제주평화연구원

Presentation by Professor the Hon Gareth Evans, Foreign Minister of Australia 1988-96, to Jeju Forum Panel on ‘Denuclearization, and Peace Regime of the Korean Peninsula and North East Asia’, Jeju, ROK, 30 May 2019 ------------------------- We are asked to focus in this discussion not so much on how to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula but rather on how to sustain peace there and in the wider North East Asian region once that formidably difficult task has been accomplished. Denuclearization of the Peninsula is a formidably difficult task because, to be worth the name, it has to involve ? although others’ definitions may be wider or narrower ? not only North Korea verifiably relinquishing all its nuclear weapons and South Korea credibly pledging never to acquire or station them, but also the United States, and desirably China and Russia as well, giving credible negative security assurances not to threaten or use nuclear weapons there. Achieving denuclearization and achieving a comfortably sustainable peace in the wider region are not separate enterprises, but highly connected ones. Not in the sense that denuclearization is the only peace and security issue in the region ? obviously there are others, above all the mounting tension between China and the United States. But the two aspirations are connected in the sense that, both in the case of achieving denuclearization and that of achieving sustainable peace in the wider region, this will only happen when two conditions are satisfied: - first, that there is a fundamental change of mindset on the part of all the key players, away from a relentlessly competitive towards a constructively cooperative approach to security; and - second, that there are formal institutional arrangements in place that consolidate and reinforce the instinct for peace, which in the present context means a formal Korean Peace Treaty, a North East Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, and an effectively functioning East Asian Summit. Mindset Change. The overwhelming, primary need is for every relevant political leader to bring to the geopolitics of East Asia a mindset focused not on confrontation and competition but on cooperation ? to adopt a ‘cooperative security’ approach. The idea of cooperative security has been round for a long time, but it is one of which we constantly need to remind ourselves, because it is the only rational and defensible way of conducting international relations in the contemporary world, and certainly the only rational and defensible way of conducting relations in an area as volatile as East Asia. It embraces a number of distinct elements, but three in particular: the idea of common security, first articulated by the Palme Commission in the early 1980s, that security is best achieved with others, rather than against them; the idea of comprehensive security, that international security in the modern age is multidimensional, demanding attention not just to political and diplomatic disputes but underlying economic and social issues; and thirdly, the recognition there are an ever-growing number of non-traditional, transnational threats to both state and human security? like terrorism, climate change, unregulated population flows, health pandemics and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ? that depend on cooperative solutions because they are beyond the capacity of any one state, however big and powerful, to solve for itself. What cooperative security demands in practice are mind-sets that emphasise consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance more than deterrence, transparency more than secrecy, prevention more than reaction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism. Not all of the messages we have been getting from key players, both in relation to North East Asia generally and in the specific context of the Korean Peninsula, have been consistent with these principles. A lot more is going to be required, for a start, from United States policymakers. Donald Trump’s Presidency ? as long as it lasts ? is manifestly not conducive to achieving a stable, cooperative and mutually respectful environment in North East Asia, any more than anywhere else. But it’s not just President Trump. We need to remember that it was his predecessor President Obama who in his 2016 State of the Union Address said, in the context of the TPP, “China doesn’t set the rules in that region, we do.” The US, right across the political leadership spectrum, is simply going to have to psychologically adjust itself to the reality that it is no longer the world’s sole superpower. That while it will have, for the foreseeable future, an important ? and for most countries in the region still welcome ? stabilizing role in East Asia, it can no longer expect to have primacy or dominance: - that it is going to have to share strategic space with China; - that it is not unreasonable for China to want to play a part in regional and global rule-making, not just rule-taking; and - that there are acute risks not just to the regional but the global economy in the US launching an all-out trade war against China rather than trying to settle grievances, legitimate as some of them might be, through mutually accommodating cooperation. For China itself, there are also some mindset changes that need to be consolidated. Part of the new assertiveness we are now seeing in Beijing’s approach to other states in the region and beyond is no more than can be expected from a country wanting to reassert its historical greatness after more than a century of wounded pride. But it would do more for our confidence in sustainable peace if President Xi Jinping much more consistently, and believably, used the kind of language he did when he visited my country, Australia, back in 2014. He told the Australian Parliament then that he understood that China was seen as the “big guy in the crowd” and that others “may be concerned that the big guy may push them around, stand in their way or even take up their place”. And said in response that what China needed most, on the contrary, was both a stable domestic and peaceful international environment, that turbulence or war was utterly against its fundamental interests, that it was committed to peacefully addressing territorial and other disputes through dialogue and consultation, and that it wanted win-win progress with all its neighbours. To be believed, of course, China is going to have to act in practice in ways that are more consistent with that language. Manifestly, it has not been doing so in the South China Sea, where it continues to reject the very clear international law of the sea that no state can claim sovereignty over some of the reefs and rocks on which it has now built major military installations. Some have also argued that its spectacular Belt and Road Initiative is inconsistent with a genuinely cooperative approach to international relations, that it is not really a ‘win-win’ enterprise at all, but designed to secure China’s geostrategic as well as economic dominance, forcing small countries into a dependent relationship through debt. But while there are some outstanding concerns about issues about transparency and governance, I think they can be resolved, and that the BRI could indeed over time become a classic example of productive international cooperation. Japan and South Korea are not themselves immune from the need for some national mindset changes. To be on the right side of history means escaping once and for all being prisoners of history. Japan should long ago have put behind it, as has Germany, any suggestion that it is not completely apologetic to all its neighbours for its war of aggression in Asia and the atrocities that were then committed. The comfort women issue continues to periodically nag away in the background of Korea-Japan relations, as does the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial dispute, which also owes something to lingering wartime memories but which should long ago have been resolved by legal adjudication or joint development negotiation. It is also my instinct that for South Korea and Japan, as for my own country Australia, a little more visible independence from the United States ? less physical and emotional dependence on our traditional great ally ? would make for more healthily sustainable relationships around the region. I do not suggest for a moment that any of us should walk away from that alliance, but we do need to be alert to the possibility that, if current trends continue, our great and powerful friend may be more capable of precipitating a war than being either able or willing to protect us from its consequences. The biggest mental makeover that is going to be required to achieve sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula and the wider region is from North Korea. The paranoia about external and internal enemies that has so long consumed its leadership simply has to be dissipated ? paranoia which has led it to be comfortable living as a global pariah; to engage in some of the world’s most systematic, prolonged and egregious human rights violations against its own people; to close off its society from economic development; and to build nuclear weapons in defiance of the Security Council and everyone else, including China. There are some signs that Kim Jong-un is capable of the mental makeover required, and changed behaviour that would flow from it. But as South Korea under the administration of President Moon Jae-in has understood better that anyone else, that change is only going to be possible ? and be sustainable not only through the nuclear negotiations but beyond ? in the context of mindset changes from the United States and others of the kind I have described. North Korea is never going to put its regime survival at risk, and is never going to be bludgeoned into submission by economic sanctions or military threats. It is only through step-by-step trust-building negotiations, giving the DPRK real confidence that its national security and regime survival will be protected ? confidence of the kind that I for one think it has had some reasonable cause to lack in the past ? that present tensions will be defused, and lasting peace sustained. Institutional Reinforcement. Just as institutional agreements and arrangements are not likely to be achievable or very durable if not accompanied by a cooperative mindset in the relevant actors, so too is it the case that psychological or mindset changes without accompanying institutional implementation are not likely to have much practical impact at all. Each reinforces the other. In my judgement there are three particular institutional arrangements which will be critical first, in consolidating the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and second, in maximising the chances of achieving sustainable peace in the wider North East Asia region. They are a new Korean Peace Treaty, a North East Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, and an effectively functioning East Asia Summit. A New Korean Peace Treaty. Although various lesser measures continue to be proposed, which may have some utility ? for example a bilateral declaration between North and South Korea, or between the US and the North ? the only way of bringing a formal end to the Korean War is to convert the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement into a binding Korean Peace Treaty. Doing that is easier said than done legally because the 1953 Armistice was not signed by states but the UN Command (UNC) on one side, representing some twenty international forces, and the Korean People’s Army(KPA) army and Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army (PVA) on the other. The most credible way forward, readily achievable if the cooperative will is there, would be for the Armistice to be supplanted by an agreement to end the war signed by the two Koreas, the United States and China, which would be endorsed by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter as necessary for the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security in North East Asia.1 A more ambitious approach to a peace treaty, very attractive if it could be delivered, has been proposed by Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes, Chung-in Moon, Tom Pickering and Lee Sigall.2 This would be what they describe as a ‘Comprehensive Security Settlement in Northeast Asia’, which would include the following elements: a peace treaty ending the Armistice Agreement; a six-party security council; declarations of non-hostility; an ending of sanctions over time; and provision of economic and energy aid to North Korea. And part of the package would be a North East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone A North East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.3 This would embrace both Koreas and Japan. All the NPT nuclear-weapon states, including the US, China and Russia, while not being required by this treaty to relinquish their own nuclear weapons, would agree to abide by it (and in the process effectively protect a disarmed North Korea): they would give negative security assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear armed states. The non-nuclear weapons states would undertake not to research, develop, test, possess or deploy nuclear weapons or allow them to be deployed on their territory. And within this framework the DPRK would freeze expansion, start to reverse and ultimately dismantle its nuclear weapons, with a stringent monitoring regime. Protection would be given to South Korea and Japan by their having the right within a certain period to withdraw from the Treaty if its denuclearization provisions were not being effectively implemented. East Asia Summit. A very encouraging institutional development for those advocating cooperation rather than confrontation as the way forward in North East Asia was the resumption in May last year, after several years lapse, of the China-Japan-Korea Trilateral North East Asia Summit ? aimed at downplaying longstanding disputes and grievances, promoting regional trade and investment, and better coordinating diplomatic relations, especially in relation to North Korea. But an even more important development would be the emergence of the East Asia Summit as the preeminent regional dialogue, policymaking and tension?defusing body. Although it has not since it assumed its present shape in 2011 even begun to realise its potential, the EAS has all the ingredients to become just that, with its eighteen members including all the major regional players (including now the United States and Russia), meeting at leader-level, and mandated to address both economic and political issues. Multilateral summit forums have been losing some of their shine in recent years, but they are inherently important vehicles not just for achieving economic and social policy goals but for maintaining sustainable peace. For a number of reasons: - they can play a significant role in building mutual trust and confidence among their participants, particularly if they are repeated at regular intervals and include ample time for one-on-one and small-group exchanges; - such meetings can set the policy agenda on crucial issues, from which participating leaders will be embarrassed if they backslide ? even if, as is often the case, agreement has been wrung out of them by strong peer pressure; - summits can be an antidote to inertia, with the pressure of looming deadlines, and the need to produce “deliverables”; and - leader-level summits can achieve things that meetings of lesser political mortals cannot, leaders usually having much more authority to make decisions and commit resources on the spot. States and their leaders who make a difference to their region and the world are of two basic kinds. There are those who are on the right side of history and those who are not ? those who make the right calls at critical, pivotal moments in national or world history and those who do not. The present generation of political leaders in this region, and among the outsiders who have played a big role in its security in the past, have some distance to go before they can be confident that future generations will think of them as true visionaries for peace. But the resolution of tensions between the major players in East Asia is, for the foreseeable future, going to matter more for the peace of the world than what happens in any other theatre. And if they bring the right cooperative mindset to the task, and spend time and energy in building effective institutional reinforcements for that mindset, there are still some grounds for hope that catastrophe can be avoided.   1 See Patrick Norton , ‘Ending the Korean Armistice Agreement: The Legal Issues’ , Nautilus Institute, March 1997 https://nautilus.org/publications/books/dprkbb/armistice/dprk-briefing-book-ending-korean-armistice-agreement/ 2 See Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes, Chung-in Moon, Thomas Pickering, Lee Sigal, ’Ending the North Korean Nuclear Threat by a Comprehensive Security Settlement In Northeast Asia’, Nautilus Institute, 26 June 2017, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/ending-the-north-korean-nuclear-threat-by-a-comprehensive-security-settlement-in-northeast-asia/ 3 See further Peter Hayes, ‘Ending Nuclear Threat via a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone’, Nautilus Institute January 2015, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/ending-a-nuclear-threat-via-a-northeast-asia-nuclear-weapons-free-zone/ Edited by DOH Jong Yoon (Research Fellow, Jeju Peace Institute) Distributed by Hyeun Jung CHOI (Research Coordinator, Jeju Peace Institute)   Professor the Hon Gareth Evans has been Chancellor of the Australian National University since January 2010. He was a Cabinet Minister in the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments from 1983-96, in the posts of Attorney General, Minister for Resources and Energy, Minister for Transport and Communications and - from 1988-96 - Foreign Minister. He was President and CEO of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, the independent global conflict prevention and resolution organization, from 2000 to 2009, and has chaired two major international commissions, on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001, and Nuclear Non-Poliferation and Disarmament in 2009.

The road that leads to Korean peninsula denuclearization is relatively well mapped. However structured, however it is phased, the specific steps that must be taken are well known.1 Some, such as John Bolton, argue that denuclearization may be achieved rapidly - in one or two years.2 Others have suggested it may take as long as a decade.3 My view is that it is somewhere in-between, with irreversible steps that would make reconstituting a nuclear arsenal in the DPRK extremely challenging possible in one year with verification; but a complete denuclearization including a return to good standing with the IAEA and re-entry into the NTP, at minimum, five years, or more likely longer. Elsewhere,4 I have argued that the rate, pace, and sequencing of DPRK denuclearization is inextricably linked with that of the inter-Korean peacebuilding and operational arms control and disarmament process. At this stage, these steps mostly amount to creating the time and space for denuclearization and peacemaking summitry to take place without disruptive loss of control and clashes along the DMZ between the two Koreas, and these steps amount to restoring the original Armistice. However, deepening and expanding these measures to reconfigure, redeploy, and even dismantle conventional offensive forces would address directly the conflict and reduce the tension that nuclear threats made by nuclear-armed states party to the Korea conflict are intended to address, whether through deterrence, compellence, or reassurance. If this process can keep abreast or ahead of the rate and magnitude of denuclearization, it will reduce hostility in a way that is conducive to nuclear disarmament and peacemaking in the Korean peninsula. It is, therefore, the most fundamental process that is now underway?and is new to Korea. Still invisible to most within the latter is the prospective transformation of the current role of UN Command from sole focus on maintaining the readiness and military capabilities of UNC and Combined Forces Command forces, to also in facilitating trilateral, collaborative steps involving the three militaries such MIA recovery, removal of guard posts, reconfiguring the Joint Security Area, demining, ensuring Kim Jong Un’s personal safety when he crosses the MDL, and other measures under consideration. UN Command’s newly active and enhanced role prefigures that US Forces Korea may shift from being a solely partisan deterrent force in Korea to becoming a pivot deterrent, one that provides reassurance to both Koreas that neither will attack the other; and that facilitates communication, cooperation, and collaboration between UNC, UNC allies, and the two Korean military forces to reconfigure their respective forces, and to employ them in constructive ways to support peacemaking and the formation of trust between political and military commanders, rather than preparing for war and ultimately, mutual annihilation.5 Thus, in Korea itself, denuclearization on the one hand, and the military dimension of inter-Korean conflict resolution on the other, will move in tandem, with the latter calibrated carefully with respect to the former, but with small steps on one front making the task easier on the other. Ultimately, as is explained well by Chaesung Chun,6 there are limits limits on how far and fast this process can go without addressing the impact that Korea, by virtue of its location at the intersection of the great powers in East Asia, has on great power competition; and the continued vulnerability of the Korean peninsula to instabilities and insecurities created by the great powers that afflict Koreans irrespective of what they do or say. In fact, the threat of nuclear war arising from the nuclear weapons states’ policies and deployed nuclear forces in this region is far greater than that posed by North Korea’s relatively tiny nuclear force. Russia’s redeployment of ballistic missile-firing submarines into the region, based in Kamchatka and deployed into the open ocean, its testing of long-range ballistic missiles for nuclear warheads to Kamchatka, its basing and operation of strategic bombers in the Far East, its deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in the Far East, and its modernization of its nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system, all pose a threat to the other nuclear great powers and to the non-nuclear states in the region. The United States remains forward-deployed with submarines carrying nuclear-armed long-range missiles, operating far outside US territorial waters; with US and allied anti-submarine forces operating in the air, on land (supported by signals intelligence, maritime and underwater intelligence systems and bases), and at sea across the entire region; with strategic bombers flying into and across the region from their homes bases in the United States; with missile tests into the region; with ballistic missile defense tests and deployments in the region; and with modernizing NC3 systems in the region, and with its allies, especially with Australia and Japan. China too is accelerating its nuclear force expansion and modernization, albeit from a relatively small base compared to the global and regional deployments of the United States and Russia. It has added many new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, strategic bombers, and may soon deploy ballistic missile-firing submarines accompanied by its own anti-submarine warfare force. It is also deploying missile defenses, anti-satellite capabilities, and modernized NC3 systems?including early introduction of artificial intelligence and quantum technologies into NC3. In many ways, these great power nuclear forces operate as if they are in worlds of their own, oblivious to the fact that each holds the other’s fate in the palms of their hands, and unconcerned that by virtue of their own nuclear deployments, they rely on their nuclear adversary to protect them against acting on their own worst impulses. In what Paul Bracken terms the Asian Pentapolar great power security system that consists of China, Russia, the United States, Japan, and India, instability today does not arise from bilateral shifts in relative throw-weight or missile accuracy or numbers, but from imbalances of power in new nuclear coalitions employing mobile missiles, missile defenses, anti-satellite systems, and new, disruptive technologies already introduced into the modernization of legacy NC3 systems. This pentapolar system is far more complex than the bipolar Cold War threat system. It is far more complex than the Cold War. As Bracken states, “Whole new kinds of emergent system behavior are developing, driven by the extension of nuclear arms to more countries and to new domains of conflict.”7 During the Cold War, the two key nuclear-armed states, the United States and the former Soviet Union, learned from crisis and control failures that skirted with first use on how to avoid nuclear war, leading to common vocabulary, rules of the road, and eventually to arms control treaties that are now unraveling. “Learning on the job” this time around, with new technologies, and with no less than 35 states owning, using, or relying upon nuclear weapons is a far more dangerous process than was the Cold War that gained stability rooted in the “delicate” balance of terror. Today, there is much more instability and little balance in the flux of international relations laden with the nuclear threat to rely on it as a foundation of a security system. Even when it is denuclearized, the Korean Peninsula will not be isolated, an island in the midst of these great power dynamics. To survive, it must use its agile diplomacy and locational leverage to find ways to ameliorate these risks, to create time and space in those places where the great powers might collide, bringing nuclear threat and weapons into play, to avoid nuclear threat mongering and risk-taking; and strive to create a regional, not just a bilateral framework that builds on the inter-Korean peace and denuclearization processes to curb the use of nuclear threat by the great powers.8 One such scheme - a nuclear weapons-free zone in the region, buttressed by other comprehensive security measures at a regional level, is an important option to explore, although it may be better framed as a comprehensive regional security zone that incorporates the key elements of a nuclear weapons-free zone, rather than a standard multilateral nuclear weapons-free zone. It’s fair to say that we all know now the necessary if not sufficient six elements9 of a comprehensive security zone, first spelled out by Mort Halperin,10 and updated since.11 In conclusion, the Korean gift to the great powers may be the creation of a comprehensive regional security zone brought into being to manage the denuclearization of the Peninsula, but requiring along the way that the nuclear great powers commit to a binding framework of negative security assurances and limiting of the use of nuclear threat against the region, and from within or around the region against each other, thereby reducing the role played by nuclear weapons in great power relations and clearing the way to address non-nuclear urgent conventional and non-traditional insecurity in the region.   1 Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes, Thomas Pickering, Leon Sigal, "GENERAL ROADMAP AND WORK PLAN FOR NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY WITH NORTH KOREA", NAPSNet Special Reports, April 10, 2018,https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/general-roadmap-and-work-plan-for-nuclear-diplomacy-with-north-korea/ 2 M. Vazquez, “Bolton says there's a one-year plan for North Korea to denuclearize, stays mum on WaPo report,” CNN, July 2018 at https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/01/politics/john-bolton-north-korea-nuclear-weapons/index.html Bolton also suggested before becoming National Security Advisor to President Trump, perhaps flippantly, that DPRK nuclear weapons be transferred to Oak Ridge in Tennessee. Of course, this would be dangerous and incredibly irresponsible. Only North Korean technicians in North Korea should dismantle North Korean warheads. J. Lind, “North Korea's Nukes Should Be Tennessee Bound: Bolton,” Patch, May 15, 2018, at: https://patch.com/tennessee/knoxville/north-koreas-nukes-should-be-tennessee-bound-bolton 3 Siegfried Hecker, Robert Carlin, and Elliot Serbin, North Korea's Denuclearization: Status and Prospects, CISAC, Stanford University, April 2019, at: https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/april_2019_dprk_report_v3.pdf 4 P. Hayes, “ENDING THE KOREAN WAR AND DENUCLEARIZING THE KOREAN PENINSULA: NO BULLETS, NO BOMBS NEEDED,” Paper to Panel on Peace Building and Provision for Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula, Nuclear Weapon-free Future of the North-East Asia Nagasaki Peace Hall, at 6th Nagasaki Global Citizens Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, November 16, 2018. 5 MORTON HALPERIN, PETER HAYES, THOMAS PICKERING, LEON SIGAL, PHILIP YUN, "FROM ENEMIES TO SECURITY PARTNERS: PATHWAYS TO DENUCLEARIZATION IN KOREA", NAPSNet Policy Forum, July 06, 2018, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/from-enemies-to-security-partners-pathways-to-denuclearization-in-korea/ 6 Chaesung Chun, “On the Way to the Third US-North Korea Summit: South Korea’s Diplomatic Task for 2019,” East Asia Institute paper, May 20, 2019, in Korean, and in English here: http://www.eai.or.kr/main/english/publication_01_view.asp?intSeq=10014&;;;;board=eng_report 7 Paul Bracken, "NC3 IN A MULTIPOLAR NUCLEAR WORLD: BIG STRUCTURES AND LARGE PROCESSES", NAPSNet Special Reports, May 14, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/nc3-in-a-multipolar-nuclear-world-big-structures-and-large-processes/ 8 Thomas Graham, "REDUCING NUCLEAR DANGERS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: BILATERAL VERSUS MULTILATERAL APPROACHES", NAPSNet Special Reports, April 08, 2019, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/reducing-nuclear-dangers-on-the-korean-peninsula-bilateral-versus-multilateral-approaches 9 These are: 1. Termination of the state of war This is clearly a major objective of North Korea. This section of the treaty should be adhered to by the armistice nations and by South Korea. It should provide for the normalization of relations while providing support for the eventual unification of the Peninsula. The agreement should provide for opening the border between the North and South and the pulling back of military forces in the demilitarized zone. The territorial disputes between the North and South, including at sea, should either be settled or the two parties should commit to a peaceful resolution of the disputes. 2. Creation of a permanent council on security: The treaty should transform the Six-Party talks into a permanent council and support organization to monitor the provisions of the treaty and to provide a forum to deal with future security problems in the region. In addition to the six parties to the treaty, other states from the region could be invited to join as full participants or observers. The treaty might take the form of a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Northeast Asia, leaving the “peace treaty” that terminates the Korean War Armistice to a side agreement, or simply to national declarations or bilateral peace treaties. 3. Mutual declaration of no hostile intent: This is a key objective of North Korea, which put great stock in getting such a statement from US President Bill Clinton’s administration. It was flummoxed when the administration of President George W. Bush simply withdrew it and when President Barrack Obama’s administration continued this policy. To be credible, this commitment must be embodied in the treaty and affect all the parties’ relations with each other. 4. Provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy: The right of all parties to the treaty to have access to necessary sources of energy including nuclear power will need to be affirmed. Any limitations on North Korea will need to apply equally to the other non-nuclear parties to the treaty. A new multilateral framework might be appropriate to deal with the fuel cycle. North Korea will also want assurances that its energy needs will be subsidized. Beyond a general commitment this will probably need to be negotiated as a separate agreement. 5. Termination of sanctions/response to violations of the treaty: The parties to the treaty will need to commit to refrain from the use of sanctions on any other party to the treaty and to remove them from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. The parties would reserve the right to collectively impose sanctions on any state that violates its commitments under the treaty. 6. A nuclear weapons-free zone: The treaty would contain a chapter that would create a nuclear weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia, tailored to the specific circumstances of the region. 10 Morton H. Halperin, "A Proposal for a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast Asia", NAPSNet Special Reports, January 03, 2012, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/a-proposal-for-a-nuclear-weapons-free-zone-in-northeast-asia/ 11 Morton Halperin, Peter Hayes, Leon Sigal, "A KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE TREATY AND NUCLEAR EXTENDED DETERRENCE: OPTIONS FOR DENUCLEARIZING THE KOREAN PENINSULA", NAPSNet Special Reports, April 12, 2018, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/a-korean-nuclear-weapons-free-zone-treaty-and-nuclear-extended-deterrence-options-for-denuclearizing-the-korean-peninsula/ Edited by DOH Jong Yoon (Research Fellow, Jeju Peace Institute) Distributed by Hyeun Jung CHOI (Research Coordinator, Jeju Peace Institute)   Peter HAYES is Honorary Professor, Center for International Security Studies, Sydney University, Australia and Director, Nautilus Institute in Berkeley, California. He works at the nexus of security, environment and energy policy problems. Best known for innovative cooperative engagement strategies in North Korea, he has developed techniques at Nautilus Institute for seeking near-term solutions to global security and sustainability problems and applied them in East Asia, Australia, and South Asia. Peter has worked for many international organizations including UN Development Programme, Asian Development Bank, and Global Environment Facility. He was founding director of the Environment Liaison Centre in Kenya in 1975.

East Asia is a region having been enjoyed durable peace since the end of the war in Cambodia in 1991. From then on, most of those who have been warning the danger of war in East Asia have seemed to overlook this fact, unfortunately. The East Asia peace survived North Korea’s nuclear program for more than a decade, and the peace looks quite stable rather than vulnerable. I would like to make three points to explain why peace is durable and how to maintain it in the future. First, the general peace in East Asia rests on the mutual nuclear deterrence between China and the US. As long as these two nuclear powers do not dare to fight a direct war between them, there will be no total war in this region. The narrowed military gap between China and the US is reducing the danger of proxy war in this region. Because no country, except the US, will initiate a war in this region, the regional peace will be maintained as long as the US can be deterred from launching war in this region. Regarding the issue of denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula, it will be difficult to achieve the final goal in the short term, but there is also no danger of war as long as Trump keeps its current policy toward North Korea. Being America’s ally, South Korea places a crucial role in keeping the US from initiating a war in the Korean Peninsula, because it cannot start a war against North Korea without South Korea’s support. The bipolarization between China and the US will strengthen peace in this region. First, the competition between China and the US focuses on economy, especially the technological superiority, which differs from the military rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. It is so obvious that neither China nor the US can attain an economic or technological superiority over the other side through proxy war. Therefore, they will exploit all methods to improve the capability of technological inventions like the space race between the US and the Soviet Union in the late 1950s. The NASA, which was established in 1958, suggests a competition model for the present China-US rivalry. This type of strategic competition is very expensive and this will help constrain competitors from fighting wars. Second, competition in the wireless world is different from traditional geopolitical rivalry. In 2016, the digital economy accounted for 58.2% of America’s GDP, 46.3% of Japan’s GDP, 43.4% of South Korea’s GDP and 30.3% of China’s GDP. These percentages would have increased to over 60% of America’s GDP, near 50% of Japan’s GDP, over 45% of Korea’s GDP and over 40% of China’s GDP by the first quarter of 2019. When a major part of their national wealth generates from the digital economy, Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, and Seoul will concentrate their resources on the competition in the wireless world rather than traditional geopolitical or ideological rivalry. North Korea’s nuclear program is a problem, but it is far less important than the security of the digital economy for these capitals as well as for the rest of the world. So, these four capitals will give priority to prevent North Korea’s nuclear program from disturbing their digital economy growth, rather than quick denuclearization itself. The superiority of the digital economy greatly rests on durable inventions of electric communication technology. America’s diplomatic tour requiring allies to bloc Huawei 5G indicates that Trump’s administration has already focused its containment strategy against China on undermining China’s capability of technological invention. It implies that North Korea’s nuclear program can no longer get Trump’s priority in visible future. Unlike geopolitical rivalry, competition in the wireless world does not require competitors to control the governments of other countries but to attract foreign markets by superior technology and low price. For instance, the Australian federal government is a firm supporter of the US in blocking Huawei, but West Australia insists on purchasing Huawei equipment for their local metro system. In early May, the Japanese government also abandoned the early decision to join the US in blocking Huawei. Simultaneously, Abe’s administration suggested an unconditional summit with North Korea. Third, the world center is moving on the path towards East Asia, which is favorable to maintaining peace in this region. The GDP of China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN is equal to that of the EU and the military budget of East Asia is already larger than that of European members in NATO. In visible future, East Asia will have a stronger influence on international politics than Europe. To be the new world center, East Asian countries will value the regional peace more than before because the durable peace will be an important condition for economic growth, social advantage, sense of political pride and regional identity. Being a center of the world will automatically improve the regional identity of East Asian countries just like what happened to European states in the last few decades. Most countries still dislike North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, but they also have increasing confidence in preventing that problem from escalating into war. The calm response to the break-up of the US-DPRK Hanoi summit in February 2019 showed how unperturbed the East Asia countries are at this result. People in this region feel far less afraid of the danger of nuclear issues. The regional economic identity of East Asia countries is growing along will China’s rise. East Asia countries are still divided by both the history of World War II and the Cold War. It is difficult for them to establish the same political identity, but economically it is possible. China-ASEAN (10+1) free trade agreement (FTA) has created a semi-common market. AIIB has created a common financial identity for East Asia countries to expect Japan. China and Korea signed FTA in 2015. After Abe’s state visit to China last year, China has suggested resuming the negotiation on China-Japan-Korea FTA. Even though the trilateral FTA cannot be reached in the short term, the 10+1, AIIB, and China-Korea FTA can help East Asian countries to improve their regional identity. The common economic identity will drive most East Asian countries to side with China on most economic issues in China-US rivalry. The popular hedging strategy between China and the US adopted by East Asia countries, including Japan, will help maintain the balance between these two giants. Therefore, it also favors consolidating regional peace in this region. In general, the trends of bipolarization, digital economy, and regional economic identity are reducing the danger of nuclear threat in Northeast Asia. Countries in this region should further improve regional economic cooperation for the sake of a more solid peace.   Edited by DOH Jong Yoon (Research Fellow, Jeju Peace Institute) Distributed by Hyeun Jung CHOI (Research Coordinator, Jeju Peace Institute)   Yan Xuetong, Distinguished Professor and the Dean of the Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University.

Today the conceptual and practical linkages between climate change and security are increasingly well understood. Those who still dispute the realities of climate change may not agree, but the majority of professionals in the security field acknowledge the powerful linkages between the consequences of climate change and a daunting set of security challenges. Security is a policy imperative at many levels: at the nation state level, but also along a continuum from local communities to international cooperation. Most security functions ? from law enforcement to military operations - operate under the authorities of nation states, but climate change does not respect political borders. Consequently, greater effort is required at the global level, and often the security institutions of states are not well suited for cooperation in a globalized world. That is why we need to deepen our understanding of how climate and security are inter-related, for wiser policymaking and for greater security, at all levels of political organization. Historically the expert communities of climate science and national security lived on separate planets. They were interested in fundamentally different issues, and did not see the connections. Humanitarians, economic development experts and climate scientists did not want to see their issues “securitized” or captured by military and national security institutions. There was some cultural resistance and concern that any active interest by the military in their work in environmentally stressed places and climate affected communities would cause political friction, or make the work of environmental non-government organizations (NGOs) appear more linked to national security interests, rather driven by local needs. In the large security community in the United States, both civilian and military, if we look back 25 years, there was resistance to giving climate change a prominent role in security planning at the national level, or as a topic for dialogue with allies and other security partners. ● In the 1990s, those responsible for security budgets did not want to allocate resources to this issue because it was not a national security priority and there were other centers of expertise in the government to work on climate issues. ● In some important alliance relationships, such as Germany and Japan, their elites did not want environmental issues to become the concern of military establishments. Both were still politically committed to a very constrained role for their militaries, and Green (pro-environment parties) political activists did not want to see any expansion of the role of the American military in their countries. ● At the UN, earlier in this decade, some countries resisted having the Security Council address climate as a cause and consequence of conflicts. They did not wish to see this important social and economic issue captured by the fifteen countries of the Security Council, and have pushed to create an office to deal with climate change that would report directly to the UN Secretary General, not be captured by the Security Council. But today, few would resist the notion that the effects of climate change have profound consequences for all domains of social and political life, and can affect the stability and security of countries and regions. Many would now place the impacts of climate change for world peace and security alongside the existential threat of nuclear weapons use. In the United States, former President Barack Obama made an important speech in 2015, declaring climate change a national security priority. “Climate change will impact every country on the planet. No nation is immune. So I’m here today to say that climate change constitutes a serious threat to global security, an immediate risk to our national security. And make no mistake, it will impact how our military defends our country. And so we need to act -- and we need to act now." Even in the Trump administration, where political appointees and the president remain climate skeptics and have tried to scale back many domestic environmental regulations, parts of the national bureaucracy continue to monitor and report on the evolving dangers and risks from climate. In the national security community, the Defense Department has recently issued a report assessing the vulnerabilities of dozens of defense installations to climate change caused floods, droughts, and wildfires, to name a few. And the leaders of the US intelligence community now routinely include climate change in their annual public threat assessments to Congress. It is not up there with geopolitical competitors China and Russia, but is on the short list of things that affect the international environment and US interests, and for which intelligence effort is required. Within security communities, responsibilities range from very immediate operational concerns to broader, strategic objectives. One can think of the climate-security linkages along a hierarchy of policy action and ideas: Practical Military Concerns On the military side, climate change was first addressed in the 1990s as it related to pollution, sea level rise, and warming ocean temperatures, which could affect everything from port access to technical systems, to the requirements for sailors’ or soldiers’ uniforms and facilities. Military-Military Cooperation At least a decade ago, the US Department of Defense found that its security dialogues with partner countries in warm climates and with significant coastal zones were increasingly focused on the effects of climate. Even if it was not the US’ highest priority, there was a growing realization that many small countries consider climate to be their highest security concern, more than conflict with a neighbor or some other external threat. Climate in Conflict Analysis and Response Considerable work has been done in the peace operations and economic development communities to conceptualize climate change as a driver or outcome of conflict, within and between states. It may be a true cause of conflict, or, most often, exacerbates other underlying vulnerabilities that make conflict more likely, more acute, and harder to bring to an end. Climate as global driver of change Climate change will affect power imbalances, will change the fortunes of states, with some becoming winners and others losers. It will exaggerate the disparities between rich and poor countries. Stanford scholars Noah Diffenbaugh and Marshall Burke recently published results of empirical quantitative research showing how global warming increases global economic inequality. They looked at the parabolic relationship between temperature and economic growth, which is up in cold countries and down in warm countries, increasing the gap. The connection to security is not always direct, but it’s there, as countries facing serious slowdowns in growth can become unstable and be preyed upon by adversaries. Climate as determinant of global assistance Climate considerations will rise as a determinant of foreign assistance priorities, and will also shape spending requirements at home. Some EU analysts project that the EU should plan to spend over a third of its budget on climate adaptation, in all its dimensions, from infrastructure to energy to other fundamental public policy requirements. Climate as part of the new geopolitical struggles From the Arctic to the rise of China, climate change will be part of the way we understand new geopolitical competition, and will shape the global agenda. Its impact on security will be profound, even if indirect. The migration crisis in recent years from Africa and the Middle East to Europe and to Southeast Asia, for example, has significant climate change dimensions, which are not always explicit in defining the immediate policy challenge. Climate scientists want to do their work in an apolitical environment, and may find it disturbing to put a security filter over their work, in terms of how research funds are allocated, or how much attention climate issues get from policymakers. But these two enormous communities of experts, officials, and concerned citizens have no choice but to engage in dialogue, hopefully mutually respectful and productive. The climate change experts have much to contribute to security debates, and security institutions and experts will play their roles as states and the international community look for solutions to the daunting challenges ahead.   Edited by Intaek HAN (Research Fellow, Jeju Peace Institute) Distributed by Hyeun Jung CHOI (Research Coordinator, Jeju Peace Institute)   Ellen LAIPSON is the Director of the Master's in International Security degree program and the Center for Security Policy Studies at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. Professor LAIPSON joined George Mason University after a distinguished 25 year career in government and as President and CEO of the Stimson Center (2002-2015).

  Forty years of relative stability in the US-China relationship are at an end. That stability had depended on two things. First, a huge inequality in the relationship, with the US by far the dominant partner. Second, the long enduring American illusion that the only future for China, if it was to be successful, was to become like America. History has undermined both propositions. Over a period of 40 years, the most remarkable in global economic history, China overtook the US economy and is now 20% larger in terms of GDP purchasing power parity. Furthermore, it is patently clear to everyone that China is never going to be like the US. The US hugely miscalculated, a victim of its own hubris. Its response is a volte face: a desperate search to find ways of reversing China’s rise or at least slowing it down. The US is right that the underlying reason for China’s rise is economic. So it is logical to start with a trade war. But it will not stop at that. It will encompass all aspects of their relationship. We are watching the birth of a new cold war. And the most likely scenario is that it will last a long time, my guess is at least twenty years. But this will not be a rerun of the last cold war. There are only two similarities: the US is one of the adversaries; and a Communist Party is the governing party in the other. (In truth, though, the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties have barely anything in common.) Otherwise the circumstances are now entirely different. During the cold war, the US was still a rising power. Now it is a declining power. The Soviet Union failed: China is the antithesis of failure. It has achieved the most remarkable economic rise in human history. China is in the ascendant; the US is an angry and divided country desperately trying to hold on to what it had and the world which it created. So what is likely to happen in this new cold war? So far it is being fought overwhelmingly on economic terms. This is China’s ground. Apart from its far superior growth rate, which is still three times that of the US, its standout economic achievement over the last decade has been its sharply rising capacity for innovation. The speed with which Alibaba and Tencent have joined the Silicon Valley tech giants in the premier league of technology has been quite remarkable. Huawei is the global leader in telecommunications, most notably 5G: the US doesn’t even have a player in the field. Of course, most Chinese companies lag well behind their American equivalents in terms of productivity, but the direction – and speed – of travel is irresistible. You may remember that even five years ago, the West was still questioning whether China could ever be innovative rather than imitative. No one asks that question anymore. China is a technology superpower in the making. It is this, above all, that has stunned the US. The underlying motive for the attack on Huawei has little to do with security; above all, it is about a fear of China’s competitive challenge. The argument about security is a typical cold war-style diversion. The US faces a great danger with the trade war. Tariffs, and a growing willingness to cut itself off from the dynamism of the Chinese economy (now the most dynamic in the world), will make the US economy increasingly less competitive: as a result, it will emerge from the trade war and protectionism, whenever that might be, seriously weakened. Both economies, of course, will suffer, but in the long term the US economy will be much the bigger loser. One of the central characteristics of the last cold war – in which overt economic conflict was very much a secondary factor, with the two economies largely insulated from each other – was military competition between the US and the USSR. This time it will be very different. While military strength remains America’s most coveted form of power, this is not the case for China. The two most important modes of Chinese power, both historically and in the contemporary context, are economic and cultural. For the West, in contrast, they have most typically been military and political. In Chinese thinking, one recalls Sun Tzu, war is something to be avoided rather than embraced. This does not mean that China will not develop a formidable military capacity, but it will not behave in anything like the same fashion as the US (or indeed the Soviet Union). Nor does it mean there will not be war between the US and China, but it makes it rather less likely. The Chinese believe in the very long run; and in the long run they are confident that their economic and cultural power will be decisive. Such thinking engenders patience. All of this tells us that China will be a very different kind of great power to the US. People have found it very difficult to understand China, a problem that has been compounded by the speed of its rise. We have become habituated to Western ways of thinking and behaving, the legacy of more than two centuries of Western hegemony. China is profoundly different, the product of a very different history and culture. Rather than seeking to understand the difference that is China, we see China through a western prism and expect and require the Chinese to behave accordingly. Entirely unsurprisingly, they don’t. We condemn their lack of western-style democracy. But trends and events increasingly require us to pause for thought. We might not like it, or choose it for ourselves, but Chinese governance has been extraordinarily successful over the last few decades; a global force for good, taking 800 million Chinese out of poverty and saving the world from a cataclysmic depression after the Western financial crisis. As the world once more enters dangerous waters, in my view our concern should not so much be China but the United States. One of the remarkable things about China is how relatively peaceful it has been during its rise: contrast that with the US in its equivalent period, notably between 1860 and 1914, with the wars of westward expansion against Spain, Mexico, the annexation of Hawaii and the conquest of the Philippines. The same can be said, by the way, of the UK, France and also Japan, all of which fought many wars of expansion during their rise. In contrast, China’s rise has been characterised by an extraordinary restraint, a fact that is largely, if not overwhelmingly, ignored. What concerns me most of all is how America will respond to and deal with its decline. Trump is the first clear expression of and response to this process and it is not encouraging: the authoritarian turn, the erosion of democracy and the separation of powers, the drawing on some of the most regressive aspects of American history, the rejection of diversity at home and plurality in the world. The fact is that imperial countries find decline extremely difficult and painful; my own country, the UK, is a classic illustration. America is almost totally unprepared for its own decline. One must hope that it is not too a harrowing experience either for the US or for the rest of the world. Which brings me finally to Korea. This has so far shown us, in chronological order, the worst of Trump (‘we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea’) and the best (‘the US must pursue a chance to avert nuclear war at all costs’). In a way, Korea is a test case: the longest lasting legacy of the cold war which has so far been impervious to all attempted solutions. After the Singapore summit, which was seemingly beyond almost everyone’s expectations, the Hanoi summit was a great disappointment. Where from now? It is difficult to see progress in the context of a rapidly deteriorating relationship between China and the United States and Trump’s turn towards a cold war. Can the Korean peninsula provide a shaft of light? It seems unlikely; but the Singapore summit, and Trump’s embrace of Kim Jong-un and warm words about North Korea’s economic future, cannot be erased. But the rational part of my brain tells me that pessimism is in order.   *The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not reflect the position of the Jeju Peace Institute. Edited by Intaek HAN (Research Fellow, Jeju Peace Institute) Distributed by Hyeun Jung CHOI (Research Coordinator, Jeju Peace Institute) Martin JACQUES is the author of the global best-seller When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order. He is a Senior Fellow at the Department of Politics and International Studies, Cambridge University, and a Visiting Professor at Tsinghua University, Beijing and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore. He took his doctorate while at King’s College, Cambridge.

  미국과 북한은 북핵 문제를 풀기 위해 지난해 6월 싱가포르에 이어 금년 2월에도 베트남에서 북미 정상회담을 개최하였다. 미국과 북한은 정상회담 성과 도출에 집중하였지만, 회담장소를 선정함에 있어서도 서로 치열한 신경전을 벌였다. 미국과 북한이 싱가포르를 1차 정상회담 장소로 선정한 것은 안전한 ‘중립지대’라는 싱가포르의 이미지를 고려했다고 한다. 평소 싱가포르가 가지고 있는 국가 브랜드 상징성이 역사적인 정상회담 장소로 결정되는데 작용한 것이다. 또한 2차 북미정상회담 장소였던 베트남도 사회주의 국가이면서 개혁개방 이미지를 갖고 있다는 점에서 싱가포르와 유사한 국가브랜드의 상징성이 고려되었다. 기업들도 마찬가지이다. 세계 우수 글로벌 기업들은 기업 브랜드 이미지 구축을 위해 많은 노력을 하고 있다. 우선 글로벌 기업들은 글로벌 시민들에게 긍정적인 자사 브랜드 이미지를 각인시키기 위해 친환경, 인권, 평화, 지역사회공헌 등 다양한 방면에서 사회적 책임(CSR) 활동을 하고 있다. 글로벌 종합화학회사인 듀폰은 환경윤리경영 비전 성명서를 발표하고 친환경적인 경영을 하고 있으며,1)델, 인텔 등 글로벌 IT 회사들도 교육 등을 통한 지역사회 봉사활동에 참여하고 있다. 북미지역 최고 슈퍼마켓인 세이프웨이는 암퇴치를 위한 연구기금을 기부하고 소외계층을 지원하고 있다. 2) 글로벌 기업들은 또한 혁신적인 기업 브랜드 구축과 연구개발에 도움이 되는 장소를 본사로 선택하기도 한다. 미국의 실리콘 벨리는 미국 서부 지대의 개척정신과 평화, 자유를 사랑하는 상징성이 잘 녹아있어 벤처문화 확산의 정신적 밑바탕이 되었다. 그리하여 실리콘 벨리는 현재 전세계적인 벤처산업의 메카이자 기술혁신의 산실이 되었고, 구글, 페이스북, 애플, 인텔과 같은 미국의 대표적인 글로벌 IT 기업들은 실리콘 벨리에 본사를 두고 혁신적이고 차별화된 기술 개발에 주력하고 있다. 구글은‘MoonShot 정신’,3)애플의 스티브 잡스는 매킨토시와 iPhone을 통한 혁신적인 발상으로 글로벌 시민들로부터 많은 사랑을 받고 있다. 그렇기 때문에 전세계의 우수한 IT 엔지니어들은 아메리칸 드림을 이루기 위해 실리콘밸리로 몰려 오고 있으며, 앞으로도 이러한 행보는 계속 될 것으로 전망한다. * * * 제주도는 과거 4.3사건의 아픔을 겪은 화합과 평화의 상징을 간직한 ’평화의 섬’이며 아름다운 자연으로 친환경적인 이미지도 갖추고 있다. 2002년에는 국제자유도시로 다시 태어나 발전을 거듭하고 있고, 국제학교라는 교육 여건도 조성되어 주목을 받고 있다. 젊은 특히 IT 기업들의 경우, 혁신적이고 창의적인 발상으로 기술연구를 하기 위해서 자유롭고, 평화로운 근무 환경이 중요한데 제주도의‘평화의 섬’상징성과 좋은 환경여건을 적극 활용 한다면 글로벌 브랜드 이미지 구축에 많은 도움이 될 것이다. 국내 IT 기업들의 제주도에 대한 관심을 살펴보면, 우리나라 대표 IT 업체인 카카오는 본사를 제주도로 이전하였으며, 본사 건물인 스페이스닷원에서 제주지역 중고등학생들을 대상으로 IT 교육을 하는 등 기업의 사회적 책임(CSR)을 위한 활동을 하고 있다.4)또한 국내 1위 게임업체인 넥슨은 지주회사인 NXC와 자회사인 네오플 등을 제주도로 이전하였고 컴퓨터 박물관을 운영하고 있다.5) 이들은 혁신적인 IT 기업답게 기업 브랜드 이미지 차별화를 위해 남다른 행보를 보여주고 있다. 제주도는 국제자유도시로 발전하기 위해 글로벌 IT 기업 등에 대한 유치 활동에 노력하고 있다. 최근에는 아시아 최대 IT 기업인 중국의 텐센트와 중국인 관광유치 등에 대한 업무협약을 맺었다.6) 제주도도 ‘평화의 섬’브랜드 상징성을 갖고 있어 이를 잘 활용하면 글로벌 IT기업들의 활동무대가 되기 충분하다고 생각된다. 동북아시아지역의 실리콘밸리로서 IT 기술혁신의 아이콘 지역이 되는 것이다. 국제자유도시인 제주도가‘평화의 섬’상징성을 살려 실리콘밸리와 같은 혁신의 아이콘 지역으로 발전해 나가기를 바란다. * * * 전세계는 이미 4차산업 혁명 시대에 진입해 있다. 사물인터넷, 로봇, 인공지능, 무인자동차 등 각 분야에서 선진국들의 치열한 경쟁이 나타나고 있다. 글로벌 IT 기업들도 4차산업 혁명이라는 새로운 환경에 적응하여 시장을 선점하기 위해 기술혁신에 박차를 가하고 있고, 실제로 경쟁을 주도하고 있는 실정이다. 이러한 글로벌 경쟁 속에서 우리 IT기업들이 4차 산업혁명의 아이콘이 되기 위해서는 혁신적인 실험정신과 ‘다르게 생각하는’ 브랜드 이미지를 구축하는 것이 필요하다. 현재 제주도는 우리나라 다른 지역보다 전기자동차가 활발하게 보급되고 있다. 앞으로 무인 자율주행차도 제주도에서 제일 먼저 운행되면 좋겠고, 우리나라의 많은 IT 기업들이 제주도로 이전하여 자유롭고, 친환경적이며, 평화로운 환경 속에서 글로벌 기술혁신을 주도해 주기 바란다. 물론 제주도가 이들 기업들에게 각종 인센티브를 보다 적극적으로 제공하여 글로벌 벤처환경이 조성될 수 있도록 더욱 노력해야 할 것이다.   기획 및 편집: 한인택 (제주평화연구원 연구위원), 최현정 (제주평화연구원 연구원) 저작권자 © 제주평화연구원, 무단 전재 및 재배포 금지   1) 이재기, 『윤리경영과 글로벌 경쟁력』 (보는 소리 2012), pp. 144-146. 2) 마크 베니오프, 칼리 애들러 『세상을 바꾸는 비즈니스』 (해냄 2008) p. 106, pp. 142-147, p. 265 3)토마스 슐츠 『구글의 미래』 (비즈니스북스 2016) pp. 115-116. * MoonShot 개념은 1960년초 미국의 제35대 대통령 존 케네디가 10년 안에 달에 착륙하겠다고 공언했듯이 “인간을 달에 보내는 것만큼의 용기와 독창성을 필요로 한다”는 것임. 즉 새로운 문제에 도전하는 과감한 정신을 말한다. - 4) “카카오, 여름방학 맞아 ‘코딩교실 개설.” http://www.jejudomin.co.kr/news/articleView.htm/?idxno=103572 (2018.7.11. 제주도민일보) 5) “넥슨 지주사 NXC, 제주와 9년째 아름다운 동행 눈길” http://news1.kr/articles/?3415865 (2018.9.4. news1뉴스) 6) “중 관광객, 제주도서 위챗페이— 제주도.텐센트 협약” http://news1.kr/articles/?3497526 (2018.12.10 news1뉴스)   現 한양대학교 국제학대학원 글로벌 인텔리전스 학과 특임교수. Pace 대학교 경영학 박사 및 한국외국어대학교 국제관계학 박사. 제주평화연구원 객원연구위원, 통일연구원 초빙연구위원을 역임. 『한미양국의 대북정책과 남북경협』을 저술하였고, 남북관계, 경쟁정보, 미래학 등을 연구.

  [Editor's Note] The rise of a new global power has often led to hegemonic wars. In the following essay, Prof. Graham ALLISON discusses how the rise of China might affect the Korean Peninsula and offers his insights on the possibility of a second Korea war. An earlier version of this essay was presented at the 14th Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity held in Jeju, South Korea on May 29-31, 2019.   The hallmark of US-Korea joint command is its readiness to “fight tonight.” The scenario on which most focus is one in which the North attacks the South. Because the US-South Korean forces are ready and able to defend and ultimately defeat North Korea, our deterrent posture has succeeded in preventing war for more than six decades. But beyond that, I believe we must now recognize another potential trigger to a second Korean War: Thucydides’s Trap. The current Thucydidean rivalry between a rising China and a ruling US creates a vulnerability to third party actions or even accidents that could trigger a spiral of reactions that end in war. 1. What’s happening in relations between the US and China? The past hundred years have been what historians call an “American century.” Americans have become accustomed to their place at the top of every pecking order. The very thought of another nation becoming as big and strong as we are, strikes many Americans as an affront to who they are. For perspective on what we are seeing in this rivalry between a rising China and a ruling US, it’s useful to locate current events on the broader canvas of history. In the last 500 years, the world has seen 16 cases in which a rising power has threatened to displace a ruling power. Twelve ended in war. To help us get our minds around this challenge, I’m going to introduce you to a Great Thinker and present a Big Idea. The great thinker is Thucydides. Yes, his name is a mouthful?and many people find it difficult to pronounce. So, let’s say it out loud together: Thucydides. Again: Thucydides. Who was Thucydides? He was the father and founder of history. Thucydides wrote the first ever history book?titled the History of the Peloponnesian War, about the conflict between Sparta and Athens in Greece, 2,500 years ago. About the war that devastated classical Greece, Thucydides wrote:. “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.”. So, the rise of one and the reaction of the other created a toxic cocktail of arrogance, pride, and paranoia that led to war. Which brings us to the Big Idea: Thucydides’s Trap. Thucydides’s Trap is a term I coined to make vivid Thucydides’s insight. The Trap is the dangerous dynamic that occurs when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power. As Henry Kissinger has pointed out, this concept is the best lens available for cutting through the noise and news of the day to the underlying dynamic driving current US-China relations. 2. In a Thucydidean rivalry in which neither the rising power nor the ruling power wants war, how do wars happen? One of my most surprising discoveries in exploring the history of rivalries between rising and ruling powers was the fact that in most of the cases, neither the rising power nor the ruling power wanted war. In few of the cases did either the rising or ruling power initiate war. So, the puzzle: how did war occur? The answer: an external shock caused by the action of a third party, or even an accident, is misunderstood by one or both of the principal protagonists. As a result, it triggers a spiral of reactions that drags both to a war neither wants. In the history Thucydides wrote about the war that destroyed the two great city-states of the classical Greece, a dispute between Corinth (which was a Spartan ally) and Corcyra (a neutral naval power) dragged Athens and Sparta to an unwanted war. 3. How did the assassination of the Archduke in June 1914 spark a conflagration that destroyed Europe? “Ah, if we only knew.” That was the best that German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg had to offer when pressed about how it could have happened. At the dawn of the 20th century, Britain had ruled the world for a century with an Empire on which the sun never set and a navy that ruled the waves. But after unification, in the final decades of the 19th century Germany grew rapidly, its GDP overtaking Britain in 1900 on a trajectory to be substantially larger in the decades that followed. Amidst this rivalry, on June 28, 1914, a terrorist assassinated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The event appeared so inconsequential that it did not make the front page in either London or Berlin. Nonetheless, the Austro-Hungarian Emperor felt obliged to respond by punishing the Serbs. Russia came to the defense of its fellow Serbian Orthodox Christians. Germany stood by its only ally Austria-Hungary. France honored its military alliance with Russia. Britain had become so entangled with France that it could not extricate itself. Thus, in six weeks, all the great nations in Europe found themselves caught up in a conflagration that claimed more than 20 million victims. 4. How could events in the next 20 months of the Trump Administration’s first term end in war? If the Singapore “deal” that many experts now dismiss as a delusion collapses, what will happen next? If Trump concludes that he was trumped, what should we expect? Will Kim return to ICBM tests that could give North Korea a reliable capability to conduct nuclear attacks on the American homeland? If he does, will Trump act on his threat to attack North Korea’s launch sites? In response, will North Korea attack Seoul? If it does, will that lead to a second Korean War? And where would that war end? In the first Korean War, more than 1.3 million people died?most of them killed by American or Chinese combatants. A second Korean War would be much more deadly. In 1950, the American military commander Douglas MacArthur could not believe that China would attack the United States. After all, Mao had just one year earlier finally won a long and bloody civil war, and was attempting to consolidate his own control, thinking about Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang who had escaped to Taiwan. But as American troops marched towards the Yalu River that marks the Chinese border, they awoke one morning to find themselves under assault by Chinese forces who subsequently beat them back to the 38th Parallel. Could the current Chinese government accept an American-South Korean victory that consolidated Korea under the control of Seoul that remained an American military ally? 5. What’s to be done? That’s the topic of this conference-and I’ve come to listen and learn. But watching developments to this point, I applaud President Moon’s imagination. I suggest we take his advice and recognize that “the important task right now is to maintain the momentum of dialogue,” and test his theory that “advancement in inter-Korean relations is the driving force behind denuclearization.”   *The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not reflect the position of the Jeju Peace Institute. Edited by Intaek HAN (Research Fellow, Jeju Peace Institute) Distributed by Hyeun Jung CHOI (Research Coordinator, Jeju Peace Institute) Graham T. Allison was Director of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs from 1995 until July 2017. He also served as Dean of the Harvard Kennedy School from 1977 to 1989. Allison is a leading analyst of U.S. national security and defense policy with a special interest in nuclear weapons, terrorism, and decision-making. He has served as Special Advisor to the Secretary of Defense under President Reagan and as Assistant Secretary of Defense in the first Clinton Administration. His latest book, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (2017) quickly became a national bestseller. Dr. Allison was educated at Davidson College; Harvard College (B.A., magna cum laude, in History); Oxford University (B.A. and M.A., First Class Honors in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics); and Harvard University (Ph.D. in Political Science).

  Situations in which two countries are in dispute, or have been at war with each other, are always very hard to resolve. There is a complex legacy of hatreds, family losses and divisions, and catastrophic episodes that can never be fully erased. But throughout history there have been cases in which bitter conflicts have been settled peacefully. The challenge for negotiators who are seeking peace is to identify both the motivation of each of the conflicting parties to find a peaceful solution, and also the elements which may satisfy the parties and permit them to agree to a solution. Of course the passage of time can also help — it is easier to discuss peace when the generations which did the actual fighting have passed away. And sometimes reaching conclusions simply requires a lot of talk, reflection, and adjustment of positions. I have participated in — and in one case created — a number of negotiating processes which were aimed at resolving an international dispute but did not lead to agreement, nor even to a peaceful solution. These have included negotiations on the Cyprus dispute, the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the dispute between the central government of Afghanistan and the Taliban movement. None of these conflicts or disputes has yet been successfully resolved, and the hatreds they have engendered continue to dominate the societies involved. These few examples from my personal experience have shown me how complicated it is to find peace after conflict. In contrast, the dispute between the Soviet and the West over the division which was imposed on Germany at the end of the Second World War, and the key question of whether Germany could eventually be reunited, was resolved successfully and peacefully. This happened partly through a negotiating process and the evolution of history, partly because of the realism and discipline of the governments concerned, and also partly because of the foresighted and creative negotiating skills of a few key negotiators. Years later their creative work furnished an existing, agreed legal basis for Germany’s reunification. It is this German example, — the peaceful reunification of East and West Germany — accomplished partly within the negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act, which offers some possible lessons for the situation of the two Korean states. And it suggests that there could one day be some form of reunification, or re-association, or process, between them. And those famous and situation-changing words which were included in the Helsinki Final Act apply universally: “frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement." Thus an interesting question, at this time in history, here in Korea, is whether there are lessons in the experience of the German reunification process, and the way it was universally permitted by the Helsinki Final Act, which may be usefully applied to the situation of the two Koreas. Many experts and observers will of course respond with profound skepticism, since the possible reunification, or association, of the two Koreas has always looked extremely difficult, not to say unlikely, or impossible. Even with the recent improvements in the atmosphere between the two independent Koreas, and the many political gestures which have been made, the notion of some sort of full - or even partial — reunification, or association, or just openness between the two countries still looks pretty unlikely. At the same time, there are now many areas of cooperation between the two countries, there have been some genuinely moving and symbolic cooperative gestures, and there are other elements which suggest that we might foresee a new phase in the relationship. Skeptics will no doubt sneer at such an observation, and certainly the development by North Korea of nuclear weapons and long-distance missiles undercuts the notion that North Korea might somehow be motivated to develop peaceful cooperation with Seoul. These major developments reflect a huge investment of money and political will, while wasting resources that could be used for the real economic and societal development which is so badly needed in the North. But peace is not found through skepticism it is found through active and enthusiastic searching, experimentation, and efforts which are immune to disappointment. I can assure you of this from my own experience in the Helsinki negotiations. The world was deeply skeptical about that elaborate and complicated affair of words. No one believed the words, and many in the West thought the effort was completely wasted, and naive. The Wall Street Journal’s front-page headline read “Gerry, Don’t Go,” an appeal to President Gerald Ford not to go to Helsinki to sign the CSCE’s Final Act. Many academicians, journalists and politicians mocked the Helsinki Final Act, which, it was argued, accepted and sealed the division of Germany for the foreseeable future. But years later things changed, largely because the peoples of the Eastern half of Europe agitated for their rights, and there was a growing clamor for change, inspired partly by the much-ridiculed Helsinki Final Act. And ultimately the Wall Street Journal apologized for that headline addressed to Gerry Ford — one of the very few occasions in its history when the Wall Street Journal has apologized. And now the situation in Europe, including the fully-unified German nation, is back to a “normal” existence, cooperating positively in the framework of the European (minus, of course, the UK, which is negotiating a special relationship with the EU — but that is another story). For those who are focused on Korea, all of this should be very interesting, as a potential model, and as a source of ideas for application in this part of the world. No two international situations are the same, of course, so one must be careful about drawing parallels, or trying to transfer elements from one situation to another. And the form, procedures, participation and agenda of one negotiation will likely be different from those followed in other negotiations. Nonetheless, the “Helsinki Model” may well be the most relevant for the situation in this region. And, after all, what would be lost if there were to be a broad, multilateral negotiating forum to address a range of issues and possibilities for cooperation among countries in this region of the world? There are many subjects that could usefully be discussed in such a multilateral setting, and there is also the potential — even if it may be small — for increased understanding and some positive results.   *The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not reflect the position of the Jeju Peace Institute. ​Edited by DOH Jong Yoon and Intaek HAN (Research Fellows, Jeju Peace Institute) Distributed by CHOI Hyeun Jung (Research Coordinator, Jeju Peace Institute) Ambassador John J. Maresca was the Deputy Head of the US Delegation which negotiated the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, and the Head of the US Delegation which negotiated the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 1990. His latest book, Helsinki Revisited, (Ibidem Press — part of the Columbia University Press) was published in 2015.

  The Jeju Forum 2019 will be held from May 29th to May 31st 2019 in Jeju Island, Republic of Korea. The Forum was originally designed to build and promote peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and throughout East Asia. Since its inception in 2001, the Forum has served as dynamic platform for discourse on peace and prosperity through active exchanges of views among world renowned leaders and high ranking government officials. The themes for the Forum have been chosen for reflecting long-term vision of the Forum for establishing a permanent peace regime in North-east Asia region and beyond. In this regard, the Jeju Forum 2019 is proud to introduce “Asia Towards Resilient Peace: Cooperation and Integration,” as its theme for this year. Concept of resilience has been studied and developed in the field of psychology since 1950s. Even-though the concept was not cleary defined yet, it can be described as capability of bounce-back toward normal state of mind from abnormal mental state. In other words, resilience is capability of human beings to utilize psychological resources to overcome mentally difficult situations such as emotional wounds and setbacks. Resilience can be cultivated in the individual level and community level as well. The 21st century is witnessing a vital transition in the global political landscape. Asia is taking on a greater role and assuming additional responsibility in this process. In particular, East Asia has undertaken some dramatic changes over three layers of its security, economic, and regional order in 2018, and this trend of regional transformation is expected to continue in tandem with uncertainties in 2019. As we are observing, the most notable change in this regard is transpiring on the Korean Peninsula. This change was indicated in the New Year's Address of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un in 2018. The government of the Republic of Korea positively responded to the message of the North and rapidly developed the relationship between the North and the South into reconciliation and cooperation. A series of summit meetings among four countries of North and South Korea, the US and China have been taking place. However, certainty for peace is not a word properly used in these diplomatic endeavors. The risk of war on the Korean Peninsula is not yet visibly lowered. Disputes between the US and China are still on-going in every field. Recent dispute on trade between them represents just the tip of the iceberg in their overall relationship. The international community, particularly Asian countries is concerned regarding the possibility of the development of disputes into military clashes between the two in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, the territorial disputes of East Asian countries are also threatening the peace and stability of the entire Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, it is an urgent task and imperative for all of us, the people of Asia and the world to make every effort to avoid military confrontation and clash in the Asia-Pacific region and reach a common goal of a “peaceful and prosperous Asia.” Under this backdrop, what then is the most secured and effective way to accomplish the task for the common goal of the Asian people? There exists a broad consensus that a mechanism or peace regime for a permanent, sustainable or resilient peace is required in this region. This is evidenced by the post-war experience of the international community, in particular, multilateral cooperation mechanism of OSCE in Europe. And it is a long-term vision of the Jeju Forum. The permanent peace regime should be comprehensive in its operation and clear in its task and character. Its modus operandi includes a nexus of measures of conflict prevention, crisis containment and management, peaceful resolution of disputes, peace building, promotion of human rights, multilateral cooperation for economic co-prosperity and regional integration of the Asia-Pacific region. Resilient peace is a core concept and an end-product of the mechanism. Once the mechanism starts to effectively operate, a resilient peace will be established. As such, it is high time for Asia-Pacific region countries to collectively endeavor to establish a resilient peace to realize permanent peace and co-prosperity. The Jeju Forum, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea is an unique platform of discussion and promotion of a resilient peace in Asia. The theme of the Jeju Forum 2019, “Asia Towards Resilient Peace” is increasingly timely and relevant under the growing uncertainties in Asia, in particular the East Asian region. The Jeju Forum 2019 is expected to expedite its discussion on "resilient peace" that is consistent with sustainable peace and prosperity and produce a fruitful result for the relevant contents and way of establishment of resilient peace in Asia. All the participants in the Forum is warmly welcome. ​ ​ 아시아 회복탄력적 평화​를 향하여: 협력과 통합 제14회 제주포럼이 2019년 5월 29일에서 31일까지 제주에서 개최된다. 제주포럼은 한반도와 동아시아의 평화와 번영을 증진하기 위하여 매년 제주에서 개최되고 있다. 2001년 시작된 제주포럼은 그동안 비약적인 발전을 거듭하여왔다. 대한민국의 대통령, 국무총리를 비롯하여 세계의 정치, 경제 지도자들과 고위 공직자들, 그리고 저명한 학자들이 참석하여 아시아 지역 및 세계 평화와 번영에 관한 담론을 창출하여 왔다. 금년도에 개최되는 제주포럼은 아시아 지역의 항구적 평화체제 구축이라는 장기적 비전하에 “아시아 회복탄력적 평화를 향하여: 협력과 통합”이라는 주제를 선정하였다. 회복탄력성(resilience)이라는 용어는 1950년대부터 심리학 분야에서 사용되기 시작하였다. 아직 개념이 정립되어 있지 않지만 심리학에서 사용되는 용례를 검토해 보면 회복탄력성이란 ‘비정상적인 개인의 심리상태가 정상적인 심리상태로 복원되는 성질 또는 능력’이라고 정의될 수 있다. 이에 대한 연구는 최근에 심리학의 영역을 넘어서 기업의 회복탄력성에 대한 연구로 확대되고 있다. 기업이 다양한 외부 환경적인 도전을 극복하면서 소멸되지 않고 지속적으로 성장해 나가기 위한 내부적 요소들이 연구되고 있다. 국제정치학 분야에서도 관련된 연구들이 이루어지고 있다. ‘회복탄력적 평화’의 개념을 심리학에서 사용되는 개념을 차용한다면 ‘위기상황이 전쟁으로 비화하지 않고 평화로 복원될 수 있는 기제가 존재하고 잘 작동하는 상태 또는 능력’이라고 정의를 내릴 수 있을 것이며 ‘제주포럼 2019’에서는 이 개념을 사용하고자 한다. 21세기의 세계 정치, 경제 지형도는 중요한 변환기를 맞고 있다. 이 변화의 과정에서 아시아가 중요한 무대가 되고 있다. 특히, 동아시아는 2018년에 목도한 바와 같이 안보와 경제, 그리고 정치적 질서의 측면에서 급격한 변화를 보이고 있고, 이러한 역내 변화의 흐름은 불확실성이라는 확실한 요소와 함께 2019년에도 계속될 것으로 예상된다. 동 아시아에서 가장 두드러진 변화는 한반도에서 발생하고 있다. 이러한 변화는 북한의 김정은 위원장의 2018년 1월 1일 발표된 신년사에서 시작되었다. 대한민국은 김정은 위원장의 메시지에 긍정적 반응을 보였고 남북관계를 화해와 협력의 국면으로 빠르게 발전시켜왔다. 북한의 변화가 근본적인 것인지 아직 알 수 없지만 남북한은 수차례 정상회담을 개최하였고, 북미, 북중 간에도 일련의 정상회담이 개최되었다. 그러나 이러한 외교적 노력에도 불구하고 평화가 정착되었다고 말하기는 이르다. 한반도에서 전쟁의 위험은 아직 확실하게 감소되지 않고 있다. 한반도에서의 불확실성과 더불어 미국과 중국의 갈등은 아시아 지역 및 국제사회 전체의 커다란 관심과 우려 사항이 되고 있다. 미국과 중국은 모든 영역에서 대립과 갈등을 보여 왔으며 이러한 대립과 갈등은 금년에도 여전히 계속되고 있다. 최근의 미-중간 무역 분쟁은 양국 관계에서 나타날 수 있는 갈등의 일부분에 지나지 않는다. 국제 사회, 특히 아시아 국가들은 미중 양국 간 갈등이 아시아태평양지역에서 군사적 충돌로 비화할 가능성을 우려하고 있다. 또한 동아시아의 영토분쟁은 아시아태평양 전역의 평화와 안정을 위협하고 있다. 이러한 위협적인 요소들을 제거하고 평화롭고 번영하는 아시아를 구축하기 위해서는 우리 모두의 공동노력이 요구된다. 이러한 노력의 과정에서 우리는 유럽지역의 사례를 통하여 교훈을 얻을 수 있을 것이다. 제2차 세계대전을 경험한 유럽은 위기상황을 통제하고 평화로 복원될 수 있는 기제를 구축하기 위하여 노력하여 왔다. 유럽은 1975년 헬싱키 선언을 시작으로 지역적 안정과 평화를 정착시키기 위하여 다자간 협력기구인 유럽안보협력기구(OSCE)를 창설하고 발전시켜 왔다. 이를 통하여 제2차 세계대전 이후 유럽지역의 안정과 평화, 그리고 공동의 번영을 위한 기제가 마련되었다. 다시 말하면 유럽은 ‘회복탄력적 평화’를 성공적으로 정착시키고 있다고 할 수 있다. 아시아 지역에서도 유럽의 경험을 원용하여 지속가능하며 항구적인 평화, 그리고 위기상황이 평화상황으로 복원되는 기제가 마련되어야 한다는 광범위한 공감대가 형성되어 있다. 이러한 공감대를 현실화 시키는 것이 제주포럼의 장기적 비전이기도 하다. ‘제주포럼 2019’의 대주제인 ‘회복탄력적 평화’는 이 기제의 핵심개념이자 최종적 산물이다. 이러한 기제가 효과적으로 운영되기 위해서는 그 내용면에서 갈등예방, 위기 억제 및 관리, 분쟁의 평화적 해결, 평화구축, 인권증진, 경제적 공동번영을 위한 다자간 협력 및 지역적 통합이 포함되어야 한다. 따라서 제주포럼에서는 ‘평화’뿐만 아니라 ‘번영’, ‘지속가능성’, ‘다양성’에 관한 세션을 운영하고 있다. 2019년 제주포럼에서 ‘회복탄력적 평화’에 대한 논의를 통하여 시의적절하고 향상된 평화담론을 만들어 내고 아시아 지역에 있어서 전쟁의 위기를 극복하고 지속가능한 평화와 번영을 달성하는데 기여할 것으로 기대한다. ‘제주포럼 2019’에 참석하시는 모든 분들을 환영한다.

  신북방정책의 중심 중앙아시아 투르크 벨트 국가들 문재인 대통령은 오는 16일부터 23일까지 투르크메니스탄, 우즈베키스탄, 카자흐스탄 등 중앙아시아 3개국을 국빈방문한다. 먼저, 16일부터 18일까지 투르크메니스탄을 방문해 베르디무하메도프 대통령과 정상회담을 갖고, 18일부터 21일까지는 우즈베키스탄 미르지요예프 대통령을, 21일부터 23일까지는 카자흐스탄을 방문해 최근 취임한 토카예프 신임 대통령을 만날 예정이다. 위의 세 나라는 모두 구소련이 해체된 이후 91년 독립한 신생국으로서 한국의 중요한 신북방정책의 중요한 파트너이다. 자원 부국이며, 에너지, 철도 등 물류 허브 국가로서 중요한 의미가 있다. 남북한이 통일이 된다면 실크로드로 다시 연결될 수 있으니 교통과 교류의 중심축을 이룬다고 할 수 있다. 이 세 국가는 모두 투르크 국가이며, 알타이어 군에 속하는 대한민국과는 문화적 친연성을 갖는 투르크 벨트 국가들이다. 최근에는 한류의 바람이 불고 있고, 한국을 경제발전을 이룬 롤모델로 삼고 있어 한국에 대한 호감도가 높은 나라들이다. 영세중립국인 투르크메니스탄을 포함하여, 독립 초기 핵을 포기하고 비핵화를 이루었던 카자흐스탄 그리고 우즈베키스탄도 남북 평화 분위기 조성에 매우 깊은 관심과 응원의 박수를 보내고 있다. 이번 방문에서도 투르크메니스탄의 경우, 양국 간 ICT 등 4차 산업혁명 분야와 교통, 통관, 국토관리 분야 협력, 공동번영 협력기반 강화를 위해서는 에너지‧플랜트 등 고부가가치 산업 분야 협력을 지속하면서 기술인력 양성지원을 통한 산업역량 강화, 보건, 산림 등의 분야에서도 새로운 협력의 가능성 등을 논의할 것으로 보이며, 카자흐스탄의 경우, 신정부와 신뢰관계를 구축하고 양국관계의 호혜적 협력 증진 방안에 대해 논의할 방침이다. 중앙아시아의 거점 국가 우즈베키스탄의 혁신 2017년 미르지요예프 우즈베키스탄 대통령의 한국 국빈방문 정상회담에서 양국 정상은 호혜적 미래 경제발전 동반자로서 양국 간 교역‧투자 확대, 교통‧도시‧에너지 인프라 구축, 보건‧의료‧교육‧농업 등 분야에서의 실질 협력 증진을 위한 구체 방안 등에 대해 논의를 이어 나간 바 있다. 그리고 이번 문재인 대통령 답방에서 양국 간 전략적 동반자 관계를 한 단계 높은 수준으로 격상할 것으로 알려져 큰 기대를 모으고 있다. 이번 문재인 대통령의 국빈방문에서는 우즈베키스탄의 WTO 가입, 한-우즈베키스탄 FTA 체결 공동연구 등에 대한 구체적인 방안 등이 협의가 이뤄질 것으로 보인다. 또한 양국 정상이 한-우즈베키스탄 실질 협력 확대를 촉진하는 금융지원 체계 구축을 위해 대외경제협력기금 공여(향후 3년간 5억 달러) 약정 체결 및 신규 사업 발굴‧지원을 위한 금융협력플랫폼(20억 달러 이상) 창설 등에 합의한 것의 일환으로 전자정부 시스템 구축과 전자 결제 시스템 구축안이 구체화될 것으로 전망된다. 이럴 경우 한국기업의 우즈베키스탄 내 대규모 프로젝트 참여 촉진과 활성화를 위한 여건이 마련될 것으로 보인다. 특히 전자 결제 시스템 구비는 한국기업이 지금까지 우즈베키스탄에 겪어 왔던 송금 문제나 환율, 혹은 관료주의 문제 등을 극복할 수 있는 획기적인 전환점을 마련할 수 있을 것으로 기대되어 많은 기업의 관심이 집중되고 있다. 우즈베키스탄은 인구, 교육열, 자원 등에서 거대한 잠재력이 있는 나라이다. 그동안 성장에 걸림돌이 되어 왔던 전자정부나 전자 결제 시스템이 완비된다면 향후 10년 후 우즈베키스탄의 미래는 상상을 초월할 정도로 성장 속도를 낼 수 있을 것이다. 과거 다소 뿌리 내리기에 어려운 기업 환경으로 인해 를 제외하고는 대기업이 진출하지 못하였고, 그나마도 의 붕괴로 인해 우즈베키스탄은 한국 대기업이 진출하지 못한 유일한 나라로 존재했다. 그러나 이러한 시스템의 변화로 를 비롯한 여러 대기업 진출이 예정되어 있어 큰 변화가 예고된다. 한편, 대기업이 진출하기 위해서는 이를 뒷받침할 수 있는 인재와 인력풀 양성이 뒷받침되어야 한다. 그런데도 아직은 한국과 우즈베키스탄 양국의 교류를 촉진하고 리드를 해나갈 인재양성 시스템이 갖추어져 있지 않은 것도 양국이 해결해야 할 문제이다. 대한민국의 마지막 시장은 중앙아시아임에도 불구하고, 지금까지는 한국에서 중앙아시아 투르크 벨트 국가들의 정치, 경제, 외교, 문화적 중요성을 인식하고 이에 맞는 인프라 구축 및 인재양성에 제대로 투자가 진행되어 오지 못했던 것이 그 이유이다. 우즈베키스탄에 부는 의료 한류 열풍 미르지요예프 대통령은 2017년 정상회담에서 단순 교역만이 아니라, 고등교육과 보건의료 분야로의 협력 확대와 노동 쿼터 확대 분야의 중요성에 대해서도 거듭 강조한 바 있다. 이를 계기로 우즈베키스탄에서는 의료에도 본격적인 한류 바람이 불어닥치기 시작했다. 병원 건립 및 검진센터 그리고 의대 설립 등을 한류가 채우기 시작했다. 구소련시대에는 높은 의료 수준을 자랑했던 우즈베키스탄이지만 오랜 세월 사회주의 시스템 속에서 기술혁신과 변화를 추진하지 못한 탓으로 시스템은 있지만 제대로 된 의료시설과 설비를 갖추지 못했다. 우즈베키스탄에서 공식적으로 가장 높은 사망률 원인은 심근경색, 뇌졸중과 같은 심장질환이 압도적으로 높지만, 실제로는 암으로 인한 사망률이 가장 높을 것으로 추정되고 있다. 그런데 우즈베키스탄에는 아직 제대로 된 암 진단 시스템이나 장비가 갖추어져 있지 않아 암으로 의심되는 환자들의 경우, 외국으로 의료관광을 떠난다. 과거에는 인도가 주목을 받았지만, 최근에는 대부분 한국행을 택한다. 이렇게 수준 높은 한국 의료진과 시스템에 대한 신뢰는 2017년 미르지요예프 대통령 방한 이후 의료 한류 바람을 본격화하기에 이르렀다. 먼저, 상원의료재단 힘찬 병원이 우즈베키스탄에서 실크로드 유적지와 세계문화유산으로 유명한 부하라에 병원을 설립하여, 올해 6월부터 본격적인 진료를 시작한 것이 그 예이다. 이어, 고양시 명지병원 또한 페르가나 지역에 병원설립과 원격진료 시스템 구축, 의학 전문가 교류, 인적 교류와 인턴십, 그리고 교육과정 개설 등을 협약하였다. 한국보건산업진흥원으로부터 2년 연속(2016-2017) 우즈베키스탄 해외진출 프로젝트에 선정되어 외과수술 전문병원과 첨단검진센터 설립 사업을 추진해왔던 정병원은 타슈켄트에 외과수술전문병원과 첨단검진센터 설립을 추진을 협상 중에 있다. 이외에도 여성 암 분야와 관련하여 이화의료원은 국립여성병원 설립에 컨설팅을 진행해오고 있다. 특히 가천대는 국내 40개 의대 중 처음으로 우즈베키스탄 아크파메드라인 병원 부속 의대를 설립하고, 교육프로그램을 수출하여 6년간 교육프로그램을 전수하고 200만 달러를 받기로 하였다. 이 대학은 우즈베키스탄에서는 처음 설립되는 사립 의대이다. 이렇게 의료분야에 불어닥친 한류 바람은 건강보험 등의 의료 시스템 수출로도 본격적으로 이어질 것으로 기대된다. 한국대학의 우즈베키스탄 교육 시스템과 콘텐츠 수출의 전망 우즈베키스탄 정부는 교육계 전면 개방으로 한국 대학이 우즈베키스탄에 진출할 수 있는 길을 터주었다. 타슈켄트 인하대는 이미 제1회 졸업생을 배출하였고, 높은 취업률로 한국 교육 수준의 진가를 과시하였다. 이어 타슈켄트 부천대학교가 개교했다. 우즈베키스탄은 미취학 아동에 대한 교육이 시급하여 취학 전 교육부를 신설하였는데, 이에 부응하여 타슈켄트 부천대에서 유아교육과를 개설하였고, 이 분야 교육을 전담해 나가고 있다. 이는 미르지요예프 대통령의 오랜 바람이기도 했다. 이어 페르가나 인천재능대학교, 여주대학교가 이미 우즈베키스탄 진출을 확정하였으며, 계명대학교, 건국대학교 등 여러 대학교가 대학 설립을 검토 중이다. 하지만 한국 대학이 수준 높은 교육 시스템과 콘텐츠를 수출하는 것은 긍정적인 일이기는 하나 여기에는 아직 풀어야 할 문제가 많다. 한국 대학들이 우즈베키스탄에 제대로 뿌리를 내리고 자리를 잡기 위해서는 양국에서 구체적인 문제점들에 대한 해결방안 논의가 수반되어야 한다. 우선, 한국 대학교에서 우즈베키스탄으로 파견할 수 있는 교수가 많지 않다. 우즈베키스탄에 설립된 대학교는 ‘분교’가 아니라 어디까지나 우즈베키스탄 교육부 산하 사립대학이다. 따라서 한국 대학교에서 교수진을 초빙하기 위해서는 현지 교수에 비해 높은 비용이 든다. 이 비용을 우즈베키스탄 학생들의 등록금으로 충당하기에는 학교 운영 차원에서 큰 부담이 된다. 한국인 교수들의 수준 높은 강의가 보장되기 위해서는 언어 장벽 또한 해결되어야 한다. 강의시간에 통역을 대동하는 방식으로는 내용전달이 제한적일 수밖에 없다. 특히 한국 교육부에서는 아직 한국 대학의 해외 진출을 허용하지 않고 있기 때문에, 한국 대학 재단들이 우즈베키스탄 대학에 투자하거나 본격적으로 학생을 유치하기는 어려운 상황이다. 현재는 2년은 우즈베키스탄에서 수학하고, 나머지 2년은 한국에서 수학하는 2+2 방식의 운영방식을 고려해보고 있는데, 이 또한 피상적인 계획에 머물 수 있다. 대부분의 우즈베크 학생들은 2년을 한국에서 유학해야 한다는 수학 조건을 경제적 부담으로 받아들이기 때문이다. 우즈베키스탄 정부에서 의료와 교육 문제에 본격적이고 전면적인 개방정책을 시행하고 있는 것처럼 한국 정부에서도 우즈베키스탄에 한하여 긍정적인 개방을 고려해봄 직하다. 인구절벽과 학생 수 감소로 위기에 처한 한국 대학에도 교육수출을 통한 출구를 마련할 필요가 있기 때문이다. 한국 정부의 협력이 없이는 우즈베키스탄에 수출한 한국 대학 시스템도 정착하는 데 어려움을 겪을 수밖에 없으며, 성공적으로 외부 토양에 이식될 수 있을지는 아무도 장담할 수 없다. 한국의 여성가족부 수출 한편 우즈베키스탄 정부가 한국에서 도입하고자 하는 또 하나의 시스템은 “여성가족부”이다. 아직 우즈베키스탄에는 여성가족부가 없다. 현재까지는 “어일라(OYLA)"라고 하는 정부 기구가 이 분야를 전담하고 있다. 그렇기 때문에 여성 문제는 늘 순위에서 밀리고 제대로 된 해결책 마련이나 제도 보완이 이루어지지 못했다. 더구나 우즈베키스탄은 오랜 시간동안 여성의 조혼 풍습, 부모의 강압적인 중매 결혼 종용 등으로 여성은 이른 나이에 결혼을 할 수밖에 없고, 이에 비해 제도적으로 이혼은 매우 쉽게 이루어지기 때문에 이혼 후 여성이 혼자 아이를 돌보며 사는 한부모 가족 문제가 심각하게 대두되어 왔다. 너무 이른 나이에 결혼했기 때문에, 아이를 둔 여성들은 직업선정이나 정체성 형성 기회도 미처 갖지 못하는 경우가 많아 생활고를 겪으며 살아야 한다. 결혼을 했다 하여도 가부장적인 문화에서 가정폭력, 지나친 순결주의 등은 여성을 괴롭혀 왔다. 이런 문제에 거시적인 측면에서 해결책을 제시할 수 있는 제도 및 정책 보완, 법률 제정 등이 촉구되어야 한다. 한국 정부가 여성가족부 설치와 운영 노하우를 제시할 필요가 있다. 이는 미르지요예프 대통령의 최근 최대 관심사 중의 하나이기도 해서 이번 문재인 대통령 방문에서 본격적으로 논의될 것으로 보인다. 대한민국도 여성 문제에 있어 아직 갈 길이 멀다고는 하지만, 여성의 삶을 둘러싼 문제들을 양국이 함께 논의하고 풀어간다면 보다 현명한 대안을 찾아갈 수 있을 것으로 보인다. 우즈베크인 노동 쿼터 확대를 위한 테러 문제 해결 마지막으로 노동 쿼터 확대 분야에서도 협력 방안이 논의될 것으로 보인다. 우즈베키스탄 정부에서 대한민국 국민들에게 비자를 면제해준 것처럼 대한민국도 상호호혜 원칙에서 양국이 무비자 협정을 체결하는 것이 바람직하다. 다만, 테러 청정국으로 자부심을 가지고 있는 대한민국에 퍼지고 있는 이슬람포비아와 최근 발간된 유엔보고서의 내용은 이에 대한 걸림돌이 되는 것도 사실이다. 대한민국에 체류 중인 우즈베크인들이 시리아 테러리스트들을 지원하고 있다는 보고서는 양국을 모두 예민하게 하는 부분이다. 오랜 세월 아프가니스탄 국경 지역과 페르가나 지방의 이슬람근본주의자들로 골치를 앓아온 우즈베크 정부에게도 어려운 문제이기도 하다. 양국 정상이 이러한 문제에 대하여 어떤 방식으로든 순조로운 방향으로 해결책을 마련하기를 기대하는 바이다. 한국 정부에게 바란다 한국 정부가 신북방정책의 일환으로 중앙아시아 투르크 벨트 국가들과 적극적으로 교류하고 협력방안을 모색하는 것은 매우 고무적인 일이다. 그러나 정치, 경제, 외교, 역사, 문화적인 측면에서 이 나라들이 매우 중요한 역할을 할 수 있음에도 불구하고, 체계적인 인력 공급이나 전문가 후속 세대들을 양성할 수 있는 시스템이 마련되어 있지 않음은 조속히 해결해야 할 문제이다. 한민족과는 고대부터 문화적 친연성이 있는 투르크 벨트 국가 및 중앙아시아 국가들에 대한 연구는 러시아, 중국, 일본 등에 비해 거의 백 년 정도는 뒤처져 있는 상황이다. 국가 차원에서 “실크로드연구소(가칭)”을 설치하여, 인문학적 연구부터 서둘러 연구 결과를 축적하고 체계적으로 전문가를 양성할 수 있는 시스템을 구축해야 한다. 남북한의 통일을 준비하는 시대, 앞으로 다가올 통일 시대에 본격적인 유라시아 거점 국가로 한국이 역할을 할 수 있고, 새로운 실크로드의 출발국이 되는 그날을 준비하기 위해서는 정부 차원에서 연구 및 교육에 대한 투자부터 시작되어야 한다.   現, 동덕여대 교양교직학부 교수이자 유라시아투르크 연구소장. 한국외국어대학교를 졸업하고, 터키 정부 장학생으로 초청받아 국립 하제테페대학교에서 터키문학과 비교문학으로 문학박사(Ph.D) 학위 취득, 한국학 중앙 연구원에서 박사후과정(Post-doc), 우즈베키스탄 국립학술원에서 우즈베크 구비문학과 민속학, 비교문학으로 우즈베키스탄 최초로 인문학 국가 박사학위(Doctor of Science, professorship)를 취득. 주요 경력으로, 문화방송 MBC 터키 통신원, 터키 국립 앙카라대학교 외국인 전임교수, 우즈베키스탄 니자미 사범대학교 한국학 교수를 역임하고, UNESCO Category 2기관인 아태무형문화센터 자문위원, 한국연구재단 학술지 평가위원 등을 맡고 있음. 주요 연구 분야는 터키·우즈베크　문학·이슬람여성·비교문학·중앙아시아 투르크 민족의 구비문학·정신분석학임. 주요 저서로, 『터키 문학 속의 한국 전쟁』, 『20세기 페미니즘 비평: 터키와 한국 소설속의 여성』(터키어), 『주몽과 알퍼므쉬의 비교연구』(우즈베크어), 우리말로 『베일 속의 여성 그리고 이슬람』, 『이슬람에서 여성으로 산다는 것: 정신분석으로 보는 여성, 전쟁, 테러, 이슬람』을 썼으며, 주요 역서로 야샤르 케말의 『독사를 죽여야 했는데』, 『바람 부족의 연대기』 , 『의적 메메드 1. 2』, 무라트 툰젤의 『이난나: 사랑의 여신』, 하칸 귄다이의 『데르다』가 있으며 『고은의 만인보』, 『고은 시선』을 터키어로 옮김. 계간 ≪아시아≫를 공동 기획하는 등 투르크 국가들의 문학작품과 문화를 국내에 소개하고 있음.