제주평화연구원

  아마도 우리는 2010년을 동아시아 안보에  매우 중요한 한 해로 기억하게 될 것이다. 동해와 남중국해에서 일어나는 해상 영토 분쟁으로 인해 분쟁확대를 억지하는 메커니즘의 필요성을 진지하게 재고해야 하는 상황이다. 또한 군비 증강과 비전통적 안보에 대한 우려가 날로 높아짐에 따라 보다 강력한 역내 다자간 메커니즘에 대해 열띤 논의를 낳았다.하지만 천안함 침몰사건과 연평도 포격사태는 한반도가 뿌리 깊고 가장 위험한 불안정한 상황에 속해있다는 사실을 다시금 우리에게 상기시켜 주었다. 외견상 한국 및 일본 그리고 미국 사이에 양자간 혹은 3자간 공조를 위한 계기를 마련한 것으로 보였다. 2010년 7월, 일본 자위대 장교들은 한미 군사 훈련을 참관했고, 지난 12월 한국군 장교들은 미일 군사훈련을 참관했다. 한미일 3국의 외무장관들은 지난 12월 뉴욕에 모여 북한 도발을 반대하는 공통 입장을 보여주었고, 한국과 일본 국방부 장관들은 올해 1월에 양국의 안보 공조를 격상하겠다는 의지를 확인했다. 일본 총리도 일본의회 첫 연설에서 일본이 3자 공조 강화에 관심을 두고 있음을 표명했고, 지난 1월말 미국 태평양사령부(USPACOM: United States Pacific Command) 사령관 또한 향후 3자간 합동 군사 훈련에 관심을 표명했다.이런 일련의 움직임이 냉전 때부터 존재해온 허브 앤 스포크(hub-and-spoke) 체제를 넘는 새로운 안보체제를 동북아에 탄생시킬 수 있을까? 그리고 이렇게 새로이 강화된 파트너십을 통해 제공할 수 있는 기능은 무엇일까? 이와 동시에 일각에서는 이런 파트너십으로 인해 자칫 중국이 한층 더 북한을 지원하도록 자극하여 결국 이 지역이 양진영으로 갈라지는 상황에 처할 수 있다고 우려한다. 과연 이 주장이 정말 설득력이 있는가? 동맹국간 공조를 강화하면서도 중국과 공동으로 북한에 대응할 수 있기 위해서는 어떻게 해야 할까?지난 20년 간 미국, 일본, 한국은 명백하게 북한의 핵과 미사일 개발로 인한 안보 위협을 함께 우려했다. 하지만 3자간 메커니즘을 유지하는 데는 실패했다. 1994년 북미핵동결협약으로 1차 북한 핵위기 사태를 진정시키는데 성공한 후, 해당 3개국은 북한 문제와 관련해 협력하기 위하여 임시방편적 성격의 고위급 회담을 갖기 시작했다. 그러나 3개국 회담은 초반부터 국가별 우선순위와 대북(對北) 정책의 상충으로 난관에 봉착했다. 하지만 대포동 미사일발사와 페리 프로세스에 의해 한미일 3자조정감독그룹(TCOG: Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group)을 결성하는데 성공했다. 공식적으로 TCOG는 1999년에 설립되었는데 조지 W. 부시 행정부가 출범할 때쯤 기능을 멈추었다. 그 결과, 2차 핵위기 때  TCOG는 북한의 행동에 대한 3자간 대응을 효과적으로 조율할 수 없었다. 일부 관료들이 예상하고 두려워한 대로, 6자회담 동안 다자간 협의로 인해 미국, 일본 및 한국 3자간 관계가 약화되었다.하지만, 오늘날 한국-일본 양국 관계 및 미국을 포함한 3자간 체제를 공고히 하는 것이 적어도 4가지 정당한 이유가 있다고 많은 이들이 주장하고 있다.첫째, 현상 유지를 추구하는 국가들간의 결속이 약해서 대북한 억지력이 약화되었고, 북한이 쐐기전략을 펼 수 있는 여지를 마련해 주었다. 연평도포격사건을 보더라도 북한의 저강도 군사작전을 억제할 정도로 대북한 억지력이 작동하지 못했다. 이는 상당히 새로운 상황이다. 더 강력한 억제 체제가 없다면 악몽으로 끝날 또 다른 북한의 도발을 저지할 수 없을지도 모른다. 옵저버의 참관 하에 이루어지는 한미 및 미일 합동 훈련은 어느 정도 상징적이고 억지적인 효과가 있지만 여전히 우리는 보다 확실한 방안을 구축해야 한다.둘째, 특히 북한의 전면적인 도발과 국내 혼란(domestic turmoil)이라는 두 개의 시나리오에 대처하려면 정책적 공조가 필요하다. 아직 가능성이 높지는 않지만 3국간 대응 메커니즘이 부재하다면 비판받아 마땅하다. 전(前) 일본외무성 차관이었던 히토시 다나카(Hitoshi Tanaka)는 3국 협력에는 북한 도발 발생 시 한국을 방어하기 위한 총체적인 긴급사태대책을 마련하는 것이 포함되어야 한다고 주장한다. 그는 또한 “탈북난민 문제를 처리하는 것과 같은 비군사적 측면”도 대비해야 한다고 지적했다. 주한미군과 한국 간의 군사 계획에 일본도 당사자로 포함시킬 수 있을 것이다.셋째로, 한미일 3개국은 미국과 맺은 동맹관계의 신뢰성을 유지하기 위해 믿을 수 있는 첩보 메커니즘을 수립해야 한다. 2006년 7월 5일 북한의 미사일 발사 직후 3자간 공조체제의 균열이 드러났는데, 한국 측 대응은 일본이나 미국보다 확실히 늦었다. 만약 북한에 의한 사건이 일어난 직후 미국 혹은 한국이 일본과의 정보공유를 결정하지 않는다면 이런 유사한 문제들이 다시 일어날 수 있다. 또한 한국과 일본의 우방국이자 동반자인 미국이 극히 중대한 안보 사건에 대해 즉시 통고하지 않을 수도 있기 때문에 한국과 일본은 신뢰성 문제에 직면하게 될지도 모른다.넷째로, 지금 현재의 모멘텀으로 인해 이번 기회가 적기이다. 2010년 사건들은 일본과 한국의 국민들에게 지역적 불안정성을 인식시키기에 충분했다. 또한 이명박 대통령은 정상회담을 위해 도쿄를 방문하고, 한국과 일본 양국은 새로운 한-일 시대에 대하여 합의할 것이다. 또한 보도에 의하면 일본 총리도 6월에 미국을 방문하여 전략적 동맹의 목적과 방식에 대한 새로운 지침을 공표할 것이라고 한다. 억지력이 발휘되려면 군사력과 준비태세에 덧붙여 상징적인 단합이 필요하기 때문에 최고위급 결정은 중요하다.2009년 9월 이후 일본의 새로운 여당인 민주당은 미국과 거리를 유지하는 것처럼 보였다. 그러나 실제로는 천안함 사태와 연평도 포격 사건이 터지자 일본 정부는 이에 신속하게 대응했고, 한국을 강하게 지지했다. 비록 언론보도에서는 마에하라(Maehara) 외무상이 북한과의 대화를 모색하고 있는 듯 보였지만 북한과의 양자간 협상에 대한 일본내 지지를 얻어 내지 못했다. 만약 북한과의 협상이 가능하다면 미국이 먼저 나서야 하고, 그래야만 한다.이번 기회에 세계 안보차원에서 양국공조를 가능케 하는 물자, 용역의 상호제공협정(ACSA: Acquisition and Cross Service Agreement)과 같은 소규모(low key) 항목을 필두로 한국과 일본 양자 간 안보파트너십이 공고해질 것이다. 첩보 공유 메커니즘도 가능성이 있다. 이와 같은 초기조치들을 넘어서 젊은 세대를 포함한 한일 간 실무급 정규회담을 시행해야 한다. 일본과 미국도 또한 “일본 주변지역의 상황에서 일본의 평화와 안보를 보장하는 조치에 관한 법(SIASJ: Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)”에 대해 추가 조치를 논의할 수 있을 것이다. 또한 3자간 긴급사태 대책수립과 합동 해상훈련을 위해 회담을 조직하는 등을 통해 미국이 참여하는 것이 핵심적이지만, 한국과 일본도 3자간 협력이 미국의 안보 약속과 이해관계를 확보하는 목적이라는 관점을 가질 필요가 있다. 이런 관점에서 지난 12월 3개국 외무장관회동에서 언급했던 동남아시아 정책에 대한 3자간 대화도 책임분담 방식으로 소중한 가치가 있다.하지만 많은 이들이 더욱 강력한 공조 체제를 수립하는 데 있어 역사문제와 중국의 우려가 장애물이라고 또한 지적한다.물론, 역사적 화해를 위한 일본 정부의 노력을 한국 국민들은 여전히 미흡하다고 생각하여 일본 자위대와 협력하는 데 거부감이 있음을 알아야 한다. 하지만 북한발 위기와 벼랑끝 행동(brinkmanship behaviors)은 긴박하며 현행 안보 체제를 강화하지 않는 한 처리하기가 어렵다. 또한 한국과 일본은 미국을 설득하여 이 사태에 공동으로 진지하게 대처하고 미국이 우방국과 공조하도록 해야 한다. 나아가서 만약 도서관 협정과 역사적 성명 등과 같은 다른 양자 협정과 이러한 안보 공조를 연계시킨다면 양국 정부는 자국 내에서 강한 압력을 받을 것이다.또한 우리는 동맹 공조와 중국의 차후 행보 간 관계에 대해 신중하게 생각해봐야만 한다. 우리는 중국의 영향력이 어느 정도일까 의아해하지만, 말할 필요도 없이 중국은 북한에 여전히 영향력을 미치는 관계를 맺고 있다. 이런 의미에서 중국이 3개국 및 유엔 안보리 결의안에 공조하도록 유도하는 것이 중요하다. 한미일 3자간 결속은 중국에 압력으로 작용할 수 있다. 왜냐하면 중국은 절대로 미국 동맹 네트워크가 이 지역 내에서 미국의 영향력을 보존하도록 공식적으로 강화되는 것을 원하지 않기 때문이다.물론, 중국을 몰아 부치는 것은 바람직하지 않다. 이런 결과를 피하기 위해 우리는 먼저 중국의 부상을 견제하려는 것이 아니라, 현재의 상황을 대처하는데 미흡한 공조 수준을 강화해서 오로지 북한의 도발을 억제하는 3자간 공조체제를 설계해야 한다. 인권문제와 민주주의를 홍보하는 것이 3자간 공조체제의 의제가 될 수 없다는 것이다.둘째로, 아시아재단(Asia Foundation)의 스콧 스나이더(Scott Snyder)는 3개국 간 파트너십은 “중국의 협력을 배제하거나 억지해서는 안 된다”고 지적한다. 중국-일본-한국의 3자간 회담과 중국과 일본 및 한국의 양자 간 회담 진척은 병행되어야 한다. 하지만 일각에서는 한국, 일본과 미국 간의 동맹 공조를 격상하면 결국 중국-북한 관계를 강화하게 될 것이라고 우려하는데 이는 너무 지나친 비관주의이다. 중국으로서는 북한과의 관계를 상징적으로 그리고 실질적으로 강화하는 것이 중국에게도 더 이상 이로울 게 없기 때문이다. 목표는 여러 채널을 통해 모든 당사국들이 합의를 도출하는 방식으로 한반도 비핵화를 향해 전진할 수 있도록 하는 것이다.후진타오 주석이 미국을 방문하고 나서 미국과 중국은 공동으로 북한과의 대화 재개 가능성을 모색하고 있다. 외교는 항상 수정주의자들을 평화적인 방법으로 설득하는 매우 중요한 도구이다. 동시에, 우리는 동맹 공조를 더 확고히 할 수 있는 모멘텀을 놓쳐서는 안 된다. 이는 우리가 오랫동안 가지지 못했던 것이기 때문이다. 또 위기가 고조되는 상황에서 우리는 우선 우리가 갖고 있는 것이 무엇인지 따져보아야 한다. 현재의 억지상황에는 해결책이 절실히 필요하기 때문이다._____*이 논문의 원제는 “Momentum for Alliance Coordinations is as Important as Negotiations: Why is Seoul and Tokyo Cooperation Necessary?” 이며 요약본이 “North Korea: Why Seoul-Tokyo cooperation is necessary”라는 제목으로 동아시아 포럼(East Asia Forum) 웹사이트에 게재되어있다. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/09/north-korea-why-seoul-tokyo-cooperation-is-necessary/이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* 료 사하시(Ryo SAHASHI)는 일본 카나가와 대학교(Kanagawa University) 법학부 국제정치학 부교수이며 일본 국제 교류 센터(Japan Center for International Exchange)의 겸임 연구위원이다.

  The year 2010 would be remembered as the pivotal year of East Asian security. In the East and South China Seas, the maritime territorial disputes force us to seriously rethink the needs of de-escalation mechanisms. Also, military buildups and rising concerns of non-traditional security created heated discussions on the stronger multilateral mechanisms in East Asia.     However, the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeongdo reminded us of the deep-rooted and most risky instability lying in the peninsula. Seemingly, it created the momentum for the bilateral and trilateral cooperation among South Korea, Japan and the US. In July of 2010, officers from Self-Defense Forces observed the US-South Korea's military exercise, and last December South Korean military officers observed Japan-US exercises. The three countries' Foreign Ministers gathered in New York last December and they showed a common stance against the challenges from North Korea. South Korean and Japanese Defense Ministers confirmed their willingness to upgrade their security cooperation this January, and then the Japanese Prime Minister's address at the first day of the Diet also showed its interests in reinforcing the trilateral cooperation. The commander of USPACOM also showed his interests in future trilateral joint military exercises in late January.       Will this lead to a new security architecture in Northeast Asia, beyond the hub-and-spokes system since the Cold War? What functions could such newly-enhanced partnerships provide? At the same time, some argue that it would stimulate China towards further supports to Pyongyang, which ends up dividing this sub-region into two camps. Is this argument really persuasive? Where could we find out the balance between alliance coordination and shared approaches against a North Korea allied with China?   In the last two decades, the United States, Japan, and South Korea clearly shared concerns over the security threat of North Korean nuclear and missile development, but failed to keep the trilateral mechanism. After the 1994 Agreed Framework succeeded in cooling down the first North Korean nuclear crisis, the three nations began ad hoc high-level meetings to discuss collaboration on the North Korea issue. The trilateral meetings initially encountered difficulties over conflicting national priorities and policy towards North Korea. However, the Taepo-dong missile launch and the Perry Process successfully resulted in the creation of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG). The TCOG, officially established in 1999, ceased to function by the beginning of the George W. Bush administration. Thus, in the second nuclear crisis TCOG was unable to coordinate an effective trilateral response to North Korean behavior. During the Six Party Talks, multilateral negotiations undermined trilateral relations between the US, Japan, and the ROK, as some officials had predicted and feared.       However, today many argue that the effort for strengthening Seoul-Tokyo bilateral ties and trilateral frameworks with the US has at least four rationales.     Firstly, weak unity among the status quo powers has led to an insufficient power of deterrence on North Korea and the room for its wedging strategy. The Yeonpyeongdo shelling shows the deterrence did not work to the extent to prevent North Korea from taking low-intensity military action. This is quite a new situation. Without stronger frameworks of deterrence, another action by the North, which could prove a nightmare, might not be stopped. US-ROK and US-Japan joint exercises with the observers contributed to a symbolic, deterring effect, but we still need to develop more assurances.       Secondly, necessity for policy coordination lies in preparing for both scenarios of North Korean full-scale aggressions and domestic turmoil. The likelihood is still not high, but a lack of responsive mechanisms among the three countries should be criticized. Hitoshi Tanaka, former deputy minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, proposes that trilateral cooperation should "include the formulation of full-fledged contingency planning for the defense of South Korea in the event of North Korean aggressions." He also points out the "non-military aspects such as coping with a flow of refugees." The military planning between US Forces in Korea and Republic of Korea could include a Japanese counter-part.   Thirdly, the three countries should establish a trustworthy intelligence mechanism to maintain the credibility of the alliance with the US. In the wake of North Korea's missile launch on July 5th 2006 Seoul's response was clearly later than those of Tokyo or Washington, revealing the fractures in trilateral coordination. Similar problems are possible if the United States and/or South Korea choose not to share information with Japan immediately after incidents occur with North Korea. The event might also have created a credibility problem for Seoul and Tokyo, since they may not be immediately notified by its ally and partner on vital security incidents.       Fourthly, the momentum makes this time special. The events in 2010 provoked people in Japan and ROK enough to make them realize the instability that exists within the region. Also, President Lee Myung-bak will come to Tokyo for a summit meeting and it is expected that both will agree on the issue of a ROK-Japan New Era. The Japanese Prime Minister will also visit the United States in June, reportedly, and will publish new directions of the alliance strategic objectives and ways. Top-level decisions are significant since the deterrence needs symbolic unity in addition to the military's capability and readiness.       The Democratic Party of Japan, the new ruling party of Japan since September of 2009, was regarded as keeping its distance from the US, but in fact, after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeongdo shelling the government reacted quickly and supported the ROK strongly. Even though media reports suggested Foreign Minister Maehara seeks to open a dialogue with Pyongyang, bilateral negotiation with Pyongyang has not achieved domestic support and if it happens it would, and should, be preceded by the US.   This time the bilateral security partnership between Seoul and Tokyo would be enhanced, starting from the low-key items such as Acquisition and Cross Service Agreement (ACSA) which enables both to cooperate in global security. Intelligence sharing mechanisms also have some potential. Beyond such starters, regular dialogues at both practical levels, including younger generations, need to be established between the ROK and Japan. "Japan and the US could also discuss additional measures to the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ)." Also, even though the US involvement is the key as a catalyst, for example through organizing the dialogue to aim trilateral contingency planning and joint naval exercises, Seoul and Tokyo also need to have the perspective that trilateral cooperation is the aim for securing commitment and interests from the US. From this angle, the trilateral dialogue on Southeast Asian policy, which was mentioned in the trilateral foreign ministers' meeting last December, is also valuable as a method of  burden sharing.       However, many also point out the history problem and China's concerns as an obstacle for stronger cooperation.       Of course, we should realize that the Japanese government's efforts on historical reconciliation has not been regarded enough by the Korean people and they keep mental barriers to collaborate with Japanese Self Defense Forces. However, the ongoing crisis and brinkmanship behaviors by Pyongyang are urgent and difficult to manage without reinforcing the current security architecture. Also, the ROK and Japan need to persuade the US for a joint, serious commitment and coordination with its allies. Furthermore, if we link this security cooperation with other bilateral negotiations, such as library agreements and historical statements, it would a domestic context where both governments receive strong pressure.   We also need to think carefully about the linkage between alliance coordination and China's next steps. Needless to say, Beijing's ties with Pyongyang is still believed to be influential, even though we start to wonder how much. In this sense, to induce China into the collaboration with the three countries and UNSC resolutions is significant. Trilateral solidarity could work as pressure on China since it never wants to see a US alliance network formally enhanced, thus preserving the US influence in the region.       Of course, to push Beijing into a corner is not a good idea. To avoid such results, we firstly need to design the trilateral cooperation solely for North Korean challenges by cementing a lack of necessary cooperation for now, not for challenging the rise of China. Promoting human rights and democracy cannot be the trilateral agenda.     Secondly, as Scott Snyder, Asia Foundation, points out, the partnership among the three countries "should not preclude or inhibit Chinese cooperation." The development of China-Japan-ROK trilateral and bilateral talks between China and others should be paralleled. But if one worries that upgrading alliance coordination among Seoul, Tokyo and Washington end up enhancing Beijing-Pyongyang ties, it is too much pessimism. For China, enhancing its relationship with Pyongyang, symbolically and substantially, will not be to their benefit anymore. The goal, through many channels, is that all parties can move towards the de-nuclearization of the peninsula through a consensual approach.       After Hu's visit to the US, the US and China have been jointly seeking the possibility of the resumption of talks with Pyongyang. Diplomacy is always a very important tool to persuade the revisionist by peaceful means. Simultaneously, we should not lose the momentum for stronger alliance coordination. That is what we have lacked for a long time. In time of a crisis stage escalating, we have to review what is available. The current deterrence conditions need a remedy now.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.   * Ryo SAHASHI is Associate Professor of International Politics at the Faculty of Law at Kanagawa University, and an Adjunct Research Fellow at the Japan Center for International Exchange. * An shortened version of this essay is available as "North Korea: Why Seoul-Tokyo cooperation is necessary" at the East Asia Forum web site, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/09/north-korea-why-seoul-tokyo-cooperation-is-necessary/

1. 정상회담을 계기로 미중간의 갈등은 일단 봉합  21세기 새로운 10년을 시작하는 시점에 이루어진 미중정상회담은 세계의 이목을 집중시켰다. 이번 정상회담에서 양국은 ‘상호존중·호혜공영의 협력동반자관계 건설’이라는 양국관계의 새로운 비전을 제시했다. 특히 이번 정상회담기간 ‘상호존중’과 ‘협력’이라는 단어가 키워드로 자리 잡으면서 사실상 이번 정상회담의 의미와 성격을 대변해 주고 있다.  2009년 오바마 대통령의 중국 방문이후 국제사회의 일반적인 예상과는 달리 미중 양국은 2010년 벽두부터 미국의 대만 무기판매, 오바마 대통령의 달라이 라마 면담, 남중국해와 동중국해에서의 영유권 문제, 천안함과 연평도사건, 위안화 평가절상 문제, 그리고 류샤오보(劉曉波) 노벨 평화상 수상에 이르기까지 사사건건 마찰을 빚어 왔다. 심지어 일부에서는 신냉전의 도래를 우려하기도 했다. 이번 정상회담은 이러한 우려를 완화시키며 양국관계가 다시 협력기조로 전환되고 있음을 국제사회에 보여주는 쇼윈도우 역할을 충실히 하고 있다.  특히 양국은 공동성명에서 각각 “강력하고 번영하며 성공적인 중국이 국제사회에서 큰 역할을 하고 있고” “미국이 아시아태평양지역의 평화, 안정, 그리고 번영에 기여하고 있음을 환영 한다” 라고 명시함으로써 “상호존중”의 정신을 십분 과시하기도 했다. 이번 정상회담을 통해서 천안함 사건 이후 진행되었던 미중간의 동아시아지역에서의 영향력 경쟁, 즉 자신의 지역기반을 확장하려는 중국과 전통적 지역 영향력을 회복하려는 미국간의 갈등이 적정선의 타협점을 찾아 봉합되었음을 보여주고 있다.  요컨대 미중 양국 모두 현재 본격적인 세력경쟁 국면으로 발전하는 것은 양국의 이해관계에 부합하지 않는다는 현실 인식이 반영된 것이다. 중국은 명실상부한 강대국이 되기 위해서는 여전히 상당기간 동안 체제내의 부상을 진행해야 하고 그 과정에서 미국과의 협력은 현실적, 전략적으로 필수적이다. 아울러 2012년 10년만의 5세대 지도부로의 대대적인 권력교체를 앞두고 있는 중국에게 체제안정은 다시 최대의 현안으로 떠오르고 있다. 미국 역시 이라크 철군에도 불구하고 아프가니스탄, 이란 문제, 그리고 국내 경제회복 문제로 인해 중국과의 협력적 관계를 안정적으로 유지하는 것이 필요하다.  아울러 2008년 세계 경제위기 이후 단일 제국이 주도하는 국제질서의 가능성은 상대적으로 약화되는 대신, G2, G20 등 새로운 국제적 다자주의가 지구적 거버넌스의 대안으로 부각되고 있는 국제정치의 현실 또한 이번 정상회담 결과를 통해 재확인 된 것이라 할 수 있다. 미국과 중국 어떤 국가도 현실적으로 국제체제의 독점적 리더십을 확보하기 어려울 수 있음을 상호 인정한 것이다. 즉, 미중 양국이 현안별로 경쟁과 갈등을 지속 할 수는 있지만 큰 틀에서는 상호 상대의 지위를 인정하고, 협력하는 것이 불가피하다는 것을 양국이 수용한 것으로 보인다.2. 협력적 관계가 반드시 안정적이라고 단정은 불가  그럼에도 양제츠(杨洁篪​) 중국 외교부장이 이번 후진타오(胡錦濤) 주석의 방미를 ‘중미간 협력동반자관계의 새로운 국면을 개척한 여정’으로 평가하는 것처럼 향후 미중관계를 낙관적으로만 전망할 수 있을지에 대해서는 여전히 논란의 여지가 많아 보인다. 이번 정상회담은 6개 부분 41개 항으로 구성된 방대한 공동성명이 상징하듯 전체적으로는 양국이 상당한 영역에서 합의에 도달하고 있음을 보여주려 한 의지가 읽혀진다.  그런데 정작 공동성명의 내용을 보다 세밀하게 들여다보면 2010년 양국간 갈등을 야기했던 쟁점들이 여전히 해결되지 않은 채 봉합되거나 아니면 이견이 그대로 노출되고 있다. 예컨대 인권, 대만, 티베트 문제와 같은 전통적인 양자간 이슈에서 여전히 입장 차이를 분명히 했다. 후 주석은 워싱턴에서 한 연설을 통해 “대만과 티베트 관련 문제는 중국의 주권에 관련된 핵심이익으로 13억 중국 인민의 감정과 관련돼 있는 것”이라며 예의 핵심이익론을 제기하였다. 위안화 환율 절상 문제 또한 일단 450억 달러어치의 대미 수입패키지로 임시 봉합하는 선에서 접점을 찾았다. 그리고 북핵문제 역시 원론적으로는 합의에 도달한 것으로 해석할 수 있지만 새로운 해결책을 제시하고 있지는 않기 때문에 이 또한 불씨를 남겨두고 있다.  아울러 이번 정상회담은 외교적 수사를 통한 비전제시에도 불구하고 미중이 향후 세계질서의 운영에 대한 어떠한 청사진에 합의했는지에 대한 명확한 메시지를 제시해주고 있지 않다. 양국 정상 공히 일정 정도는 이번 정상회담을 성공적으로 마무리지어야 하는 정치적 이유가 있었기 때문에 구동존의(求同存異)의 타협을 이끌어 낸 측면도 있다. 2012년 퇴임을 앞둔 후진타오 주석은 중국이 세계 2위의 경제대국을 넘어 미국과 대등한 강대국으로 부상하고 있음을 대내외에 각인시켜 리더십의 정당성과 안정성을 강화해야 할 정치적 동기가 있었으며, 오바마 대통령 또한 재선을 앞두고 중국으로부터의 일정한 경제적 양보를 얻어내 경제회복에 일조했다는 성과가 필요했던 것이다.  요컨대 미중관계는 이번 정상회담을 계기로 일단은 갈등을 봉합하고 협력적 관계로 전환하게 될 것이다. 그럼에도 협력관계가 안정적이라 단정하기는 어렵다. 미중관계는 공동성명에 명시했듯이 “매우 중요하면서도 복잡한 관계”로 변화, 발전하고 있다. 냉전시기 미소 양극체제와 달리 미중관계는 갈수록 상호의존성이 높아지고 협력의 동기 또한 확대되고 있는 한편, 경쟁적이고, 갈등적인 이슈들을 내재하고 있고 심지어 세력 대결적 속성마저 지닌 복잡한 관계로 진화하고 있는 것이다. 이번 정상회담 역시 이러한 미중관계의 복잡성의 단면을 확인해주고 있는 것이다. 향후 미중관계 역시 이러한 복잡한 모습과 요인들이 상호작용하고 교차하면서 경쟁, 갈등, 협력이 반복적으로 전개될 가능성이 커 보인다. 다만 우려되는 것은 이러한 양국관계의 복잡성을 제대로 읽어내지 못할 경우, 취약한 안보구조와 분열적 국내 정치 지형을 지닌 한국에게는 예상치 못한 강한 충격을 전달할 개연성이 있다는 점이다.  이와 관련 이번 정상회담에서 주목되는 또 하나의 중요한 특징 중의 하나는 미중 정상회담에서는 매우 이례적으로 한반도 문제가 핵심 의제로 대두되었다는 점이다. 뿐만 아니라 양국이 중요한 양자간 쟁점에서는 합의에 이르지 못한 반면에 한반도 문제에 대해서는 큰 틀에서 타협을 이루어냈다는 것이다. 양국은 기본적으로 “한반도에서 발생한 일련의 사태로 인해 긴장이 고조된데 우려”를 표명하고, 한반도의 평화와 안정의 유지가 중요하다는데 동의했다. 그리고 그 기반위에서 진정성있고 건설적인 남북대화와 6자회담의 재개를 해법으로 제시하는데 합의했다.  이 과정에서 중국은 북한이 주장한 농축우라늄계획(UFP)에 대한 우려를 공동성명에 포함시키는데 동의했고, 미국은 UFP에 대한 우려 표명이 한국이 남북대화에 참여할 수 있는 여건을 조성한 것이고, 남북 고위급 군사회담 개최 합의가 미중정상회담의 중요한 성과라는 부연 설명까지 덧붙이고 있다. 미중 양국이 남북대화와 6자회담에 남북한을 각각 유도해 내기 위한 최소한의 여건을 조성하려고 주고받기식의 타협을 이룬 흔적이 역력하다.3. 미중정상회담의 시사점과 교훈  이를 통해 우리는 몇 가지 중요한 외교적 시사와 교훈을 얻을 필요가 있다. 우선  한반도의 운명이 향후 우리의 의지와는 무관하게 갈수록 미중 양국의 갈등과 타협의 산물이 될 가능성이 커지고 있다는 것이다. 그리고 미중 양국이 공동성명에서 한반도의 평화와 안정이 중요하다는 원론적 합의를 통해 한반도 문제로 인해 양국관계가 훼손되는 것을 경계하고 있고, 또한 양국간 온도의 차이는 있겠지만 기본적으로 한반도 정세의 급격한 변화와 불안정성을 기피하고 있다는 것을 암시해주고 있다. 이는 결국 한반도 문제에 있어서 중국의 상대적 영향력은 증대하고 있는 반면에, 우리의 입지와 발언권을 확보하는 것은 더욱 어려워질 수 있다는 것을 시사해주고 있는 것이다.  한국은 천안함 사건 이후 한반도 문제가 급속하게 미중간 갈등으로 확대되는 상황을 지켜볼 수밖에 없었던 것과 마찬가지로 이번 역시 미중간 타협의 결과에 따라 대화국면에 참여할 수밖에 없는 현실에 직면하게 된 것에서 외교적 교훈을 얻어야 할 것이다. 강대국간 협력과 경쟁의 영향을 최소화하고 나아가 한반도의 통일이라는 국가 과제를 실현하기 위해서도 한반도 문제에서의 우리의 입지를 확보하려는 노력이 무엇보다 우선되어야 할 것이다. 이제 다시 재개되는 대화국면에 참여하는 과정에서도 이러한 교훈을 새기면서 한반도 문제의 해법을 찾는 보다 치밀하고 전향적인 의제를 창출하고 이를 기반으로 북한과의 대화를 주도하는 정교한 준비가 필요할 것이다.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* 1996년 중국 북경대학 국제관계학원에서 정치학 박사확위를 취득하였다. 1997년 3월부터 동덕여대 중국학과 교수로 재직 중이며, 주요 연구 분야는 중국정치, 외교 등이다. 최근 연구로는 ” China’s policy and influence on the North korea nuclear issue: denuclearization and/or stabiization of the korean peninsula?” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol.22 no.2(June 2010), 『중국외교연구의 새로운 영역(공저)』(나남, 2008), 『중국의 영토분쟁(공저)』(동북아역사재단, 2008)등이 있다.

The National Security Environment in the 21st Century and the Need for Complex DiplomacyUnder the prevalent situation of the 21st century, nation states are required to adopt an all-out approach to diplomacy. In the 21st century, the influence of non-governmental players has become so much greater. New issues have emerged in various sectors such as the environment, culture, technology and human rights. In inter-governmental negotiations over matters of national interest, changes are taking place, including the diversification of diplomatic activities toward global civic communities, international organizations and businesses as well as the (toward) the peoples of other countries. Also, the international order of the current century has seen the emergence of a new network-based complex international order amid intensification of the information revolution and globalization. Thus, the international system can no longer be regarded as a system of involving single nations only, while the traditional concept of sovereignty is not really suitable to cover the new complexity of global politics. In the international relationships of the 21st century, a new measure of national strength has to be adopted: a level of connectedness, i.e., how well the players in international relationships, including governments, are connected with other players, or how they maintain a good network. In the preceding century, the international order was understood to be based on the so-called billiard ball model, wherein countries collided with each other militarily and economically. In contrast, the network-based international order of the current century exists above the state, below the state, and throughout the state, so the countries with the most connections become central players and acquire the power to designate the global agenda.As a result of such changes, we no longer live in an era in which diplomats represent the government of a country by collecting information, carrying out negotiations, and making decisions to protect the national interest in matters relating to the country’s relationships with other countries. In the new international political environment, diplomats are required to assume more roles than in the past.South Korea is not free from these changes in the flow of diplomacy. In his inaugural speech, Minister of Foreign Affairs, KIM Sung-hwan emphasized “all-out complex diplomacy” as the new direction required for the country’s diplomatic efforts: to be precise, he referred to all-out diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy, complex diplomacy, and digital network diplomacy among other factors. At a session to discuss a report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), President LEE Myung-bak said, “The business of diplomacy has changed from the ways of the past. Career diplomats in the traditional sense of the word cannot do the job alone. Ordinary people with lots of experience should be allowed to take part in the country’s diplomacy.” The President’s remarks have been taken to mean that the capabilities of the country’s diplomacy should be upgraded and its horizons expanded accordingly, as the country’s requirements in this era of globalization cannot be adequately met by diplomats who have focused exclusively on information collection and partner management.Complex diplomacy aims to accomplish a country’s policy objectives through the use of all available means, including military diplomacy, trade diplomacy, development collaboration diplomacy, public diplomacy and private diplomacy, concerning specific diplomatic policy issues. To that end, it should be possible to mobilize network power resources as well as the hard power and soft power (i.e. knowledge, ideology, culture, etc.) that both the government and the private sector own. This need for complex diplomacy arises from the complexity of the players in international politics and the occurrence of a situation in which such players’ avenues of activity are becoming increasingly complex.The Lesson from the U.S. Department of State’s QDDRMajor countries are changing their concept of diplomacy to cope with the ongoing complexity of diplomatic avenues. The U.S. Department of State’s first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), published toward the end of 2010, for example, contains many indications to which South Korea ought to refer in its execution of complex diplomacy. While the Pentagon’s QDDR serves as a comprehensive appraisal report on the U.S. defense strategy, military structure, military modernization plan, defense budget, and so forth, the newly introduced QDDR is an attempt at a fundamental review of the country’s diplomacy. The QDDR, which is a blueprint for the “smart diplomacy” that the Secretary of State Hillary Rodham CLINTON promoted earnestly with the launch of the OBAMA Administration, is based on the “transformational diplomacy” emphasized by her predecessor, Condoleezza RICE. The main idea of the QDDR lies in the judgment that U.S. diplomats can only cope efficiently with diverse pending issues all over the world when they maximize the use of civilian power by dismantling the wall between the public and private domains. The QDDR stresses that civilian power, as well as that of diplomats, should be fully utilized to realize the country’s national interest and values and to settle issues of common global concern in the 21st century.The first signs of such a view appeared in the thinking of the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. GATES, who tried to refrain from the militarization of diplomacy during the second term of President George W. BUSH. Mr. Robert GATES stated that the U.S. needs to maintain closer collaboration with its allies and friendly countries, as the U.S. alone cannot secure victory. He also stressed the need to win the hearts and minds of the people of hostile countries with soft power, including economic support, rather than carrying out military attacks against them, and to shift the focus from hard power to soft power in the use of military strength. He added that the U.S. needs to use even the capabilities of allies and friendly countries while combining all the elements and institutions of the country efficiently to fight radical ideologies, as the reality of the current century does not quite match the system of role division between the Departments of State, Defense, etc. traditionally practiced by the U.S.The Secretary of State Hillary CLINTON thinks highly of this particular insight from Mr. Robert GATES. In a speech delivered at the Asia Society before her departure to visit various Asian countries in February 2009, she defined the focus of the U.S. diplomacy and security as the “3Ds,” i.e. Defense, Diplomacy, and Development, thus expressing the commitment to share the responsibility and division concerning the development agenda of the world and to attach importance to diplomacy as well as to military strength. Two of the 3Ds are the responsibilities of the State Department. Mrs. Hillary CLINTON characterizes the effort to upgrade the level of the country’s diplomacy and development to that of defense as “smart power diplomacy.” As such, she considers the role of the USAID to be as important as that of the State Department. She thinks that civilian power in the U.S. should be strengthened and expanded much further if the country is to be able to carry out smart power diplomacy. The first step to be taken toward smart power diplomacy is to utilize talented people, including experts, in all government institutions, regardless of their business boundaries.Indications for the Korean Version of Complex DiplomacyThe content of the all-out/complex diplomacy to be conducted by the South Korean government is little different from the civilian diplomacy stated in the QDDR. The South Korean government has already adopted the concept of complex diplomacy in its diplomatic avenues to a considerable extent, but it has yet to systematize its activities. It has to check the relevant theories, concepts, strategies and tools altogether from a complex perspective:First of all, with regard to South Korea’s all-out/complex diplomacy initiative, consideration should be given to the vision of complex diplomacy, i.e. what form of diplomacy it should take and for whom. In the use of such terms as all-out diplomacy, complex diplomacy, digital network diplomacy and soft power diplomacy, it is important to identify the differences between these and the existing practices of diplomacy and to assess which parts should be viewed from a new perspective. And then, in defining the duties of the new diplomacy, consideration needs to be given to the addition of complex sectors, such as traditional (bilateral/multiparty) diplomacy, trade (or economy, resources, energy), development (or support/international contribution), and ‘charm’ (e.g. Hallyu, which refers to the current vogue for Korean pop culture throughout Asia, or the Korea Brand).Second, the new diplomacy tools require a whole-of-government approach in the use of talented people invigoration formation of a task force that links the MOFAT with the other ministries of the government use of the digital network (e.g., Internet-based digital public diplomacy or use of social networking services like Tweeter or Facebook) adoption of a system of collaboration between the private and public domains and use of customized regional diplomacy, etc.Third, the MOFAT should broaden its outreach, keeping in mind that diplomacy is no longer its exclusive responsibility. The current trend is running toward expansion of the territory of diplomacy, including national security, trade, culture, development support, and even cyber space. To cope with such a change, it is necessary to establish a well-knit system of collaboration between the MOFAT and the other ministries of the government and between the government and academic circles and experts.Finally, the MOFAT should innovate itself on a long-term basis through organizational overhaul, diversification of the way talented people are recruited, redefinition of the role of diplomats, launch of an office in charge of innovative measures within itself, education to improve the organizational culture, and identification of methods of enhancing the ability for formulating and implementing promotional strategies and action plans.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* Sang-Hyun LEE is Director of the Security Studies Program at the Sejong Institute in Korea. He received his B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University and Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 1999. He was a research fellow at the Korean Institute for International Studies (1987-88) and the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (1988-90). He joined the Sejong Institute in 2001 and currently serves as Director of Security Studies Program at the Institute.

지역갈등과 하토야마의 동아시아 공동체한편 갈등구조에 있는 국가 안보의 이해관계 뿐만 아니라 역사적 문화적 갈등 때문에, 우리는 상당 수의 정치적 난제가 존재하고 있음을 인식해야 합니다. 그러므로 나는 어느 정도 역설적으로 들리지만 지역 통합의 기로에 있는 문제들이 보다 상위의 통합을 향해 나아갈 때에만 진정으로 해결될 수 있다는 점을 제안합니다.2009년 8월 유키오 하토야마 수상은 일본을 위한 새로운 길이라는 제목의 시론을 통해 ‘동아시아 공동체’의 창설 필요성을 역설했다. 인용된 바와 같이 이 계획은 동아시아의 갈등을 해소할 수 있는 대안으로 제시되었다. 이후 하토야마와 민주당은 선거에서 일방적인 승리를 거두었고 하토야마는 수상에 임명되었다. 그의 동아시아 공동체 계획은 일본의 공식정책으로 채택되었고 일본은 동아시아 공동체 창설을 위한 노력을 경주하였으나 한국과 중국은 이를 무시하였다. 예를 들면 한국과 중국의 정치지도자와 최초로 가진 3국 정상회담에서 한국과 중국의 정치지도자들은 하토야마의 제안에 대해 긍정적인 반응을 보인 적이 없었다. 하토야마는 이후로도 지속적인 노력을 경주하였지만 한국과 중국의 정치지도자와 시민사회는 동아시아 공동체 제안에 대해 관심을 기울이지 않았다.그렇다면 왜 하토야마의 동아시아 공동체 제안은 한국과 중국으로부터 외면을 받았는가? 이 글은 하토야마의 실패를 분석하고 이를 통하여 동아시아의 갈등에 대하여 이해하고자 한다.미국이 배제된 불명확한 제안하토야마가 실패한 첫 번째 이유는 계획의 불명확함이다. 하토야마와 일본 정부는 공동체의 회원국에 대해 명확한 입장표명을 하지 못했고 추구하는 목표가 어떤 종류의 공동체를 -경제, 재정, 사회, 정치, 또는 전략 공동체 등- 상정하는지에 대해서도 설명하지 못했다. 경제 대국이 제시한 애매한 제안으로 아시아 국가들은 혼란에 직면하였다.둘째 이유는 이 계획은 미국으로부터 거리를 유지하려는 일본의 새로운 외교정책으로 간주되었다는 점이다. 잘 알려진 바와 같이 미국은 자국을 가장 중요한 아태지역 국가로 자임하고 미국이 배제되는 어떤 형태의 아시아 공동체의 창설에도 반대해왔다. 하지만 하토야마는 공식적으로 “우리는 지금 단계에서 미국을 동아시아 공동체에 포함시켜야 하는지 여부를 논의할 필요가 없다”고 공표하고 그의 동아시아 공동체 계획에 미국이 포함되지 않을 가능성을 내비쳤다. 미국이 아시아 지역에 강력한 영향력을 가지고 있는 상황에서, 동아시아 다른 국가들의 입장에서는 미국과의 관계에 부정적인 영향을 미칠지도 모르는 일본의 제안을 받아들이기에는 어려움이 있었다.아시아 상황에 대한 오해하지만 하토야마의 실패에 있어서 가장 중요한 원인은 동아시아 상황에 대한 오해이다. 예를 들면, 그는 앞에서 인용한 동일한 시론에서 다음과 같이 주장했다동아시아 지역의 경제력과 역내의 독립적 상호관계는 심화 및 확대과정에 있었다. 지역경제블럭의 형성을 위해 필요한 구조는 이미 형성되어있다.여기서 하토야마는 동아시아 공동체 계획의 두 가지 전제조건을 제시하고 있음을 알 수 있다. 이름하여 우선 동아시아 경제력과 독립적 상호관계는 성장하고 있다는 것과 동아시아는 향후 공동체 발전을 위한 구조가 존재하지 않는다는 것이다. 첫째 조건과 관련하여 동아시아 상황은 복잡하다. 동아시아 경제가 성장하고 있다는 사실이 확실하다고 하더라도 역내 국가 사이의 상호의존이 확대된다고 말하기는 쉽지 않다. 확실히 이 지역의 교역량은 여전히 급속도로 증가하고 있다. 하지만 이와 동시에 동아시아 국가와 다른 국가 사이의 교역도 역시 급속도로 증가하고 있다. 그 결과 동아시아 국가의 전체 교역에 대하여 동아시아 역내 교역의 비율은 점진적이지만 지속적으로 감소하고 있다. 역내 교역의 비율의 감소는 세계화의 전형적인 현상이며 이러한 추세는 EU에서도 나타나고 있다.두 번째 논점에 있어서도 하토야마의 오해는 동아시아는 유럽 국가들과 같이 견고하고 종합적인 구조가 있는 것은 아니지만 그렇다고 구조가 전혀 없는 것은 아니다. 예를 들면 현재 동아시아에는 EPA, FTA, 그리고 BIT가 존재하고 있다. 그 결과 이 지역에서 재화와 통화의 움직임이 과거 10년 전에 비해서 훨씬 원활해졌다. 사증면제 프로그램의 증가에 따라서 특정 국가 사이에 인력의 이동도 훨씬 용이해지고 있다. 달리 말해서 동아시아의 발전과 역내 교류는 다자협정이 아니라 양자 협정에 기초한 구조에 의해 유지되어왔다.향후 협력의 필요성요약하자면 하토야마의 최대 실수는 동아시아 공동체라고 불리는 체제를 만들어낼 이유를 설명할 수 있었다고 확신했다는 것이다. 그 때문에 하토야마는 아시아의 다른 국가들을 유인할 수 있을 만큼 충분히 매력적인 아이디어가 필요했지만 그런 아이디어를 개발하지 못했다. 그의 계획의 불명확성은 다른 국가의 우려를 자아냈고 하토야마의 계획으로부터 이들 국가를 소원하게 만들었다.그렇다면 하토야마의 계획은 오늘날 동아시아 분쟁에 대해서 어떤 시사점을 가지는가? 여기서 중요한 사실은 세계화가 보편적인 오늘날 국제분쟁을 해결하기위한 노력의 근거를 찾는 것이 쉽지 않다는 것이다. 일본-한국-중국 관계가 알려주는 바와 같이 국제화가 진전되면서 영토 및 역사 갈등에도 불구하고 상호 경제 및 사회적 교류를 지속하는 것이 쉽다는 점이다. 동아시아 국가들 사이의 관계를 해칠 만큼 심각한 분쟁이 일어나는 경우에도, 이들 국가들은 심각한 문제로 우려하지 않을 협력의 동반자를 쉽게 찾을 수 있다는 점이다.몇 십년전에 주변 국가들과 원만한 관계를 유지할 필요가 있다는 것은 명백한 사실이었다. 그래서 우리는 이를 위한 공동의 노력이 필요하다는 명분을 모색하지 않았다. 하지만 오늘날 우리는 왜 공동의 노력을 기울여야하는지 이해를 구해야하는 상황이 되었다. 하토야마의 실패는 이러한 상황을 단적으로 보여주고 있다.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* Kan KIMURA is Professor of Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies at Kobe University.

  The winds of democratic change are blowing in the Middle East, jeopardizing the positions of their long-time leaders. Under such circumstances, social media are becoming the focus of attention.How powerful is the influence of social media? How can they be used as a diplomatic policy tool? What influence do they have on the formulation and execution of a country’s foreign policies?The Power of Social MediaThere is no consensus as to how powerful social media are. There are people who think that the power of social media is “revolutionary” as it threatens even the position of those who have exercised absolute power and is carrying ideas about democracy even into very conservative Middle Eastern countries. But there are others who think that the power of social media is overly exaggerated and misunderstood.With regard to the current situation in the Middle East, the belief that the power of social media is only limited can be divided into two views, as follows:First, those who hold such a view say that opposition leaders and street demonstrators have not relied so heavily, if ever, on social media. They point out that governments would shut off the cell phone network and the Internet if there was even a whiff of a threat from social media. They also say that outsiders misunderstand and think that social media play an important role in the current situation in the Middle East, as news of street demonstrations was spread to other parts of the world chiefly through social media due to the limited freedom of speech. As it is, social media have not played a significant role in encouraging the formation of oppositions in the Middle Eastern countries, although they went a long way in drawing outsiders’ attention to that part of the world.Second, some holders of this view say that social media could be used to launch a large-scale online signature campaign or heated debates, but fell short of organizing a mob that would be prepared to risk arrest and torture or would not be intimidated by indiscriminate shooting by the police. In other words, the opposition’s “high-risk/cost” activities were put into practice under the leadership of offline organizations, although social media might have provided a catalyst for “low-risk/cost” online activities.Social Media as a Foreign Policy ToolIf social media do indeed prove to be so powerful, it follows that the possibility of using them as a foreign policy tool should be considered. However, it is difficult to judge which one of the two foregoing views about the role of social media is more accurate at the moment, given that the situation in the Middle East is still in progress.It is thought that these two views indicate that the power of social media is not something uniform or fixed, but something that varies depending on the context and purpose.For one thing, social media can play a crucial role as an alternative where there is only limited freedom of speech or where a subject is not being dealt with by existing mass media. If the Middle Eastern countries had granted sufficient freedom of speech, many discussions currently held through social media would have been made through existing mass media, which means that the importance of social media would not have emerged so conspicuously. In terms of the level of technological development, social media can only exert an influence in countries where the Internet or cell phones have reached a certain level of penetration. The Middle Eastern countries in question do not figure among the countries that have reached such a level of cutting-edge information technology. In terms of groups of people, younger people and people with a higher level of educational attainment are more likely to be influenced by social media due to the characteristics of information technology and the relevant equipment. It is also thought that social media are more effective in encouraging people to engage in “low risk/low cost” activities.Such being the case, it is necessary to adopt a strategy of using social media in consideration of target countries or target groups of people, based on the objectives of diplomacy, as the power of social media varies depending on the context and purpose.Foreign Policy and Social MediaSocial media can be used as a tool of foreign policy, and, conversely, the process of establishing and executing a country’s foreign policy can be influenced by social media. One such example is the candle-lit street vigil held in Seoul in relation to the issue of mad cow disease in 2008.The influence of social media on the establishment and execution of a country’s foreign policy can be thought of in the light of two key terms, i.e. ‘collective intelligence’ and ‘smart mobs’.‘Collective intelligence’ refers to a process by which the grassroots majority, who are not experts about an issue in question, obtain collective ability through interaction. Wikipedia is an example of a group of ordinary people reaching a professional level of intelligence that extends beyond their individual intellectual ability. Sometimes, a person or a small group of people influence(s) public opinion by disseminating inaccurate knowledge, as in the case of ‘Minerva’, an economic opinion-maker in the ‘agora’. The thing is that the general public has come to be involved in the establishment and execution of a country’s foreign policies as a result of the knowledge they acquire by their own efforts thanks to the development of social media. Such being the case, governments find it hard to set the state agenda alone without heeding the opinion of the general public, or hardly find themselves superior to the general public in terms of the breadth of their information or the depth of their knowledge. Even in the past, attempts were made to impose checks on governments, mostly by the mass media.Turning to the emergence of ‘smart mobs’, bloggers, repliers and tweeters consider taking collective action when they feel that politicians or political parties do not respond to the general public’s opinions sufficiently or when their views are not reflected in the policy-decision-making process. In such cases, social media facilitate their collective actions, making it easy to raise or spread an issue and have those with similar thoughts gather together. In the past, individuals were indifferent to social issues and remained powerless as they lacked information. Now, they know how to form a powerful mob with the help of social media.The development of social media is bringing about rapid changes throughout the world. With proper understanding and use of the power of social media, the country will be able to choose from more diverse foreign policy tools and accomplish foreign policy objectives more efficiently. In the meantime, it should not be overlooked that social media may influence the process of establishing and executing a country’s foreign policy.It is desirable to have the general public take part in the establishment and execution of a country’s foreign policy through social media from a democratic perspective. However, the problem is that the stability, objectivity or propriety of the process of foreign policy formation may be jeopardized, if opinion-makers like “Minerva” – rather than those with collective intelligence supported by expertise and objectivity – lead public opinion, while traditional channels of political participation like political parties or parliament are ignored due to social media.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* Intaek HAN is Associate Research Fellow at the Jeju Peace Institute. Dr. Han received his Ph.D. in political science from UC, Berkeley and both his M.A. in political science and B.A. in economics from Seoul National University. His recent publications include “US-Asia Relations beyond the Global Financial Crisis,” in A Pacific Nation (Japan Center for International Exchange, forthcoming), “Nuclear Rollback: Implications and Limitations of the South Africa Case” (in Korean), Korea and World Politics, Spring 2011, and “Towards a Korean Model of Public Diplomacy: The Case for Country-specific, Scientific Public Diplomacy” (in Korean), 2010.

21세기 안보환경과 복합외교의 필요성21세기 외교환경은 국가총체적 접근을 요한다. 21세기에는 비정부 행위자들의 영향력이 커지고 환경, 문화, 기술, 인권 등 새로운 이슈영역이 등장하면서, 국가이익을 둘러싼 정부간 교섭에서 타국의 국민은 물론 지구적 시민사회와 국제기구, 기업 등을 대상으로 한 외교활동의 다변화와 같은 변화가 일어나고 있다. 또한 21세기 국제질서는 정보혁명과 세계화의 심화 결과 네트워크에 기반한 새로운 복합적 국제질서 출현이 특징이다. 그 결과 국제체제는 더 이상 단일국가들의 체제로 간주될 수 없을 뿐만 아니라 이제 전통적인 주권의 관념은 세계정치의 복잡성을 담아내기에 부적절하다. 또한 21세기 국제관계에서 국력의 새로운 척도는 바로 ‘연결성(connectedness),’ 즉, 국가를 포함한 국제관계의 다른 행위자들과 얼마나 연결되어 있는지, 혹은 얼마나 좋은 네트워크를 유지하고 활용하는지가 국력의 바탕이다. 20세기의 국제질서는 각국이 군사·경제적 수단으로 서로 부딪히는 이른 바 ‘당구공 모델’로 이해되었다. 이에 비해 21세기의 네트워크 국제질서는 ‘국가 위에, 국가 안에, 그리고 국가를 관통해(above the state, below the state, and through the state)’ 존재하는 질서로서, 가장 많은 연결을 갖는 국가가 중심적 행위자가 되고 글로벌 어젠다를 설정하는 힘을 갖게 된다.이러한 변화의 결과 외교가 정부를 대표하는 외교관이 전권을 가지고 국익을 보호하기 위해 주요 국제 문제의 정보수집, 협상, 결정, 실행을 담당하던 시대는 지나갔다. 따라서 새로운 국제정치 환경 속에서 외교관의 역할은 국가를 대표하여 교섭을 행하는 과거의 역할보다 더 많은 역할을 요구받고 있는 것이 현실이다.한국의 외교도 변화의 흐름에서 벗어날 수 없다. 김성환 외교통상부장관은 취임사에서 한국외교가 나아갈 방향으로 ‘총력·복합외교’를 강조했다. 구체적으로는 총력외교, 지식외교, 복합외교, 디지털 네트워크외교 등이 주요 내용이다. 이명박 대통령도 외교통상부 업무보고에서 “외교란 업무가 과거 시대와 완전히 달라졌다”며 “전통적인 직업 외교관만 가지고는 될 수 없으며, 많은 경험을 가진 민간인도 참여해야 한다”고 말했다. 이는 정보수집과 파트너 관리에 집중해온 외교관들의 기존 업무방식으로는 ‘글로벌 대한민국’ 외교를 감당할 수 없는 만큼 한국외교의 역량과 지평을 넓혀야 한다는 주문으로 풀이된다.복합외교는 특정한 외교정책사안에 대해 군사외교, 통상외교, 개발협력외교, 공공외교, 민간외교 등 수단을 종합적으로 활용하여 정책목표를 달성하고자 한다. 이를 위해서는 민간과 정부가 보유하고 있는 하드파워, 소프트파워(지식, 이념, 문화 등) 뿐만 아니라 네트워크파워 자원을 함께 동원할 수 있어야 한다. 복합외교가 필요한 이유는 21세기 국제정치에서 행위자의 복합과 더불어 이들 행위자들의 활동무대가 복합되는 현상이 동시에 발생하고 있기 때문이다.미 국무부 QDDR의 교훈외교무대의 복합화에 대응해 주요국들은 외교의 개념을 발빠르게 변화시키고 있다. 대표적인 사례로서 미 국무부가 작년말에 발간한 첫『4개년 외교·개발검토(QDDR: Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review)』보고서는 한국의 복합외교를 구상하는데도 많은 시사점을 준다. 국방부의 4개년 국방정책검토(QDR) 보고서가 미국의 국방전략, 군구조, 군현대화 계획, 국방예산 등에 대한 종합 평가보고서라면, 이번에 처음 선보인 QDDR 보고서는 미국의 외교에 대해 근본적 재검토를 시도한 것이다. QDDR은 오바마 행정부 출범과 더불어 힐러리 클린턴 국무장관이 적극 추진해온 스마트외교의 청사진으로, 콘돌리자 라이스 국무장관이 역설한 변환외교(Transformational Diplomacy)에 기원을 두고 있다. QDDR 보고서의 핵심은 미국 외교관들이 공공 영역과 민간 영역 사이의 벽을 허물고 외교에서 민간역량(civilian power) 활용을 극대화해야만 전 세계의 각종 현안에 대해 효율적으로 대처할 수 있다는 판단에 있다. QDDR은 미국의 국익과 가치를 구현하고 21세기 인류 공통의 문제를 해결하는 데 외교관은 물론 민간역량을 앞세워야 한다는 점을 강조한다.이러한 인식은 최근 갑자기 나온 발상은 아니고 이미 조지 W. 부시 2기 행정부 시절 ‘외교의 군사화’를 지양하고자 하는 로버트 게이츠 국방장관의 시각에서 단초가 보이기 시작했다. 게이츠 장관은 군사력 사용에 있어서 하드파워에서 소프트파워로 중점 이동과 아울러 적에 대한 군사공격보다 경제지원 등 소프트파워로 민심을 얻는데 중점을 두고, 미국 혼자 힘으로는 승리할 수 없기 때문에 동맹 및 우방과 긴밀한 협력이 필요하다는 점을 강조한 바 있다. 또한 그는 21세기의 현실이 미국 정부 내 국무, 국방, 기타 부서의 분업체계와 딱 맞아 떨어지지 않기 때문에 글로벌 차원에서 극단적 이데올로기와 싸우기 위해서는 국력의 모든 요소와 모든 기관들을 효과적으로 결합함은 물론 동맹국과 우방들의 역량까지도 활용해야 한다고 주장했다.힐러리 클린턴 국무장관은 이러한 로버트 게이츠 국방장관의 식견을 높이 평가한다. 클린턴 국무장관은 2009년 2월 아시아 순방에 앞서 가진 아시아소사이어티 연설에서 미국 외교안보의 중점을 ‘3D,’ 즉 국방(Defense), 외교(Diplomacy), 그리고 개발(Development)이라고 규정했다. 군사력과 함께 외교를 중시하고, 세계의 발전 어젠다에 대한 책임과 분담을 공유하겠다는 의지를 표명한 것이다. 그 3D 중 2D가 국무부의 소관이다. 클린턴 국무장관은 외교와 개발을 국방과 같은 수준으로 격상시키는 것을 스마트파워 외교라고 부른다. 그래서 힐러리는 국무부와 더불어 미국국제개발처(USAID)의 역할을 중시한다. 스마트파워 외교가 가능하려면 미국의 민간역량이 크게 강화·확대되어야 한다는 것이 그의 생각이다. 스마트파워 외교를 향한 첫 걸음은 부서별 구획을 벗어나 정부 모든 기관의 유능한 인재와 전문가들을 폭넓게 활용하는 것이다.한국형 복합외교를 위한 시사점비록 표현은 다르지만 우리 정부가 추진할 총력·복합외교의 내용은 QDDR에서 말하는 문민외교와 크게 다르지 않다.한국 정부도 이미 복합외교의 개념을 외교현장에서는 상당 부분 실행하고 있으나, 이를 이론과 개념, 전략과 수단을 복합적으로 엮어서 보는 체계화의 과제를 앞두고 있다.첫째, 한국의 총력·복합외교 구상에서는 우선 복합외교의 비전, 즉 무엇을 위한, 어떤 외교를 할 것인가를 먼저 고려해야 한다. 총력, 복합, 디지털 네트워크, 소프트파워 외교 등의 개념을 원용할 경우 기존의 외교와 무엇이 다르고, 새롭게 봐야 할 부분이 무엇인지를 먼저 이해하는 것이 중요하다. 그 다음에는 새로운 외교의 임무를 규정해야 하는데, 여기에는 기존의 전통적 외교(양자, 다자), 통상(경제, 자원·에너지), 개발(지원, 국제기여), 매력(한류, 코리아브랜드) 등 복합적 분야들이 추가될 수 있다.둘째, 새로운 외교 방식은 ‘국가총체적(whole-of-government)’ 인재 활용, 외교부와 정부 타 부서를 종·횡으로 엮는 TF 활성화, 디지털 네트워크의 활용(인터넷을 활용한 디지털 공공외교, 트위터나 페이스북 같은 SNS 활용), 민·관 협업체제, 지역별 맞춤형 외교 등을 요한다.셋째, 외교 부서의 대외활동(outreach) 강화가 요망된다. 외교는 더 이상 외교 부서만의 임무는 아니다. 외교와 안보, 통상과 문화, 개발지원과 사이버공간에 이르기까지 외교의 영역은 확대되는 추세이다. 이러한 변화에 대응하려면 외교 부서와 정부 타 부서는 물론, 정부와 학계·전문가그룹과의 유기적 협력체제가 필요하다.마지막으로, 장기적 과제로서 외교부 혁신 문제가 제기된다. 조직 재검토, 인재 선발 방식 다변화, 외교관의 임무 재정의, 외교부내 혁신담당부서 신설, 외교부 조직문화 개선을 위한 교육, 그리고 추진전략 및 액션플랜 기획능력의 강화 방안을 모색해야 한다.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* 서울대 외교학과를 졸업하고 미국 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign에서 정치학 박사학위를 받았다. 현재 세종연구소 안보연구실장으로 재직 중이다. 한국국제관계연구소와 한국국방연구원 연구원을 역임했다. 동아시아연구원(EAI) 국가안보패널(NSP) 연구위원, 매일경제신문 객원논설위원, 통일부, 육군, 국방부 자문위원으로 활동하고 있다. 국제정치와 안보, 군사전략, 한미관계, 북한 문제를 주로 연구하며, 최근 논저로는 “The 2010 NPR and North Korean Nuclear Issue”(2010),『세계화시대 한국의 국가안보: 주요 내용과 특징』(공저, 2010), “이명박 정부 중반기 한미 안보협력 과제와 전망”(2010), “한국의 핵 비확산정책: 한미 원자력협력을 중심으로”(2010) 등이 있다.

Regional Conflicts and Hatoyama’s East Asian Community  On the other hand, due to historical and cultural conflicts as well as conflicting national security interests, we must recognize that there are numerous difficult political issues. Therefore, I would suggest, somewhat paradoxically, that the issues that stand in the way of regional integration can only be truly resolved by moving toward greater integration.  In August 2009, Yukio Hatoyama, wrote an essay titled ‘A New Path for Japan’ and insisted there are needs to an ‘East Asia Community.’ As cited, this plan was also suggested as a possible solution for international conflicts in this region. Hatoyama and his Democratic Party of Japan achieved a landslide win in general elections held soon after that, and Hatoyama was appointed as Prime Minister. His ‘East Asia Community’ plan was accepted as an official policy, and Japan started to make efforts to it.  The plan was almost ignored by Chinese and South Korean governments, however. For example, at his first trilateral summit meeting with Chinese and South Korean leaders, the respective leaders never showed positive reactions about Hatoyama’s proposal. Hatoyama continued the same efforts after that, but Chinese and South Korean leaders, and their societies did not pay any serious attention to his plan.  Why then would Hatoyama’s East Asia Community plan not get support from China and South Korea? This paper will provide the reader a sense of the difficulties involved with Asian conflicts while analyzing Hatoyama’s failure.An Ambiguous Proposal without the United States  The first reason for Hatoyama’s failure was the ambiguity of the plan. Hatoyama and the Japanese government could never identify possible members of the community. They could not even explain what kind of community – economical, monetary, social, political, and/or strategic, for example ? they were promoting their policy to. Facing such a vague plan from an economic giant, Asian countries were understandably confused.  The second reason was that this plan was regarded as part of a new Japanese policy initiative which tried to distance itself from the United States. As is well-known, the United States regards herself as one of the most important Asian-Pacific nations, and has been against any plan to an Asian community plan without its own involvement. But Hatoyama officially said that ‘we do not need to discuss at this moment whether the East Asian Community should include the United States or not’, and showed possibilities that his plan might not include the United States here. Of course, the United States still has strong influence in this region, and it was very difficult for other Asian countries to accept a Japanese idea which might have a negative influence in their relation with the United States.  Misunderstanding the East Asian Situation  The most important reason for the failure of Hatoyama, however, was his misunderstanding of the East Asian situation. For example, he wrote in the same essay I cited at the beginning of this paper  The economic power of the East Asian region and the interdependent relationships within the region have grown wider and deeper. So the structures required for the formation of a regional economic bloc are already in place.  Here we can see that he put two premises on his East Asian Community plan. Namely, one is that East Asian economic power and interdependent relationships are growing, and the other is that East Asia lacks the structures for further development. On the first point, the East Asian situation is complicated. Although it is clear that the East Asian economy is growing, it is not easy to say their interdependence is also growing. Certainly, the amount of exchanges in this region is still rapidly increasing. But at the same time, the amount of exchanges between East Asian countries and other countries are increasing more rapidly. As a result, the share of inner exchanges in East Asia to all exchanges is gradually, but steadily decreasing. A decrease in inner exchanges is a typical phenomenon of globalization, and we can observe the same phenomenon between EU countries.  Hatoyama also had a fatal misunderstanding on his second point. Certainly, East Asia has no firm and overall structure as European countries have, but it does not mean that this region has no structure at all. For example, today, in East Asia, there are a lot of EPAs, FTAs, and BITs. As a result, movements of goods and money in this region have become much smoother than some decades ago. By increasing VISA exemptions, the movement of peoples has also become dramatically easier among some countries. In other words, East Asian developments and inter exchanges were sustained by the system made of such independent agreements in this region.  Needs and Reason for Further Cooperation  In short, Hatoyama’s biggest mistake was that he could have explained the reasons to a cooperative system called the East Asia Community. For that cause, he needed to have an idea charming enough to attract other Asian countries, but he could not find it. The ambiguity of his plan rather worried other countries, and caused them to distance themselves from Hatoyama’s plan.  Then what can this episode tell us about the current conflicts in East Asia? The important point here is that in today’s globalizing world, it is not easy for us to justify the further efforts to resolve international conflicts among East Asian countries. As Japan-China-ROK relations demonstrate, globalization makes it easy for a country to maintain cooperative economic and social exchanges, regardless of the disputing parties on territorial and historical issues. In this world, even in a case when disputes are serious enough to jeopardize the cooperative relationships, a country can easily find other partners with which it does not have serious problems.  Since it was clear for a country to justify cooperative relations with neighbors a few decades ago, it did not have to justify the reasons for cooperative efforts to resolve interstate conflicts. Today’s climate, however, requires a country to an idea to attract cooperative partners and to explain the reason for the cooperative efforts. Hatoyama’s failure demonstrates the major shift in situations of cooperative effort in East Asia.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* Kan KIMURA is Professor of Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies at Kobe University.

  I was detained in the Yodeok political prisoner camp in North Korea. One day in 1984 or 1985, I and a number of other inmates happened to catch some balloons sent to the North by South Koreans. That moment still remains vivid in my memory. A rectangular box attached to a large balloon contained propaganda leaflets and various articles, such as underclothes, food supplement pills, beef jerky, and ramyeon (pot noodles). It was an amazing sight for us inmates. Made of a special vinyl material, the colored leaflets were water-proof, tear-proof and even fire-proof. The political prisoner camp in North Korea was totally cut off from the outside world. The inmates were completely in the dark about what was happening in their country, not to mention what was happening in foreign countries. For them, the leaflets sent by South Koreans were a pleasant surprise. Such leaflets were the only means by which the inmates of a political prisoner camp could get any information about the world outside the camp. We inmates took solace in the fact that South Koreans knew about the existence of political prisoner camps in the North. It goes without saying that the leaflets were regarded as a serious threat by the State Security Department of the North. Even after being released from the prison camp in 1987, I had opportunities to see leaflets sent from the South. In early 1990, thousands of people, including me, were attending a gathering held in a plaza in Yodeok. Balloons sent from the South burst over our heads. People scrambled ahead of each other to get the leaflets carried by the balloons. The whole place broke into pandemonium in an instant. The authorities forced the people to leave the place, as they had to collect the leaflets in a hurry. The leaflets informed us that a group of North Korean students studying in Eastern Europe had defected to the South, and we were shocked at such news. Effects of the Leaflets Sent from the South As a society that controls the flow of information to an extreme degree, North Korea prohibits its people from getting news about the outside world by radio, or by any other means. Any violation of this prohibition is regarded as state treason. Any attempt to criticize the Kim family, including Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, is punishable by death. Thus, a statement criticizing the Kim regime contained in a leaflet can cause an uproar. A small, disrespectful memo posted on the fence of a house puts the regional office of the State Security Department into a state of emergency. For people in the North, any disrespectful remark about the "Kim dynasty" is simply an unthinkable thing. Statements about the leader's private life leave people feeling more than upset. It is clear that the regime is afraid that the facts about Kim Jong-il's women, the sumptuous foods enjoyed by him, and the atrocious acts perpetrated by him will make the military less loyal to him. The regime keeps people under strict surveillance to make it impossible to start any group action. The regime is very sensitive to any information that might foster an atmosphere conducive to a popular uprising against the Kim dynasty. The South Koreans' spreading of leaflets to the North using large balloons was first targeted at political prisoner camps in inland areas in the North. Then, the activity was expanded to Pyongyang and areas along the DMZ in 1994. At that time, the North could not provide sufficient food, even to the troops deployed along the DMZ, although they were given priority. Under such difficult circumstances, balloons containing information leaflets and food went a long way towards weakening the troops' Juche (self-reliance) philosophy, which the North's regime has so often bragged about. The North's troops deployed along the DMZ were gradually awakened to certain facts about their regime by the information sent by South Koreans. However, South Korea's Kim Dae-jung Administration (1998 ? 2003) put a stop to the distribution of leaflets to the North in response to the Northern leader's call for the outright cessation of the South's psychological warfare as a precondition to the improvement of relations between the two countries. The docile attitude adopted by the South played a decisive role in breathing life into the North’s collapsing regime. Changes in the North's Strategies Toward the South - The Lee Myung-bak Administration During the South's election campaign in 2007, all the ministries of North Korea did what they could to prevent Lee Myung-bak, from being elected as President. The North's regime felt infuriated by Lee's election. Then, it set up a plan to carry out acts against the Lee Myung-bak Administration and tried yet again to provide support for a pro-North Presidential candidate after five years. In the ensuing period, the North's regime took one provocative step after another, including nuclear tests and the launch of long-range missiles, towards the goal of becoming "a strong and prosperous country," in addition to stepping up its threats against the South. Such an action on the part of the North led the South to withdraw its provision of economic support, and also resulted in the North's isolation within the international community. During the ten-year period prior to the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak Administration, the South provided generous economic support to the North. Thus, the North’s regime forgot all the hardships that it had experienced in the past. Now, with an unfriendly regime in the South, the North is faced with a similar crisis again. The North may have thought that it could make the South's regime more docile with such provocations as the sinking of the Southern Navy's warship Cheonan and the bombing of Yeongpyeong Island, but the South Korean government responded by resuming its psychological warfare against the North. As such, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has developed in a direction that even experts found hard to foresee. North Korean defectors living in the South started sending propaganda balloons to the North in 2003. At that time, the Roh Moo-hyun Administration of the South abstained from voting on a U.N. resolution calling for an improvement of the human rights situation in North Korea. This upset North Korean defectors, including Park Sang-hak and a scientist named Lee Min-bok, and they decided to take further steps, including the sending of propaganda leaflets to the North. At first, they started on a small scale, i.e., by using a small number of primitive balloons. However, various civic organizations in the South joined them and the movement developed into a large one. Feeling threatened, the North’s regime made verbal attacks against the people engaged in such an act. The Lee Myung-bak Administration had intended to oblige anti-North activists to refrain from their activities in the hope of improving its relations with the North. However, increasing provocation by the North, including the sinking of the Cheonan and the bombing of Yeongpyeong Island, has led the Southern government to resume its strategy of psychological warfare. A large amount of money is required for the sophisticated balloons. The Southern government can do that and it will prove very effective, and very threatening for the North's regime. Kim Jong-un's Accession - Abrupt Changes Possible in the North's Regime The currency reform carried out by the North's regime in November 2009 drove the entire country into a state of confusion. Following the collapse of the market, even state-run businesses and economic organizations experienced a similar fate. Due to its nuclear program, the international community has imposed economic sanctions on it. To make a bad situation worse in 2010, Typhoon Kompasu slammed Hwanghae Province, a breadbasket for the North, bringing its dire food situation to a head. Under such circumstances, the ruling Worker's Party delegates' meeting held in September 2010 worsened the confusion in the regime. The North Korean leader's 28-year-old, third son Kim Jong-un and his younger sister Kim Gyong-hee were appointed as four-star generals, making them targets of mockery and ridicule. Even members of the North Korean military laughed at this anachronistic attempt to return to the era of feudalism. The slogan adopted by the North’s military was changed from "We serve the people" to "Let's be the rifles and bombs that protect our leader." In the past, the troops of the North, particularly those deployed along the DMZ, were in a much better position regarding their food supply. However, the situation has changed considerably, and even those deployed along the DMZ are suffering from a food shortage. The regime’s emphasis on its troops' loyalty is becoming shaky. There has been a drastic increase in the number of desertions and of cases of soldiers suffering from malnutrition. The regime appears to feel seriously threatened due to the spread of a large number of propaganda leaflets, so much so that the military is saying that it may fire shots aimed at the places from which South Koreans are sending the propaganda balloons. The North's regime, led by Kim Jong-il, feels extremely nervous about the recent situation in Egypt and Libya, countries which are run by dictatorial regimes quite similar to that of the North. The news that some Libyan troops defected to the side of the people and that Gaddafi's bodyguards had been shooting indiscriminately at people in the street would likely have a tremendous impact on North Koreans. The military will continue to play a central role in any changes made in the North and the majority of them will provide support for the people. However, those troops that have been treated well by their leader are likely to remain loyal and defend him to the last moment. The South's psychological warfare against the North is a strong tool that has the potential to topple the regime without the use of force. The South, then, has a critical opportunity in the continuation of sending propaganda leaflets. Stepping up its efforts to send leaflets, irregardless of the North's threats, will help to awaken the North's troops to the reality of the country's dire needs, and turn the current situation to the South’s advantage. * Mr. KANG was imprisoned in the Yodeok political prisoner camp in North Korea for ten years, and eventually succeeded in defecting to the South in 1992. He graduated from the College of Business Administration, Hanyang University, Seoul, and went on to work for KEPCO for three years. He joined the Chosun Ilbo, one of the major newspapers in South Korea, as a reporter in 2000, and is currently serving both as a research fellow for the Chosun Ilbo's Northeast Asia Research Institute and as the representative of the North Korea Strategy Center, a think tank for North Korean defectors. He is author of the book The Aquariums of Pyongyang.

  민주주의의 오지로 생각되어 온 중동에 민주화의 바람이 불고 있고, 확고부동해 보였던 중동의 권력자들이 권좌에서 밀려나고 있다. 이러한 중동사태를 계기로 소셜미디어가 자연스럽게 화두가 되고 있다.소셜미디어의 위력은 과연 어떠하며, 어떻게 외교정책수단으로 활용할 수 있을까? 또 외교정책의 수립과 집행에는 어떤 영향을 미칠까?소셜미디어의 “힘”소셜미디어의 위력에 대해서 일치된 평가가 존재하지 않는다. 다른 곳도 아닌 중동에 민주화 바람을 불게 하고 절대권력을 행사해온 권력자마저 위협하기 때문에 소셜미디어의 위력이 말 그대로 혁명적이라는 견해가 있는가 하면, 소셜미디어의 위력이 과장되고 오해되고 있다는 반대 견해도 있다.중동사태에 있어서 소셜미디어의 위력이 제한적이라는 견해는 크게 두 가지 정도로 정리해 볼 수 있다.첫째, 중동국가 ‘내’에서는 실제로 소셜미디어의 역할이 크지 않았다는 주장이다. 이 주장에 따르면 반정부 지도자나 시위군중이 소셜미디어를 사용은 했지만 많이 의존하지는 않았다고 한다. 또한 소셜미디어의 위력이 위협적으로 될 것 같으면 그 이전에 각국의 정부가 휴대전화 네트워크와 인터넷 망을 차단했다는 것이다. 그럼에도 불구하고 중동사태에서 소셜미디어가 중요한 역할을 했다는 오해가 생겨난 이유는 중동국가 내에서는 언론이 자유롭지 않아서 주로 소셜미디어를 통해서 시위소식이 밖으로 전해졌기 때문이라고 한다. 달리 말하면 소셜미디어는 중동국가 ‘밖’에서 중동사태에 대한 관심이 생겨 나는 데에는 아주 중요한 역할을 하였지만, 정작 중동국가 ‘내’에서 반정부 조직이 생겨나고 시위가 조직되는 데에는 별 역할이 없었다는 것이다.둘째, 소셜미디어가 온라인 상에서 대규모 서명운동이나 열띤 토론이 발생하는 데에는 효과적이었을지 모르나, 고문이나 투옥의 위협을 무릅쓸 반정부 조직이 결성되거나 체포와 심한 경우 무차별 총격을 각오할 시위대를 동원하는 데에는 역부족이라는 주장이다. 달리 말하면 소셜미디어가 ‘저 위험, 저 비용’의 온라인 활동의 촉매가 되었는지 모르지만, ‘고 위험, 고 비용’을 수반하는 행동의 실천은 보다 전통적인 방식으로-예컨대 오프라인 조직의 지휘와 준비를 통해서-이루어졌다는 것이다.외교정책수단으로서 소셜미디어만약 소셜미디어가 위력적이라면 당연히 외교정책수단으로서 소셜미디어의 활용을 검토해 봐야 할 것이다. 불행히도 중동사태가 아직 진행중인 현 시점에서 소셜미디어의 위력에 대한 상반된 견해 중 어느 것이 더 정확한지 확인하는 대에서는, 즉 소셜미디어의 위력을 정확히 평가하는 데에 어려움이 있다.상반된 견해의 존재가 시사하는 바는 아마도 소셜미디어의 위력이 일률적이거나 고정된 것이 아니라 ‘맥락’과 ‘목적’에 따라 다를 수 있다는 점일 것이다.예컨대 소셜미디어는 언론의 자유가 존재하지 않거나 기존 언론이 다루지 않는 주제를 다루고자 할 때에 대안이나 대체재로서 중요한 역할을 할 수 있을 것이다. 만약 중동국가들이 언론의 자유를 보장하였다면 소셜미디어를 통해서 이루어진 많은 논의들이 기존의 언론매체를 통해서 이루어졌을 것이고, 따라서 소셜미디어의 중요성은 부각되지 않았을 것이다. 기술적으로는 당연히 인터넷이나 휴대전화가 어느 정도 보급된 국가들에서만 소셜미디어가 제대로 역할을 발휘할 수 있을 것이다. 하지만 중동국가들이 IT 기술의 최첨단 국가들이 아니었다는 사실을 보면 IT 기술은 어느 수준을 넘어서기만 하면 되는 것 같다. 대상집단의 경우 IT 기술과 IT 장비의 특성상 노년층보다는 청년층에게 그리고 저학력 층보다는 고학력 층에게 소셜미디어가 효과적일 수 있으며, 목적 상 대상집단에게 ‘고 위험, 고 비용’ 행동이나 결정을 설득하는 것보다는 ‘저 위험, 저 비용’ 행동이나 결정을 촉구하는 데에 소셜 미디어가 더 효과적일 것이다.이렇듯 소셜미디어의 “힘”이 맥락과 목적에 좌우된다면, 대상 국가, 대상 집단, 외교적 목적에 따라 맞춤형으로 소셜미디어 사용전략을 수립해야 할 것이다.외교정책과 소셜미디어소셜미디어는 외교정책의 수단으로 쓰일 수도 있지만 역으로 외교정책의 수립과 집행과정 자체가 소셜미디어에 의해서 영향을 받을 수 있다. 2008년 광우병 촛불시위가 바로 그러한 예가 될 것이다.소셜미디어가 외교의 수립과 집행에 미치는 영향을 두 가지 키워드-“집단 지성(collective intelligence)”과 “영리한 군중(smart mobs)”-을 통해서 이해 볼 수 있다.‘집단지성’이란 개별적으로는 전문가에 못 미치는 일반대중들이 상호작용을 통해서 얻게 되는 집단적 지적 능력을 의미하는 것으로, Wikipedia처럼 실제로 일반대중이 개개인의 지적 능력을 초월하여 전문가적 지적 수준에 도달하는 사례들이 존재한다. 물론 아고라의 경제논객 ‘미네르바’가 보여준 것처럼 1인 또는 소수의 사람들이 부정확한 지식을 가지고 여론을 좌지우지하기도 한다. 중요한 것은 소셜미디어의 발달로 외교정책의 수립과 집행에 있어서 일반대중이 나름대로의 지식을 갖고 관여하게 되었다는 것이다. 이제 정부가 단독으로 의제설정을 하거나 일반대중에 비하여 정보나 지식에서 우위를 확신하기 힘들어졌다. 물론 정부에 대한 견제는 과거에도 있었지만 소셜미디어가 아니라 주로 언론에 의해서 이루어졌었다.둘째는 ‘영리한 군중’의 등장이다. 정당이나 정치인을 통한 간접적인 민의의 표시가 만족스럽지 않거나 블로그, 리플, 트위트만으로 자신들의 목소리가 정책결정과정에 충분히 반영되지 않는다고 느낄 때 블로거, 리플러, 트위터들은 집단행동을 고려하게 된다. 이때 소셜미디어는 이들의 집단행동을 용이하게 만든다. 소셜미디어를 이슈의 제기나 확산도 쉬워지고 비슷한 생각을 갖는 사람들이 같은 장소에 군집하는 것도 용이하게 하기 때문이다. 과거라면 무관심하고 정보를 결한 분자적 개인으로 남았을 개인들이 이제는 소셜미디어를 통하여 신속히 그리고 자생적으로 조직되어 군중으로 개입하게 된다.소셜미디어의 발달로 세계 도처에서 변화의 움직임이 더 빨라지고 있다. 이러한 소셜미디어의 힘을 잘 이해하고 활용한다면 우리의 외교정책수단도 더 풍부해지고 외교적 목적도 더 잘 성취할 수 있을 것이다. 아울러 소셜미디어가 우리의 외교정책의 수립과 집행과정에 영향을 준다는 점도 간과하면 안 된다.소셜미디어를 통하여 국민들이 외교정책의 수립과 결정에 참여하게 되는 것은 민주주의의 정신 상 바람직한 일이다. 하지만 전문적이고 객관적인 집단지성보다 ‘미네르바’ 같은 논객들이 여론을 주도 하는 경우, 그리고 만약 소셜미디어 때문에 정당이나 의회 또는 선거 같은 전통적 정치참여의 채널과 방식이 외면될 경우에는 자칫 외교정책과정의 안정성이나 객관성, 그리고 궁극적으로는 정당성의 확보도 쉽지 않을 수 있다는 데에 그 고민이 있다.이 글에 포함된 의견은 저자 개인의 견해로 제주평화연구원의 공식입장과는 무관합니다.* 제주평화연구원 연구위원. 한국공공외교포럼 운영위원. 서울대 경제학과를 졸업하고, UC, Berkeley에서 정치학과에서 박사 학위를 취득. 최근 연구로 “한국형 공공외교 모델의 모색: 정책네트워크를 활용한 맞춤형, 과학적 공공외교”와 “핵폐기 사례연구: 남아프리카공화국 사례의 함의와 한계”가 있음.