제주평화연구원

[caption id="attachment_16444" align="alignright" width="264"] Jwa, Min-seok Senior Researcher of Jeju Research Institute[/caption] Necessity The waters around Jeju, an island located off the southernmost tip of the Korean Peninsula, flow northward with the Tsushima Warm Current and the Yellow Sea Warm Current moving from south to east and from south to west, respectively. Depending on the season, Jeju’s waters are intricately affected by water masses with different properties, such as the Chinese Coastal Water, the Korean Southern Coastal Water, and the Korean West Sea Cold Water Zone. This diversity creates good conditions for migration routes and wintering grounds of different fish varieties in the neritic waters of Jeju Island. Of the waters around the Korean Peninsula, the region features the most diverse marine flora and fauna and provides habitats for various living species. Due to climate change, however, it has been reported that the subsea desertification near Jeju Island has caused the disappearance of macro-algal communities (e.g. Sargassum spp., kelp, Ecklonia cava, Eisenia bicyclis, etc.) and the emergence of epiphytic coccolithophorid – a valueless species as food organisms for commercial clam resources (e.g. abalone, horned turban, etc.) – with an increasing occurrence of soft coral reefs. As such, understanding the global carbon cycle is crucial to comprehending and forecasting global warming and other climate change-related phenomena. The ocean is critical for storing carbon (38,000 Gt C). Sixteen times more carbon dioxide (100 Gt yr-1) than the amount released into the atmosphere by human activities (6 Gt yr-1) is circulated by the exchange of gases between the ocean and atmosphere. Carbon dioxide introduced into the ocean due to the exchange of gases between the ocean and the atmosphere is transformed into different forms of organic carbon during the photosynthesis process. Most organic carbon (97%) exists in the form of dissolved organic carbon (DOC) of 700 Gt C, similar to the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (750 Gt C). As such, DOC plays a crucial role in the carbon cycle. However, most of the studies on DOC have focused on the oceanic province. Although the significance of the neritic environment of the marine carbon cycle has been recognized, few studies have addressed the mechanism of cycling, generation, and removal of DOC. Jeju Island – Korea’s representative pristine environment – is well-known to be very sensitive to climate change. It is therefore necessary to identify the movements of DOC affected by climate change and complete the Carbon Balance Model by quantifying carbon in the neritic environment of Jeju Island.   Domestic and International Research Trends Although there has been dramatic advancement over the past 30 years in the studies of the process of the marine carbon cycle and quantitative flux measurement, much has been incompletely understood in terms of the origin, generation, movement, and removal of DOC, as well as the carbon balance of the neritic seas. The trends and prospects of the latest domestic and international research and the problems of preceding research trends on the two topics are as follows: (1) Origin, generation, movement, and degradation of dissolved organic carbon (DOC) - In the ocean, the DOC has a concentration of 34-150 μM. Between 1980-2000, however, great controversy erupted over how DOC was measured. According to preceding studies, the high-temperature oxidation methods are more efficient in DOC measurement, take a shorter time for analysis, and require smaller samples for analysis (100-1000 μl) compared to the peroxide oxidation and ultraviolet oxidation methods. However, the results revealed that much higher concentrations of DOC (300 μM) were reported due to contamination from the device. The recent large-scale distribution of Deep Sea Reference by the University of Miami has greatly improved the reliability of DOC measurements using high-temperature oxidation. - Therefore, research has been actively conducted around the world to trace the origin of the DOC in the oceans and to understand the generation process of the non-biodegradable DOC. As tracers for terrestrial dissolved organic matter, using 13C, 14C, CDOM (colored dissolved organic matters), and C-H-O values has been attempted. However, the origin and generation process of DOM remains insufficiently identified because the analytic methods for the components have yet to be well-established and are difficult to measure, thus forcing researchers to limit the areas of study to certain subjects or phenomena depending on their majors. Therefore, in order to understand the origin and generation process of DOM in the oceans, it is necessary to comprehensively understand the generation, movement, and degradation processes of DOM, while many tracers as possible should be applied at the same time. (2) Are the neritic seas the source of carbon supply or of carbon removal? Neritic seas exhibit substantial changes in pCO2 by region, function of the source of carbon supply, or that of carbon removal. Even when assuming that the oceans stay relatively consistent, the complexity of carbon supply channels and removal processes makes it difficult to measure regional pCO2. Decades of neritic pollution, climate change, and change in the neritic terrestrial environment have made it even more difficult to measure pCO2 by region and/or time. Additionally, preceding studies on the carbon matter balance ignored the influx of carbon and nutritive salts from undersea groundwater, while the findings of recent studies have revealed that the amount of undersea groundwater is absolutely crucial. Therefore, clearly understanding the carbon balance of neritic waters is critical to creating a carbon cycle model that can predict future climate changes and to establish neritic carbon reduction policies.   The Mechanism of the Cycling of Materials Introduced into the Seas Currently, almost no quantitative analysis has been conducted of the physiochemical effects of groundwater due to snowfall in Jeju, where a considerable amount of snow falls every year. And little research has been conducted on the impact assessment of groundwater recharge and spring water created due to snowfall on the island. Snow from the atmosphere penetrates into the aquifer through the process of freezing and thawing, after which the penetrated groundwater is released into neritic waters alongside high concentrations of terrestrial materials (e.g. nutritive salts, heavy metals, carbon, and organic matter) through various biogeochemical reactions in the aquifer. Given this, it is necessary to qualitatively and quantitatively assess terrestrial materials contained in groundwater while considering the impacts of snowfall in Jeju, where groundwater outflows are relatively high compared to other regions. The assessment is crucial in terms of water resources on land as well as of environmental changes in marine ecosystems. In particular, Jeju Island is located in the transition zone from subtropical to temperate climate, which makes the island’s temperature and precipitation higher than those of Korea’s inland regions. Moreover, groundwater is very important as a water resource on Jeju Island because 40-45% of its mean annual precipitation is absorbed underground due to the highly permeable volcanic rock formation, leaving no surface water available. Many of preceding studies focused on the research and development of groundwater created due to precipitation. With a large amount of snowfall around the summit of Mt. Halla from mid-November to April – although the total amount of snowfall is smaller than that of inland areas – the snowfall in the highlands of Mt. Halla is expected to have a significant impact on the changes in the amount of groundwater. Nonetheless, no research has been conducted from this perspective. The continuous rise in temperature due to climate change will likely affect the amount of snowfall in the alpine region of Mt. Halla, eventually affecting Jeju’s main water supply, that is, groundwater recharge. Also important is to grasp the influence of nutritive salts, heavy metals, and major ions on the groundwater environment, including organic substances from the atmosphere. Furthermore, a recent study has reported that nutritive salts that contain nitrates emitted by China have melted into the sea through rain and snow, increasing the level of nutritive salts in the neritic waters off the Korean Peninsula over the past decades (Kim et al., 2011). In the analysis of the entire Pacific Ocean, Korea’s East Sea showed the highest concentration of nutritive salts, which were found to be one-fifth the concentration in Hawaiian waters. This confirmed that the nutritive salts originated from air pollutants emitted in China and other East Asian states. The study also forecast that the increasing concentration of nitrates in the atmosphere will cause the increase in the influx of nitrates into the ocean, eventually diminishing the amount of small phytoplankton while augmenting that of large plankton that causes red tide.   A Research Proposal on the Direction of the Marine Environment-Related Policies Reflecting Climate Change Research on the marine environment is deemed to provide basic data for global climate change forecasting and carbon cycle models as well as lay the foundation for setting future policy directions for Jeju Island’s marine environment, which is sensitive to climate change. In this perspective, I propose the following potential research areas: (1) Changes in the cycling of water and nutritive salts and the feedback effect concerning climate change - A study on the water cycle and water balance reflecting climate change: The purpose of this study is to secure future water resources and accurately forecast climate change. - A study on the iron cycle reflecting climate change: This study calculates the iron supply through aerosols to broaden the understanding of biochemical movements of micro-nutritive salts, which are essential for biological production. It will also help recognize the importance of marine-atmospheric interaction. - A study on the cycling of nutritive salts reflecting climate change: This study aims to understand how limiting factors in biological production appear depending on the marine environment. As biological production in the oceans is related to the reduction of carbon dioxide – a major greenhouse gas – it will be considered important as a timely research topic at an international level. (2) Ocean acidification and global ecological change due to climate change - A study on ocean acidification due to climate change: The increase in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere causes the acidification of the ocean. Therefore, the different scenarios on the increasing level of carbon dioxide allow for the varied prediction of ocean acidification and the resulting changes in the marine ecosystems. It also creates a feedback effect concerning climate change. - A study on the changes in the global ecosystems due to climate change: Fundamental research is needed on how the changes in terrestrial vegetation and ecosystems due to climate change affects the changes in water cycle, greenhouse gases, and aerosols, and on what feedback it eventually gives to climate change. Jwa, Min-seok is a Senior Researcher of Jeju Research Institute. Earned a Ph.D. in the College of Ocean Sciences of Jeju National University. Authored “Physiological Responses of Intrinsic Small Abalone Haliotis Diversicolor Aquatilis under High Temperature Stress by Low-Level 60Co, Gamma Irradiation-Mediated Hormetic Effect” (2020) and “Current Situation and Economic Analysis of Flatfish Aquaculture in Jeju” (2020). Study underway on the distribution status of marine products from Jeju Island.

[caption id="attachment_17288" align="alignright" width="121"] Hwang Kyung-soo Professor, Department of Public Administration, Jeju National University[/caption] This article aims to examine how Jeju has built peace through cooperation within the framework of “village autonomy.” Despite the island’s difficult conditions and history of tyranny, war, and destitution, Jeju has maintained a steadfast custom of village autonomy. I have always had the aspiration to talk to anyone, in any place, about the pain of Jeju, about the potential of Jeju, about the goodness of the Jeju people, and about how they could build peace through cooperation and village autonomy. For a country to maintain peace, would it need an excellent ruler? Excellent subordinates? Or excellent people? The answer would be all three. In the case of Jeju Island, excellency was particularly found in its people. The Jeju people are excellent in that they have created a mechanism for cooperation, and that mechanism is village autonomy.To write this article, I interviewed Dr. Kim Il-soon, who has studied Jeju’s village autonomy, and Prof. Go Chang-hun, who has studied peace with a focus on Jeju. The interviews were used in the article where relevant. 1. The history of Jeju’s feebleness against state power In tracing the history of Jeju, one would discover a host of suffering that the Jeju people endured but could speak of only with difficulty. In chronological order, there was the deplorable conquest of Tamna [an ancient name of the island now called Jeju] by the Goryeo Dynasty to suppress the rebellion of Mokho [Mongolian horse ranch managers sent from the Yuan Dynasty]. (Specifically, Goryeo subjugated Tamna during King Gongmin’s reign while subduing the insubordinate Mokho whose number reached 1,700.) Secondly, Jeju people suffered excessive taxation and exploitation committed by state-appointed governors during the Joseon Dynasty. The third suffering would be the ban on Jeju residents’ exiting the island (1629-1825) and the poverty they experienced in the Joseon era. The fourth suffering was caused by Jeju 4∙3 and Cold War-ideology. Other historical examples include battles against Japanese raiders, oppression by Imperial Japan’s Kwantung Army (58,320 soldiers stationed on Jeju alone in 1945), and the preventative arrests of Jeju residents before and during the Korean War with regard to Jeju 4∙3 (the tracking down and imprisoning those who were thought to harm government-friendly forces by sympathizing with the enemy in wartime). Jeju also suffered pain due to the guilt-by-association system concerning the pro-Pyongyang Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan). With respect to the Chongryon, there were cases where new cadets were not accepted into the military academies after passing their exams because of the background check. In other cases, some Korean citizens who had lived in Japan were wrongfully accused of being spies (The Hankook Ilbo, dated Oct. 11, 2009, “Chongryon ‘spy’ now aged over 80 finally acquitted after 45 years”). In the history of Jeju, it was difficult to secure freedom from state power as is taught in books. Jeju was the most oppressed place in Korea. Rather than a place of freedom, Jeju was an island of exile and a harsh place to live. 2. The Jeju people who needed a community of cooperation The Jeju people needed the most primitive tool of cooperation to surmount the Japanese raids, the Mongolian invasion, the tax extortion by state power and governors, the disasters, and the destitution. Even revolutionary naturalist Charles Darwin would have trouble explaining the conditions of Jeju Island. When looking at the Jeju residents, he would find them competing when viewed as individuals, while cooperating when viewed as a group. As the villages on Jeju were not a community that existed as a combination of individual people, but a community of people who were all poor and persecuted, Pyotr Alekseyevich Kropotkin's framework of cooperation (2015) would be more convincing when explaining Jeju’s conditions. Animals would not compete with each other or wield violence in their family communities. There may be special cases where an old male lion leaves its family or where nomads leave elderly people in the fields due to the difficulties of migration. Normally, however, a family community is premised on cooperation. Residents of Jeju’s villages had to live a communal family life. It is connected with the Gwendang [kinship] culture. However distant, they consider all of their relatives as somebody to rely on. They even call all of their elderly neighbors “Samchun” [uncles], be they neighbors inside or outside their kinship network, regardless of their gender. This is called the “Gwendang culture.” When two people introduce themselves to each other and notice even the slightest connection, they would say, “Oh, we’re Gwendang!” The in-laws and the most distant of relatives also ​​had to be united in a cooperative framework of Gwendang. It was an inevitable tradition in order for Jeju people to survive. The Jeju people tried to exclude selfish elements in order to protect the cooperative community. As Choi Jung-kyu (2009) indicates, an altruistic society is unstable. This is because when the selfish elements -- that is, the free riders -- appear, an altruistic society would begin to crack and most people would try to lead a selfish life. Traditionally, Jeju residents made innumerable efforts to keep their society altruistic. One example is “separately provided mutual assistance” (e.g. contributing to one’s funeral by giving money to each of their children in condolence). If a Jeju resident fails to provide mutual assistance to each and every relevant person, they will be regarded badly. In another example, Jeju haenyeo, women divers, have maintained very strict qualifications and penalties in order to protect Haenyeo Badang, the sea areas used by the haenyeo. The strong rules protect the shared space. Historically, each village agreed upon their respective Hyangyak [communal rules] and made sure that every villager followed them. It would not be an exaggeration to say that violating Jeju's Hyangyak was more terrifying than violating actual laws. Jeju residents are criticized for being exclusive. This is because there was a strong in-group tendency to abide by Hyangyak and protect the community. In order to solve problems that are difficult for a single family to handle, they developed the culture of Sunureum [exchange of labor] through the practices of Gye and Jeop, which are communal fraternities. The custom was necessary in order for Jeju residents to survive. The ceremonial occasions of coming of age could be also addressed through Gye and Jeop. Gaining a paid membership to Gye and Jeop would help the residents cope with large family events. That was how they survived. Non-members or non-contributors were not allowed to participate in the distribution of fruit. Although the custom is criticized for being exclusive, it should be seen as the solidarity of the weak. 3. Jeju’s village autonomy as a result of democracy, along with cooperation Jeju’s village autonomy could be presented as a form of adding the framework of cooperation to democracy as is described by Greek philosopher Aristotle. None of Jeju’s villages expelled members by voting. It was also not a republic where power was transferred to a single person through democracy. Jeju’s system was much better than Athenian democracy, which sugarcoated bad deeds with fluent, easy-on-the-ear speeches. This is because Jeju’s system was created by adding cooperation to democracy. In an interview on July 7, 2021, Prof. Go Chang-hun said: “Jeju’s village autonomy was a democracy in which decisions were made through continuous meetings. It was a way to overcome difficulties by working together, and a structure of unavoidable compliance with the decisions made within the group. The villages were not large, and the residents had to live a life of face-to-face relationships, getting to know each other.” There may have been a form of aristocratic government where community leaders discussed. However, given the mechanism of gathering public opinions through village meetings, activities of self-supporting groups, and associations by vocation and age, the government featured democracy. 4. An Asian mode of co-production based on the sharing economy Village autonomy in Jeju is a sharing economy system. In the context of Western economic history, it was an Asian mode of co-production before slavery or feudalism. It is proven in the systems of Haenyeo Badang and the common meadows. Even now, these rules are obeyed in the yearly adjustment or distribution of profits from the management of common meadows and the group activities of haenyeo. Village autonomy should be interpreted that the commons have been used as a tool for maintaining community, rather than interpreting it within the framework of the tragedy of the commons or the comedy of the commons. The system would have the ultimate purpose of maintaining the health of the community, rather than pursuing economic logic. Co-distribution required a strict compliance with norms. Selfishness, free-riding, immorality, untrustworthiness, lack of shared responsibility, and, especially, incapable leaders (e.g. Sanggun haenyeo [highly accomplished haenyeo] lacking work capabilities) were subject to condemnation and penalties in the co-distribution process. These were efforts for the continuity of village autonomy. 5. Village autonomy in Jeju: resident autonomy rather than group autonomy In the system of village autonomy, the villagers became the center. It was no different from the mentality that man is equal to heaven. People in need were constantly cared for, respect was continuously shown for the elderly, and efforts were made for fair distribution. It would have been possible as the communities were based on a village unit. To cite my childhood experience, when the neighborhood was celebrating something, we used to give away Tteokban, rice cake and boiled pork prepared to be shared, to the neighbors over a certain age in the evening. Then we reported on the reason for sharing the food. The elderly members of the community asked who we were and shared the joy with us. It was a custom that allowed us to play various roles at once, including sharing, reporting, checking on the health of the elderly, and providing enjoyment. In this sense, village autonomy in Jeju features resident autonomy, rather than group autonomy. Apparently, the national government still struggles to accept Jeju's village autonomy as a new system of autonomy in the Local Autonomy Act. This is partly because it is difficult to determine the scope of the activities by law, but also because village autonomy coexists with the practice of co-production and distribution, which are difficult to regulate with Korean laws and institutions. 6. Hyangyak: The standard and norm for peace in villages Hyangyak has provided a framework for building peace in the village. All 172 sub-districts called Li, the sub-districts composed of Eup and Myeon, in Jeju have established their respective Hyangyak. Mostly, Li communities directly elect their leaders called Lijang, or appoint them through recommendation. Li communities also appoint their office managers. The sub-districts also receive membership fees from the residents. (Some sub-districts secure the operational costs using the profits from their own assets and properties, without collecting membership fees.) These villages manage their own properties, while receiving and executing Li-related subsidies. They also form self-supporting groups to make collective decisions. These activities shape the standards for village economy and the essence of the village. Hyangyak induced peace while serving as a norm for villagers to follow. It played a role in managing conflicts as well as serving elderly villagers. It also laid the groundwork for village development decision-making. It served as a basis for managing the commons, managing spring water and piers, and inducing investment in social overhead capital. It served as a norm in performing Maeulje [village rituals] and providing scholarships to village youth. In the process of following these rules, peace was guaranteed in the villages. Hyangyak led the peace-building process by creating a public forum for the villagers. On communal matters, villagers consult with the Lijang first, rather than with provincial councilors or town heads. In an interview on July 5, 2021, Dr. Kim Il-soon said: “Hyangyak provided the foundation for the village’s role as a small government to encourage its members to directly participate in village affairs and solve them. It even motivated the self-supporting groups to take the role of a parliament.” In the interview on July 7, 2021, Prof. Go Chang-hun said: “The mechanism of the meeting played a significant role in keeping peace. However, it was also used as a negative tool. For example, as meetings were instrumentalized for decision-making, they were reduced to a mobilization system. The challenge for the future is to prevent the meetings from being instrumentalized so that the democratic style is properly applied.” Hyangyak realized peace through a mechanism similar to governance. Dr. Kim Il-soon said in the interview: “Jeju has the governance system of village autonomy, which enabled the residents to secure peace through the roles of self-supporting groups. Cooperation was achieved within the self-supporting groups such as the development committee, youth association, women's association, elderly association, fishing village cooperatives, farmers’ association, and property management committee. Profits from the village activities are distributed fairly, while part of the money is provided every month to the elderly over a certain age. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, some villages distributed relief grants to each household.” 7. Thinking of peaceful village autonomy that embraces diverse values Jeju’s village autonomy should embrace diverse values. From a geopolitical perspective, Jeju Island is the center of East Asia. Cruise ships enter the island’s ports more than 500 times a year (507 times in 2016, with recent changes concerning the THAAD deployment and the COVID-19 pandemic). In Jeju villages, not only multicultural families but also refugees coexist with locals. (484 Yemenis applied for refugee status in Jeju in 2018, and 414 of them currently live in Jeju.) Jeju is a representative region with a net increase in the number of immigrants, which surpasses the decrease in the population. These diverse values ​​should be embraced by the villages. Just as Jean Monet in France tried to embrace Germany after World War II, it is necessary to achieve coexistence and a resonating village autonomy. Attention should also be paid to women’s engagement in village autonomy. In Jeju villages, discussions have been increasingly active concerning gender equality. This is because the autonomy’s membership qualification of being the head of the household limits the participation of women in village affairs. An increasing number of villages have had such discussions. It may be a reflection of the island’s traditional feature of Yeoda, the phenomenon of women outnumbering men. The direction pursued by village autonomy must also change. My idea is that cultural and artistic needs should also be reflected. We are living in an era where village autonomy is not all about responding to tyranny and destitution as it did in the past. Village autonomy should allow us to pursue leisure, healing, and the fun of life. Therefore, village autonomy should reflect the current culture and art. I also believe that more attention should be paid to environmental protection. Recently, village autonomy has begun to take an interest in environmental protection through such efforts as the community building campaign. There is growing interest in the environment, which involves the management of common meadows, Haenyeo Badang, and spring water, as well as the prevention of groundwater pollution. I conclude this article by thinking about Jeju’s village autonomy, which leads people and nature to peace even after times have changed. □ References Darwin, C. The origin of species. Translated by Chul-yong Song. Seoul: Dongsuh Press, 2009. Kropotkin, P. P. Mutual aid: A factor of evolution. Translated by Hoon Kim. Seoul: Summer Hill, 2015. Choi, J. K. Emergence of altruistic man. Seoul: Puriwaipari, 2004. Choi, J. S. Economic history of the west. Seoul: Seomoondang, 2018. Hwang, K. S. Cartoon: Understanding of the science of public administration. Jeju: Guide Book Publishing, 2008. Kim, Y. C. Bargaining for Advantage. Seoul: Humanist, 2016. About the author Hwang Kyung-soo B.A. in Public Administration (Department of Public Administration, Jeju National University); M.A. in Urban and Regional Planning (Graduate School of Environmental Studies, Seoul National University); Ph.D. in Transportation Engineering (Graduate School of Urban Science, University of Seoul); former researcher at the Jeju Research Institute (two years); current professor in the Department of Public Administration, Jeju National University. Authored “Cartoon: Understanding of the science of public administration” and co-authored “Understanding of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province.” Lecture titles include: Public Administration, City and Transportation, Negotiation, Theory of State, Cultural Administration.

[caption id="attachment_16444" align="alignright" width="264"] Jwa, Min-seok Senior Researcher of Jeju Research Institute[/caption] Necessity The waters around Jeju, an island located off the southernmost tip of the Korean Peninsula, flow northward with the Tsushima Warm Current and the Yellow Sea Warm Current moving from south to east and from south to west, respectively. Depending on the season, Jeju’s waters are intricately affected by water masses with different properties, such as the Chinese Coastal Water, the Korean Southern Coastal Water, and the Korean West Sea Cold Water Zone. This diversity creates good conditions for migration routes and wintering grounds of different fish varieties in the neritic waters of Jeju Island. Of the waters around the Korean Peninsula, the region features the most diverse marine flora and fauna and provides habitats for various living species. Due to climate change, however, it has been reported that the subsea desertification near Jeju Island has caused the disappearance of macro-algal communities (e.g. Sargassum spp., kelp, Ecklonia cava, Eisenia bicyclis, etc.) and the emergence of epiphytic coccolithophorid – a valueless species as food organisms for commercial clam resources (e.g. abalone, horned turban, etc.) – with an increasing occurrence of soft coral reefs. As such, understanding the global carbon cycle is crucial to comprehending and forecasting global warming and other climate change-related phenomena. The ocean is critical for storing carbon (38,000 Gt C). Sixteen times more carbon dioxide (100 Gt yr-1) than the amount released into the atmosphere by human activities (6 Gt yr-1) is circulated by the exchange of gases between the ocean and atmosphere. Carbon dioxide introduced into the ocean due to the exchange of gases between the ocean and the atmosphere is transformed into different forms of organic carbon during the photosynthesis process. Most organic carbon (97%) exists in the form of dissolved organic carbon (DOC) of 700 Gt C, similar to the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (750 Gt C). As such, DOC plays a crucial role in the carbon cycle. However, most of the studies on DOC have focused on the oceanic province. Although the significance of the neritic environment of the marine carbon cycle has been recognized, few studies have addressed the mechanism of cycling, generation, and removal of DOC. Jeju Island – Korea’s representative pristine environment – is well-known to be very sensitive to climate change. It is therefore necessary to identify the movements of DOC affected by climate change and complete the Carbon Balance Model by quantifying carbon in the neritic environment of Jeju Island.   Domestic and International Research Trends Although there has been dramatic advancement over the past 30 years in the studies of the process of the marine carbon cycle and quantitative flux measurement, much has been incompletely understood in terms of the origin, generation, movement, and removal of DOC, as well as the carbon balance of the neritic seas. The trends and prospects of the latest domestic and international research and the problems of preceding research trends on the two topics are as follows: (1) Origin, generation, movement, and degradation of dissolved organic carbon (DOC) - In the ocean, the DOC has a concentration of 34-150 μM. Between 1980-2000, however, great controversy erupted over how DOC was measured. According to preceding studies, the high-temperature oxidation methods are more efficient in DOC measurement, take a shorter time for analysis, and require smaller samples for analysis (100-1000 μl) compared to the peroxide oxidation and ultraviolet oxidation methods. However, the results revealed that much higher concentrations of DOC (300 μM) were reported due to contamination from the device. The recent large-scale distribution of Deep Sea Reference by the University of Miami has greatly improved the reliability of DOC measurements using high-temperature oxidation. - Therefore, research has been actively conducted around the world to trace the origin of the DOC in the oceans and to understand the generation process of the non-biodegradable DOC. As tracers for terrestrial dissolved organic matter, using 13C, 14C, CDOM (colored dissolved organic matters), and C-H-O values has been attempted. However, the origin and generation process of DOM remains insufficiently identified because the analytic methods for the components have yet to be well-established and are difficult to measure, thus forcing researchers to limit the areas of study to certain subjects or phenomena depending on their majors. Therefore, in order to understand the origin and generation process of DOM in the oceans, it is necessary to comprehensively understand the generation, movement, and degradation processes of DOM, while many tracers as possible should be applied at the same time. (2) Are the neritic seas the source of carbon supply or of carbon removal? Neritic seas exhibit substantial changes in pCO2 by region, function of the source of carbon supply, or that of carbon removal. Even when assuming that the oceans stay relatively consistent, the complexity of carbon supply channels and removal processes makes it difficult to measure regional pCO2. Decades of neritic pollution, climate change, and change in the neritic terrestrial environment have made it even more difficult to measure pCO2 by region and/or time. Additionally, preceding studies on the carbon matter balance ignored the influx of carbon and nutritive salts from undersea groundwater, while the findings of recent studies have revealed that the amount of undersea groundwater is absolutely crucial. Therefore, clearly understanding the carbon balance of neritic waters is critical to creating a carbon cycle model that can predict future climate changes and to establish neritic carbon reduction policies.   The Mechanism of the Cycling of Materials Introduced into the Seas Currently, almost no quantitative analysis has been conducted of the physiochemical effects of groundwater due to snowfall in Jeju, where a considerable amount of snow falls every year. And little research has been conducted on the impact assessment of groundwater recharge and spring water created due to snowfall on the island. Snow from the atmosphere penetrates into the aquifer through the process of freezing and thawing, after which the penetrated groundwater is released into neritic waters alongside high concentrations of terrestrial materials (e.g. nutritive salts, heavy metals, carbon, and organic matter) through various biogeochemical reactions in the aquifer. Given this, it is necessary to qualitatively and quantitatively assess terrestrial materials contained in groundwater while considering the impacts of snowfall in Jeju, where groundwater outflows are relatively high compared to other regions. The assessment is crucial in terms of water resources on land as well as of environmental changes in marine ecosystems. In particular, Jeju Island is located in the transition zone from subtropical to temperate climate, which makes the island’s temperature and precipitation higher than those of Korea’s inland regions. Moreover, groundwater is very important as a water resource on Jeju Island because 40-45% of its mean annual precipitation is absorbed underground due to the highly permeable volcanic rock formation, leaving no surface water available. Many of preceding studies focused on the research and development of groundwater created due to precipitation. With a large amount of snowfall around the summit of Mt. Halla from mid-November to April – although the total amount of snowfall is smaller than that of inland areas – the snowfall in the highlands of Mt. Halla is expected to have a significant impact on the changes in the amount of groundwater. Nonetheless, no research has been conducted from this perspective. The continuous rise in temperature due to climate change will likely affect the amount of snowfall in the alpine region of Mt. Halla, eventually affecting Jeju’s main water supply, that is, groundwater recharge. Also important is to grasp the influence of nutritive salts, heavy metals, and major ions on the groundwater environment, including organic substances from the atmosphere. Furthermore, a recent study has reported that nutritive salts that contain nitrates emitted by China have melted into the sea through rain and snow, increasing the level of nutritive salts in the neritic waters off the Korean Peninsula over the past decades (Kim et al., 2011). In the analysis of the entire Pacific Ocean, Korea’s East Sea showed the highest concentration of nutritive salts, which were found to be one-fifth the concentration in Hawaiian waters. This confirmed that the nutritive salts originated from air pollutants emitted in China and other East Asian states. The study also forecast that the increasing concentration of nitrates in the atmosphere will cause the increase in the influx of nitrates into the ocean, eventually diminishing the amount of small phytoplankton while augmenting that of large plankton that causes red tide.   A Research Proposal on the Direction of the Marine Environment-Related Policies Reflecting Climate Change Research on the marine environment is deemed to provide basic data for global climate change forecasting and carbon cycle models as well as lay the foundation for setting future policy directions for Jeju Island’s marine environment, which is sensitive to climate change. In this perspective, I propose the following potential research areas: (1) Changes in the cycling of water and nutritive salts and the feedback effect concerning climate change - A study on the water cycle and water balance reflecting climate change: The purpose of this study is to secure future water resources and accurately forecast climate change. - A study on the iron cycle reflecting climate change: This study calculates the iron supply through aerosols to broaden the understanding of biochemical movements of micro-nutritive salts, which are essential for biological production. It will also help recognize the importance of marine-atmospheric interaction. - A study on the cycling of nutritive salts reflecting climate change: This study aims to understand how limiting factors in biological production appear depending on the marine environment. As biological production in the oceans is related to the reduction of carbon dioxide – a major greenhouse gas – it will be considered important as a timely research topic at an international level. (2) Ocean acidification and global ecological change due to climate change - A study on ocean acidification due to climate change: The increase in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere causes the acidification of the ocean. Therefore, the different scenarios on the increasing level of carbon dioxide allow for the varied prediction of ocean acidification and the resulting changes in the marine ecosystems. It also creates a feedback effect concerning climate change. - A study on the changes in the global ecosystems due to climate change: Fundamental research is needed on how the changes in terrestrial vegetation and ecosystems due to climate change affects the changes in water cycle, greenhouse gases, and aerosols, and on what feedback it eventually gives to climate change. Jwa, Min-seok is a Senior Researcher of Jeju Research Institute. Earned a Ph.D. in the College of Ocean Sciences of Jeju National University. Authored “Physiological Responses of Intrinsic Small Abalone Haliotis Diversicolor Aquatilis under High Temperature Stress by Low-Level 60Co, Gamma Irradiation-Mediated Hormetic Effect” (2020) and “Current Situation and Economic Analysis of Flatfish Aquaculture in Jeju” (2020). Study underway on the distribution status of marine products from Jeju Island.

[caption id="attachment_16264" align="alignright" width="200"] Hong, Chang-yu Research Fellow, Jeju Research Institute[/caption] Jeju Island, due to its insular traits, possesses distinctive environmental resources, whose picturesque scenery exhibits a unique local charm. Other valuable assets of the island include its natural environment represented by peculiar geological formations such as Mt. Halla, its mid-mountainous regions, parasitic volcanic cones, waterfalls, and lava tubes, alongside the various living conditions that are home to more than 7,800 species. The value of Jeju’s natural environment has been internationally recognized, as shown in its inscriptions as a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve in 2002, a UNESCO World Natural Heritage site in 2007, and a UNESCO Global Geopark site in 2010, as well as in its five Ramsar Wetlands of International Importance designations. Presumably, the values of the island’s unique, indigenous ecology could receive even more international praise than we can imagine. Gaining momentum from the 2012 World Conservation Congress (WCC), the Jeju provincial government has established the island as a World Environmental Hub. During the WCC it hosted in 2012, the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (JSSGP) expressed the will to develop its environmental value into a global brand and reestablish itself with a global social, economic, and environmental system to be recognized as a World Environmental Hub (WEH). To this end, the local government enacted the JSSGP Framework Ordinance on the Establishment of the WEH System and the Promotion of Low-Carbon and Green Growth in 2011. On this statutory foundation, the Master Plan for Establishing the WEH was developed in 2014 and is still in effect. The Moon Jae-in administration and the JSSGP have made several declarations concerning their intent to cooperate in promoting Jeju as a Northeast Asian Environmental Hub (NEH), while closely consulting with one another at the working level. Before its inauguration, the incumbent national government announced the “creation of an NEH for peace and human rights” as a local campaign pledge. Against this backdrop, South Korea’s Ministry of Environment (MOE) and the JSSGP have collaborated since October 2018 to realize Jeju as an environmental model city, which will contribute to the sustainable development of both the province and the region through systematically conserving and managing their environmental assets and improving their environmental values. Therefore, it is now time to prepare a specific vision for the promotion of Jeju’s NEH 2030 initiative. Promotional strategies in the environmental, social, and economic sectors should be developed for sustainable development while putting top priority on the conservation and management of Jeju’s excellent natural resources. The purpose of this paper is to emphasize the need for a consistent evaluation and monitoring system for the assessment of the promotion of NEH and suggest a system for government role allocation and cooperation for the realization of an NEH on Jeju Island. In the 1990s, various concepts of “environment cities” appeared under the orientation of “environmentally sound and sustainable development,” such as the sustainable city, the eco-city, the low-carbon green city, and the carbon-neutral city. While making efforts to improve their environmental problems, these environment cities encourage their citizens to voluntarily engage in resolving related issues, and are thus considered more competitive than other cities. Freiburg in Germany, Curitiba in Brazil, and Kitakyushu in Japan are particularly recognized as environment cities by improving their environmental issues that were caused by industrialization and urbanization through encouraging voluntary civil engagement and introducing environmentally friendly alternative methods. The international awards for environment cities present overall indicators for environmental evaluation in selecting environmental model cities. Representative awards include the European Green Capital Award, Japan’s Eco-City Contest, and South Korea’s Green City Evaluation. The “environmental hub” can have different definitions depending on the vision, specialization strategies, and projects promoted by the city. The JSSGP also defined the environmental hub in its Master Plan for Establishing the WEH 2020 as “an excellent global city where the environment, economy, and society are well-harmonized and where everyone wishes to call home.” The NEH, with the target completion date of 2030, is defined as “an environmental model city, which raises Jeju Island’s environmental value through systematic conservation and management of its environmental assets to allow nature and people to coexist.” This definition was established by adopting the latest agendas, such as the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals and Habitat III Conference and the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives’ sustainable urban development framework. The Vision and Plan for the NEH 2030 is a follow-up to 2014’s Master Plan for Establishing the WEH 2020, which was a 10-year plan developed on the legal foundation of the JSSGP Framework Ordinance on the Establishment of the WEH System and the Promotion of Low-Carbon and Green Growth (Article 5). Notably, the plan is a vision that considers the provincial government’s cooperation with the Moon administration’s campaign pledge and MOE-level efforts. In the 2nd World Leaders’ Conservation Forum held on Oct. 3, 2018, the JSSGP and the MOE signed an official agreement to cooperate on establishing Jeju’s vision for the NEH initiative. Based on this agreement, the JSSGP commissioned the Korea Environment Institute and the Jeju Research Institute to conduct the research project titled the Vision for the Establishment of Jeju as an NEH by 2030 from 2019 to July 2020. The purpose of the research project was to suggest guidelines on how to make Jeju an environmental model city and an NEH in order to contribute to the sustainable development of the region and Korea. Specifically, the following three aspects have been considered to establish the vision for the establishment of Jeju as an NEH: First, the vision needs strategies based on the local conditions and characteristics of Jeju Island. In other words, the vision to develop Jeju into an environmental model city should be established by building on the island’s excellent natural environment, while strengthening and highlighting the efforts made by principle of choice and concentration. Second, the vision needs a process of managing its implementation. This means that the promotion of the environment model city should be regularly monitored and the provision for feedback on related policies and projects should be specifically designed. By the principle of transparency, timeliness, accountability, and feedback, the performance of each policy and project will have to be analyzed and diagnosed to further advance those with outstanding performances and readjust the policies and projects. Third, the vision needs to emphasize sustainability, which must not just focus on the environment but also consider the society and economy. Public opinion should be collected through public hearings, debates, and consultation meetings. On the basis of public opinions, media analyses, and the performance diagnoses of the Master Plan for Establishing the WEH 2020, the vision should secure sustainability, which considers the economic and social sectors as well as the environmental sector for the future of Jeju society. Given these three aspects, the vision for the establishment of Jeju as a WEH by 2030 has been set in Jeju, an NEH Where People and Nature Coexist to Improve Environmental Value. To explain it in detail, Jeju will be developed into a WEH, which will allow everyone to fully enjoy the benefits of nature, raise the value of the environment through enhanced sustainability in all sectors of society, and contribute to the sustainable development of the Republic of Korea and Northeast Asia. To achieve this vision, the following specific goals have been determined: The first goal is “eco-Jeju with affluence.” Ultimately, Jeju will pursue to be a smart, environmentally friendly city, which works as an “eco-model city” to conserve and restore the natural and ecological environment and its damaged system, while allowing for the mutually beneficial existence of nature and people. The second goal is “circulating Jeju with cleanliness.” Through this goal, Jeju will turn itself into an ideal city of circulated resources, which manages its clean water resources based on circulation while pursuing carbon neutrality by means of an energy shift. The third goal is “sustainable Jeju with vitality.” By expanding its future-oriented green economy, stable job opportunities should be created in the green sector. The goal will help build a culture valuing the environment where cooperation is available through engagement and inclusiveness. Establishing Jeju as an NEH requires as a prerequisite a systematic platform to promote the initiative. To this end, governance building and role allocation are required, which involve the JSSGP, as well as Jeju residents, the Jeju Special Self-Governing Provincial Council, NGOs, industries, research institutes, and national agencies (e.g. MOE). The JSSGP, as the key agent, should lead performance outcomes in close cooperation with local industries, residents, NGOs, and research institutes. Winning the bid for projects led by national agencies is also important to promote the NEH initiative, alongside diversified efforts to adjust the local budget and secure funds such as the environmental conservation fund and the environmental hub fund. The JSSGP also has the mandate to foster close cooperation with the national government to execute such funds as the cooperation charge on ecosystem conservation and the environmental improvement charge. The JSSGP should also form and operate the promotional committee and the working group for the environmental hub initiative, which will generally direct the seamless implementation of the related projects and readjust them based on the monitoring and evaluation results. Finally, the JSSGP should promote and support the enactment and revision of the related municipal ordinances for the initiative. The national government represented by the MOE and other national agencies is the key stakeholder, which, as a partner of the JSSGP’s vision for the NEH initiative, decides whether or not to support the related strategic projects by reviewing their connectivity with the national initiatives, the necessity of supporting the projects, and the fulfillment of requirements. The national agencies can also provide support by considering the preparation of statutory grounds, such as revising the Jeju Special Act. Additionally, it will be necessary for the national government to institutionally and financially support the JSSGP at the international level by working with international organizations such as the United Nations and UNESCO, and consider the establishment of an international organization tentatively named the Global Research and Cooperation Center for Internationally Protected Areas. Specialized research institutes such as the Korea Environment Institute and the Jeju Research Institute should study specific measures of the strategic projects to help establish Jeju Island as an NEH, while conducting surveys and research into the development of policies related to the environmental hub and their action plans. Should there be a change in local public awareness of the environment for the NEH initiative, the institutes will also take a long-term view to provide education programs and publicize the necessity of the initiative on a continued basis. The key industries that drive the local economy will have to be accountable for promoting the provincial NEH vision by taking on the important role of practicing environmentally friendly business management to conserve the clean environment and inflict the least amount of harm to nature. Finally, the most crucial role should be taken by the NGOs and the residents of Jeju Island. The NGOs will monitor the negative impacts of the strategic projects related to the NEH initiative, such as natural destruction and pollution. In doing so, they will facilitate the promotion of the projects that correspond to the vision. These efforts will lay the groundwork for building the individual capacity of Jeju residents as well as leadership, which is required to establish Jeju as an NEH. In the same context, the local community should foster active engagement and cooperation. Local community members will make concerted efforts to proactively engage in the initiative, while playing the role of observers. Above all, the citizens of Jeju Island will be recognized as core members of the environmental hub to establish the environmentally friendly lifestyle. The other vital roles Jeju residents will have to take on include reviewing the major plans and projects related to the NEH vision, electing members of the JSSGP Council, and having local lawmakers enact and/or revise the related municipal ordinances to facilitate the plans and projects promoted by the NEH vision and establish the NEH as a successful model. Hong, Chang-yu is a research fellow at the Jeju Research Institute. Ph.D. in Urban Studies from the College of Urban and Public Affairs of Portland State University. Author of “Challenges and Achievements beyond Decision-Making Power of Planners: How Are Decisions on Planning for Stream Restoration Made in South Korea?” (2020) and co-author of “Regaining Tractability through Reframing of a Watershed Management Conflict: A Case of Southwestern Puerto Rico” (2020). Study underway on the socio-ecological case of building a global governance system for the climatic environment.

A paradox of periphery [caption id="attachment_16028" align="alignright" width="200"] Sungchan Cho Director, Hananuri Academy of Northeast Asian Studies[/caption] The need to escape from a disconnected space to be connected is such a natural human need that requires no proof just as the axiom in mathematics. Throughout the long history of mankind, some have embodied this need as a desire for territorial expansion, while others have materialized it through the exchange of civilization in such forms as the “Silk Road.” Recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has convincingly revealed the reality of how closely the world is connected. Still, there remains a place that is yet to be connected. It is South Korea. North and South Korea are separated by the Military Demarcation Line, obstructing land routes from the South not just to the North but also to the Asian and European continents. Although South Korea sits on one periphery of the Asian continent, it is still an island in a geopolitical sense. The world map produced from a Korea-centric perspective would place the entire Korean Peninsula including South Korea as the central nation in Northeast Asia. When upside down, however, the map transforms it into a peripheral state. Shin Young-bok (2012) paid attention to the creative possibility of the periphery. He said the periphery is a space of change, of creation, and of life. Shin perceived that the peripheral consciousness offers an insight into the world and the social agents, thus breaking the frame we are locked up in and creating a sheer escape in search of new territory. South Korea is on the periphery of the continents of Asia and Europe; and in a geopolitical sense, it is an island. It is where the maritime and the continental forces meet, and where the two Koreas remain in conflict over ideology. However, if the history of the Korean Peninsula can paradoxically suggest an insight into the world and the social agents, and if it can generate a dynamic energy for the search of a new territory, the painful history of the peninsula could be endured with gratitude. Then, how can it be connected? A measure in the perspective of the policy studies may sound fairly prosaic. But the term would gain vitality when a persuasive measure is closely connected to our dream. As one of the measures, I would like to present the Northeast Asian Peace and Economy Cooperation Model based on the Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE-based NAPEC Model). This paper consists of three sections. First, it compares Ahn Jung-geun’s theory of Oriental Peace with the history of European integration, followed by a review of the Northeast Asia Peace and Economic Cooperation Model that has been promoted by the United Nations (UN) and other related international organizations. As a practical strategy for the model, the paper discusses the Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE), a strategy adopted by the UN to achieve its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The last section considers what role Jeju, “the island of peace,” can play in the peripheral area. Ahn Jung-geun’s Theory of Oriental Peace and EU, and the NAPEC Model The year 2020 marks the 110th anniversary of the execution of Ahn Jung-geun, a Korean patriot who sacrificed his life for national independence. On Oct. 26, 1909, Ahn, a special general for the national independence of the Korean Army, fatally sniped Japanese Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi at the Harbin railway station in the jurisdiction of Russia. During the five months of imprisonment following his arrest and until his execution on March 26, 1910, Ahn left significant documents concerning peace in Northeast Asia. The representative documents include The Affidavit (written in Japanese) and The Theory of Oriental Peace (written in Chinese). The Affidavit is a record of Ahn’s interview with Higher Court Head Yoshito Hiraishi on Feb. 17, 1910, the third day after the ruling on his capital sentence. Ahn wrote The Theory of Oriental Peace, which contains his opinions about the world of peace, and he worked on it until he was executed. As the request to postpone his execution was rejected, The Theory of Oriental Peace is Ahn’s incomplete posthumously published work. Fortunately, The Affidavit allows for an understanding of the key message that Ahn intended to present in The Theory of Oriental Peace. The peace that Ahn advocates for is fundamentally different from the Western concept of peace or pax. The Latin term pax refers to the dominance of a strong party or the hegemony of an empire, while Ahn’s peace implies coexistence and mutual prosperity of the strong and the weak. To achieve Oriental Peace, Ahn suggested the creation of an economic community named the Oriental Peace Association. This approach contrasts with Ito’s theory of peace in the Far East as he implemented the strategy of imperial domination based on military power. Ahn’s peace theory aimed at logically and systematically refuting Ito’s theory. Surprisingly, Ahn’s theory is substantially analogous to the European integration model represented by the EU, thus bearing great significance for peace in Northeast Asia. Through the two relatively short documents, Ahn expressed his idea of Oriental Peace, which he contemplated for a long time, according to his special commentary. First, The Theory of Oriental Peace suggests the background of Eastern philosophy as well as the reasons for punishing Ito. However, the unfinished writing failed to contain the essential part, the specific measures for Oriental Peace. As earlier mentioned, The Affidavit details the core of Ahn’s theory of Oriental Peace. To briefly introduce his suggestions, the ownership of a territory is unchangeable and Japan was supposed to return to China the ownership of Dalian and Lushun, which Japan had occupied after winning the Sino-Japanese War. Ahn suggested the restored regions should be at the center of realizing Oriental Peace, particularly between Korea, China, and Japan. To this end, competent people of the three nations could convene to form an internationally recognized economic community named the Oriental Peace Association. According to Ahn, the association would recruit individual members and collect 1 yen per person for membership to secure financial stability. He then wrote that a bank should be established to issue currency shared by the three nations. Additionally, important spots in the region should be deemed peace zones, where the bank would have a branch office to solve financial issues. Ahn said this would complete Oriental Peace, but to counteract against the world powers, representatives from the three nations would take responsibility for forming a military and organizing a corps of young men. Ahn figured that letting the young soldiers learn each other’s languages would strengthen brotherhood among the nations. Lastly, if the emperors of Japan, Qing, and Korea were crowned after making an oath to the Roman Catholic Pope — the Roman Catholic population accounted for two-thirds of the religious population at the time — Ahn presumed that the three nations could gain the trust of the people of the world and form even stronger forces. Although it reveals limits in certain aspects, such as making an oath to the pope, Ahn’s theory of Oriental Peace is still greatly insightful in that it presents specific strategies for peace in Northeast Asia. Ahn’s argument was fairly innovative at the time but rather difficult to accept. However, his idea is very convincing because the core of his argument was actually realized in the progression of the EU. The history of European integration is largely divided into three dimensions: the background of the times, the symbolic region, and the structure of integration. First, the background of the times features the horrible experience of World War I and World War Ⅱ. The pain caused by the two World Wars drove the creation of the EU of today. The next dimension should be Alsace-Lorraine, which has now become the symbolic region of European integration. Strasbourg, a central city of Alsace-Lorraine, is a border area between France and Germany, providing a cause for inter-state conflicts. Today, the European Parliament sits in the city, transforming Alsace-Lorraine into the symbol of reconciliation and peace. The last dimension is the realistic model for the structure of integration. However it may sound familiar now, the EU was actually formed through a long and complicated process. On May 9, 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman announced the Schuman Declaration, launching the European Coal and Steel Community. Later in 1993, the EU was established based on the Maastricht Treaty, leading to the creation of a single market, the establishment of the European Central Bank, and the introduction of a single currency. It is natural that the similarity between the philosophy and the orientation of two different items leads to a similarity in their components. The same applies to Ahn’s theory of Oriental Peace and today’s EU. The commonality of the two systems in terms of goals can be summarized as “a warless status of peace and mutual prosperity.” The two ideas are also very similar in terms of the overall system, particularly for the creation of the central bank, the issuance of a single currency, and the use of an official language. However, differences are also found in terms of territoriality, characteristics of the economic communities, fundraising methods, and joint defense systems. Additionally, the two ideas exhibit a marked difference in winning international approval. The European integration model presents a new hope and practicability to the members of Northeast Asia that have been trapped in devastating conflicts over a long period of time. Northeast Asia can also pursue a model similar to the EU. First, I would like to suggest naming it the NAPEC, which stands for the Northeast Asian Peace and Economy Corporation. The name reveals the target region and the goal of the community. The target region includes Northeast Asian states. Generally, Northeast Asia includes South Korea, North Korea, China, Japan, Mongolia, and Russia. The goal is to pursue peace and mutual economic prosperity. Northeast Asia is where war continues though fighting has ceased, thus it is in desperate need for peace more than in any other region on earth. Only when peace is settled, the regional economy can create a virtuous cycle and allow for mutual economic prosperity between neighboring states. The political characteristics of the concept is a “corporation,” which may sound ambiguous. Presumably, the concept I suggest will serve as an interim stage. Just as the EU has had controversy over whether or not to move onto the next stage of the European Federation, if the “corporation” I suggest is well operated, it could function as an interim stage before the creation of the Northeast Asian Union. To create and develop the NAPEC, a diversity of economic communities should be established. As shown in the Moon Jae-in administration’s initiatives for the East Asia Railway Community, the Northeast Asia Energy Corporation, the Northeast Asia Logistics Community, and the Northeast Asian Atomic Energy Community, it is necessary to form communities with specific orientations. The former European Steel and Coal Community, the European Economic Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community were incorporated into the European Community and then remodeled as the European Union. In the same manner, the NAPEC can start by incorporating small-scale economic communities and develop into next-level political and economic communities. Should the larger scale incorporation be realized, more ideas could be adopted from Ahn’s theory of Oriental Peace, including establishing a central bank, issuing a single currency, allowing for a visa-exempt and tariff-exempt transportation of people and goods while recognizing national borders, and creating a joint defense force at a Northeast Asian level. It would be appropriate to use the language of all member states as official languages, rather than selecting a specific language. UN’s Northeast Asia Peace and Economic Cooperation Model There may be some readers who consider my idea an unreachable dream. However, it might not conclusively appear as an unrealistic idea when we review what happened and is happening in the Tumen River area, a border area between North Korea, China, and Russia. In 1991, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) took on the Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP). The TRADP was the first project for economic cooperation and the first plan for sub-regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. The multilateral project involved five countries including South Korea, North Korea, Mongolia, and Russia, and the state that most actively engaged in the project was China. In 1992, China designated the Border Economic Cooperation Zone in Hunchun City, a border area near North Korea and Russia. It is China’s only economic cooperation zone in the border area, with three districts included for export-oriented processing, visa-exempt transnational commerce, and for trade with Russia and North Korea. The North Korean city that is connected to this zone is Rajin-Sonbong (or Rason). North Korea also showed a strong will for participation in TRADP by designating the Rajin-Sonbong Special Economic Zone in December 1991. However, TRADP was suspended due to Pyongyang’s withdrawal after its nuclear test. Several years later in 2005, Chinese President Hu Jintao expressed an intention to resume TRADP by scaling it up to the Great Tumen Initiative (GTI). GTI targets a vast area that encompasses Rason of North Korea, the three north provinces of China, and a part of the Primorsky Krai of Russia. Unfortunately, Pyongyang also withdrew from GTI in 2009, and the initiative is virtually on hiatus due to the intricate interests of participating states. Despite the cessation of the GTI, the China-led experiment to create a Northeast Asian economic cooperation community is now being pursued in a different form. Currently, tourism is excluded from the UN’s economic sanctions against North Korea. Taking this advantage, China is working to construct with Russia and North Korea the Tumen River Delta International Tourism Cooperation Zone in the border area along the Tumen River. The initiative is aimed at creating a virtually “borderless” space for profits from shared tourism resources by establishing an international tourism cooperation zone with an area of 100㎢, which covers Fungchuan in China’s Hunchun, Dumangang Village in North Korea’s Rason City, and Khasan of Russia’s Primorsky Krai. According to the initiative, the zone will allow for visa-exempt entry and tariff-free commerce for up to 72 hours. What Ahn Jung-geun suggested in his theory of Oriental Peace is to be realized in this zone. Of course, since it is led by China, the South Korean government should make clear responses. Development Initiative for the Tumen River Delta International Tourism Cooperation Zone [caption id="attachment_16033" align="aligncenter" width="800"] Source: November 2019, The author’s photo from the Fungchuan Observation Tower in Hunchun[/caption]   UN selects Social and Solidarity Economy as an SDG strategy Social economy (économie sociale in French), which has a 200-year history in France, was specified in South Korea by the enforcement of the Social Enterprise Promotion Act in 2007 and the Framework Act on Cooperatives in 2012. During the 2010 local election, social economy also emerged as a regional development strategy. (Jang 2018) The term is now firmly established as a common expression not just in Europe but also in South Korea. Jeju Island is one of the regions where social economy is actively practiced. In late 1981, the expression of économie sociale was first stipulated in French statutes. Then on July 31, 2014, French President François Hollande led the enactment of the Law on the Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE) by adding the term “solidarity.” The French legislation of the Law on SSE was due to the shortage in platforms for social economy. Noticeably, only four types of groups were legally recognized as social economic organizations, including cooperative unions, mutual aid cooperatives, associations, and foundations. In fact, social economy involves a range of areas and engages in literally all fields of society. Evidently, the former category shows that social economy could not be limited to a certain organization or territory. (Jeantet 2019) The organizations under the current Law on SSE also include social enterprises. Nonetheless, the Law still has its limits because the concept of SSE incorporates all of the organizations that pursue social values. The attempt to overcome this limit has recently become visible mainly by the UN. Experts in France, who led the enactment of the Law on SSE, joined the team of UN agencies to explore the possibility of SSE. SSE also considers environmental issues and sustainability in addition to its existing awareness of the issues discussed with the theme of social economy. The International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Federation of Cooperatives (ICA), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the UN-affiliated Inclusive Social Development Division (DISD) have actively participated in exploring the possibility of SSE platforms. It is well known that the UN, which is exploring the possibility of SSE platforms, is leading the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) project (2016-2030). SDGs are a common goal with a very high level of international consensus, as they were unanimously established by the 193 UN member states at the 70th UN General Assembly and at the UN Summit in 2015. Interestingly, at the same time, international organizations supporting the internationalization of SSE gathered in New York on Sept. 29, 2015, to commemorate the 70th UN General Assembly. They adopted the Declaration of the International Leading Group on Social and Solidarity Economy, and made it clear that SSE is a strategic means of implementing the SDGs. SDGs and SSE are two sides of the same coin. Surprisingly, Cuba has also paid attention to the possibility of SSE. Cuba enacted the Act on Cooperatives in 2012 and made SSE a new economic development strategy. Professor Rafael Betancourt at Havana University, who also works on the Red ESORSE, aims to create a new social relationship that constitutes social economy that is centered not on the reproduction of capital but on life, going beyond the concept of organization (Betancourt 2019). If Cuba’s new attempt is successful, it could have great implications for the North’s transition in its economic system. The increasing connectivity between SDGs and SSE with the support of the UN has expanded the possibility of cooperation with North Korea. North Korea has worked to achieve four major goals: food and nutrition security, social development services, resilience and sustainability, and data and development management (Choi 2019). Therefore, with the continued economic sanctions against North Korea, the strategy of pursuing SDGs at an international level through SSE could help open the door for exchanges and cooperation with the North. Given the current trend where the UN internationalizes SSE as a measure to implement the SDGs, it is clear why South Korea’s non-profit organizations and local governments that pursue various humanitarian assistance and development cooperation projects with North Korea should choose SSE platforms. Furthermore, SSE has great significance as a theoretical framework for the shift of North Korea’s socialist economic system. Jeju, shouting for peace from the periphery The above review of two trends that have developed around the UN shows that our task is to embody SSE that the UN has chosen as the SDGs promotion strategy as a practical strategy for the NAPEC Model. Above all, it needs to be applied as a regional development strategy for the border area between North Korea, China, and Russia or a strategy for North Korean regional development. To this end, the first step is to redefine the concept of SSE from the perspective of the NAPEC. In other words, based on the theory of commons that values land and currency, SSE can be redefined as the development of business activities with the philosophy of social solidarity by various organizations in the land that is the most basic of the real economy and in the economic space created by the highest currency. In this context, I have conducted a study on Jeju Island (in 2016 and 2019) with the privatization of commons as the core concepts. Jeju Island is the land of possibility for SSE-based NAPEC. Ideological conflicts were sharply expressed during Jeju 4·3 but today it is shouting for peace in just the same way that Alsace-Lorraine does. Jeju Island has also played an important role in inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. For example, it sent tangerines to North Korea from 1999 to 2010. It also launched a project to cooperate with the North using carrots and black pigs. The cooperation project was suspended from 2010 during the Lee Myung-bak administration, but Jeju resumed the project and sent 200 tons of tangerines to the North in 2018. Additionally, Jeju has established social economy as an important sector, so it can play an important role in future inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. The North has recently announced that it will not receive free humanitarian aid under its national policy. A new approach is needed. At this point, exchanges and cooperation through SSE and regional development in North Korea can be promoted as international cooperation while respecting Pyongyang’s principle of self-reliance. I expect that Jeju Island can play an important role in this regard. I would like to propose to Jeju, an island of peace, exchange, and cooperation. Hananuri, the institute where I belong, has carried out a project of supporting cooperative farms in North Korea’s Rason since 2009. Hanaruri has recently promoted a financially self-sufficient village project based on social and solidarity finance. The project remains a village-level financing institute called the “village fund.” If conditions permit, however, it is necessary to develop it into an urban regional cooperation project through social and solidarity finance at the Rason City level. Therefore, Jeju and Rason, both being special administrative districts of Korea and located at the northern and the southern ends of the Korean Peninsula, can become partners to establish a social and solidarity bank in Rason and to develop cooperative projects. These small practices will be the substantive start of SSE-based NAPEC. Jeju is where the ideological conflict on the Korean Peninsula began. It is now time for the island to shout for practical peace from the periphery! Dr. Sungchan Cho is the Director of Hananuri Academy of Northeast Asian Studies. He earned his Ph.D. at the Department of Land and Real Estate Management, Renmin University of China. He authored City of Coexistence (2015), Public Land Leasing Theory: Reforming the Land Policy in North Korea (2019), etc. and co-authored Land Reform Experience in China (2011, co-authored), Social Economy: An Inter-Korean Bridge (2020), etc. His papers include “Analytical Review of Jeju Free International City’s Development Strategy Depending on the Model of Privatizing Commons” (2016), “Comparative Analysis of Transition Route between China and North Korea’s Dual Land Ownership: Focusing on the Changes of Rural Land System” (2019), etc. He is currently conducting research on the theory of Social and Solidarity Economy, the inter-Korean urban cooperation model based on Social and Solidarity Finance, and the land system of Hong Kong (translation).

[caption id="attachment_15911" align="alignright" width="200"] Seong-joon KoDirector of Jeju Institute for Korean Unification[/caption] What would be the image that best represents Jeju Island? Jeju, often referred to as “an island of fantasy” due to its beautiful environment, is a globally recognized tourist destination. The island’s landscape inscribed as a UNESCO World Natural Heritage creates a breathtaking view of people harmonizing with nature. Another motto associated with Jeju is “an island of world peace.” Today, national borders have disappeared and the world is increasingly becoming interconnected by the idea of “global citizenship.” However, Korea remains the only divided nation in the world. National division signifies disconnection in a hyper-connected globe. In this regard, national reunification is a dream to be realized for the Korean people as well as a vital task to be accomplished for world peace. Korean reunification can never be achieved by external forces. It is a journey that the Korean people must complete with concerted efforts for their own national interest. By practicing reunification in their daily lives, and by living daily lives of reunification, Koreans can make the nation’s dream of reunification become a reality.Affluent stories and places should be created where people can ponder on and empathize with the necessity for national reunification in their everyday lives. Jeju should also be revisited as “an island of reunification and peace” that calls attention to Korean reunification. [caption id="attachment_15907" align="alignright" width="200"] Dong-wan KangProfessor of Dong-a University[/caption] Jeju Revisited from the Perspective of Korean Reunification “Jeju Revisited from the Perspective of Korean Reunification” is a project to develop an educational program for national reunification and peace. In the project, the historic and cultural resources of Jeju Island are reinterpreted and rediscovered from the perspective of Korean reunification. The project involves the task of reinventing the content to answer the question of “Why is Jeju a starting point for peace and national reunification?” The project thus redefines peace and Korean reunification from the perspective of Jeju’s unique local resources in the fields of politics, the economy, environment, culture and arts, and tourism. Ultimately, it aims to heighten the brand value of Jeju as an island of peace and bestow to the island a substantive reputation for Korean reunification. Jeju is a popular resort island visited by many tourists from Korea and overseas. Unfortunately, these visitors often end up having the same experiences, visiting the same tourist sites. Jeju needs to diversify its content to allow for sustainable tourism that proves its value is worth multiple visits. As the first step toward this goal, a book was published with the title “Jeju Revisited from the Perspective of Korean Reunification” (Jeju Institute of Korean Reunification, 2018). The publication is an attempt to reinterpret and rediscover the historic and cultural resources of Jeju Island from the perspective of reunification and peace. When discussing the reunification of Korea, Jeju should not be excluded. “From Halla to Baekdu,” a signature slogan for Korean reunification that is highlighted in this book, which introduces 41 spots on Jeju Island that are historically and culturally significant. One of them is the 1st Army Training Camp in Daejeong-up, a southwestern town in Seogwipo City. During the Korean War, the army training camp was established on Jeju Island. During the war, it was difficult to train servicemen for long periods of time. As fierce battles continued for consecutive days mainly around the Nakdong River Front, it was urgently needed to dispatch more soldiers to the battlefields. During the war, Jeju became the last bastion for training troops to defend the country. The earlier army training camps in Daegu and Busan were relocated to Jeju to be integrated into the 1st Army Training Camp. This implies that the South Korean forces were pushed down southward. Korea’s southernmost island of Jeju was the last offensive and defensive end for South Korean troops, who had no place left to retreat to and who refused to give up the spark of hope to protect their country with all their heart. At the time, the Jeju camp trained approximately 500,000 soldiers, of whom some 2,000 were admitted a day. There was even an occasion where 80,000 people joined the military through this camp. In 1953, the military camp was nicknamed “Military Buildup Camp” as it was Korea’s main source to build up its military forces. After the war, the training camp was relocated in August 1954 to its current location in Nonsan, Chungcheongnamdo Province, and the Jeju camp was closed in January 1956. Now, the only remains of the camp are the two columns that were formerly used for its front gate. The concrete columns standing on each side of the road are likely to be passed unnoticed. When recalling the gratitude of Koreans for their fallen heroes, however, visitors will sense the noble spirit of the courageous soldiers who risked their lives to protect their country. Moseulpo, the district where the Daejeong-based camp was located, has many different sites related to the Korean War. The current Daejeong Elementary School was formerly used as a temporary air base, and the monument stands alone in a corner of the school ground. Other war-related historic sites in Moseulpo include the ROKA 29th Division Commemorative Tower, the site of the former Prisoner-of-war Camp for the Communist Chinese Army, and the former ROK Marine Training Facility. The sites, rich in historical value, have been left without proper care and only few people remember them today, which is unfortunate as the lesson that the tragedy of war should not be repeated can be learned from these Daejeong sites. Another Jeju resource worth attention is olle, a local term for a neighborhood path and the namesake of the island’s famous trail brand. Olle is a path that connects people of a community. Following the path from the entrance of a village, one can sense the humanity among neighbors. Recently, the island’s symbolic Jeju Olle Trail network was reinvented with a peaceful touch ― Jeju Olle Trail Route 6 is now called the “Olle for Peace.” The Seogwipo City branch of the National Reunification Advisory Council and the Jeju Olle Foundation, which oversees the trail network, installed a stone landmark along the route, hoping that the “Olle for Peace” will be extended “from Halla to Baekdu.” The “Olle for Peace” is located near Soesokkak, a southern estuary of Jeju Island. Meanwhile, the Jeju Olle Foundation has worked to create an Olle trail in North Korea. When the North Korean Olle trail opens to the public, it will allow for walkers to take the great journey for peace “from Halla to Baekdu.” Unlike pilgrimage routes, the Olle trail is a trail of hope, where visitors can feel the laughter and affection that people living along the path share with their neighbors. That is why much is expected of the “from Halla to Baekdu” journey once it is connected to the “Olle for Peace.” Jeju has many more sites whose images can be used for Korean reunification. For instance, the coastal forest path of Keuneong in Namwon, a northeastern town, looks similar to the map of the Korean Peninsula. Another example is the Kim Man-duk Memorial Hall, which reminds visitors of the implications of benevolence and reunification. To rediscover such places, this project should be further promoted. Storytelling with the Theme of Korean Reunification and Peace The core of the project is to develop a “storytelling” program that is different from the existing unremarkable tourist programs with the theme of Korean reunification and peace. In a sense, the project will breathe life into Jeju’s tourism resources through the technique of storytelling. Specifically, the project will organize the existing tourist resources of Jeju into a network, optimizing visitors’ itineraries to their length of stay. For this purpose, specific 2-day-1-night programs, 3-day-2-night tours and so forth will be developed. Additionally, a camping program will be organized to integrate local tourist resources. The program will bridge major tourist sites through storytelling with the theme of “Korean reunification revisited in Jeju,” with a particular focus on the seasonal characteristics, the representative color, etc. of Jeju Island, rather than on the popular or scenic spots. A good example is canola, a symbolic spring of Jeju that blooms yellow flowers. The program can redesign the significance of the flower and its color from the perspective of Korean reunification. For another instance, Saryeoni Forest on the southeastern region of Jeju Island can reinvent the meaning of the color white — the color that represents winter in the forest — from the perspective of reunification and peace by transforming it from simply highlighting the popularity of the winter forest. From Dark Tourism to Emotional Tourism for Korean Reunification In short, the project will rediscover the relics of national division and reunification left on Jeju Island by reflecting on the “essence of Jeju” to differentiate it from other Korean regions. The program will thus involve documenting the oral statements of Jeju locals on their experiences and thoughts about national division and reunification. Specifically, local historical experiences will be collected to be archived, while local perception and memory of national division and reunification will be compiled into a database for storytelling. The tour program with the concept of “connecting the past, the present, and the future” is significant in that it will help Koreans overcome national division and walk toward reunification by practicing reunification in their daily lives. Currently, Jeju’s tourism with the concept of peace mainly revolves around dark tourist sites related to the history of Jeju 4·3. Jeju is in need of a shift in order to leave behind the bleak past due to national division and sublimate its painful memory into the future of reunification. In fact, few people may known that there is a piece of the Berlin Wall standing in the Jeju 4·3 Peace Park The Berlin Wall Monument, representing the Reunification of Germany, and the camellia flowers, representing Jeju Island, harmonize in the Jeju 4·3 Peace Park. As mentioned earlier, Jeju needs to connect its content to tour products that benefit its title of being “an island of world peace.” In this context, the planned program of revisiting Jeju from the perspective of Korean reunification will redesign the island’s image to achieve this goal. The program will also provide an opportunity to create a new brand value for Jeju Island. New tour products can be developed to diversify demand, while experience-oriented tourism can generate more economic benefits than the common shopping-oriented tourism industry. Expectedly, these impacts of the program will eventually help Jeju gain public recognition as a field of reunification, security, and peace. Efforts to achieve mutual existence, harmony, and peace will naturally draw kindness, openness, and stability from Jeju residents, which will create an image of Jeju islanders as people who are committed to peace. Ultimately, the planned program with a new concept of Jeju tourism will imprint upon the Jeju residents the image that they are peaceful global citizens. Jeju has already branded itself as “an island of world peace.” Jeju’s status as an island of a divided nation will hardly allow for discussions on peace in its true sense. How about branding the slogan “From Halla to Baekdu” and, with that brand, developing a symbolic character for Jeju with the theme of Korean reunification and peace? A significant example is the recent case where young artists created a character image of Jeju haenyeo and made character-themed products with that brand. The character branding of Jeju haenyeo excellently reinvented the unique local heritage of Jeju with a modern touch. Taking this case as an example, Jeju will hopefully become a starting point for peace and Korean reunification through embracing Halla and Baekdu. Seong-Joon Ko is Emeritus Professor of Jeju National University, Jeju, Korea. he has been Professor of Political Science in Jeju National University(1977-2016.2). He was visiting Professor of Eat Asian Institute in Columbia University, New York. U.S.A(1999). He was Chairman of Jeju International Council. Also, He is chairman of the jeju citizen association for the world peace island. And the director of Jeju Institute for Korean Unification. He has Written books including 「Juche Idea and North Korea」(co-author), 「North Korea in Transition」(co-author),「East Asian and Jeju, Peace Island」(co-author), 「OKina and Peace」(co-author).「New understanding of unification problem」, 「Unified Korea and World Peace island Jeju」(co-author). He received his B.A and M.A in Mass Communication From Sogang University, Korea and Ph.D. degree in Political Science from Konkuk University, Korea. Dong-Wan Kang is a Professor at Dong-a University Hana Center. He received his PhD in Political Science and Diplomacy from Sungkyunkwan University. His main research interests are South-North culture, North Korean defectors, North Korean media and has written, among others, , , , , and .

[caption id="attachment_15775" align="alignright" width="200"] Hyeong Soo KimProfessor of Public Administration at Dankook University[/caption] The paradox of globalization and Jeju as the starting point of peace Unrelenting globalization, which started in the 1990s, lowered interstate barriers and eventually solidified global value chains (GVCs). The extended interstate network connotes a double-sided effect of reinforced interdependence and weaponized interdependence. To firmly sustain mutual cooperation resulting from the emerging network states, institutional support is required above anything else. This is because the world that ensures no institutionally binding safety device will head toward the paradox of weaponized interdependence. The colossal formula of linking peace on the Korean Peninsula to that of Northeast Asia, and ultimately to the peace of the world, presupposes interconnectedness and mutual cooperation among Northeast Asian states. However, if the structuralized order fails to be institutionalized, it will remain an asymmetrical mutual threat at all times. Setting aside Japan’s previous attempt to invade its Asian neighbors with the pretext of making the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the current structural reality of the Korean Peninsula due to the U.S.-China disputes in Northeast Asia well reflects the aforementioned situation. Would Jeju, the “World Peace Island,” be able to stay free from the supposed asymmetrical mutual threat? The year of 2020 marks the 15th anniversary of the Republic of Korea’s designation of Jeju Island as the “Island of World Peace.” Commonly described as an island of “Three Treasures and Three Charms,” Jeju has established a strong footing of its recognition of its affluent humanities resources and natural environment. What would be the grounds for Jeju’s status as an island free from structural violence working to realize peace, or the state of serenity? Fundamentally, Jeju’s status is the fruitful outcome of the solidarity and willpower of the local community members who have surmounted the structural violence they experienced and worked to build peace through their own exertions. Jeju, the starting point of South Korea’s territorial boundary and a transitional zone of tension and peace When placing the capital city of Seoul at the nation’s center, Jeju Island is located along the boundary of the Republic of Korea since it includes Ieodo, the southernmost tip of Korea’s territorial boundary. Scholarly, a “boundary” is a term that combines the concept of a “frontier” and that of a “border.” A “frontier” refers to the front of an inland area, thus representing the starting point of a territory. Concurrently, it is a place of encounter without a clearly definition in geographical and cultural contexts. Therefore, a “frontier” can be interpreted as a transitional domain that is located between two politics or administrations featuring different levels of change, or between two cultures featuring different levels of diversity. It is construed that no politics exists or no direct physical contact occurs between a “frontier” and its hinterland. Historically, border area residents of countries such as the United States, Russia, and China have promoted their own interests, which often divert from their central or national governments, and feature a strength of being unbound to a particular domain. On the other hand, a “border” is a concept of a distinct political or administrative unit with a fixed demarcation line. Should anyone leave one state and enter another, that person is perceived to have crossed the “border,” a clear line drawn between political or administrative substances. A “border” is dynamic by nature, but conceptually it also includes a temporary cessation of political expansion once the demarcation line is fixed. A representative example is the Military Demarcation Line that divides South Korea and North Korea. If a “frontier” is a transitional domain that manifests a centrifugal force, trying to stay farther from the center, a “border” is a closed, inner-oriented concept that reflects a centripetal force. As a “frontier,” Jeju Island is the entrance to the territory of the Republic of Korea as well as the exit of its boundary. Jeju also forms a part of the nation’s “border” and serves as the entrance to and the exit of the Republic of Korea, distinguishing its territorial domain from that of other countries. Hence, Jeju is a geopolitically crucial part of the South Korean territory where tension persists. The underwater reef of Ieodo is located in 149㎞ southwest from Marado, an islet belonging to the administrative district of Daejeong-eup, Jeju Special Self-Governing Province. Also, the rock issue of ‘Ieodo’ surrounding the South Korea and China and the tension is revealed on the tension and conflict with both countries in terms of the geopolitical significance. Recently, the concept of a “borderland” has been frequently used so as to dive rt from intricate arguments. A “borderland” indicates a community or area that emerged as the function of modern inter-state borders explicitly changed. A “borderland” is to be a place of closure — a boundary of the adjacent social communities which sectioned with obstacles or lines — and a place of openness — a boundary of potential for mutual existence between the adjacent societies. Concurrently, it is where the identity of an actor is revealed due to the permanent existence of others; thus, it functions as a mirroring boundary for an actor and others. Bradley J. Parker defined “borderlands” as “regions around or between political or cultural entities where geographic, political, demographic, cultural, and economic circumstances or processes may interact to create borders or frontiers.” In this sense, Jeju Island is a borderland that connects South Korea and other countries, and a transitional area where different cultures mutually exist. Therefore, Jeju Island is a space of peace where openness and mutual existence can be sustained. Jeju, a symbol for peace and human rights and a significant actor on public diplomacy The trend of globalization, which drove the appearance of a “global-risk” society, often makes it unclear to distinguish domestic issues from international ones. Global warming and nuclear weapons are issues that a single state may face, but also have attributes of global issues. Pandemics, such as COVID-19, are another representative example. The issue involving migrants to megacities, caused by the rapid movement into the globalized era, is not easy for a single city, or the state the city belongs to, to address. The population and economic capital in such megacities as New York or London already feature denationalization in terms of composition. These cities retain independent attributes that are difficult to be unitized into their governing states, thus having to solve their own issues that are distinguished from those of the states. Residents of Jeju, the “the Peace Island,” embraced their experience of Jeju 4․3 and their suppression by structural violence during the Cold War as their painful memory of modern Korean history. Jeju community members did not “otherize” such a historic experience by confining it to their own memory concerning a specific area. Rather, they overcame the atrocious experience with the spirit of reconciliation and mutual understanding and embraced it with the greater values of peace and human rights. This is the power of Jeju, the “the Peace Island.” And that power turned the island into a symbolic site for not only inter-Korean ministerial talks but summits between key states as well as international conferences on peace. The new, multilayered diplomatic environment in the 21st century requires more than the public diplomacy at the national government level. Under these circumstances, Jeju now heralds its growth as a new actor in the era of public diplomacy. Diplomacy is complicated and created by diverse state or non-state actors. Clearly, there exists room for independent roles of local governments, such as Jeju, and the expansion of such room is a newly emerging feature of modern diplomacy. A new normal era and Jeju as a symbolic space for the peace culture Now is the time that Jeju should establish its own soft power strategy based on the experience of its community and the identity of its culture. This is the task of realizing a new value that a ‘small town boy from Seoul’ should learn, not the task for a ‘peripheral, small town of Jeju.’ A representative case is that Jeju province has recently proposed “peace of energy.” To lead the proposal, the authentic culture of Jeju and the unique experiences of its people should be revisited. To this end, first, Jeju is required to develop and distribute pivotal content that symbolizes its identity. From the perspective of renewal, it is necessary for Jeju to rediscover its innate historical and cultural assets in tangible and intangible forms. At the same time, it should lay the cornerstone for an affluent reproduction of cultural content through sustainable management and conservation. Second, Jeju needs to divert from the structure of commercialism and developmentalism that damages the natural landscape, and of quantity-driven tourism that is represented by monetary values. Most importantly, it should avoid the existing politics- and administration-led management and development, creating an environment that encourages citizens to exert creativity through voluntary engagement and solidarity. The top priority in this context is to achieve decentralization and autonomy within the communal space of Jeju. Third, the administrative authorities of Jeju province should make an effort on a mutual consultation to achieve on the networking among relevant elements. It will be possible when the system for flexible and diverse administrative support is prepared for the sustainable management of the networking. Recently, in the massive shift era, it is a profound task that most actors in various ranges of public sectors have to perform and prepare for the uncertain future. The centrality and identity of Jeju, not as an isolated island but as a symbolic space with a centripetal force for the culture of peace, will be able to exert its centrifugal force as a space for global peace. Hyeong Soo Kim is a Professor of Public Administration at Dankook University and the president of the Korean Association of Northeast Asia Studies. His research interests are culture administration, cultural policy, and Northeast Asian cultural community. He has written, among others, Tasks and Prospects of Inter-Korean Cooperation and Exchange 2.0 in Korea Local Government (2018) and Developing a Model for Development Cooperation Project in South-North Border Region (2019).

[caption id="attachment_15517" align="alignright" width="200"] Yea-yl YoonResearch Professor atJeju National University[/caption] 1. The past five years of the North Korean nuclear issue 2018 was the year when it emerged as a social concern and an academic agenda whether the North Korean nuclear issue will be resolved, and further, whether the resolution will provide an important turning point in building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. In April, South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un met in the Peace House at the truce village of Panmunjom for the historic inter-Korean summit, where they jointly announced the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula. In June, the North Korean leader and the U.S. President, Donald Trump, held a summit meeting in Singapore and signed a joint statement, agreeing to establish new relations and build a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. The summits signified the staging of a huge reversal. From January 2016 to September 2017, Pyongyang had consecutively conducted its fourth, fifth, and sixth nuclear tests, and in response, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution which reduced the amount of oil provided to North Korea. In February 2018, Trump announced new sanctions against Pyongyang, aimed at shutting down North Korea’s illicit transshipment in the high seas, which had been identified as a hole in the sanctions against the North. Up until early 2018, the situation on the Korean Peninsula caused growing concerns over the possibility of military conflict. Nevertheless, the confrontational phase was shifted to one of negotiation, first holding the inter-Korean summit, and, finally, the U.S.-North Korea summit. However, Washington-Pyongyang relations have been at a standstill since February 2019 when the negotiations broke down during the Trump-Kim Hanoi Summit. Trump, currently running for the November general election, is highly likely to maintain the keynote of his policy of managing the status quo unless Pyongyang carries out provocations that could pose a direct threat to the United States. Moreover, Seoul-Pyongyang relations have also remained in a stalemate since the spring of 2020 when North Korea destroyed and shut down the liaison line to South Korean authorities. Even after the second anniversary of the April 27 Panmunjom inter-Korean summit, Seoul and Pyongyang are far from delivering what their leaders agreed upon. 2. The five years until the North Korean issue broke out Let us now go back some 20 years to the five-year period which spans from 1989, when the Cold War ended, to 1993, when the North Korean issue broke out. In 1993, the first North Korean nuclear crisis arose on the Korean Peninsula. The general analysis is that Pyongyang rushed its nuclear weapons program in self-defense, due to the loosened alliance between North Korea and China. However, the most serious crisis to the Sino-North Korea relationship was posed by no other than the opening of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China in 1992. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Pyongyang sensed a strong threat to giving up its alliance with China when China, its sole ally, established diplomatic ties with South Korea, one of China’s enemies at the time. Subsequently, Pyongyang and Beijing were swiftly estranged from each other, while Pyongyang concentrated on developing nuclear weapons under the slogans of “Juche” [self-reliance] and “Songun” [military-first]. In other words, North Korea’s nuclear program was triggered as Pyongyang sensed the inevitable crisis if left alone due to the collapse of a pillar of the Cold War. It can also be construed that North Korea, faced with the looming crisis, not only hurried to develop nuclear weapons to boost its self-defense capabilities, but also used an entrapment strategy in the Sino-North Korea relations when exposed to the threat that China might give up the alliance. With the self-preservation measure of arming itself with nuclear weapons, North Korea highlighted its geopolitical value, while warning that it was capable of causing regional instability and driving China to face a national security crisis. Although the world of thought in South Korea the opening of Beijing-Seoul ties as creating momentum to restore the regional image of East Asia, the North Korean regime considered it a doughnut-shaped image of East Asia that could besiege North Korea. However, what should not be overlooked is the fact that the Sino-ROK relations, which gave rise to Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons development, were also established against the backdrop of the improved Japan-North Korean relations. In September 1990, a Japanese delegation led by Shin Kanemaru visited North Korea and signed a joint declaration with the Workers’ Party of Korea where Japan apologized for its colonization of Korea and agreed to commence negotiations on normalizing its diplomatic ties with North Korea. This aroused the vigilance of Chinese policymakers, who rushed to normalize Sino-ROK diplomatic relations. Beijing concluded the normalization of its relations with Seoul early due to concerns that the Tokyo-Pyongyang negotiations on diplomatic relations could expand Japan’s influence on the Korean Peninsula. However, the Japan-North Korea negotiations failed to show substantive progress due to the so-called abduction issue of Lee Eun-hye (also named Yaeko Taguchi) and the subsequent North Korean nuclear issue. To Tokyo, negotiating for the normalization of relations with Pyongyang meant a touchstone for diversifying from its U.S.-reliant foreign policies in the post-Cold War era and attempting an autonomous diplomacy with Asian countries. Noticeably, one of the moments that drove Japan to take such a forward-looking step was the progress in inter-Korean relations early in the 1990s. To put it differently, Japan judged that it was necessary to secure its presence on the Korean Peninsula by means of normalizing its ties with the North before Seoul and Pyongyang made progress towards a stable inter-Korean relationship. Japan achieved a good result in improving its relations with China; however, in terms of Japan-North Korean relations, it failed to escape the influence of America’s North Korean policies. They were indeed turbulent five years from 1989, when the Malta Summit between the United States and the Soviet Union officially ended the Cold War, to 1993, when the first North Korean nuclear issue broke out. In the given period, Beijing improved its relations with Japan, opened diplomatic ties with South Korea, and successfully emerged in the international diplomatic arena, whereas Pyongyang failed to normalize its diplomatic relations with Japan and took the path of nuclear weapons development, isolated from South Korea and other neighbors. This outcome reflects the entangled East Asian conditions, which are unreducible to the political choices made by Chinese and North Korean leadership, including the asymmetrical alliance and the gap in national power between China and North Korea, as well as the scope of Japan’s autonomy in its Asian diplomacy under the influence of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 3. East Asianization of the North Korean nuclear issue For the subsequent 20 years, the North Korean nuclear issue has been “East Asianized,” beyond the boundaries of the Korean Peninsula, and has become an extremely difficult issue to resolve. “East Asianization” of the North Korean nuclear issue implies that the weight of the issue is now even able to determine the future of the East Asian region. It also connotes that the principal agents in the region are involved in a closely intertwined relationship around the medium of the North Korean nuclear issue. The East Asianization of the North Korean nuclear issue is, above all, construed as Pyongyang’s survival strategy. With the beginning of the post-Cold War period, the economic gap between North Korea and South Korea widened, while Seoul’s Northward policy weakened Pyongyang’s position in diplomacy. This drove the North to lay out the survival strategy of developing nuclear weapons. The North Korean regime decided, for the benefit of its survival, to use the strategy of maintaining a perpetual crisis to entrap international agents such as the United States and China in the Korean Peninsula issue, rather than concentrating on the post-Cold War lineal inter-Korean rivalry. In the process, it has designed a diversity of rivalries and diplomatic relations, including ‘U.S.-ROK vs. DPRK,’ ‘U.S.-ROK vs. U.S.-DPRK,’ ‘U.S.-ROK vs. China-DPRK,’ and ‘China-ROK vs. China-DPRK,’ on different occasions. Pyongyang’s maintenance of a perpetual crisis and entrapment of international agents are based on America’s embrace of the dilemma in making policy choices. Washington, despite its alliance with Seoul, rules out military solutions due to the concerns over the possibility that they will damage regional stability in East Asia. As such, North Korea has attempted to maximize the national interest for its survival by grasping the structural uniqueness of Northeast Asian regional security issues where multiple matters are intricately intertwined, including South Korea’s limited autonomy in the North Korean nuclear issue, America’s dilemma in making policy choices, China’s interest in maintaining the status quo, and Russia’s concerns over securing regional influence through the North Korean nuclear issue. Although Pyongyang has urged Seoul to “deal with the Korean Peninsula issues on the Korean Peninsula,” it in fact has worked to “deal with the Korean Peninsula issues at the regional and international levels” by means of nuclear diplomacy. 4. Multilayeredness of North Korean nuclear issue Thus, the North Korean nuclear issue should not be limited to North Korea. Primarily, Pyongyang should be held responsible for its nuclear issue since it has promoted its nuclear program with a strong will for nuclear capability. However, the outbreak and the intensification of the issue are also the result of the the increasingly multilayered interests and dynamics of each principal agent in East Asia. Again, let us return to the early 1990s. At the time, the U.S. government, due to the strategic confusion in East Asia, was concerned about the possible changes that a normalization of Pyongyang-Tokyo relations would bring to the regional dynamics. The U.S. therefore put the brakes on Japan and North Korea’s move and sealed the signal of changes. The Japanese government also used the abduction issue for domestic politics while in the process of normalizing its diplomatic ties with the North, after which it continued to create anti-North Korean sentiment, resulting an abuse of those ties. Meanwhile, when the United States began high-profile negotiations with North Korea in response to Pyongyang’s brinkmanship in 1993, the South Korean government opposed the direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang by announcing its principle of linking the negotiations to the North Korean nuclear issue. The Chinese government utilized its superior status in the asymmetrical China-North Korea alliance, consequently spurring Pyongyang’s sense of crisis. North Korea was unable to involve itself in regime rivalries in the normal fashion due to domestic circumstances; mainly the worsening of international isolation and economic problems amid the rapid changes in the regional order, and thereby employed the nuclear program as the core of its national strategies. As such, the situation of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons development was where the intertwined East Asian circumstances were condensed and expressed. From the perspective of East Asia, the North Korean nuclear issue bears a complicated significance. For North Korea, the nuclear program is an internal political means to maintain and strengthen the regime. In terms of inter-Korean relations, it is a diplomatic tool that Pyongyang can use to put pressure on Seoul, as well as a weapon to complement its inferiority in defense capability and eventually break the current military balance. In the China-North Korea relations, it is the measure Pyongyang takes in order to execute its strategy of entrapping China, and at the same time, secure autonomy from China. In the relationship with the United States, North Korea’s nuclear program serves as a safety valve it can use to strengthen its bargaining power against the U.S. and guarantee the survival of the regime, with the pretext of its potential to pose a direct physical threat to the U.S. or by its possible transfer of nuclear and/or weapons technologies to terrorist groups in the worsening post-Cold War international environment. Additionally, the program becomes an economic tool when North Korea trades with Iran, Syria, Pakistan, and other countries that develop missiles and nuclear weapons. North Korea’s nuclear program is the nuclear program of a divided nation-state, of a buffer state in a strategic point in Northeast Asia, and of a communist state which has survived in the U.S.-led world order. 5. Repositioning the North Korean nuclear issue: the Korean Peninsula issue and an East Asian issue The North Korean nuclear issue, as earlier mentioned, is not just a security issue surrounding weapons development, but also reflects the condensed expression of East Asian conditions and circumstances, such as the dissimilarity in state forms, the asymmetry between states/international relations, and the continuity of the divided regimes in East Asia despite post-Cold War trends. The North Korean nuclear issue constitutes a part of another issue and also the whole issue as it is. Therefore, the issue cannot be resolved by addressing it from the normative perspective of non-proliferation. The process of resolving the issue involves matters regarding politics, economies, and security, such as the economic development of North Korea, the division of the Korean Peninsula, the multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, and the normalization of the U.S.-DPRK diplomatic relations. Considering the multilayeredness of the North Korean nuclear issue, resolving the issue will presuppose or catalyze improvement in U.S.-DPRK/Japan-DPRK relations, the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and progress in multilateralism in the region. It condenses nearly all factors that determine the path of a society, a state, and a region, including the form of a state, the identity of a nation/people, the hard/soft power of a state, and international relations and diplomatic strategies. In this sense, the North Korean nuclear issue from the perspective of East Asia is a matter that should be addressed both as a “North Korean” issue and as an “East Asian” issue. If the North Korean nuclear issue is related to how to handle North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, the North Korean issue is extended to how to determine the status of North Korean sovereignty in East Asian geopolitics. It is noteworthy that Pyongyang has claimed that its nuclear program originated from America’s policy of hostility against North Korea and that it develops nuclear weapons for self-defense. In other words, North Korea is willing to guarantee its security using nuclear capabilities because the United States has suggested a preemptive nuclear strike as an alternative policy option. Its logic is that the root of the claimed hostility of America against North Korea historically dates back to the Korean War, so it is difficult to give up its nuclear program unless a peace treaty is signed between the first parties of the war; that is, North Korea and the United States. From this perspective, the South Korean measures to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue should contain long-term strategies for denuclearizing the North, such as guaranteeing the recognition of the North Korean regime at an international level, building military confidence, agreeing on mutual non-aggression policies, announcing an end to the Korean War, enabling Pyongyang to build diplomatic ties with its neighbors, encouraging the international community to provide aid to the North, establishing a system of regional security cooperation, and developing measures for the peaceful unification of Korea. This view of North Korea demonstrates that the North Korean nuclear issue is equal to the “Korean Peninsula” issue. The Korean Peninsula issue in this case refers to the issues of politics, military, economy, society, and culture that are raised on the Korean Peninsula and in the regions surrounding the Korean Peninsula due to the hostile division and concurrent existence of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on the Korean Peninsula. Building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula to resolve the Korean Peninsula issue also coincides with another East Asian condition. This condition is represented as the dissimilarity, not the similarity, among the different countries that exist in the East Asian region. First, the notion of peace on the Korean Peninsula itself is highly likely to have a different significance in South Korea than in its neighbors. In the context of the regional order in East Asia, settling peace on the Korean Peninsula, shifting to a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and the unification of Korea based on those elements are not as continuous nor lineal as presumed in South Korea. Even if neighboring countries hope for lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, it does not mean that they support the shift to a permanent peace regime on the peninsula. In addition, building a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is significant in eliminating the remaining effects of the Korean War, which are the unstable armistice and the military rivalry, but it does not mean that it is a pre-unification stage. Most of the countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula prefer to maintain the current state of peace. Thus, even with the support from neighboring countries for the shift to a peace regime, the chances are low that they will support the unification of Korea because the unification, which indicates changes to the status quo, may change the regional dynamics and augment uncertainties in the regional situations. Although the unification of Korea is perceived as the resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue at the peninsular level, the neighboring states may regard it as the onset of a new Korean Peninsula issue. 6. North Korean nuclear issue as a thought challenge Since March 1993 when Pyongyang declared its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), U.S.-ROK relations and inter-Korean relations have evolved surrounding the North Korean nuclear issue. However, South Korean scholars and journalists have avoided making insufficient efforts to deeply contemplate the North Korean nuclear issue. The mainstream tendency is to cast doubt on North Korea’s financial/technological capabilities to develop nuclear weapons, to underestimate its nuclear weapons as a tool for negotiations, or to forecast that North Korea will give up its nuclear program when the South uses such tactics as incentives and pressures where applicable. Some even predicted that the North will soon collapse since it is an autocratic regime with vulnerable economic and social infrastructures. Even today, the North Korean nuclear issue is still presented as one of the diverse security issues. In the case of media, the narrow-sighted articles on the North Korean nuclear issue limitedly describe the increasing crisis as just a phenomenon; are inclined to quoting and interpreting the statements made by officials; rush to find diplomatic measures to prepare a negotiating table; or seek an equivalent of the negotiation. In addition, academic articles with constructive East Asian views mostly conclude with the notion of peace and/or the following concepts: co-existence, exchange, reconciliation, cooperation, solidarity, integration, balance, harmony, community, overcoming the state-centrism, resolving the nationalistic rivalries, etc. As time passed by, the content of the body changed in accordance with the changes in the situation. However, the conventional conclusions hardly changed. Probably, it is now time to relocate the concepts of peace, solidarity, harmony, and community, which used to be left in the concluding chapter, to the beginning chapter where questions are raised. In other words, it is now time to review the concepts of peace, solidarity, harmony, and community by considering the conditions of the Korean Peninsula and East Asia, rather than repetitively making complacent prescriptions for the problematic situation based on those concepts. One of the key conditions of the Korean Peninsula and East Asia that should be considered is the North Korean nuclear issue. As earlier mentioned, the North Korean nuclear issue has condensed in it all of the East Asian conditions, such as the regional division that still exists amid global post-Cold War trends, the dissimilarity in the form of a state, the asymmetry in relations between states and in relations between inter-state relationships. If so, should the world of thought in South Korea reposition the North Korean nuclear issue as the Korean Peninsula issue and make a thought challenge for peace in order to translate the Korean Peninsula issue into an East Asian issue? In fact, if not with the North Korean nuclear issue, the South Korean people will be unaware of the existence of North Korea. This lack of recognition is due to perspectives of Orientalism (on North Korea), approaches based on the theory of modernization, a sense of repulsion due to ideological differences, mentalities led by powerful states, as well as passive or complacent views of peace. Probably, these are the epistemological obstacles that we should urgently overcome in working to settling peace on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia around the medium of the North Korean nuclear issue. Yea-yl Yoon is a Research Professor of SSK Research Center on the Commons and Sustainable Society at Jeju National University. He received his PhD in Sociology from Seoul National University. His publications include East Asian Discourse, Time to Become a Square, the Origin of Thought, and the Translation of Thought. His key research interests are the history of East Asian sociological thought, the social movement theory, and the theory of the commons.

[caption id="attachment_14990" align="alignright" width="200"] Yong-Soo KimProfessor of Political Science at Sogang University[/caption] Jeju, the only island-province of the Republic of Korea, has spearheaded the humanitarian aid effort to North Korea. It imprinted its image of providing support to North Korean residents by sending tangerines. Under the simple slogan of “From Halla to Baekdu,” it has constantly expressed its desire and willingness for national unification. Probably, that is why North Koreans dream of visiting Jeju Island where Mt. Halla is located. Since Jeju has spared no effort in invigorating inter-Korean cooperation and exchange, it has been recognized as a model for other local governments. Additionally, the Jeju provincial government has made incessant efforts to interact and collaborate with other cities and provinces by developing a joint manual for advanced inter-Korean relations and activating a network for improving inter-Korean relations. Despite these efforts, even the humanitarian aid efforts to the North have undergone many hardships. On many occasions, South Korea ended up being anxious about the North Korean authorities’ refusal to agree to improve ties as the South desires. Many negotiations that had formerly been proceeding well were abruptly halted. After these trials and errors, only one lesson has been learned: However passionate and willful the South may be, it is still early to expect continued and stable exchange and cooperation with the North. The current state of inter-Korean relations gives the impression that anything of significance will be difficult to achieve with North Korea for a while. Additionally, it appears that the two Koreas will be unlikely to be able to achieve living together in a short period of time. Although the South has made strenuous efforts to shorten the gap in its strengthening of ties with the North, the response was simple and clear. Kim Yo-jong’s description of Seoul as an “enemy” well-represents the characteristics of inter-Korean ties. Her cold-hearted statement implies that the long-desired ‘unification’ is still not visible. Should the current state continue, would South and North Korea ever be able to live together? Although 70 years have already passed, the residents of the two Koreas still live in thorough ‘severance’ to the extent that even visiting each other is barely allowed. In the meantime, they have become increasingly different. It is not sure as to whether ‘restoring homogeneity and overcoming heterogeneity’ would be possible. This long-used expression also requires reconsideration. It should be calmly reflected which side should be a standard for homogeneity and what measures should be taken to overcome the extreme heterogeneity. Korea was trapped in the ordeal of ‘national division’ even before its people could feel the joy of liberation. While experiencing the tragic Korean War, the homogeneous nation was divided into two. After division, the two sides staged a heated competition for securing legitimacy while being involved in ‘hostile rivalry.’ Nonetheless, they reached the July 4th North-South Joint Statement (1972) and the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement (1991-1992). Meanwhile, the inter-Korean relations based on ‘hostile rivalry’ changed to the new structure of ‘hostile coexistence.’ In 2000, a historical moment was created where the leaders of the two Koreas met for the first time. It was a phenomenal shift to ‘non-hostile coexistence.’ With the event as momentum, the hope for unification spread rapidly. Ideas of how to design the community of the two Koreas were poured out. However, the structural power of ‘hostile coexistence’ remained strong. The scars of Pyongyang’s attack on and sinking of Cheonan, a South Korean navy corvette, and its bombardment of Yeonpyeong, a western island of South Korea, clearly showed that it was too early to view the relationship between the two as a non-hostile one. The consecutive meetings of the South and North Korean leaders in 2018 heralded the entry of inter-Korean relations into a new framework. The meetings even gave hope that the two could accomplish ‘non-hostile exchange and cooperation’ beyond ‘non-hostile coexistence.’ However, such anticipation collapsed with Kim Yo-jong’s comment in June 2020 that South Korea is still an “enemy.” It brought despair to the South because Kim’s comment implied that unification would be unachievable unless the aged ‘hostility’ is lessened. South Koreans also realized once again that their relationship with the North remains in the stage of ‘hostile coexistence.’ East and West Germans could watch each other’s TV channels beginning in 1972, 18 years ahead of the reunification. As the East German leaders, immersed in arrogance, allowed watching West German TV programs, East Germans worked during the day in the eastern style, while dreaming of the West at night. On top of that, East German residents could travel to West Germany for the purpose of visiting relatives, and the number of East Germans visiting the West surpassed one fourth of the entire East German population. The Germans felt less hostility than Koreans have because the two Germanies did not experience the war that the two Koreas had, and reciprocal visits were allowed despite the obstruction by the Berlin Wall. As more than 340,000 Soviet troops were stationed on East German soil for security reasons, most of the 170,000 East German soldiers were mobilized for economic construction, without taking full responsibility to defend their land against the West. Against this backdrop, East and West Germans could partially experience ‘non-hostile exchange and cooperation’ that goes beyond ‘non-hostile coexistence.’ Compared to the German case, Seoul and Pyongyang have barely experienced well-performed exchange or cooperation. Instead, ‘severance,’ ‘unawareness,’ and ‘hardships’ have dominated inter-Korean relations since the national division, for which the two Koreas have stayed within the frame of ‘hostile coexistence’ where the gross ‘hostility’ barely diminishes. Recent events candidly show that South Korea’s one-sided wishes for ‘non-hostile’ inter-Korean relations are futile. North Korea’s emphatic hostility against the South is clearly shown in the public denouncements by North Korean residents against North Korean defectors and against the sending of propaganda leaflets by balloon into the North from the South. Pyongyang views national unification as ‘liberating its un-recaptured domain.’ This means that it views national unification as equal to finishing the negotiation with the American imperialists over the ‘South Korean soil’ which remained un-recaptured due to the American imperialists during the Korean War. From the North Korean perspective that ultimately, the U.S. should be held responsible for the ‘South Korean issue,’ inter-Korean relations degenerate into a dependent variable of the U.S.-D.P.R.K. relations. Pyongyang argues that interfering with South Korea, which is occupied by the United States, is a justified interference, while getting enraged when the South interferes with North Korean issues, calling it an ‘interference in domestic affairs.’ For these reasons, inter-Korean negotiations have been a game played on an ‘uneven playing field.’ Nonetheless, Seoul has dealt with its North Korean counterparts to the extent that it endures all of these circumstances for the future of a unified Korea. ‘Denuclearization’ is also a goal that appears to be difficult to achieve. North Korea already declared itself as a nuclear nation in the 2006 revision of its Constitution, with the goal of beating the U.S. It should be noted that given the characteristics of the North Korean regime, no discussion regarding ‘denuclearization’ will be made within the North without Kim Jong-un’s approval. Additionally, the South should accept the fact that even if the negotiation over Pyongyang’s denuclearization is achieved, it will feature a continued, prolonged war whose ultimate deadline is hard to presume. Considering that having nuclear capability is directly related to the legitimacy of Kim Jong-un, winning the ‘denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ through a major deal is only plausible in President Trump’s scenario. If inter-Korean relations are unlikely to break away from the frame of ‘hostile coexistence,’ would it be impossible that Seoul and Pyongyang could live in harmony in the future? For the two Koreas to build a future where they can live together, what efforts should be made? Jeju has taken the lead in improving the inter-Korean relations while emphasizing ‘peace.’ What preparations should it make under these circumstances? Above all, Jeju should reconsider the inter-Korean relations from step one by taking the recently worsened ties with the North as a touchstone. It should exclude the highly impromptu abstract argument over a seemingly imminent national unification, while fine-tuning the existing manual to customize it to the ‘hostile coexistence’-based relations. Additionally, a substantive preparation and effort for ‘non-hostile coexistence’ should be made. The first requirement in this sense is the re-perception of ‘peaceful and harmonious reunification.’ Peace and harmony can be achieved when two different parties perceive each other as having the same status. If they have experienced a fight, reconciliation is a necessary step toward achieving ‘peace’ and ‘harmony.’ Even if the leaders of each side meet up, shake hands, and reach an agreement, it is not easy to reach a true communal reconciliation. A one-time event is insufficient to break down the structure of division. To ‘reconcile,’ hostility needs to be diluted through ‘small’ and ‘frequent’ meetings rather than a big, one-time event, and the two sides can take the next step toward ‘non-hostile exchange and cooperation.’ In 70 years of inter-Korean history, it has been clear that summit meetings and agreements for political purposes rarely have lasting effects. In recent years, even the reunion of separated families disappeared, which had previously been considered a humanitarian cause. This teaches us the lesson that even the highest-level meeting is unable to break down the wall of national division of Korea. The second requirement is the revisioning of ‘unification.’ Gathering divided pieces together into one organization or system — this describes the definition of ‘unification.’ However, if the divided parts are unable to be easily united as time passes by, ‘unification,’ or putting them back into one, is nearly impossible. Rather, the desired ‘unification’ can be expected when in a state where the two parts communicate with each other, and where the different parts make sense to each other. To achieve this end, it is ultimately necessary to understand the other party. To heighten the possibility of unification, South Korea should be well-aware of its counterpart — North Korea. In this sense, South Koreans know very little about the North. Without any knowledge of its natural geography, the characteristics of its regime, or the way that North Koreans live and think, South Koreans have simply dreamed of unification. Without any knowledge of what the other party thinks of, of how North Korean society works, they have vaguely imagined that a ‘seamless life after unification’ would be possible once they just meet and agree on unification. Immersed in the abstract, mesmerizing term, ‘the benefit of unification,’ former South Korean administrations have focused on publicizing that the benefit of unification is far greater than the cost of unification. The third requirement is to nurture in advance the ‘capability of healing the wounds.’ Sincere consideration should be given to whether the scars of division can be addressed with an open mind and also be concealed as much as possible. It is necessary for South Korean society to build capacity that can create effects similar to those of ‘remedial agents.’ Prior to unification, South Korea should upscale its social capacity for unification through education and enlightenment, so that it can endure the aftermath and side effects of unification. Amidst the flow of unification, it should prepare and consider caring measures for underprivileged people. It should not repeat in the process of the unification of the Korean Peninsula the regret and sorrow of the East German women and elderly who were thoroughly excluded in the great wave of German unification. The fourth requirement is to deliver South Korean ideas of unification to North Korean residents through ‘frequent meetings’ to build empathy. It is unimaginable in the current state of inter-Korean relations; still, efforts should be made to enter the stage where the ideas of both sides can be delivered and confirmed while managing the state of division. This is the phase of ‘reconciliation.’ ‘Hostile coexistence’ will be difficult to overcome with only political events that happen between leaders without a stage of confirming and readjusting to each other’s different ideas. The final requirement is to create the ‘environment for unification.’ South Korea should look squarely at the geopolitical factors on the Korean Peninsula that is surrounded by superpowers, turning the unification into an agenda of international politics that helps draw positive support from the neighboring power states. Koreans cannot leave the matter of national unification in the hands of the superpowers who caused the division. South Koreans should transmit a strong message to North Koreans that Korean issues will be determined by the ‘Korean nation,’ while persuading them to join in concerted efforts to resolve the issues related to unification in the remaining period before unification. If this is addressed inadequately, the unification that Koreans desire would be unachievable and the tragedy will be repeated where the future of the Korean nation will be left in the interests of superpowers. What is more important than standing under the principle of national self-determination against the collusive alliances of superpowers is the survival of the Korean nation. Survival should not be lost before unification. In short, the wisdom for the future of Koreans living together should begin with developing a unification management manual and North Korean policies that are tailored to ‘hostile coexistence,’ the current distinctive feature of inter-Korean relations. For ‘peaceful and harmonious unification,’ the South and the North should reach the state where they share the same status, while the two parties can communicate well with each other. Through ‘small’ but ‘frequent’ meetings, ideas should be exchanged. In the meantime, ‘reconciliation’ is absolutely necessary to dilute the aged emotions against each other. Finally, a very difficult task of creating an ‘environment of unification’ where Koreans lead their own unification should be accomplished. This is the wise approach for Jeju Island in preparing for unification in the current stage. Yong-Soo Kim is Professor of Political Science at Sogang University. After receiving his BA in Political Science from Sogang University, he went on to receive his MA in International Politics and PhD in North Korean Politics at the same university. His research interest is focused on North Korean Politics and North-South Relations. His key publications are “North Korean Political Culture: Traditional Political Culture and Juche Culture” (Doctorate, 1992), “Japanese Society's Perceptions toward North Korea: Realities and Problems” (New Asia Research Institute, 2011), “North Korea's Perception of the United States” (Review of North Korean Studies, 2015), and “North Korean Politics: Present and Dilemma” (New Asia Research Institute, 2018).

[caption id="attachment_7536" align="alignright" width="150"] Hye-kyung HyunSenior Researcher of Jeju Research Institute[/caption] 1. The birth of Cold War Landscape in East Asia The term “Cold War” first came into existence when Bernard Baruch, an influential advisor to Democratic presidents, used it in his speech on 16 April 1947 to describe the specific post-war geopolitical confrontation between the Soviet and the United States. Since then until the dissolution of the Soviet in 1989, the majority of the world had absorbed in an arms race, being divided into two camps: the United States and the Soviet with their respective allies. It was also the time when East Asia distinguished itself as a second front in the Cold War. The Chinese Civil War that restarted after WWII and the Korean War ignited violence, which led to the Cold War in East Asia. East Asian Cold War is a product of nationalism and global Cold War, which features hierarchical hostility of the middle classes, the division of the Korean peninsula, and the Cross-Strait Relations between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. Regional battles that were utilized as a strategy in the Cold War brought about environmental changes such as gigantic fortressed towns and deformed nature, which survived the era and are left as relics of the Cold War. Today, they make Cold War Landscape in various forms in the border areas. The Military Demarcation Line that makes the land borderline between South and North Korea also represents the border in East Asian Cold War, and the relics such as the remains of fire, iron fences, and the observatory witness the Cold War era. The current conflict between the United States and China has created a new kind of cold war in East Asia. This new Cold War is rearranging geopolitics in entire Asia and tends to divide the area into maritime Asia and continental Asia. It is rewriting the old Cold War Landscape and gives rise to further studies on the creation of the new Cold War and the underlying motives. 2. Peace Tourism utilizing Cold War Landscape Efforts to utilize Cold War Landscape in Peace Tourism have been widely made in the East Asian countries, among which are Taiwan Strait, Kinmen Island, Mazu Island, Okinawa, Hiroshima, Hokkaido, Cheorwon, Jeju Island and the Five West Sea Islands in South Korea. The term “peace tourism” originated from the annual conference of Britain’s tourism association in 1929. The theme was “Tourism for Peace.” Then after WWII, the first general meeting of the World Travel Organization was held in London in 1946, and a new non-governmental organization-level travel agency was established to replace the International Tourism Promotion Organization (IUOTPO). The general assembly of the founding of the International Travel Organization (IUOTO) was held in Hague in the following year. IUOTO and other global tourist agencies held a meeting to increase influence and raise their status to help tourism contribution to international cooperation and peace. In the meetings, they started to use the meaning and concept of peace tourism in an expanded manner. Peace tourism was used as a strategy to expand the sense of peace through the legacy of the Cold War and the fierce battle, and to lasting peace. There are many different forms of peace tourism today. This is because each country and region has its own stories. Hence the subjects, values, and practices of peace tourism are different. Nevertheless, peace tourism in general shares some common features. First, the countries that introduced peace tourism have a history of grave conflict. Secondly, those countries have particular spaces and a reproducibility structure that brings up a memory of the conflict. Thirdly, peace tourism intends to bring about cooperation and international solidarity in order to promote sustainable peace-building through peace tourism. After the two world wars, the international community noted the potential of tourism to contribute to the prevention of war and an easing of conflict. The effects of tourism on bringing to an end of many international conflicts and civil wars and building sustainable peace have drawn much attention through its experiments and theories. There are terms similar to peace tourism, Dark Tours, Red Tours, and Security Tours, o name a few. The name varies because it reflects different experiences in shaping the Cold War landscape. The relationship between peace tourism and other types of tours can be hierarchical or supplementary. Nonetheless, the field of peace tourism is still being studied. “Dark tour” would be appropriate for Jeju as the peace tour has open been associated with security tours. 3. The introduction of Jeju Dark Tour Cold War Landscape in Jeju can be found where the remains of military camps and the Jeju Uprising broke out. The Jeju Uprising that occurred on April 3, 1948 (also called the 4.3 Incident). It is regarded as the authentic beginning of geopolitical tension between the United States and the Soviet which led to the Cold War. In the course of the uprising, over 30,000 Jeju residents were killed between 1948 and 1954, spanning the period of the US Military Government and Rhee Syngman’s presidency. Since the tragedy ended, those places involved in the uprising have made Cold War Landscape and attracted visitors as a part of the Jeju Dark Tour program which was designed to look back on the unfortunate past and learn lessons from it. The term “Jeju Dark Tour” was first introduced in 2006. Throughout the changes of regimes, the Jeju Uprising, the once overlooked tragic event, has drawn gradual attention. The Special Act on the investigation of the uprising and the restoration of honor of the victims had passed under the Kim Dae-jung government and President Roh Moo-hyun made a public apology for the tragedy to citizens. There were also NGOs established to promote artistic and cultural movements in remembrance of the event and the idea of Dark Tour was brought up in the course of discussing the future of the movement. Some people had called it Journey to Historical Lessons or Tour of Historical Culture at first but as it threw a question that the terms strike as accepting being victimized, the term Dark Tour soon prevailed. Dark Tour has its roots in the annual pilgrimage to the remains of the Jeju Uprising arranged by Jeju 4.3 Research Institute and the Joint April Ritual Preparation Committee. The pilgrimage has been taken place since 1989 against the suppression by the government. They took a visit to places where mass killings were carried out, major battles were fought, towns were completely destroyed by fire. It includes Mt. Halla, Mt. Songak, Altteureu Airfield, Donggwang-ri, Darangswi Cave, and Jeju Bukchon Village. Among those places include the battlefields and camps stationed by the Imperial Japanese Army troops in the past and it has gained public attention. It also happened to bring up an argument about whether it is cultural consumption or social movement. 4. Research on historical and cultural resources in regards to Jeju Dark Tour Jeju was one of the most vital regions for the Imperial Japanese Army troops in the Japanese colonial period and Japan sent over 75,000 soldiers to build military foundations to it at the end of the Pacific war. Accordingly, there are a lot of remains of battlefields and camps stationed by the Imperial Japanese Army troops in Jeju, such as airfields, hangars, batteries, trenches, training camps, watchtowers, shelters, tunnels, armories, and underground mines. The research for the remains of the Imperial Japanese Army troops was initiated when Jeju Cave Research Institute announced its discovery in 2001 during its usual investigation into natural caves. Then the Tamna Cultural Research Institute of Jeju National University, which received support from the Korea Research Foundation, conducted a "Study on the Survey of Japanese Military Enemy Sites in Jeju Island under Japanese colonial rule" and published a report for the first time in 2006. At this time, Tsukasaki Masayuki, a researcher at Japan's Institute of 15 Years of War, presented documents from the Japanese Defense library. One could identify the movement and deployment of the Japanese Military on Jeju Island, the formation of the subordinate units of each division, the number of personnel, horses and cars, and the status of major weapons. The number of historical sites relating to the Jeju Uprising is estimated to be 499, according to a survey by Jeju Special Self-Governing Province in 2018. The number would be more than 700 when the results of a regional survey in Seogwipo city in 2019 are combined. The investigation into the historical sites of the Jeju Uprising has been conducted continuously by the Jeju April 3rd Research Institute with limited scope. Recently, the Jeju local government has established a comprehensive management plan for the Jeju Uprising sites and is seeking to refurbish them, designate them as national registered cultural assets, and utilize them as historical, cultural and tourism resources. As a result, two issues have arisen, one of which is whether it is possible and appropriate to use these sites as tourist spots when most of them are designated as military facility protection zone and owned by the Ministry of Defense. The other issue is how we can plan the tour program and also protect the cultural assets at the same time. Recently, ordinances related to the Jeju Dark Tour have been created, and thoughts are given about how to approach the issue more systematically. What is new is that the Jeju 4.3 Peace Park is emerging as a hot spot of the Jeju Dark Tour. The newly built Jeju 4.3 Peace Park with the shrine of ancestral tablets has emerged as a gathering place for people commemorating the Jeju Uprising memory and victims. In addition, various tour programs are being planned in villages where the sacrifice was severe, one of which is termed “4.3 Road” program. There are also efforts to expand the spirit of the commemoration of the Jeju Uprising at the national level, including pilgrimages to prisons across the country. In honor of the victims who were taken to prison camps nationwide during the Jeju Uprising, the “4.3 Road” tour expands the scope of the Dark Tour related to the Jeju Uprising nationwide. Recently, the focus of using historical and cultural resources has even expanded from place to interest in storytelling. In the case of Mrs. Jin Ah-young’s Life Preservation Society, it presents a new form of Dark Tour by combining her life story of being victimized by the Jeju Uprising with her living space. It hints at the possibility of developing new forms of Dark Tour resource and the importance of preserving the scattered historical and cultural resources. 5. The expansion of Jeju Dark Tour and its perspective In the 2010s, the number of visitors to Jeju increased thanks to the blossoming of budget airlines, the increased popularity of Jeju Island, and the 60th and 70th anniversary of the Jeju Uprising. Accordingly, there have been more and more people learning about the Jeju Uprising through the Dark Tour programs. Now various institutions and organizations show a keen interest in the Dark Tour, which endows a multilayered character to it. It includes the discovery and utilization of Dark Tour as a cure for the past, as a way to inform people of the Jeju Uprising nationwide and globally, as an education for the post-experience generation, as a way to revitalize community and to build solidarity in East Asia after the Cold War. The Dark Tour is basically used as a new paradigm for developing tourism in Jeju. Dark Tour sometimes creates synergy by combining with Ecotourism or Olleh tour, beyond only focusing on historical and cultural resources. The Jeju Ecotourism Association, Jeju Ecotourism Co., the Travel Planner's Cooperative Committee, the Jeju April 3 Culture Commentary Society, and the Marathon Club have been carrying out Dark Tour programs relating to the Jeju Uprising with diverse themes. As the subject matters of Dark Tour have expanded, some argue that we should also extend the scope of Dark Tour in terms of its period of time that it deals with. Currently, there is an agreement that the target of Jeju Dark Tour should include the Cold War landscape, such as historical sites related to the Jeju Uprising or former Japanese military bases. However, some claim that we need to also embrace the legacy of the pre-modern era. For example, the Jeju Tourism Organization included historical events and places from the late 19th century to the early 20th century when it planned a Dark Tour called “Jeju's 100-year time travel”. Considering the fact that the concept of Dark Tour was formed in the process of dealing with the world wars, it can be controversial to include the pre-modern heritage in the program. There is also an issue of the relationship between Peace Tourism and Dark Tour. The Korean government designated Jeju Island as an “Island of World Peace” on January 27, 2005. Since then, it was expected that the tourism industry in Jeju would grow as part of the peace industry, but rather, the term Dark Tour has been used more often than Peace Tourism. Also, there is a concern about the ambivalent meaning of peace. While some treat the term “Peace” interchangeable with “human rights”, others find “security” or “military power” in it. As the Jeju Dark Tour expands, the issue of establishing relations with the Peace Tourism is expected to become more of an issue. It should also address social demands for establishing peace discourse as an ideological basis for developing cultural resources. On top of that, it is important to keep in mind that all these works are to hand over cultural heritage to future generations. Hye-Kyung Hyun currently works as a senior staff researcher of tourism and social culture at Jeju Research Institute. She earned her PhD in sociology from Chonnam National University where she also undertook her post-doctoral research as a research assistant professor in sociology. She worked as a research staff for a SSK project at Jeju National University, a visiting scholar at the University of Sheffield, UK, and a senior staff researcher at Center for Jeju Studies. She served as an editorial board member for journals and societies including Journal of Memory & Vision in the Korea Democratic Institute, and Journal of Daegu Gyeongbuk Studies. She guest edited a special section on maritime culture in Island Studies Journal in 2018. Her major research interests include Jeju 4.3 incident, peace and tourism in East Asia and local communities. Her representative publications include “The struggle for memory and the development of cultural movements” (2003), “The memory and cultural representation of protests” (2006), “May 18th succession between generation and youth festival” (2011). “A study on Japan’s memorial day ritual over maritime territorial disputes” (2013), “Social meaning of protest song on the truth finding of April 3 Jeju uprising” (2017), “Maritime and island culture along the Kuroshio current” (2018), “Memorial rituals and recognition struggles by collateral blood relatives of Jeju 4.3 victims in the absent of lineal blood relatives”, and “A study on the continuation of rituals and memory for Jeju 4･3 victims without immediate family” (2019).