeju can deal with. The Island of World Peace needs to go beyond the statism and neoliberalism from the Korean people and demands the peculiar mission and even the sacrifice of Jeju people. Now the issue of arming Hwasoon seaport becomes the testing gate that Jeju has to pass if Jeju wants to keep the brand of the Island of World Peace and show its capacity for pushing forward the Island of World Peace.

V. Conclusion: Beyond the Nation-Oriented Viewpoint

Jeju, Island of World Peace is the vision of upgrading the future of Jeju by combining peace and prosperity within the dimensions of Nature, Culture, History, Geopolitics and Geoeconomy. At the same time Jeju, Island of World Peace is the strategy to achieve the goals of Jeju Free International City. Though there are different opinions about the vision and strategy of World Peace, Jeju people and the Roh administration had common understandings as follows: 1) review and revival of a unique traditional culture and the clean environment of Jeju, and reinterpretation and overcoming of the April 3 Incident, 2) reflection and reformation of the developmental tracks as international tourist resorts since the 1970s, 3) using the geopolitics of Jeju which has played a networking role in upgrading the exchange and cooperation in East Asia including the Korean peninsula in the post-cold war era, 4) making Jeju a model of decentralized & balanced development through opening markets as a response to the challenges of globalization. When Roh Moo-Hyun announced Jeju as the Island of World Peace on January 27, 2005, Jeju people applauded the designation.

But now in 2006 the policy of World Peace is not satisfying Jeju people, though the vision of Jeju, Island of World Peace is still welcome. This is first of all owing to the economic logic of neoliberalism that the central governments, including the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations, have cherished in order to respond to the pressures of globalization. Since making money is of primary importance all over the world, some people of Jeju think that the vision of Jeju, Island of World Peace can be postponed if necessary to make money. The issue of arming Hwasoon seaport turns out to be an economic issue to Jeju people while a military or security issue to the Naval Forces.²⁰

²⁰ Because I already reviewed the theoretical debate about the relation between peace and security concerning heavily arming Hwasoon seaport (Yang 2005, 57-73), I focused on the opinions of Jeju people in this paper.

It is obvious that the project of heavily arming Hwasoon seaport does not serve the vision of Jeju, Island of World Peace. But some people of Jeju suggest the actual postponement of World Peace for economic benefits and then the inhabitants vote is proposed to solve the hot issue of whether to arm Hwasoon seaport or not. To make a decision on the hot issue, the inhabitants vote can be effective. But before the vote is conducted, the central government has to make clear its official stance about arming Hwasoon seaport for two reasons: First, because the Roh administration designated Jeju as the Island of World Peace, it is reasonable that the Roh administration has to say something about the relation between world peace and the military base. Second, the issue of heavily arming Hwasoon seaport deserves a national debate before coordinating the opinions of Jeju people as Ko(2006, 46) argued.

Finally, I would like to suggest the East Asian perspective in relation to arming Hwasoon seaport. In the 20th century, Korean people lived within the perspective of localism and statism. Localism ruled the consciousness and behavior in our daily life from the regional rivalry between Yeongnam and Honam areas to Jeju's little version of regionalism between North and South areas or that between East and West areas. Statism exerted enormous power, regarding the Republic of Korea as the pivot. This Nation-oriented viewpoint was partly owing to the consciousness of identifying the fortune of the individual with that of the state, which was forced by Japanese imperialism, the division of the nation, the Korean War and the continuous threats from the North.

But the new trends of the post-cold war era, globalization and the information network make us realize that the future of peace and prosperity is not possible with localism and statism. In fact, Jeju Free International City in 2002, Jeju, Island of World Peace in 2005 and Jeju Special Self-governing Province in 2006 are all consistent with the globalism that is renamed as an East Asian perspective beyond localism and statism. But there is the gap between the global vision and statist policy as well as that between the East

Asian perspective and local consciousness. Then, there is one group of people approving and another group opposing the military base at Hwasoon seaport.

Now Jeju people have the three interconnected global tasks of Free International City, Island of World Peace and Special Self-governing Province. I think that the future of Jeju depends on the coordinated efforts to perform the above-mentioned three tasks, but not on arming Hwasoon seaport. It poses a unique mission to Jeju people demanding the consciousness of globalism and an East Asian perspective in order to implement the Free International City successfully. From the perspective of East Asia, the military base of Hwasoon seaport should not be established as an excuse for economic benefits in the short term. Thus, I would like to suggest the idea of an East Asian Peace Seaport for Hwasoon seaport in the paradigm of 'the peace by peaceful means' and globalism.

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A Suggestion for the Establishment of a Jeju International Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Centre

Yasushi Akashi

The following suggestion has been inspired by instances of UN and international activities in Asia such as the UN Peacekeeping Operation in Cambodia (1992-1993), the UN Peacekeeping Operation in East Timor (1999-2006) and other international disaster relief operations, including the Indian Ocean Tsunami disaster (December 2004) and the earthquakes in Pakistan and Indonesia in 2005 and 2006. These operations are brilliant and positive examples of international and regional cooperation, and have demonstrated tremendous potential for solidarity and mutual confidence among the nations concerned. They have also shown that the countries of the region can and should do more in developing skills and effectiveness in coping with common threats of conflicts and humanitarian disasters.

The international activities mentioned above have contributed to alleviating human suffering, have improved the prospects for peace and stability in the region and have helped solidify the sense of regional and international cohesion.

Objectives: the Jeju International Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Centre aims at contributing to a more effective participation and capacity-building by the countries in Asia and the Pacific in partic-

icipating in UN-sponsored peace operations or other similar operations as well as in international humanitarian activities. Through its activities the Centre intends to enhance mutual confidence and trust among the countries and peoples in Northeast Asia and the wider Asia and the Pacific. The Centre hopes to play a positive role in promoting conflict resolution, peacekeeping, peace-building and other efforts for the peaceful settlement of conflicts and alleviation of instability through the cooperation among governments and other international and national institutions in the region.

Sponsorship: the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province will be responsible for the organization as well as the administration of the Centre under the over-all supervision of the Government of the Republic of Korea. The Centre will be guided by a small international advisory board, consisting mainly of eminent persons with relevant experience from countries in the region, assisted, as required, by the United Nations and other institutions.

Programmes and Activities: the Centre will conduct training programmes and seminars of various durations at advanced, mid-career as well as for beginner levels in order to enable participants to acquire new skills and insight and better perform in peacekeeping, civilian police and civilian activities as well as in humanitarian situations undertaken by the United Nations, regional or other multi-lateral organizations. The Centre will also organize conferences and workshops with a view to elucidating emerging international issues and producing practical suggestions. In addition, it will undertake publications and other information programmes for the dissemination of relevant knowledge and for educational purposes.

Participants: interested governments, academic or research institutions, regional organizations, business groups and enterprises, and interested civil society and NGOs and individuals, who are able to make a tangible contribution to the attainment of the objectives of the Centre, will be invited to participate in programmes and activities of the Centre.

Affiliations: the Centre will undertake relevant programs and

activities by itself, or in cooperation with other similar institutes in other countries and regions, as required. A formal agreement of affiliation may be concluded with selected institutions.

Funding: funding for the formative period will be made by the Government of the Republic of Korea in cooperation with the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province. Other governments, organizations and individuals may also wish to participate in funding. Financial contributions from sources outside the Republic of Korea will be welcomed to ensure the Centre's international and regional perspectives and activities.

About Contributors

• Opening and Welcoming Remarks

Chairman KIM, Cae-One, International Peace Foundation

Chairman KIM was a professor at the Department of Economics of Seoul National University (1971-2004) and dean of the College of Social Sciences (1995-96), and served as President of the Academic Association of International Economic Studies (1988-89), and the Korea Economic Association (2000-01). He was founding President (1988-91) and Chairman (1993-98) of the Korea Information Strategy Development Institute (KISDI), and Commissioner of the Financial Supervisory Commission (1998-99) of Korea. He was awarded the French Government Decoration, *Legion d'Honneur* (1990). He assumed the Chairmanship of the International Peace Foundation in March 2006.

Chairman LEE, Su-Hoon, the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Initiative

Chairman Lee received his Ph.D. in Comparative International Development and Sociology from the Johns Hopkins University in 1986. In 1986, he joined the faculty of Sociology at Kyungnam University in Korea and simultaneously assumed the position of Associate Director at its Institute for Far East Asian Studies in Seoul. In 2000, he joined the faculty of the School for North Korean Studies in Seoul. In August 2005, he was appointed as the Chair of the Presidential Committee on the Northeast Asian Initiative, one of the key policy advisory bodies for President Roh Moo -hyun.

Governor KIM, Tae-Hwan

In May 2006, Mr. Kim was elected as the first Governor of the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province through popular vote. He completed his undergraduate work in law at Cheju National University. Afterwards, he received an MA in Administration at Yonsei University. In 2004, he was conferred an honorary degree from Cheju National University. He has served in various capacities including, Governor of South Jeju District County, Mayor of Jeju City, and Governor of the Special Self-Governing Province.

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Currently Vice Chancellor of the Jeju Peace Institute, International Peace Foundation. He studied German language and literature (Seoul National University) before joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1969. He has served at the Korean Embassies in Vienna (1971), Bonn (1978), and Amman (1982) before being appointed as Ambassador to Norway (1995-1997), Denmark (1998-2000) and Germany (2003-2005). In Seoul, he has served as Director-General in the European Affairs Bureau (1991-1992) and Deputy Minister for Policy Planning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His latest publication is *Regional Community Building in East Asia* published by the Yonsei University Press in 2002.

H.E.Mr. LIM, Chae-Jung, Speaker, the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea

Elected as Speaker in August 2006, moving from his previous post in the National Assembly as Chairman of the Unification, Foreign Affairs & Trade Committee, held since 2004. From 1992, he has been a member of the 14, 15, 16 & 17th National Assemblies. During his tenure in the National Assembly, he has served in several important positions such as Chairman of the ruling

Uri Party Planning and Advisory Committee (2004), Chairperson of the Presidential Transition Committee (2002) and Chairman of the Special Committee Supporting Development of Inter-Korean Relations. He graduated from Jeil High School, Kwangju and Korea University (B.A. in Law).

H.E. Amb. GODAL, Bjorn Tore

Bjørn Tore Godal was educated at Telemark Commercial College, Holly Royde College, and the University of Manchester 1965, earning a B.A. at the University of Oslo (1969). After becoming secretary of research and international affairs for the Norwegian Labour Party (1973-80), he served as secretary and chairman for the Oslo Labour Party (1980-82; 1982-90), continuing his career as a member of the National Executive Committee, Norwegian Labour Party (1983-90). He was Minister of Trade and Shipping (1991-94), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1994-97), and Minister of Defence (2000-2001). He was also a member of Parliament (1986-2001). He also served as Senior Advisor, Department of Political Science, the University of Oslo.

• Paper Contributors

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Yasushi Akashi graduated from the Graduate School of the University of Virginia after receiving a B.A. at the University of Tokyo. He is currently chairman of the Japan Center for Conflict Prevention, president of the Japan Association for UN Studies, and director of the Foreign Language Research Institute of the Gunma Prefectural Women's University. After joining the UN (1957), he served as Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs of the UN (1987) and as Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General (1995). He was the first president of the Hiroshima Peace Institute and the Asahi Shimbun Asia Network (AAN) until February of 1999.

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Steve Chan received his Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota (1976), and has been a Fulbright scholar in Singapore and Taiwan. He studies international relations and comparative politics with a focus on East Asia. His recent

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