Jeju Peace Institute

KIM Sung-Han(Korea University)No More Salami Tactics  A strong message was delivered from the Rose Garden to Pyongyang. “We agreed that under no circumstance are we going to allow North Korea to possess nuclear weapons,” South Korean President Lee Myung-bak told reporters after he and President Obama held a morning-long summit meeting on June 16. Obama was equally emphatic about the need to defang the North Koreans by saying that “we will pursue denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula vigorously.”  In addition, both leaders agreed that North Korea’s provocations have been ‘rewarded’ as the international community offered fuel, food and loans in exchange for promises of good behavior that are eventually broken. They said in a single voice that “we are going to break that pattern.” President Obama also said that North Korea would not find security or respect through threats and illegal weapons. This was a firm warning message to North Korea which has been relying on the so-called ‘salami tactics’ that slice an issue into pieces so that it may maximize its benefits through negotiations over each sliced issue. In this light, the United States and other participating countries of the Six Party Talks are expected to explore a package deal, not a gradualistic deal, by putting all issues on the table and striking a deal all at once. They already purchased North Korea’s horse twice through the Geneva Agreed Framework of 1994 and the February 13 Agreement of 2007, which means they will never buy that horse (the ‘freezing’ of the nuclear weapons development program) three times. North Korea must dismantle nuclear facilities and eliminate nuclear weapons in a complete and verifiable manner.  The final goal in the resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem is the realization of a ‘denuclearized, WMD-free Korean peninsula.’ This includes comprehensive arms control: conventional and biochemical weapons as well as nuclear dismantlement. Hopefully, this will lead to the creation of a new peaceful order in the region through the normalization of tri-national relations among South and North Korea and the U.S. The principles of the settlement of the North Korean nuclear weapons problem are as follows: 1) Both North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and war on the peninsula must be prevented 2) North Korea’s nuclear weapons issue is not only limited to its relations with the U.S., but also to those with South Korea 3) While based on cooperation among South Korea, Japan and the U.S., efforts should also include help from other related countries 4) Both carrot and stick tactics should be used 5) There should be preparations for the worst-case scenario in which North Korea turns down the dialogue and chooses nuclear armament. The North Korean nuclear issue is accepted as part of the international agenda beyond the issue of the Korean peninsula. Thus, instead of ‘Korean exceptionalism,’ the concept of ‘international universalism,’ which is based on denuclearization and non-proliferation, should be applied.Comprehensive and Strategic Alliance  The alliance between South Korea and the U.S. can be considered the most successful of those formed in the Cold War era. Since the Cold War ended, the alliance has developed into a strong security alliance based on liberal democracy. Fifty years ago, there was no understanding whatsoever between the two, except regarding their shared enemy North Korea, but since then the two countries have established strong political, economic, social and cultural ties. Faced with constant threats from North Korea (with the nuclear threat the most recent reminder) a solid alliance has supported the two countries to continue to deepen their economic and social interdependence.  Presidents Lee and Obama agreed that the geo-strategic range of the ROK-US alliance should not be limited to the Korean peninsula. They also agreed that, in addition to deterring the 19th-century-style hegemonic struggle between China and Japan, the alliance should be a strategic deterrent against new threats of the 21st century: terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, drugs, illegal immigration and piracy, among others.  During the June 16 summit meeting, both leaders signed a vision statement entitled ‘the Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea.’ The most impressive and conspicuous sentence in the statement is that “Through our alliance we aim to build a better future for all people on the Korean Peninsula, establishing a durable peace on the Peninsula and leading to peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy.” This signifies two things: 1) The ROK-U.S. alliance is an alliance of shared values and 2) The ROK-U.S. alliance is an alliance for peace-building and Korean reunification.  An ‘alliance of shared values’ means that the two countries, as partners who share the values of democracy and a market economy, cooperate in dealing with threats on human beings (human security threats) such as human rights violations, terrorism, drugs, and environmental/natural disasters. In particular, South Korea and the U.S. may strengthen human security cooperation with such democracies as Japan, Australia, New Zealand and India, while stamping out global human rights violations, including those in North Korea. The two leaders also emphasized in the vision statement that they would work together to promote respect for the fundamental human rights of the North Korean people. It is particularly notable that the two allies made it clear that the alliance would contribute to peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy, which means the Korean reunification will have to take place on South Korean terms with the help of the United States.  In addition, the summit meeting on June 16 between Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Barack Obama marked the turning point where those two allies will be working on ‘real peace,’ not ‘declaratory peace’ on the Korean Peninsula. There are two types of peace: one is ‘declaratory peace’ where one declares there is peace the other is ‘real peace’ where one proves the peace by action. The Lee administration will focus not on ‘declaratory peace’ that is, relying on a ‘declaration of peace’ or a ‘declaration of the end of the war’ but on building ‘real peace,’ in which denuclearization would eliminate the threat of war and conventional weapons would be reduced. Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, where a number of declarations did not guarantee peace, suggest the importance of real peace.Keeping KORUS FTA Alive  After the summit meeting with President Obama, President Lee Myung-bak urged representatives of top U.S. companies to push for quick ratification of a stalled U.S.-South Korean free trade deal. He told a crowd of business leaders at the June 16 dinner sponsored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that “now is the time to step up” and ratify a deal that he said would boost trade dramatically and strengthen the countries’ alliance. President Obama said during the summit that he wanted to make sure differences over automobiles are settled before the deal is sent to Congress for ratification.  With the growing importance of political economy in international relations, the prominent position of market economies in Northeast Asia harbors political, strategic and economic implications. In this context, trans-Pacific economic interdependence has been the backbone of prosperity for the last few decades and will constitute the single most important factor determining the region’s economic order in this century. This interdependence is a two-way street, benefiting both Asia?including South Korea?and the United States. In this context, Seoul and Washington need to deepen bilateral economic ties and work together on regional economic cooperation. South Korea can play an important role throughout the region. For example, in view of the enormous differences in the level of economic development, it can act as a bridge between developed and developing countries.  In this vein, the KORUS FTA should be understood as a part of the strategic alliance. President Obama should recognize the fact that the United States has acquired invisible strategic benefits from the KORUS FTA since the United States can utilize its FTA with South Korea to encourage a regional FTA and to discourage ‘East Asian regionalism’ that excludes the United States. On the regional level, the current U.S. strategy asks South Korea to choose between the ‘East Asian regionalism’ preferred by China on the one hand and Asia-Pacific regionalism promoted by the U.S. on the other. For South Korea, ‘Asia-Pacific regionalism’ which includes Pacific nations such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, seems to be a better choice to satisfy both China and the U.S. than East Asian regionalism that solely includes ASEAN plus Three countries. Still, Asia Pacific regionalism should not damage cooperation with China, and should lead the effort for regional cooperation. In this context, the June 16 summit meeting reminded those two leaders, particularly President Obama, of the strategic importance of the KORUS FTA from a wider regional perspective.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* Kim Sung-hanKim Sung-han (ksunghan@korea.ac.kr) is Professor of International Relations at the Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University, in Seoul.

Korea’s New Asian Diplomatic Policy  In March 2009, the Korean Government declared a “New Asian Diplomatic Policy” with the aim to facilitate friendship and cooperation with the countries in Asian region. “Northern Diplomacy” had been declared and carried out in the early 1990s by the Korean Government. However, it has been the first time for Korea to officially announce so-called “southern diplomacy.”  Therefore, I believe that references to southern diplomatic policies by neighboring countries could provide us with valuable lessons.  Firstly, in early 1970’s concerning the future of low-tech, labor intensive and polluting industries, Japanese society engaged in a heated debate on whether they be closed down or transferred abroad.  It is known that Japan selected 3 countries as major cooperation partners for the southern diplomacy after studying economic potentiality, resource endowment, market size, and domestic industrial policy etc.   Assisted by regionally specialized institutions such as JETRO and JAICA, and dispatched investigation teams of specialists to Southeast Asia. This was fully consulted and coordinated by related government organizations such as Industry and Trade Ministry, Finance Ministry, Transportation Ministry, and Foreign Affairs Ministry to gather information in each country.  Probably it was an example of “and Concentrate Strategy”. The targeted three countries were Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In some sense, transfer of declining industry to less developed areas increased Japanese foreign direct investment and at the same time supported the construction of social overhead capital around the transferring companies through official development assistance.  Ranges of Japanese corporations from Azinomoto, Asahi Beer, to Toyota and Nissan Motors made inroads into Thailand. However, during the early days, most auto parts were directly imported from Japan. The Thai government took a firm attitude on the negotiation process with Japanese corporations in order to acquire auto part manufacture technology and succeeded in manufacturing some auto parts in Thailand. Actually the great part of foreign direct investment in Thailand was led by Japanese MNCs. As of the financial crisis in July 1997, among the total Thai foreign debt($90 billion) Japanese shares were as much as about $70 billion (77.7%), reflecting the high dependency on Japan.  Malaysia carried out a “Look East” policy immediately after Prime Minister Mahathir’s inauguration about for 6-7 years (1980-1987), which was modeled on the Korean developmental strategy. Thus at that time the consultant of an industrial policy part in 5-year economic development plan was Korean, a Professor from Chung-Ang University, and about 50 high-ranking officials had been trained by the Central Officials Training Institute in Korea on the Malaysian government account. But afterwards, Look East Policy started gradually moving to Japan, the no-pollution, high-tech industry SONY, Hitachi, Mitsubishi’s Proton car model, etc, had begun to make inroads into Malaysia industrialization through Japanese government southern diplomacy.  Indonesia had been a target country of Japanese southern diplomacy. But, in order to check Japanese reliance, in the second half of the Suharto presidency (mid-1990s), he assigned KIA Motors of Korea as the people’s car model. The Japanese government and WTO reacted against Jakarta. Because Indonesia is such a very large country, Japan`s investment together with Australia, Germany, Netherlands, Korea and so on, was worthy of close attention.  Secondly, in 1992 Taiwan formulated the “Southern Policy,” similar to that of Japan. Before Taiwan made some concentrated investment in Central and South America combining with ODA and FDI in order to penetrate American market.  Concentration was also spearheaded by the private sector to Fujian Shang in China. However, according to Taiwan’s Southern Policy, the Taiwan government selected Vietnam and the Philippines as target countries of southern diplomacy after close research and in depth studies.  The large-scale investment to Vietnam and advancement into Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines were results of Southern Policy at the government level.  Thirdly, Southern Policy of Korea, “New Asian Diplomatic Policy” announced in March 2009, carries a declarative significance to emphasize a new policy concentration on this specific area. Above all Korea recognizes the importance of Asia. It is announced that first, Korea’s goal is to raise trade with ASEAN. Second, Korea will increase Official Development Assistance (ODA) to developing countries of Asia. Third, Korea will participate in regional economic integration such as East Asia FTA (EAFTA) of ASEAN+3, Comprehensive Economic Partnership in EAST ASIA (CEPEA) of ASEAN+6, South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and so on. Fourth, Korea will make a greater effort for Asian common interest on global issues including the global financial crisis, climate change, development and cooperation, anti-terrorism, etc., through solidarity with allied nations in Asia. Fifth, the primary vehecle of Korea’s promoting its New Asian Diplomatic Policy is utilization of summit diplomacy.  However, most experts in diplomatic community understand the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) is merely building on the old policy rather than creating any new initiatives.  In any case, southern diplomacies on the part of neighboring Japan and Taiwan were implemented comprehensively by experts, related agencies and authorities, and by the private sector, with active participation and debate. Therefore, it may be also worthwhile for Korea to look into these experiences as well.The Future of Korea-Asian cooperation  Actually Korea-Asian cooperation already has begun not as top-down approach but community-building of bottom-up approach. Korean companies have made inroads into Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines without their government’s support.  And they have executed business activity more competitively in the least developed ASEAN countries such as Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar than Japanese companies which have benefited from their government’s support. Korean companies’ horizons have already jumped beyond ASEAN. Korean entrepreneurship has been sweeping over the whole of Asia through automobiles, washing machines, TV sets, and so on, in India, high-speed highways and bus businesses in Pakistan, textiles and clothings in Bangladesh, toys, hats, pottery business in Sri Lanka, and even countries in Central Asia, Iran and Turkey.  Malaysia’s model for its Look East Policy as well as the industrial model for Doimoi of Vietnam was Korea. Developing Asian nations are yearning for Korea at the government level. In these days Korean Wave joins this, and now the New Asian Diplomatic Policy is announced by the government, so Asia developing countries are harboring excited expectations.  During the June 1-2, 2009, ASEAN-ROK Commemorative Summit Meeting, investment agreements that had been under negotiation were signed, and Korea and ASEAN have finished a framework for a free trade zone to succeed commodity and services agreements that took effect in June 2007 and May 2009, respectively. This statement has extensive policy significance such as ① raising trade to $150 billion in 2015 from $90 billion in 2008, ② increasing ODA to $400 million from $200 million, ③ dispatching 10,000 Korean Overseas Volunteers, together with inviting 7,000 ASEAN trainees to Korea for 7 years, ④ promoting ICT knowledge cooperation between Korea and ASEAN, ⑤ especially promoting green technology tie-ups, ⑥ addressing global issues such as climate change, food and energy security, global financial crisis, and so on, ⑦ addressing the North Korean nuclear issue by peaceful approach, with the six-party framework as soon as possible, ⑧ collaborating on international crime such as terrorism, etc.  Therefore, the Korean government’s political will is committed to make a broad proclamation. Perhaps, next step should be to take a specific strategy and action plan concretely and effectively, taking overall aim and direction into consideration. For this, the academic world, experts in the private sector, and related government agencies must work together to come up with the best approach among the various alternative plans, through in-depth study, research and debate.  Newly established “Korea-ASEAN Center” in March 2009 and possibly proposed “Korea-ASEAN Society” are expected to play an important role in promoting the Korea-ASEAN cooperation in future이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* Writer KimHak-Su(88hakskim@gmail.com) is a Chairman of the Asia Economic Community Foundation and served as the Executive Secretary of the UNESCAP and Under Secretary General of the UN that was the highest-level UN official of Korean before Mr. Ban Ki-moon.