제주평화연구원

  Many observers equate territorial disputes with maritime security issues in East Asia. In the East China Sea, disputes are over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands between Japan and China. In the South China Sea, it is primarily about disputes between China and certain South East Asian countries over the Paracel and Spratly islands groups.

  China has now emerged as the most important actor in East Asia’s maritime domain. China believes territorial issues in the region were quietly provoked by the US which has traditionally given its political and military support to countries that have territorial disputes with China. China claims that the US has played up a “Chinese threat” perception in the region to persuade China’s neighbours to support the US’s “rebalance” strategy and to join its alliance in countering China’s rise. In China’s view, territorial disputes, from the East China Sea to the South China Sea would not have intensified had the US not “pivoted” to Asia and strengthened its hub-and-spoke security alliances at Beijing’s insecurity. China’s diplomacy in the past two years has paid attention to trying to prevent Washington from “meddling in” regional territorial issues. The primary goal has been to negate what China perceives as the formation of a US’s led alliance around China’s periphery. China’s renewed interests and priority on periphery diplomacy in 2013 is simultaneously about limiting US access to its neighbours and expanding China’s regional influence further.

  The US has a different narrative. The US suspects that China is seeking regional hegemony and driving the US out of the region. The US sees heightening tension in the East China Sea and South China Sea due to China’s increased re-assertiveness to expand regional influence through military and para-military means as well as utilizing Beijing’s increasing economic might to influence neighbours. The US also believes that China is increasingly ready to implement policies in defiance of established international norms and practices, or interpret them in irregular ways that favour China’s interests. The establishment of the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, and several Chinese attempts to limit US military activities in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone were seen by the US as clear violations of universally accepted “freedom of navigation and over flight” doctrine. On China’s accusation that the US is meddling in regional territorial disputes, the US insists its core policy towards territorial disputes in the region is neutrality. The US, however, says it is not neutral on how countries resolve the disputes and strongly opposes: threat, use of force, coercion, or intimidation to settle disputes. The US’s insists “rebalance” is not to contain China’s rise but to ensure it continues to ascend within the current liberal order framework, and that international law (including UNCLOS) continues to be respected through out the region.

  The truth lies in the “Great Chinese dream” of becoming a naval power on the path to reclaim its Great Power status. China has a list of 100 anniversary goals the first of which is the 100th birthday of the Communist Party of China in 2021. By this time, China aspires to be able to master its maritime zone within the “first island chain”, that includes those within the 9-dashed line claim in the South China Sea. In China’s view, being abled to control this maritime zone is the core objective of its “near sea defence” strategy to ensure the security of its coastal provinces that account for 94% of its population, most economic output, and its strategic supply lifelines. Contrary to many beliefs, despite its huge energy needs, hydrocarbon resources are only China’s secondary objective in its maritime expansion (at least in the South China Sea). Most of the South China Sea is too deep for effective and economic exploitation by current Chinese technology. In 2012, the International Crisis Group interviewed some senior Chinese officials in the energy sector who claimed they would rather go to Africa than to the disputed waters of the South China Sea to search for oil. The tiny Paracel and Spratly island groups are seen by China as having a strategic value that supports its forward presence deep into the South China Sea, which is the most important motivation behind China’s recent construction and reclamation projects in these two groups of islands. China hopes that by enhancing its naval presence through out the South China Sea, it will be abled to eventually implement its Anti-Access, Area Denial strategy to keep the superior US navy out of its waterways. In the views of many, this was what provoked the US rebalance.

  East Asia maritime security is primarily about regional influence and dominance, where China and the US are the two key actors. Contradicting Sino-US strategic maritime interests are evident and widening and not easy to reconcile. This situation could lead to mis-perception and possible mis-calculations at the cost of regional peace and stability.

  What the rest of the region could do is to ensure they do not add to the mis-perceptions by sending the wrong signals such as creating the illusion to either China or the US that they are on either side. ASEAN does this by insisting ASEAN “do not want to choose sides” in the Sino-US rivalry. But claiming this alone is not enough. Clarifying strategic objectives and goals, and implementing foreign policy in a consistent and transparent manner is needed. The annual East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum or ADMM+ represents an opportunity to build strategic trust by providing an occasion and mechanism to promote region wide clarity and transparency on issues of strategic interests. The rest of the region can also encourage and support China and the US to reach certain agreements to avoid incidences, at sea or in the air (such as collisions), with potentially devastating consequences. Finally, we should encourage and cooperate with China and the US to clarify and build common “rules of the road”, and ensure that the regional maritime order is not based exclusively on the wishes and interests of a dominant power, but based on universally accepted rules and norms.

Dr. Nguyen Hung Son is Deputy Director-General of the Institute for South China Sea/East Sea Studies at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam. His areas of research are East Asia's security and cooperation, particularly maritime security, East Asia regionalism and ASEAN affairs.